23 Mar 2015 09 Jan 2018
Brownfield land, or previously developed land (PDL), “... is that which is or was occupied by a permanent structure, including the curtilage of the developed land and any associated fixed surface infrastructure.” This is the definition given in Planning Policy Statement 3 (PPS3) Housing, by the British Government, however in the United States the definition has been notably tweaked over time. The US Environment Protection Agency in 1997 quoted brownfields as being “... abandoned, idled or under-used industrial and commercial facilities where expansion or redevelopment is complicated by real or perceived contamination.” This description was however updated in 2002 to become “... real property, the expansion, redevelopment, or re-use of which may be complicated by the presence or potential presence of a hazardous substance, pollutant or contaminant.”
The development of brownfield sites has been an area of great debate and discussion for many years. There are numerous issues surrounding their re-use from almost every viewpoint. Developers have historically been reluctant and unenthusiastic to make use of them for any new planned schemes for a variety of reasons. There can be great costs associated with the cleanup of a brownfield site depending on its previous employment. Further to this, legislation held every past and present owner of brownfield property completely responsible for any pollution or contamination to nearby people or property thereby presenting a large risk for potential developers.
As time has passed by, non-built-up space available for construction of any type of buildings has diminished and therefore the Governments of most countries have made policies in a bid to control over-expansion and prevent urban sprawl. Clearly this has an impact on brownfield sites and their usage or potential regeneration.
Another important area that warrants discussion is what has been termed as ‘sustainable development' defined as, “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987) Sustainable development has become an objective which Governments throughout the world strive for. It is the core principal underpinning planning and aims to ensure a better quality of life for everyone, now and in the future. Poor planning can lead to run-down town centres, unsafe and dilapidated housing, and the loss of countryside. (HMG, PPS 1 - Delivering Sustainable Development, 2005)
Governmental policies are often introduced, altered or even eradicated depending on the state of the economy. A recent example is the reduction of Value Added Tax (VAT) carried out by the Government in the United Kingdom (UK) which was an attempt to try to limit the effects of recession by putting extra money in the pockets of consumers. Brownfield land can be affected in many ways by changes to existing economic policies and particularly planning legislation and guidelines, for example, they were brought very much more in to the spotlight with the establishment and enforcement of greenbelt land. This said, it is not just directly linked policies that can influence brownfields. The Government has five main economic goals and land use impacts on a number of these main goal areas particularly the protection of the environment, economic growth and unemployment.
The purpose of the project is to explore the issues surrounding brownfield sites for developers and the Government alike; including the incentives and support they offer, as well as restrictions they must adhere to or can receive. Further aims are to develop a deep understanding of land use focussing on brownfield land, the necessity for its redevelopment and consequences if it is left deserted and barren. The question itself centres on how the Government aims to encourage and drive new development towards brownfield sites or PDL, and whether the policies, legislation, and guidelines they introduce or modify are accomplishing this.
This chapter describes the method of data collection and gives reasons why these methods were chosen. The research encompassed three different means of data collection.
Documents, books and journals from the Government, professional bodies, public libraries and the internet will be reviewed as data sources. These will offer official information on policies or guidelines as well as help to analyse the findings from case studies and the questionnaire. Documentation in this form will help to present reliable, certified and unbiased information on brownfield redevelopment in general and further helpful information. This information will include Government reports, policy statements on the environment and planning, incentive plans, consulting reports of sites carried out by professional bodies, as well as market research and statistics. Through studying this data the researcher will be able to gain an in depth understanding of the regulations surrounding brownfields and their redevelopment, but also more detailed knowledge and comprehension of the many aspects involved.
A case study method of research, involving two large scale developments, was decided upon as a reflection of the redevelopment process of a brownfield site. These will give an insight from the beginning all through the various stages to the final new usage being carried out upon the site. It will be possible to measure the success of brownfield redevelopment, primarily it will be successful purely if there is a new use for the site rather than if no redevelopment occurred at all, and it lay derelict. Brownfield redevelopment is a complicated economic, social and environmental phenomenon requiring a close and in-depth study.
Further to these studies a questionnaire interviews conducted with developers for property investment and development companies, to gain a developer's viewpoint on the subject of brownfield redevelopment. Five professionals were contacted and asked for their opinions on the issue. The answers to important questions on the subject will help determine the current outlook on new development projects and whether professionals are still looking at greenfields.
Brownfield sites are found in former industrial, commercial and residential areas normally in cities, however many are also found in older suburbs or small towns. (Greenberg M et al, 2001) Often Brownfield sites can be traced through economic history and the evolution of industrial areas. The industrial revolution caused great heavy industrial development in certain areas across the UK; they located around transport links including rivers, the canal network and railways. As time passed, after the wars, deindustrialisation and industry decentralisation occurred and therefore the old factories and some housing became obsolete, leaving Brownfield sites often in central city zones.
For a long time Brownfield sites were not a major concern for Governments worldwide, they were just derelict or abandoned sites, eyesores, waiting for new owners and uses. “In the 1990s business and community leaders began to see the successful redevelopment of brownfields as a major policy issue.” (Gorman H S, 2003) Brownfield sites are increasingly important as space is not a multiplying entity; furthermore with planning controls now restricting certain land to remain as open space, land for new development opportunities is harder and harder to come by.
Brownfields offer a great alternative development option to Greenbelt (or open space) development. As one of the Government's goals, protection of the environment implies the idea of trying to retain as much open space as possible, as well as preventing urban sprawl. Furthermore in its continued aim for sustainable development, open space is highly important, as well as ensuring new development schemes are energy efficient and as non-detrimental as possible to the environment.
