The Legacy Of Ottoman Empire And Turkey Politics Essay

Published Date: 23 Mar 2015

The study aims to summarize and analyze the recent developments in the Middle East particularly after the Arab spring process in terms of the Turkish foreign policy and its roots dated back to Ottoman Empire. Beginning the legacy of Ottoman Empire, the study also attempts to highlight main milestones for the current Turkish Foreign policy under the light of 20th century international system and its changing atmosphere such as cold war situations and later period in this region.

Emphasizing the state formation period of Turkish Republic, it should be mentioned that secularist formation and westernization of new state created new mentality as a nation based and defensive and mostly introvert nation due to strengthen the structure of state and nation building target after the demolition of World War I. At the same period, The Middle East faced lots of transformation and rooted changes it has never seen before such as mandate system, independence of new states, oil based strategies of western states, establishment of Israel, World War II and redistribution of power among the global powers as well as regional ones.

This study also prioritizes the main principles and characteristics of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle Eastern States during the cold war and later on. In doing so, secularist structure, idealist and peaceful approaches, transformative and pragmatic aspects of Turkish foreign policy are examined in the light of main alliances and treaties in the Middle East. Particularly, relations with USA, European States, Israel and Iran were mentioned in order to demonstrate big picture including the reaction of Arab States to Turkey for long time.

Iran revolution became a new checkpoint for durability and endurance of Turkish secular system with the regime exporting concern by Iran during the 1980 s and 1990s. During 1990s, focusing on terrorist attacks, Turkey established strong military connections with Israel which increased the concern of Arab States on Turkey and historical prejudices were revitalized in the Middle Eastern States. After the AKP came into power in Turkey, gradually relations with Iran and Arab States growth both economically and politically.

Arab spring became a new turning point partially in terms of foreign policy of Turkey. While Turkey was exerting new initiatives in the Middle East, at the same some concerns on new interventionism and neo-Ottomanism were propagated among the Arab States. Concurrently, while recent developments give advantages to Turkey, some visible and long term invisible disadvantages also occurred. Among these disadvantages, increasing terrorist attacks, tension between Iran and Turkey on Syrian conflict, political intervention and new prejudices of Arab States on Turkey's foreign policy and also its proactive approach for Palestine. This study finally gives short suggestion as alternative Turkish foreign policy using soft power more than military and political pressure in the region which has more influential than others.

THE LEGACY OF OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND TURKEY

By the end of the 18th century, great scientific and technological developments had been increased in western world. Ottoman Empire could no longer compete against the increasing European powers. As a military power, after Russian invasion to the Crimea which was the part of Ottoman Empire, Russia started to dominate the northern territories of the Ottomans, particularly black sea regions (Ucuzsatar, 2002). Additionally, Napolean's invasion of Egypt in 1798 and British invasion of Egypt in 1882, increasing of Russian influence in Balkans due to nationalist slavish movements at the beginning of the 18th century, Ottoman Empire lost great part of territories in mentioned parts irreversibly (Quataert, 2000). After the long imperial background based on pax-ottoman in most cases, with the eruption of World War I Ottoman territories became a playground of European Powers for regulating the international system and particularly the Middle East. However, for this region, treaties, double promises and strategies formulated by colonial powers could not bring temporary and stable system; moreover it created endless conflict potentials and seeds of enemy like 'a peace to end all peace' (Fromkin, 1989).

Although establishing a modern, western, secular and nation based state, new Turkish Republic, mostly Turkish citizens could not ignore the Ottoman reality and its long history. Understanding contemporary Turkish politics and foreign policy particularly toward the Middle East is one of the strong arguments for analyzing recent development in this region due to its historical background and legacy of Ottoman Empire. As an emerging regional power, that exemplifies a synthesis between a Muslim-majority population in the Middle East and a functioning democratic ally of the West, by the new millennia the proactive foreign policy of Turkey has been on the rise. Understanding the recent development, in many academic researches, the focus of attention typically shifts from the present to the past. As the heart of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey claims the mantle for the imperial rule inherited from the former Roman and Byzantine Empires that made the Ottomans the center of Eastern and Western world interactions for over six hundred years (Walker, 2009). As a result, there is a growing interest in the Ottoman legacy for modern Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East as well as in Balkans and Caucasus. Addressing the empire history of great powers, Russia, Britain, France, Germany, China, Turkey, and Japan are all direct descendants and successor states of their former empires. In the same way that not all nations share the same power capabilities, ideology, or history, these post-imperial nations inherited a different type of legacy (Walker, 2009). The legacy that these former empires have bequeathed to their respective successor states vary on a number of important areas ranging from collective memories, institutions, ethnicities, boundaries, and historical disputes. Therefore, the way in which these states deal with and interpret their imperial legacies varies widely and is an important yet under theorized and understudied field in international relations.