One of the central policies to endorse these objectives and impact on brownfield re-use is the introduction of green belts (or green belt land) around settlements where planning permission is extremely hard to gain for any proposed construction. The first official proposal to retain open spaces around developments and provide open space came as early as 1935 made by the Greater London Regional Planning Committee. Since then the codification of greenbelt land and its extension to areas other than London occurred in 1955, with the control policies still remaining valid today. (HMG 2001, PPG2 - Green Belts) Green belts now cover approximately 1,556,000 hectares or about 12% of land in England.
In PPG2 - Green Belts the Government sets out guidelines on the re-use of buildings or sites on green belt land, but there are more strict controls and expansion or extension is almost impossible as it would conflict with the openness of the land. This said there is at a willingness to consider schemes on what is protected, heavily regulated land when all said and done.
In the United States the Government there have what is called a ‘smart growth policy' which is “centered on Brownfield redevelopment it directs legislation, dollars, and government's moral powers toward attracting developers and individual investors, non-profit organizations, and community groups to neighbourhoods with underutilized or abandoned properties rather than to pristine Greenfields.” (Greenberg M et al, 2001) As this highlights, by the use of legislation and cash incentives the Government can influence development towards Brownfield sites.
The UK Government did not have the same style of strategy under one name like this ‘smart growth' policy, but instead had many directives covered under areas such as planning, housing provision targets, fiscal incentives and sustainable development. They have since with the help of research and studies conducted from and by other organisations, designed a ‘national brownfield strategy'.
Since the late 1990s the Government has endeavoured to reach the target set that 60% of new housing in the UK is to be built upon previously developed land. (HMG, PPS3, 2006) “With our new policies in place, we expect local planning authorities to be able to raise the national proportion of new homes to be built on previously developed land to 60 per cent over the next 10 years.” (John Prescott, House of Commons Debate, 23rd Feb 1998) After this aim was announced, there was great debate over whether it was achievable. It was, and continues to be a high target and therefore measures needed to be taken to ensure its fulfilment. In 1999 Friends of the Earth claimed that the goal was attainable but only if central Government provided more guidance and assistance to local planning authorities, particularly in the case of clean up policy for contaminated land. (Environmental Data Interactive Exchange, 1999) The Government has also set targets for the number of new homes, and also their, and non-domestic buildings' energy efficiency in a movement towards sustainable development. In 2007, Gordon Brown made housing a priority and promised 2 million new homes by 2016, and 3 million by 2020 with a further clause that homes built from 2016 onwards would be zero carbon. (HMG, 2007, Building A Greener Future: Policy Statement) At Budget 2008 strict targets for carbon emissions were set on non-domestic buildings when the Government announced its ambition that all new non-domestic buildings should be zero carbon from 2019. (HMG, 2008)
At Budget 2001, the UK Government stated: “The Government wants to improve the confidence of owners and investors to bring contaminated land back into productive use and assist with the costs of doing so. Budget 2001 introduces a 150 per cent accelerated payable tax credit for owners and investors for the costs they incur in cleaning up contaminated sites. This is part of the Land Remediation Relief (LRR) incentive, contained within the Urban White Paper, November 2000, and introduced in 2001. These measures make the development of these sites more viable, helping to tackle the legacy of previous industrial uses and reduce the pressure to develop Greenfield sites.” The LRR introduced the 150 per cent tax incentive as well as bringing in the possibility for companies to elect that capital expenditure on qualifying land remediation expenditure is allowed as a deduction in computing its profits. Furthermore companies can opt to receive a payable tax credit in exchange for any qualifying land remediation loss surrendered to the Exchequer - the rate of the payable tax credit being 16 per cent of the loss surrendered. The credit is restricted however to the lesser of 16 per cent of the uplifted expenditure or 16 per cent of the company's unrelieved loss for the period. (HMG, Urban White Paper, 2000)
It is fair to suggest that the Government is following up on the original policies made and the concerns expressed by Friends of The Earth. Primarily, the LRR has been updated and in doing so planning controls and incentives enhanced. There has also been action taken by the use of surveys and reports completed and recommendations made to the Government.
‘Tax incentives for development of brownfield land: a consultation' is a document produced in March 2007, and illustrates the two fiscal, tax incentives the Government has introduced to promote brownfield regeneration. The document is ‘a consultation' in which the Government proposes the removal of one of the tax breaks, but the enhancement of the other. The two forms of fiscal incentive offered are firstly an accelerated 150% tax credit which helps with costs incurred in the cleanup of the site. The second measure is landfill tax exemption, introduced in 1996 when landfill tax began. Landfill tax is a tax on the disposal of waste collected by landfill site operators, aimed to encourage waste producers to produce less waste. There are some exemptions, and the one particularly relevant to brownfield regeneration is that which relates to waste arising from the cleanup of contaminated land.
It was intended to ensure that landfill tax does not act as a barrier to developing contaminated land. When the relief was introduced in 1996 there were few alternatives to dealing with contaminated land other than landfill, however as time has passed new technologies have emerged, making on site decontamination the preferred option. It is the Government's belief that on site decontamination is the better solution due to the high environmental impacts of landfill itself and its demand for space, the harm to the environment caused by the transportation of this waste, and the securing of recycling materials. These ‘costs' to the environment as the Government explains are necessary to consider in the same way as PDL itself.
Another area mentioned is that the regulatory environment has changed since 1996, and has altered how waste is handled and regulated considerably. Since October 2007 all waste has had to be treated before it is sent to landfill, and liquid waste has been banned from landfill sites. In 2005 the ‘Hazardous Waste Directive' applied increased controls to hazardous waste resulting in the prices for it to be taken as landfill rising sharply, and the paper points out that landfill tax would now only be a small proportion of the overall costs of sending hazardous waste to landfill.
Also in this document the Government expresses a desire to update and amend policies if necessary pointing out that all measures taken must be monitored and possibly altered to ensure maximum compliance and success. “The Government remains committed to these aims and to the continuation of the relief, but after 6 years of operation it is time to consider how the scope and take up of the relief can be improved to help it more efficiently deliver the objectives set out in 2001.” (HMG, Tax incentives for development of brownfield land: a consultation, 2007)
It is important that the necessity to potentially alter regulations, incentives or policies to guarantee the best results is acknowledged by the Government, as it shows a willingness to be proactive and manage the issue.
Further to this report however the Government carried out its proposed changes to the existing LRR. In the 2008 ‘Pre-Budget Report' there are some separations made between PDL itself, and alterations to the conditions of relief given. It is stated that legislation would be introduced in the ‘Finance Bill 2009' extending LRR to cover expenditure on remediating long term derelict land if the land has been derelict since 1st April 1998. Additionally the land will only qualify if the land was already derelict when acquired by the claimant, and moreover a list of qualifying expenditure is published.
“The relief will be available on specified expenditure. The qualifying costs are expenditure on the removal of:
In September 2003, English Partnerships produced an advisory document to the deputy Prime Minister having been appointed as special adviser to the Government on brownfield issues. They intended to compose a comprehensive National Strategy for brownfield land.
In their report, English Partnerships express a very significant detail that brownfield, or PDL, continues to be created, stimulated by economic and social factors and that a key challenge is to ensure the pace of reuse exceeds the pace of new creation of this land. Their concern is that it is an on-going issue and requires far more than just refocusing new schemes, but to address the subject of this newly created brownfield land.
A further chief observation made is that PDL must be differentiated between. There are marked differences, some sites have no need for encouraging policies or legislation to be made for developers to appreciate a new use and realise the profit of carrying out their new planned schemes, these are described as ‘self resolving'. There may be little to no time between when the site becomes obsolete, or unused, and then is regenerated in to something different or merely updated. This could be land currently in use, but which once redeveloped may have a higher value, and therefore more commercial value. These sites naturally therefore may be called ‘commercially attractive sites'.
Fairly evidently the report then distinguishes between ‘marginally viable' and ‘non-viable' sites, which are reasonably self explanatory, in that they lack attraction to developers due to clean up and preparation costs exceeding potential profits in the latter, or only offering a small profit in the former. Finally ‘non-development' sites are explained as being suitable only for ‘soft' or amenity use, with their values severely reduced and not necessarily related to the costs of bringing them back in to use. Here more than just the financial returns must be considered, the social costs and benefits are principal and are difficult for the private sector to take in to consideration, overall implying a clear role for the public sector, in more than just a policy making manner, but as a regenerator itself. (Towards A National Brownfield Strategy, English Partnerships, 2003)
The Government responded to the recommendations made by English Partnerships, with a number of policy creations and claim to be “successfully encouraging the re-use of more brownfield sites reducing pressure for development on greenfield land.” (HMG, Securing the Future Supply of Brownfield Land, 2008) English Partnerships made nine policy recommendations in their submission to the Government and all of nine of these were accepted in the Government's response, several of which were confirmed in the ‘Housing Green Paper Homes for the future: more affordable, more sustainable', 2007. This Green paper emphasised the necessity for local authorities “to prioritise brownfield land in their plans and to take stronger action to bring more brownfield land back in to use.” (Syms P, Land Remediation Yearbook, 2008)
This document claims that around three quarters of new development takes place on brownfield land compared to less than 60% ten years ago in 1998. Furthermore a year on year reduction in derelict and/or vacant brownfield land is highly promising and hence the stock of this land is diminishing. This relates back to a concern raised by English Partnerships, about the continuing problem of PDL, its growth as land becomes naturally derelict or unused, and the necessity to address this.
The prime concern for any private developer and their company is unashamedly profit maximisation, and the amount of time before that profit is realized. (Ratcliffe J, Stubbs M, 1996) The property development industry is risky which is why there are both high levels of profit and loss that can occur to developers. Risk carries great significance for the developer of any scheme, and can be the factor that decides whether to pursue the intended development or shelve the plans all together. The process of property development can be split in to a five stage process according to John Ratcliffe and Michael Stubbs, they write that from the initial idea to the disposal of the property at the end, the stages can be divided thus:
(Ratcliffe J, Stubbs M, Urban Planning and Real Estate Development, 1996)
Brownfield land varies greatly in its character in terms of size, location and the severity of contamination, while the constant and only common consideration for the developer is profit. The same point can be stressed about greenfield or greenbelt land too although realistically only in terms of size and physical characteristics, and not contamination severity. There are of course a number of other considerations; planning regulations and whether permission will be granted carry great importance, as the project may have to be altered due to planning constraints.
The second stage of property development, ‘site appraisal and feasibility study' as called by Ratcliffe and Stubbs, during which the developer must research the land thoroughly weighing up its credentials. At this stage the brownfield site or PDL may be rejected on the basis of infeasibility in the developer's eyes. This rejection may lead to a different site needing to be considered and utilized, or a change in the scale or intended use of the proposal.