In order to solve puzzle properly, nation's traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behavior, habits, customs, achievement and particular ways of adapting to the environment and solving problems with respect to the threat or use of force should be underlined for evaluating the imperial legacy. Collective memory is also vital point in this regard. Having been the heart of the Ottoman Empire, the Turks look back on their history with a mixed sense of pride and ambivalence (Walker, 2009). Collective memory is central to the concept of imperial legacy. It is, after all, the intense memory of the transformative historical empire that informs national beliefs and ensures the continuation of the legacy. While Turks view Ottoman "history" versus what Arabs call the "Ottoman yoke," the same facts may be interpreted by two parties in distinctly different manners. Collective memory is also naturally subjective and constructed during centuries. As a result, a legacy is drawn from "the 'stock of stories' that exist in socio-cultural context" and its function is to provide a "usable past" (Walker, 2009). The imperial reputation of the Ottoman Empire and the historical memory of modern Turkey have been always considered and prioritized on the back of Turks' mind. In order to comprehend the history of 20th century in the Middle East and recent developments, Ottoman rule based on millet system, foreign policy of Turkey as successor state, Turkey's desire toward Middle East as Ottoman legacy and unnaturally formulated borders based on western strategies rather than regional realities should be analyzed accurately.

Foundation of Turkish Republic and Developments in the Middle East

According to the most historians, the history of modern Turkey can be divided into two phases, which are independence period from 1918 to 1923 and the era of reformist and modernization of the Turkish Republic. During the first era, as a downfall of Ottoman Empire and escalation of European powers and Russian invasion of Anatolia, in the more than 10 fronts from Balkans to North Africa, from Iraq to Caucasus and Hedjaz, Ottoman armies were within the wars against Arabs, local tribes, British, French, Italian, Russian and moreover Australian and Indian troops. At the end of these wars, Ottoman frontlines withdrew to Anatolian border which is called later as "misak-i milli" describing mostly nation state borders which is almost similar with today's borders. In eastern part of Anatolia, Turco-Russian treaty named "The treaty of Moscow" and then Kars Treaty finalized eastern border problem with Russia in 1921. After the withdrawal of British and French forces from Istanbul in 1922 in the light of related resolutions of Sevres Treaty, Greece forces occupied temporarily the western part of Anatolia (Ucuzsatar, 2002). This occupation triggered the independence struggle for war of Turks as a mass defense throughout the Anatolia. In 1921 Sakarya battle which was the great defeat of Greece initiated the talks with the other imperial European powers and it was ended with Ankara Treaty. During first period of foundation, with the painful background about lost territories in the Middle East, Balkans and Caucasus, Turks defended only Anatolian land by aiming at fully independence in their Turkish heartland instead of defending large Ottoman territories due to the weakened military capacity and concluded confrontations with Greece and European powers with the Lausanne Agreement in 1923 prior to declaration of the foundation of new Turkish Republic.

In second part of foundation, briefly, Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ataturk), founder of new secular, modern, western and nation state, launched several political, cultural, educational, social and economic revolutions internally while he was formulating a new foreign policy based on principle "peace at home, peace in the world" (Ucuzsatar, 2002). This national security policy was based on territorial integrity and full sovereignty and the modernization of Turkish society after Ottoman traditional and religious social structure. All these revolutionary efforts in a nation coming from Ottoman history were not easily adaptable at that time. Beyond the internal transformative effects, these changes created a new mentality and new foreign policy strategies which prioritize the western alliance and cultures. Among the revolutionary strategies of Ataturk, abolishing of Caliphate in 1934, changing education system, new Latin alphabet as parts of secular state and society were the giant diversifications from Middle Eastern communities.

In transforming of region, during the independence period of Turkey, several tremendous changes in the Middle East, never seen in history, occurred in terms of emerging new states, drawing unnatural borders, creating new conflicts among states, increasing the influence of oil based strategies and mandate system which dominated the first half of century in the region.

With regard to the foreign policy of Turkey and its new allies at first decades of Republic, Turkish foreign policy between the two world wars was formulated by Ataturk's vision and his personality. That is why most writers called this period 'The Turkey of Ataturk.' (Gol, 1992) According to Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Turkey's foreign policy objectives were based on sovereign entity, and full benefits of peace which might be called non-irredentist approach with the exception of the Montreux Convention, Mosul province and the Hatay Issue. According to Turkey, Mosul was within the National Pact boundaries. On the other hand the Treaty of Lausanne left the undetermined frontier with Iraq to be settled directly with Britain as trustee for Iraq. Talks started in May 1924, but reached no definite conclusion. The Treaty of Lausanne envisaged that if the parties failed to find a solution within nine months, the issue would be referred to the League of Nations. By 6 August 1924 Britain had decided to make a unilateral application to the League of Nations and had the item 'Iraqi Frontier' put on the agenda of the Council of the League. Finally, the Council decided that the Brussels Line become the permanent border, thereby awarding Mosul to Iraq in December 1925 (Gol, 1992). Despite the reactions in Turkey, the government decided to abide this decision. Beyond the bilateral relations and some agreements and diplomatic visits with neighboring countries, in 1937 Turkey participated to the Saadabad Pact with Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan. It was Turkey's attempt to be a bridge between Asia and Europe.