When deliberating where to construct their new planned and profitable scheme, the obvious, most simple and least time consuming option, would be a greenfield site. There would have been no previous uses of the site, apart from perhaps agricultural, and highly unlikely a use that would have contaminated the site and thereby demand high clean up costs, or demolition of previous structures. Greenfield sites are very often on land of sole ownership making the task of purchasing the land far more straightforward, than having to trace and, or, consolidate ownership to bring together the parcel of land required and desired for the project.
This chapter introduces the case studies of brownfield regeneration that has occurred and relating the projects to some of the measures taken by the Government to encourage development of brownfield sites or PDL.
The Norwich Riverside development is a fine example of a successful project on contaminated brownfield land. It is a large site very near to the city centre, and was the largest and most significant site that had become available for redevelopment for years. Therefore it was highly important the best possible use was made of the opportunity.
The site was originally industrially used, it was close to both the railway and river providing good transport and supply links. As long ago as the early 20th Century the firm Boulten and Paul had located their ironmongers on the site, making many things from agricultural tools to aircraft during the war periods. By the mid 1980s however, owing to deindustrialisation, many of the industrial uses had declined or ceased operations and the majority of the site had become vacant and derelict. Other uses included the Harrington oil and gas works and timber yards were also present. Another user of the site was British Rail and their sidings were too left unused and derelict, leaving the site looking forlorn and unsightly. (David Simmonds Consultancy, 2004, Sargent P, A Place in History)
The site itself is large in size, 17 hectares or 42 acres, and is located south east of Norwich city centre on the banks of the river Wensum next to the railway station and Norwich City football club. Due to its previous heavy industrial use, it was highly contaminated and carried a tidal flood risk, therefore much work was necessary to rectify these issues. The site did not have good access either both by road, and for pedestrians and cyclists.
The site was seen to provide an opportunity for major expansion of the city centre which was an aim of Norwich City Council (NCC) as their desire was to attract ‘shed' style retailing and limit the shift to ‘out of town'. The completed scheme today is mixed use offering residential, in the form of 224 housing units combining town houses and flats most of which with secure parking. There is also a 15% allocation of affordable housing. In terms of retail, there is a food superstore, Morrisons, and 7 other retail units; Boots the chemist, JD Sports, Argos, Mamas and Papas, JJB Sports and Going Places Travel. A further 2 units with service operations, Big Yellow Self Storage Company and STS Holburn Tyre Centre are also present. There are leisure facilities provisions as well with a 14 screen UCI multiplex cinema, a bowling alley (Hollywood Bowl), nightclubs (Square, Brannigans and Time), restaurants (Frankie and Benny', Nandos, Pizza Hut, Old Orleans), bars (Wetherspoons, Norwegian Blue), and a health club (Fitness Exchange). A major swimming and recreation centre which was particularly important to the council that it be incorporated, as there was a need for this in a central location. (riversidecentrenorwich.co.uk)
1800 car parking spaces including a new six-storey park with 740 spaces provide sufficient car parking for both leisure development and rail users. The railway station itself has been remodelled to integrate in to the adjacent project. New access links with a new inner ring road, as well as pedestrian and cycle connections to the historic King street area.
“Riverside now represents a new quarter that compliments the city centre in accordance with recent Government planning policy guidelines, in a location with existing public transport infrastructure improved by a new interchange for buses, taxis and cyclists.” (David Simmonds Consultancy, 2004)
There were a number of serious concerns and questions raised with the major scale redevelopment of Norwich Riverside, from infrastructure issues to planning necessities and development obligations. In 1994 the council first started work with local stakeholders and potential developers designing new planning guidelines for the regeneration of the site, but it was not until 1999 that the first phase of construction was completed. The council had originally assessed the development potential of the site in 1987 after the closure of Boulten and Paul, and their plans envisaged a fine-grain redevelopment of mixed use. Due to these problems with the site, it became well known within the country's development industry as a difficult project with a significant commercial and investment risk which logically acted as a barrier to attracting backing.
Part of the delay, and bearing a great significance to the research question of this project, was that the council were attempting to use the redevelopment of Riverside as a major part of regenerating the city centre and providing services that were previously lacking. Naturally this objective brought with it some major development obligations for the scheme to provide. One such target was to supply a new swimming pool and recreation centre as this was lacking in a city centre location. A very well designed centre was created by Richard Jackson - intelligent engineering, and now has a value of £5.7 million. (Richard Jackson plc, 2009) Further constraints were that the council wished to steer ‘shed' style retailing in to this area of the city to rein in the increasing move to ‘out of town' shopping becoming prevalent. (Norwich City Council, Riverside development)
As is often the case with brownfield redevelopment the site was quite heavily contaminated, evidently this required cleaning up, which was achieved by the use of an innovative soil clean-up method called bio-remediation. Furthermore as mentioned previously, the site was at risk to flooding, and therefore the ground level had to be raised. These are both costly and time consuming processes to complete, over £5 million was spent remediating the site.
Another obstacle that can occur with brownfields and did indeed in this case was serial ownership and the difficulties involved of tracing all owners and forging agreement between them of the intended plans. The Boulten and Paul works were owned by Gazely Properties Ltd having purchased the works after its closure in the 1980s. The railway lands were owned by British Rail Property Board until its privatisation when they were transferred to Railtrack pre Network Rail. These two, Gazely Properties and Railtrack ultimately founded a joint development company on an equal partnership basis. The other land included in the site area was in the possession of NCC.
The proposed plan itself for a mix of residential, leisure and ‘shed' style retail was acceptable to most members of the local community, some residents rallied against this form of urbanisation due to the aesthetics of the retail not fitting in with the historical city. Despite their efforts however, the council stuck with the plans and agreed that it go ahead as planned with reference to the importance of the food store which would serve the south east of the city.
When the site came to ascendancy as a hub of industrial activity, Norwich was not nearly as developed and spread out in the same way as it is today. Therefore roads and infrastructure had grown up around it, and this lead to some serious access issues. There was a need to accommodate part of Norwich's inner ring road and the internal service roads at a cost of £4.5 million. The same was true of pedestrian and cyclist access which came in the form of two swing bridges over the river linking to King street, these though at a further cost of around £1.2 million each.
Finally as is necessary with almost every development, parking provision for this major mixed use scheme needed to incorporate the associated parking with the railway station. Overall 1800 car parking spaces were created with a six storey car park newly constructed offering 740 spaces at a cost of £6.4 million.
It is fairly evident through its sheer popularity that the redevelopment has been a success especially when adding in the fact that a large derelict, contaminated site in the city centre has been completely overhauled and now forms a key entertainment, retail and residential hub. According to a report by David Simmonds Consultancy, the key to the success of the scheme was partnering.
“When asked to identify the reasons behind the success, there was unanimous opinion among the interviewees that the credit must go to a culture of ‘partnering', based on pragmatism and innovation that evolved between the various local authorities and the developers involved.” As this statement underlines this whole project involved the local authority, private developers, and both private and public equity. Furthermore, the two major land owners Gazeley Properties Ltd and Railtrack, founded a joint development company (Wensum Development Ltd) pooling their land and signalled a great intention to work together towards the redevelopment. From there it was just necessary to try to work with the local authority as best as possible to provide both their goals, and to ensure commercial viability. (David Simmonds Consultancy, 2004)
A further benefit to the success was the new availability of public funding for regeneration activities, the Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) as well as the Sports Lottery. Moreover flexible funding arrangements were brought in to make sure commercial phasing for the developer was not over complicated, reducing the commercial risk. The external funding from the two sources resolved key issues in terms of expenditure on the swimming pool and recreation centre, and also the raising of the ground for flooding issues, and one of the pedestrian swing bridges over to King street. These costs could have lead to potential discord between developers and the council, and fortunately public money was available to cover them.
Finally, what may be called just good principles of development and innovation are other reasons behind the achievement. The development plan was sensible and they showed good vision and flexibility, the way the project was phased enabling costs and receipts to be balanced as the project progressed. The layout of the site with the fine-grain mixed use along the front of the river, and the less aesthetically pleasing ‘shed' style retailing at the back of the site along the inner ring road. Major anchor tenants were secured, the multiplex cinema and large food store, and prioritised in the planning and their importance as drivers of the regeneration of the area regarded.
The remediation of the site itself was cost effective involving large-scale on site blending and volatilisation of hydrocarbons, saving around £500,000 compared to of site disposal, and heavy metals were hauled off site by rail which was considerably more sustainable than the 4500 lorry journeys which would have been required. (David Simmonds Consultancy, 2004)
It is important when concluding any redevelopment site to understand that there are many occurrences or events that influence any project such as this one, and that the solutions and successes realised here may not apply to other brownfield land in other areas of the country. This can be due to different market conditions, urban forms and regeneration aspirations, availability and supply of willing developers and public funding as in the case of Norwich.
Although the centre has been successful, it was a redevelopment that was not totally without complications. The plans initially pictured by the council needed fine-tuning to assure commercial feasibility, and it took some time from Boulten and Paul's closure and the subsequent purchase of the land back in 1987, before the completion of the first phase in 1999. In general terms the project was relatively smooth in its progression, and this was helped significantly by Governmental impetus towards regeneration and then on a local scale by the council's intentions to carry out redevelopment plans.
Ownership, that is often an issue when reviving brownfield land was not a great stumbling block for this site, there were two main owners and then the local authority itself, and furthermore with the combining of those two owners there were really only two parties, one private and one public. It is argued now that the planners should have worked harder to guarantee a fuller fine-grain development across the whole site, however with the circumstances at the time, and the wishes of the council the outcome is pleasing.
Regularly developers claim that town planning professionals fail to grasp the development financing and the necessity or driving force of profit which makes a project viable. This scheme however, welcomingly illustrates a good working partnership between the planning authorities and their officers and the partnership of private developers who of course were looking for commercial viability. The notable difference to perhaps what regularly occurs in the wider profession is that the planning solution was prepared with the developer and not for the developer. The brief was set up with both a clear understanding comprehension of planning intention and commercial feasibility considered at the same time.