Having witnessed that the abolishing of the caliphate and the secularization of the state caused bitterness in Arab countries, Ataturk's westernization policies indirectly separated Arabs and Turks. The treaty of brotherhood between Turkey and Afghanistan was signed during the independence war of Turkey. Moreover, Turkey started to lead an Eastern Pact and signed two agreements with Iran and Iraq. In addition to the pact of friendship with Iran, the visit of Shah Pehlavi served to open a new era in Turca- Iranian relations. Turkey and Iraq solved the border problem with the Mosul Agreement. The Saadabad Pact was not a military alliance, but a pact of friendship and solidarity. The pact called for non-aggression, consultation among the signatory states in case of a threat (Gol, 1992). As a regional treaty, it was a seed of cooperative approach, but prior to the World War II, it could not be active and behind the expected level as a multinational organization.

Although Ataturk transformed Turkey in the 1920s and 1930s from Ottoman Empire to secular republic led Turkey toward West culturally, economically and politically, its population never left its religious beliefs, traditional values and heritage. After the death of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in 1938, the Turks showed a marked determination to preserve their Islamic identity and develop good relations with neighboring Muslim nations. In reality, unfortunately the Arabs could not forget the harsh oppression of the nascent Arab national movements, and Turks did not readily forget how Arabs had betrayed them during World War I. Actually the relations between Arab Countries and Turkey did not become as expected level due to Turkish Foreign policy priorities and the independence period of Arab countries except Iraq during 1930s and 1940s. After WWII, no close relationship developed with Arab Countries for long time II due to Turkey's whole engagement with West such as Truman Doctrine with USA in 1947 and joining NATO.

After the WW II, in most Arab Countries nationalist blocs were launched and led by Egypt and Syria which was based on supporting the Soviet position in the international arena and opposing Turkey's regional policies. Another important development was also Turkey's recognition to Israel which affected Arab countries' foreign policies remarkably against Turkey. Even though not a common known, independence struggle of Algeria against France was also milestone that Turkey did not show willingness as expected level for recognizing the independence of Algeria and not directly supported this independency due to its western relations. Under the cold war situation and transformation of Arab countries, Turkish foreign policy was based on its interest with western allies during 1960s and 1970s. Even though some positive developments internally occurred in terms of religious rights and emotional contacts with Arab communities, several military coups prevented these kinds of growing relations with region. In 1980s, Turkey's relationship with the Muslim oil producing countries was a complete transformation in the balance of power that prevailed during the 1970s. Oil import strategies basically affected Turkey's relations with Iraq, Iran and Libya. Moreover, in Turkish public arena, Arab-Israel wars and Palestine drama, invasion of Afghanistan increased public sensibility as Muslim community. Turkey was also deeply affected by Iran revolution in terms of secular regime structure and western relations.

Both developing relations with Israel and terrorist actions hosted by Iraq and Syria were dominant points on Turkey's foreign relations with Arab Countries while economic relations was going on certain level. Turkey's exertions on the membership for European Union also showed its willingness toward westernization and controlled and balanced relations with neighboring countries, particularly against Iran in internal politics. During the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s cold war situations and internally several coups with the support of western countries in Turkey played key role on foreign policy formulation.

Dilemma of Turkey : Turkish Secularism and its image in Arab States

The Arabs were one of the important nations during the Ottoman Empire. Although there has been close cultural and religious common sense between Turks and Arabs, the conflicts during the last period of Ottoman Empire fed the distance between Turks and Arabs till 2000s. During the independence period of Arab Countries and cold war period, both Turkey and Arab States have not been in common strategic allies and close relations. Despite the reactions of Arab states, Turkey was one of the states which recognized Israel initially. During the cold war Turkey preferred to develop its relations with western countries dominantly, and Turkey could not strengthen its relation with Middle Eastern Countries particularly with Egypt and Syria. Ironically, when Turkey faced serious problems with Israel such as in 1956 and after 1967 and 1973 wars, its relations with Arab Countries increased remarkably. In this period Turkey several times associated with Arab States against Israel in UN resolutions and OIC appeals which included common reactions and some sanctions against Israel (Armaoglu, 1995).

It should be also mentioned that water sharing problem between Syria, Turkey and Iraq triggered the problems which was based on sharing of Euphrates water. In this issue, Syria with the support of Arab League started to support and host terrorist groups within the Syria and Bekaa Valley in Lebanon which weakened the relations with Syria and Iraq.

Beyond the political and economic setbacks among regional states, there are several effects and understandings which feed prejudice and blames reciprocally between Turkey and Arab States. First of all, even though during the Ottoman Empire there were no crucial problems, in declining period, perceptions among the Arab nations against Turkey have been changed by nationalist approaches, movements, policies of colonial western states, priorities and new foreign policy formulation of new Turkish Republic. Secondly, the structure of western style state, abolishing Caliphate and Arab alphabet and also secularist state formation in Turkey increased the confused feelings of Arab nations against Turkey. Thirdly, the assumption about Ottoman period as "Ottoman yoke" in Arab region which was imposed by western mandatory states is also influential dimension in relations between Turkey and Arab States during the 20th century (Gol, 1992). The negative attitude of Turkey sometimes during the independence period of Arab States fostered the feelings against Turkey. Last but not least, Turkey's close relation with Israel was one of the important arguments of Arab reaction towards Turkey. Additionally, Turkey's formally unwillingness on development of relations with Arab States also played partially role due to its regime protection reflex until 2000.