Since the power station's complete closure in 1983, the prestigious building with its highly recognisable four towers has remained unused since. There have been two previous attempts to revive the land, but both failed due to escalating costs and the sheer scale of the projects. The building itself due to its Art Deco splendour was given grade II listed status in October 1980, which has complicated any plans for redevelopment as the building itself and the four towers must remain. This project is still very much in its infancy but has been deliberately chosen as there are numerous issues and objectives on both the private developer's and the local authority's sides, which relate to brownfield sites and their reuse as well as urban regeneration. (Battersea Power Station Community Group, 2002)
London was at the forefront of the industrial revolution, the city was expanding with people flocking to live centrally rather than in the countryside and an agricultural life. Battersea power station was the first in a large series of coal-fired power generating facilities constructed, aimed to solve the problems of Britain's poor electricity supply. It was designed by Sir Giles Gilbert Scott, also responsible for the iconic red telephone box, in 1930 with the first two chimneys (Battersea A) coming online in 1939. A second phase of the third and fourth chimneys (Battersea B) was completed by 1957 making the station the largest brick building in Europe. In its completed state, it was then producing 509MW providing a fifth of London's total power demand. In 1975 after a shift in national policy power generation and concerns over pollution station A was closed. Eight years later in 1983 station B closed bringing Battersea's power production to a complete stop. The building became grade II listed in October 1980 after a campaign to save the station was headed by the then Secretary of State Michael Heseltine.
The site itself is large in size, similarly to the case in Norwich, at 15 hectares or 36 acres located on the bank of the river Thames with a 420 metre long frontage, and adjacent to Battersea Park. There has been great debate over the state of the land in terms of contamination, and many surveys have been carried out dating from 1929 to the most recent in 2003. The results of these demonstrate that;
(Real Estate Opportunities, 2009)
As illustrated the site is in a reasonable condition to start construction on.
After the closure of the power station in 1983, the building was left in the control of the electricity board who were left with the problem of what to do with it. They had planned until its listing, to demolish it and then sell the land for development to produce revenue, but now faced the high costs of preserving the building, so decided to dispose of the building. They held a competition in 1983 encouraging developer to submit ideas, the competition was won by a consortium. John Broome, creator of Alton Towers, after securing finance, purchased the site for £1.5 million in 1987 and work started straight away. His intentions were to create a ‘disneyland' style theme park, however costs quickly escalated to the huge total of £230 million by January 1989, and work stopped in March leaving the station in its current state semi derelict and exposed.
The site was then bought with its debts of around £70 million by Parkview International, a Hong Kong based development firm, for £10 million. The property developers, Victor and George Hwang proposed a £1 billion ‘masterplan' promising a dedicated rail link with Victoria; a 2,100 seat theatre to be occupied by Cirque du Soleil, a 20 screen cinema with 4,400 seats, and a state of the art office block. There were also plans for 2 hotels and 650 luxury apartments. These plans too were never realised, and Parkview came under increasing pressure from local groups and Lord Dubs, a Labour peer and former MP for Battersea who said in November 2002: “I don't believe anything will ever happen. I blame the old central electricity generating board for not insisting on a reversion clause, so that if nothing happened within a fixed timescale, it could be developed as a local centre and to provide affordable housing. As it is, Parkview could sit on it forever.” (Hencke D, Evans R, 2002)
The site of Battersea power station figures predominantly in Wandsworth council's plans for the Nine Elms regeneration plan. “There's no bigger regeneration opportunity in the Capital than Nine Elms. It's hard to think of another district of Central London that offers so much potential for new development.” (Councillor Lister E - Wandsworth Council, 2009) The area is described as the traditionally industrial area now with the potential to become a vibrant and bustling place with tens of thousands new homes and jobs intended to be created. There are a number of schemes that will enhance this jaded area including the Ballymore proposal to create a large residential, office, and leisure space on a 5 acre site between the royal mail site and the flower market. (The Battersea Society, 2009) The U.S Embassy have signed a conditional agreement to leave their current Mayfair premises and re-locate to Ballymore's new development, this news is expected to really kickstart the regeneration plans for the area. (Wandsworth Council, 2009)
In December 2006 Real Estate Opportunities (REO) purchased the Battersea power station site representing their first significant acquisition in the UK for a number of years. Treasury Holdings UK owns a majority shareholding in REO, and are the development manager for the project. In 2007 world renowned architect Rafael Vinoly was appointed to create a masterplan and this was published in June 2008. The development will be a colossal £4 billion mixed use scheme comprising 3,700 homes; 1.5 million square feet of office space, 500,000 square feet of shops and restaurants, a conference centre, a hotel, and the potential for 16,000 new jobs. Furthermore an extension to the Northern line of the tube and a new Battersea tube station constructed and the power station will become a zero carbon building in line with sustainable development policies directed by the Government. The Mayor of London, Boris Johnson, has leant his backing to the extension of the Northern line “in principle” by including it in his latest transport strategy, giving a further boost.
The council are seeing this huge power station project as almost a ‘flagship' development which will play a vastly important role in the regeneration of the area as a whole. “The Power Station site is the keystone in the regeneration and transformation of Nine Elms and will create a new sustainable quarter for the capital.” (Wandsworth Council, 2009)
Construction is expected to begin in 2012, with completion of the scheme anticipated to be in 2020 depending on the speed of the planning process, on which a decision is expected later this year. The tube extension which Treasury Holdings UK are proposing to be privately funded, is foreseen to be finished in 2015.