Dramatically, this picture changed with the changing the generation structure and increasing the Islamic values in Turkey and also with transformation in Arab States recently. The improvement of the Turkish image in the Arab world over the past decade is due to a number of reasons. The rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002 changed the anti-Islamic secularism gradually in terms of politically and socially. Importantly, "zero-problems" and "win-win strategy" in regional foreign policy opened up Turkey to the Arab and Muslim world. The democratic structure of Turkey and its growing economic model and export-led growth in a region dazzled the rentier economies based on one export good. Moreover, the success of the Turkish balance between religion, secularism and public freedoms in a region was attracted by regional states. Growing familiarity with Turkish culture and society through its popular television programs, documentaries, movies and TV series also played significant role on image transformation (TESEV, 2012).

Politically, Turkey's strong stand against American use of its territory and bases in the 2003 for invasion of Iraq, Prime Minister Erdogan's unexpected reactions to Israel during the Gaza war of December-January 2008-2009 and Turkey's stand against Israel after the Gaza Flotilla incident in May of 2010 increased positive feelings of Arab nations. Most recently, with the increasing its positive image among the Arab States, this picture not only offers Turkey great opportunity, but also calls tremendous challenges in this Pandora box for coming period. In this vein, as a direct effect on Turkish-Arab relations, Turkish-Israeli relations should be examined for proper consideration of regional development (Onis, 2012).

Turkey- Israel Relations and the Reactions from Muslim States in the Middle East

Having thought the historical background during Ottoman Empire, good relations between the Jews and the Turks have played a remarkable role in development of Turkey-Israel relations in 20th century. Israel's location in the heart of a hostile Arab world triggered itself to create new allies to escape isolation by establishing relations with some states in the Middle East. Of all these countries, Turkey and Iran had more in common with Israel than others. As a historical dimension, Ottoman rulers and Turkey's attitude toward the Jews helped smooth the way to normal relations between the two countries. Turkey had been among the first states to recognize the establishment of Israel on May 14th 1948 (Abadi, 1995). However Arabs did not accept Turkish foreign policy and demonstrated their disappointment on this issue. In 1951, for example Turkey agreed with the West in protesting Egypt's decision which inhibits Israeli ships passage through the Suez Canal. This caused a serious crisis in Turkey-Egypt relations. However, these developments have occurred several times because of Israel's aggressive attitudes. Although Turkey developed its relations with Israel, it incorporated Iraq into the Baghdad Pact in terms of anti-Israeli resolutions and measures. Consequently, its policy toward Israel became more confused and it has been difficult to understand at first look. With regard to the Suez crisis, Israel, in collaboration with England and France, started to occupy the Sinai Peninsula. Upon this, based on the Baghdad Pact decisions, Turkey lowered its level of diplomatic representation. Similarly, Israeli declaring Jerusalem as the country's eternal capital caused a new crisis for Turkey-Israel relations.

On the other hand, during 1950s and 1960s, clearly Turkey-Israeli relations were determined more pragmatic approach rather by ideological. Having said Israel's desire to escape isolation in the region, relations between Israel and Turkey expanded to include non-security matters and for example Turkey initiated to share agricultural expertise from Israel (Cetinsaya, 2005).

In Turkey-Israel relations, 1967 War and the provocation on burning Al Aqsa Mosque in 1969, which is one of the most holy places of Islam, caused to establishment of Organization of Islamic Conference that have been milestone to withdraw diplomatic relations to the low level and serious condemnation towards Israel. In this period, there was a growing threat for Turkey which was the new regime in Syria and its foreign policy arguments against Turkey within the cold war situations. Therefore, Turkey's policy toward Israel was determined not only by fear of pan-Arabism and Nasser's ambition, but also by Syria's aggressive behavior. During 1970s and 1980s Syria gave important facilities such as shelter and encouragement to terrorist groups of Kurds and to political movements, such as the Armenian Marxist terrorist organization ASALA. This Syrian policy identified the relations between two countries during last three decades. In the early 1990s the audience of the diplomatic arena changed and Israel gained new dynamism in international relations. Asia's most populated countries, such as India and China, established diplomatic relations with Israel, and others followed these actions. At last, in December 1991, the political climate seemed appropriate and the Turkish government decided to re-establish full diplomatic relations with Israel. 1990s was the honeymoon for Turkey-Israel relations that several important and close relations has been founded such as military defense agreement, transportation of the Manavgat Spring water to Israel, know-how sharing on military technologies, agricultural trade on different kinds of seeds. The more Syrian threats emerged towards Turkey, the stronger ties between Turkey and Israel was established. Thus, the amount of Israeli tourist rapidly increased in Turkey (Bengio, 2005).

On the other hand, Turkey's economic needs dictated reliance on the Arab markets, especially for oil. In addition, Turkey needed more commercial relations with Arab states. In the political sphere Turkey sought to obtain Arab support during the Cyprus crisis. Increasing the relations with Israel, Turkey faced to loss of support from the numerous Muslim members in the UN. In the context of Arab public opinion on Turkey, feelings have been always fluctuated in accordance with political development, alliances, military agreements and Palestine issue. (Nachmani, 2005)

Beyond the recent development at the end of 1990s, Turkey-Israel relations lost impetus in the 2000s as a consequence of the change of government in Israel. With the Ariel Sharon administration coming to power, violence towards the Palestinian people increased. Following the Al-Aqsa intifada and Israel's proliferating operations on the Palestinian occupied lands, in April 2002, widespread protests against Israel took place in many provinces throughout Turkey. Turkey accused Israel of carrying out genocide, thereby worsening bilateral relations. On the contrary to common knowledge, Turkey-Israel relations have not worsened till 2009 even though there were several important developments occurred in that period. More obviously, with the AKP (Justice and Development Party) administration coming to power in Turkey in November 2002, mutual economic and political relations have been maintained. After the Iraqi war, officially and non-officially, various news sources stated that there was Israeli presence in northern Iraq and the (Israeli secret service) Mossad agents were training Kurdish Peshmargas which meant the direct support the separation of Iraq and terrorist PKK groups. This has resulted in mistrust towards Israel in bilateral relations. At the same time, in addition to the development in relations with Arab States particularly with Syria after Hafez Al-Assad, Turkey's facilitative role in Turkey-Syria relations started to improve again as of March 2007. This time, Turkey led the Syria-Israel negotiations and the hopes of settling dispute between these countries have risen (TESEV, 2012).

Last but not least, the breakpoint in Turkey-Israel relations has been erupted with namely Marmara flotilla issue that aimed to humanitarian assistance to the Gaza strip, unfortunately 9 Turks were killed by Israeli army. Although Turkey declared its conditions against this military intervention, the current Israeli government declined Turkey's demands which were suggested for the improvement of the bilateral relations. This rejection by Israel shows that the political relations between the two countries will continue at low-level. In recent period, mostly Turkey-Israel relations are going under the shadow of Palestinian conflict. Even though some politicians use this foreign policy leverage for increasing domestic credibility in Turkey, as long as Turkey continues to support Palestine and condemn Israel for its attacks, virtually credible image of Turkey may go on.

Turkey- Iran Relations After Islamic Revolution in Iran

Iran and Turkey are two regional powers and main regional actors which have played significant role during history and they founded two empires and civilizations. Foreign policies and strategies of these two states always designate the developments in the Middle East. Describing the recent and current situation in the Middle East, especially, after the Islamic Revolution in Iran, Turkey and Iran relations gained importance in terms of their influences in the region. With the end of the Shah's regime, Iran's foreign policy took a significant turn. This shift in Iran has redefined its relations with Turkey. In addition to the Sunni-Shia sectarian issue and historical contingences between Turkey and Iran which was deemed particularly, foreign-policy orientation of the two countries also diverged completely. While Iran has maintained contentious policies toward America and even Europe, Turkey continued to be part of the Western alliance, NATO and Europe. The revolution led America to redefine its alliances in the region and maintain even closer relations with Turkey.

During the Iran-Iraq War, as first decade of Turkish-Iranian relations after the revolution, Turkey and Iran have had willingness to cooperate in trade and economic relations. In this period, the volume of trade between the two countries exceeded $2 billion, consisting mainly of oil sales by Iran in return for Turkish goods and technical assistance.  During the Iran-Iraq War, Turkey tried to maintain neutrality and improved its economic relations with both neighbors, especially with Iran (Armaoglu, 1995). Generally, Turkey's neutrality was welcomed in both Iran and the Arab world. However, when Turkey attempted to mediate the conflict, it did not succeed. Despite developments in trade relations, problems arose between Ankara and Tehran in the mid-1980s over PKK terrorism in Turkey and Iran's efforts to spread the Islamic Revolution in the region (Sander, 1990).

After the first half of the 1980s, Turkish-Iranian relations mostly focused on problems related to ideological differences. Iran repeatedly protested the secularist policies in Turkey which was understood as an intervention and regime exportation to Turkey. The United States also reacted to the Islamic Revolution by improving its relations with Turkey. As Iranian-U.S. relations worsened, Turkey appeared to be the most important ally of NATO and the United States in the region. Significant developments toward the end of the 1980s changed the regional dynamics as well as the course of Iran-Turkey relations. In 1988, after eight years of fighting, the Iraq-Iran War ended. Moreover, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR were the most important systemic changes affecting Turkey-Iran relations (Armaoglu, 1995). In addition to the challenges caused by the Islamic Revolution, the constants of Turkey-Iran relations, in the form of cultural, political and ideological rivalries, rose to the surface. Turkey and Iran found themselves in competition for their influence over Central Asia and the South Caucasus. During the Azeri-Armenia war in Nagorno Karabag, Iran and Turkey positioned in different sides, while Iran was supporting Armenia, Turkey supported Azerbaijan's claims. Additionally, Central Asian newly emerging States became playground and political challenge scene invisibly between Turkey and Iran as well as the Saudi Wahhabism and Western ideologies.