In Norwich one of the main reasons that is believed to have made the project a success was the partnerships created, and the cooperation of local authority and the developers, here in Battersea Treasury Holdings are trying to encourage the same idea. They have undertaken comprehensive research and consultation with key stakeholders for the proposal, Wandsworth Council, the Greater London Authority, the Commission for Architecture and the Built Environment, and English Heritage. Additionally the Greater London Authority has started work on a Opportunity Area Planning Framework (OAPF) to back the broader regeneration of the area which will be due for completion in mid 2009. (Treasury Holdings, 2010)
Another key issue is that of public opinion and regard for both the building itself with its iconic status, and also the development plan. They carried out the largest ever public pre-planning consultation to which 15,000 people responded, 66% supporting the masterplan, and 80% liking the design concept. (Wandsworth Council, 2009)
Firstly it is important to point out how big and ambitious a project this really is. It is a massive mixed use development on a brownfield site in London, with a building that is listed and therefore requires thorough consideration and planning of how to incorporate it. The power station is very much integrated as the focal point of the development, and furthermore Treasury Holdings' plan is to turn it in to a zero carbon building. Treasury Holdings anticipate spending £150 million alone on saving and repairing the power station, this before installing a green energy plant, combined cooling heat and power (CCHP) creating enough energy to power a lot of the rest of the site, reducing inefficiency by around 60%. (Treasury Holdings/REO, 2008)
It is an incredibly large scale development and hence will be an expensive one. The estimates vary as to exactly how much the project will cost in total, but the range is from between £4 billion all the way up to £5.5 billion.
It is not a new problem for developers to struggle to meet the aspirations of local authorities when putting together a scheme such as this and in particular when it is so important to the whole larger urban regeneration objective. The original proposal Treasury Holdings contrived was rejected by the due to the intended ‘eco dome' and chimney which was to serve as a carbon-neutral ventilation system. After discussion with the council, Mayor of London, and English Heritage that this 300 metre high tower could impede the views over the city and those of the Houses of Parliament, and a reduced height for the tower and relocation of the ‘eco dome decided upon.
For the developer these changes that were made necessary by the authorities raise the costs of the project, as new plans must be drawn up by the architect, in this case the distinguished Rafael Vinoly, and they may cause delays. Furthermore, Treasury Holdings have been very conscientiously consulting the authorities and key stakeholders from the beginning trying to establish a partnership and cooperative working relationship which may be strained when disagreements occur. In this case there are a great number of organisations or companies involved in the development process, particularly on the part of the authorities there is the local council, then the Greater London Authority, and finally every planned alteration or construction must fit in to Government legislation.
The Battersea power station is a building that is very dear to numerous people and this has been the reasoning behind why the developer has gained a vast amount of public opinion on their proposed design for the site. Despite the opinion poll results suggesting that the majority of the public are in favour of the scheme (66% supporting the masterplan, and 80% liking the design concept) there are some vocal groups who are passionately against it. The Battersea Power Station Community Group (BPSGC) are a constant source of annoyance for the developers, they are very unhappy about the length of time involved in the project suggested, and have made their feelings about this and the previous design for the ‘eco dome' and chimney very clear.
“The tower was a stupid idea that should never have been considered in the first place. Now there will be yet more delays while there are ‘redesigns' of the scheme. In that time the condition of the building will deteriorate still further. We have always thought REO's real objective is to demolish the building and sell a cleared site.” (Garner K, BPSGC Spokesperson, 2009)
Clearly there is the need to acknowledge that Battersea is only a planned development and that it is possible that this scheme may not go ahead, however there are a number of points to mention. The Battersea area is clearly a targeted region for redevelopment by the local authority in response to initial Government targets to revitalise brownfield land and also to meet housing requirements set out in PPS3 - Housing. By the cooperation, discussion and consultation between developers and the authorities it is clear that development can be influenced to incorporate both commercial viability that is necessary for the developer, and also the goals of the local authority.
Another conclusion to draw is that tackling a brownfield site is not easy for a developer in this case the proposal was approved by the council and fit perfectly with their intentions for the area as a whole, however public approval is far harder to gain. With this case, the fact that the power station is such a highly regarded landmark and not just another abandoned building is important, had the building not held such stature the public will almost certainly not have had such strong opinions. The developer therefore, runs a risk of image damage which can be a very significant matter for some developers as they do not wish to be seen as unconcerned about historic sites and their buildings.
A questionnaire was created and sent to five developers to gain an insight in to their thoughts on the research paper's question, while one developer agreed to an interview. The researcher felt it important to represent a developer's opinions of whether Government policies are encouraging new development towards the reuse of brownfield land.
The interviewed developer is Director of Development, with twenty years of experience, for a large company whose portfolio is focussed in the Midlands but do have a number of assets throughout the UK. The interviewee works solely in commercial property development and has done throughout their career and therefore their answers may be different to those of a residential developer.
According to the interviewee in commercial development the main criteria when searching for a site is location, they need their development to have a target market nearby, or in some cases on Greenfield sites good transport links are extremely important, namely a motorway junction. This is very logical and quite obviously crucial for the success of a retail park or leisure facility. In the case of industrial development however, transport links were the main concern highlighted by the interviewee. The developer continued and agreed that the majority of recent developments had indeed been on brownfield sites due to planning policies and the difficulty in attaining planning permission for greenfield or greenbelt land.
When asked about the main objective for a developer, the interviewee agreed with the belief that profit was most important, and then declared that risk and return and their relation were crucial to a scheme's viability. It was also pointed out that risk comprises many elements, time before profit realisation, exit strategy, planning and costs and the potential growth in costs were all factors. Exit strategy is explained as the plan of how a company may dispose of an asset if they had to, this may be before they had intended to, or after, and it is highly important in the decision making of whether to carry out a project.
The change in LRR and the removal of landfill tax exemption has affected developers as it was very helpful however the view was given that developers don't have realistic options but to use brownfield land, again relating planning constraints as the main cause for this. The interviewee did also state though that they are using other means more and more regularly and showed enthusiasm towards new techniques of remediation.