The first Gulf War in 1990-91 also changed the dynamics in the region. Iran and Turkey approached this crisis differently. On the one hand, Turkey joined the international coalition. Iran, on the other hand, preferred to stay neutral during a conflict that would weaken their greatest adversary, Iraq, in the region after long battle during 1980s. Furthermore, the increasing Turkish-Israeli cooperation in military technology and intelligence was repeatedly protested by Iran. There were several assassinations towards to the secular journalist, academicians in Turkey at the beginning of 1990s and Turkey often accused Iran for this kind of operations. Despite the stressful relations, during the Necmettin Erbakan administration in Turkey in 1996, various economic agreements were signed one of which included huge amount of natural gas purchase, but the desire of Erbakan's government to extend cooperation to the military and defense sectors with Iran was opposed by the Turkish military bureaucracy. Following the post-modern military coup in Turkey in 1997, relations sharply declined with Iran, while relations with Israel were increasing significantly in terms of struggle with terrorist PKK.

However, regional, systemic and domestic developments in 2000-02 led Iran to reduce tensions with Turkey. First, the political conflict among the Iranian elite in this period focused on Iran's domestic dynamics. Iran's domestic political struggle between reformist President Khatemi and conservatives also contributed to Tehran's willingness to decrease tensions with its neighbors. After Justice and Development Party came in to power in 2002, Turkey's foreign policy, as well as its relations with Iran changed comparing with previous decade. However, focusing on EU membership process in three years, the relationship with Iran was not at the top of the AKP's foreign-policy agenda during 2003-05.

 Regional and domestic developments provided a positive environment for improving relations between Iran and Turkey. The interests of the two countries overlapped to a great extent in this period, largely due to the American invasion of Iraq. Both the governments and the public in Iran and Turkey were strongly opposed to the invasion of Iraq. Economic factors also played great role in both countries' increased interest in better relations. After 2005, a growing disappointment with the course of the EU-membership negotiations led Ankara to further develop its relations with Middle Eastern states. In 2004 Cyprus was recognized as a full member of EU as representative of entire Cyprus. Thereafter, the negotiations with EU have been effectively blocked by the Cyprus issue. Thus, Turkey not only improved its relations with Iran and Syria in various areas; it disagreed with Israel and the United States on issues such as Israel's military operations in Lebanon and Gaza.

Not surprisingly, since 2007, Turkey has been supportive of Iran's nuclear program as long as it is used for peaceful purposes although Turkey faced international pressure. Bilateral trade has increased to significant level, new energy-transportation deals have been made and others are being negotiated. Unfortunately, after the Arab spring expanded to the Syria, Turkey and Iran came again crossroad in terms of regional influence and religious threats.

Turkey's New Foreign Policy Toward the Middle East After 2002

Like all democratic societies, the making of foreign policy is subject to the choices of elected officials. However, since states are bound by international, economic, strategic or treaty ties agreed by one government, the foreign policy preferences of subsequent and alternative governments cannot be exercised, nor altered overnight. This is especially true in Turkey. Nevertheless, because of the Cold War's bipolar structure and its incapability of making independent policy choices as a minor actor in the Western camp, the Turkish foreign policy agenda remained under-developed. Turkey, as an important ally and a part of the Western Alliance throughout the Cold War period, lost its immediate relevance and more importantly its prime significance when the Soviet threat disappeared. Although NATO survived after the end of the Cold War, as Turkey searched for a new role (Armaoglu, 1995). Meanwhile, although the relationship between Turkey and the EU was a longstanding process and aimed for eventual accession, the end of the Cold War meant that Turkey was no longer considered in the EU's immediate plans. After the completion of Customs Union in 1995, Turkey became the non-member country most fully integrated into the Community structures (EU Commission, 2012).

Nevertheless, by 1999, three important developments happened which caused a dramatic change of Turkish foreign policy orientation. The first was that, Abdullah Ocalan's capture in Kenya and his trial in Turkey defused the PKK issue to an extent. Second, just two years after the Luxemburg rejection of 1997, the EU decided to allow Turkey as a candidate for the EU. Third, AKP's coming into power mostly changed mentally foreign policy direction from western style to multidimensional, including Middle East.

At the first period of the AKP's administration, EU relation was prioritized in order to push EU to accelerate negotiation process. On the other hand, in 2003 The Turkish Grand National Assembly's resolution allowing access for US troops was denied in the parliamentary voting. This decision was appreciated among the Arab States as well as in the Muslim communities (TESEV, 2012).

The wars in Afghanistan and in Iraq after 9/11 considerably shifted the regional structure and changed the distribution of power in the Middle East. Taking into account the post-Cold War conditions and Turkey's decision to diversify its foreign policy options, the new situation brought both opportunities and risks. On the one hand, the situation in the Middle East, Caucasus and Balkans provided to expand its influence, Turkey's attempted for a mediating role in Baghdad, as well as in the Balkans that is parallel to the increase in its economic power. On the other hand, the redistribution of the power in Turkey's neighboring region might threaten regional stability. Turkey's ability to persuade the Arab states to develop closer relations and to aspire to Turkey as a model country for them shows how the currency of soft power capacity. And also Turkey's multilayered foreign policy line towards Iran and Iraq should be considered as pragmatic and rational. The increase of Turkey's capabilities in the region is mostly due to its economic development (Onis, 2012).

Relations with Israel have been the most volatile story in the region. The most recently, the breakdown of Turkey's alliance with Israel is another regional case. The AKP at first sought to mediate between Syria and Israel as well as between the two Palestinian factions, Fatah and the Islamist Hamas. Following Israel's offensive against Hamas in December 2008-January 2009, Ankara became the chief castigator of Israel in international forums. Second important development in this issue was that by the spring of 2010, a nongovernmental organization designed and implemented the notorious Gaza flotilla aimed at putting Israel in an untenable position regarding its blockade of the Hamas-controlled territory. When nine Turkish citizens were killed, Ankara downgraded diplomatic relations with Israel to the level of second secretary and appealed international community to take necessary actions against Israel and declared its mandatory conditions which must be realized by Israel. As of November 2012, although third party negotiations are being held in order to find prestigious diplomatic actions, Israel has not yet showed any formal approval for Turkey's conditions such as apology, compensation and holding sanctions on Gaza.

Arab Spring and Evaluation of Turkey's Foreign Policy

Turkey redefined its geographical security environment over the last decade by deepening its engagement with neighboring regions, especially with the Middle East. In the Arab Spring, Turkey's role varied widely, with foreign policy choices unique to each state. For example, Turkey initially hesitated to join the NATO operation in Libya, with billions of dollars in contracts and roughly 25,000 Turks in Libya at the start of the protests (TESEV, 2012). Despite initial hesitation Turkey ultimately joined the NATO operation and financially supported the Libyan opposition. Interestingly when the NATO operation started in Libya, in Istanbul leader of opponents Mustafa Abdulcelil was negotiating with Turkish officials for future actions.

In Egypt, the Turkish response was more enthusiastic, emphasizing the democratic transformation of Egypt. Indeed, ErdoÄŸan was the first foreign leader to call for Mubarak to step down and to visit post-revolution Egypt. Turkey and Egypt have convened numerous official meetings and substantial economic cooperation since the revolution. Similarly, ErdoÄŸan made early visits to Tunisia and Libya. Furthermore, Turkey has likewise supported protestors' demands in Syria and challenged Assad to step down. The Syrian case, a shared long border, the current humanitarian crisis, and now the debate over the downed Turkish plane, has attracted special attention of Turkish policymakers. In this period Turkish foreign policy has reflected the nuances of Turkish interests and the larger contexts of each state (Onis, 2012).

Despite such variations, in general terms Turkish policies have supported protestors. Regardless of the diversity in Turkey's actual policy responses, the perception of Turkey's role in the region and in state development has become a relatively straightforward metaphor. The "Turkish Model" appears in Turkish and Western rhetoric as means of advancing Turkey's own power interests and as a result of Western aspirations to have a friendly ally in the Muslim world (TESEV, 2012).

The use of the Turkish model of Muslim democracy, though present in the 1990s, has gained new importance in light of the Arab Spring. While the West and Turkey itself see Turkey as an ideal balance between Islam and a secular state, the actual citizens of Arab Spring states may fail to see the attraction. Many of these opposition groups do not like the idea of being dictated by a bigger power like Turkey or others.

Beyond the chronological summary, the new Turkish Foreign policy vision based on the 'zero problems with neighbors' strategy faced a dramatic and severe test, following the onset of the Arab Spring. Relations with Syria epitomized the very principles on which the new Turkish foreign policy was based, a combination of economic interdependence and cultural affinity with no explicit agenda for democracy promotion. On the other hand, Turkey's growing economic strength and strong progress in terms of modernization combined with a comparatively open and pluralistic political system has emerged increasingly as an attractive point of reference for the Arab elites.

Moreover, Turkish foreign policy towards Syria involved a series of adaptations and U-turns. Initially, the Turkish approach was to encourage Syrian regime for making necessary reforms immediately. The expectation was that Turkey would play a kind of mediator role and exert its soft power to induce gradual, step-by-step political opening in Syria. Relations between the two countries became particularly strained when it became quite clear that Turkey was also supporting opposition groups in the background. The new approach was based on a confrontation with the Assad regime and Turkey invested in and backed the solution proposals by the Arab League and UN appointed mediator Kofi Annan. The result is that relations with Syria have seriously deteriorated. In the longer term, if the existing regime collapses and is replaced by pro-democratization forces, Turkey's relations with Syria may be revitalized. However, if the existing regime continues and resist change, this will be a serious blow to the significant improvement in the economic, diplomatic and cultural links created during the past decade.

Obviously, facing with both advantages and disadvantages in new Turkish Foreign policy, in the short run as well as effective in the long run, Turkey most likely will confront some challenges in this region and reformulate its foreign policy pragmatically in terms of its economic and political power.

Main Challenges for Turkey in the Middle East

Public opinion in the Arab world has been broadly appreciative of Turkey's appearance on the regional stage. A tipping point for interest and trust was the 1 March 2003 vote in the Turkish parliament to refuse passage to U.S. troops on their way to invade Iraq. Among Arab officials, sharp divisions of analysis remain. Some Arab states have embraced Turkey's arrival on the scene, while other Arab officials voice wariness, partly due to the way ErdoÄŸan's popularity and legitimacy show up their authoritarian regimes' unpopularity and legitimacy deficits and some Middle Eastern partners have expressed discomfort at the "neo-Ottoman" rhetoric that has entered conversations. And also, more fundamentally, several Arab states are keenly interested in knowing where Turkey stands vis-à-vis Iranian nuclear and other ambitions, which some of them view as a greater concern than Israeli policies.