Finally on the subject of whether the Government could do more to promote the use of brownfield land, the interviewee believed that indeed there was a substantial amount more that could be done. In reality however, it was claimed that the issues facing the industry were far greater than just the debate over greenfield or brownfield in isolation, and that already developers are left with no actual choice but to use brownfield land.
This chapter discusses the findings from the case studies and interview conducted and compares these with the points examined in the literature review. In the first stage of the project the research was in the form of a literature review with the important role brownfield land has to play in preventing urban sprawl and offering an alternative to greenfield development. Governmental legislation, policies and guidelines to encourage this were examined. Strategies and advice the Government has prepared and taken to improve performance of the regulations and backing of development projects. New issues and objectives the Government has to consider and attempt to achieve such as sustainable development were discussed. As well as the public sector's view of creating policies to influence development, literature was reviewed which considered the private developer's goals, and concerns they face in trying to accomplish them.
The second stage of the project entailed case study style research, where the subjects raised in the literature review were then related to two cases of large scale brownfield redevelopment.
Finally the last stage of research was that of an interview with a developer, this offered an open and quite blunt belief of what is important to commercial developers, and how they feel about Governmental pressure and efforts to reach their objectives affecting the developer directly.
This process will lead to a better understanding of how much effect Government policies and guidelines are having, whether targets can be met, and how the system could be improved.
The Government have set challenging targets for the property industry to attempt to attain, and it is vital to consider whether these can be, or are indeed being reached. Since the late 1990s the Government have set a target for 60% of new dwellings each year to be constructed on brownfield land. There were further targets regarding housing supply and sustainable development. The goal for 60% of new dwellings year on year to be built on brownfield land, the results have been promising, with the targets being overachieved. Both the numbers of dwellings built on greenfield land and the number of derelict or abandoned buildings have been declining consistently. FIGURES
On the other hand, the targets determined for the supply of housing are believed by many to have no chance of being accomplished. “The Government would need to build 240,000 homes a year to hit its home-building target but houses have not been built in such numbers since the early 1990s.” (Golding N, 2009) There are also doubts over whether the goal of zero carbon dwellings will be realistic as technological advancement has not been quick enough.
There were differences in opinion and results in the answer to this question. The interviewed developer asserted that the answer is yes, the Government could be more proactive and indeed do more to further increase the reuse of brownfield land, and notably simplify the planning process to speed up the process of development on brownfield land. This said however, the fact that there are greater issues facing the industry was more of a concern for the interviewee.
In both case studies carried out of large scale redevelopments of brownfield sites, the local Government representatives were helpful and cooperated well with the developers involved. In both cases however there was to be a major gain for the local area in terms of regeneration which is a clear priority for local Governments in order to maintain the higher, main Government objectives. Norwich Riverside redevelopment was a case in which the local Government played a key role in the design of planning policy with the developers by consultation and discussion, rather than for the developers as is often the case. This cooperative partnership was the main drivers behind the success of the project. The developers were able to express their concerns and requirements and the authorities could respond quicker, whilst also implementing their own conditions.
This is the largest area of discussion and will link with the previous heading of how the policies could be improved. There are a number of stipulations the Government has created or redesigned to encourage brownfield redevelopment over the perceived developers' preference of greenfields. There have been mixed results from the data collected, according to the literature review of Government publications, various journals and other sources, there is evidence of an increase in the number of developments occurring on brownfield land. To add to this, numbers of developments taking place on greenfields are diminishing, these are good signs of policies achieving their aims. FIGURES
According to both case studies the redevelopments have taken on board the Governmental policies and guidelines by offering schemes that integrate with these. In Battersea the power station redevelopment is seen by the council as the catalyst and flagship to their anticipated regeneration of the whole area. It is reasonable to express that the power station project is vital to them and their regeneration strategy. To Treasury Holdings whose initial plan was backed despite lobbies of public opposition, they may need assistance with the planning process, as well as potentially public money investment in the very ambitious scheme. This brings up the subject of working together again, and the fact that the measures taken by the Government have indeed helped this cooperation process become possible. Without the emphasis that has been placed on sustainable development and the goals set, local Government would not have worked so closely with the developer and therefore perhaps the development proposal would not have come into being.
Similarly in Norwich cooperation was enabled due to a flexibility and willingness to understand the developer's need for commercial viability led to a successful scheme being put together. In Norwich however, the local authority were considerably more involved in the actual design of the redevelopment, they stipulated that certain amenities must be provided within the project, the swimming pool and recreation centre. There was also public sector investment in Norwich Riverside redevelopment.
The developer interviewed also pointed out that their company simply does not bother searching for a greenfield site naturally looking for brownfield, this is due to a number of reasons though. The need to locate a commercial site around an area that is populated is self evident, as was expressed, without consumers, employees and transport links the scheme would fail because the retail shops, leisure facilities or restaurants/bars would have no customers. Another point was made that planning is so heavily regulated and permission hard to gain for greenfield development that they were almost not even considered as a practical option for a commercial development. In the case of industrial storage ‘sheds' this thinking can change, as primarily there isn't the same need for consumers as in retail developments.
The developer did have some views on the changes LRR and the abolition of landfill tax exemption for removal of waste from brownfield sites. It was stated that this tax break had been very helpful to developers often influencing them that a potential scheme was worth pursuing purely due to this exemption, as it affected the profit margin favourably. With its abolition, it may make developers think again on proceeding with a development. It was however still felt by the developer that the impact on the number of brownfields redevelopments taking place, as a developer is still faced with such l
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