In new period, Turkey's policies and diplomatic efforts in the Middle East face several major limitations. The first limitation is that Turkey primarily plays a supportive role and would have difficulty bringing to fruition a deal in though cases, such as those involving Israel and its neighbors. Turkey is aware of this limitation, and Turkish policymakers can play a key role in preparing the groundwork, as was when it initiated and helped to conduct the negotiations between Syria and Israel. In new period Turkey seems lost both current regimes in these States which complicates the Turkey's position in terms of using soft power (Perthes, 2010).

Similarly with regard to Iran and conflict over Tehran's nuclear program, Turkey faces dual unsatisfaction and one pragmatism. While Arab States displease about Turkey's support on Iranian nuclear power right, USA and European States were confused about this policy engagement of Turkey. On the other hand, although Turkey supported Iran on its nuclear capacity confrontation with west, Iran directly opposed Turkish approaches about location of long-range missile of NATO in Turkey and recently about the patriot demand of Turkey from NATO, Iran declared this situation as war declaration (ICG, 2010).

Other limitation is that an increased Turkish activism in the Middle East is not seen as entirely positive by other regional players. Turkey acting and defining itself as a major regional power in the Middle East is certainly not to the liking of regional powers, notably Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iran. More specifically, they do not want to see Turkey's regional influence at their own expense. For example, Iran does not necessarily want a mediator between itself and United States, nor does it its influence in Iraq and Arab States to be balanced out by Turkey's involvement. Furthermore, the Arab states do not really want Turkey to play a role in inter-Arab affairs, such as in the conflicts between Iraq and Syria. More common, Turkey's efforts or involvements are understood as spokesmanship of West and USA (perthes, 2010).

Like in the Gaza flotilla case, the more Turkey involves itself in the Middle East, the more it runs the risk of taking positions in these regional conflict and crises. As an emerging and developing country, even though most might say that Turkey became regional power, Turkey is behind the counteraction capacity against Israel or some other States in the Middle East. In international relations, counteraction capacity is the real power capacity which determines its future actions. In relations with Israel, internal public opinion is back of current administration, but the result of recent crises with Israel shows that if Turkey wants to play more influential role in this region, it needs to use more soft power than emotional or military threat towards neighboring countries.

One of the detrimental pest issues for Turkey currently and for future development in the region is terrorist actions and its supportive allies. Invisibly, as a well functional foreign policy tool, PKK terrorism which annoys Turkey economically and national uniformity gained activation after the involvement of Turkey in Syrian case. Like in 1990s, if any state wants Turkey to return domestic affairs rather than foreign involvement, supporting terrorist actions becomes most effective argument for this state. Similarly, in Syria case, When Turkey increased its interest in Syria and declared its supports to the opponents in terms of democratic transformation, Syria, Iran and Iraq revitalized the using terrorism option against Turkey in order to destabilize it. Up until the last year, Turkey has never seen such concentrated terrorist attacks (TESEV 2012).

For the domestic structure of Turkey, the more Turkey focuses on sectarian dimension of Syrian conflict, the worse its relations will be with Iran and Iraq, even Assad regime collapse. Turkey's social structure is also based on some sectarian diversity and some groups are not pleased and these kinds of diversity has conflict potential now as well as during the last three decades. If the Turkey wants to hesitate this dimension of conflict internally and regionally, it should dominate the emphasis on democracy, human rights and current violation in Syria. Otherwise, regional conflict will be inevitable in these hot lands.

CONCLUSION

Obviously, to survive in the Middle East needs comprehensive strategies, double check on foreign policies, consistent arguments and reliable action for each States who wants to realize its own interests. In this context, the Middle East in the 20th century became an experiment ground for dominating international system. From this point, it might be said that realist policies and power politics has been the most available tools for this region.

Seeing that as a legacy of Ottoman Empire during the 20th century, Turkish Foreign policy towards the Middle East has transformed and sometimes fluctuated under the cold war conditions. In addition to the Arab States' feeling against secular and recently interfering state, it should be mentioned that one of the main dynamism of the Turkish foreign policy always became internal affairs. Therefore, changing internal structure rapidly was reflected to the new foreign policy making process and actions. Under the dilemma of secularism and muslim identity, Turkish public has a transformative capacity rather than governmental bodies due to globalization and emerging new middle class economically who created strong relations with Middle Eastern business communities after 2000. Actually, this reality has been seen after 1980s in Turkey, however this middle and educated class could not find significant chance to influence foreign policy in Turkey. After the AKP which is conservative and pro-islamist came into power, coherence between political side and business side was realized which triggered to create new politics towards Arab states and other muslim states.

Beyond both these leverage in Turkey after 2002, while Turkey was differentiating its strategies in the Middle East, international community watched several wars in this region which caused the change power balance and each states skidded to different courses. Under these conditions, Turkey as an economically growing countries strengthened its relations both Arab States and Iran while it was escalading conflicts with Israel. Arab spring introduces new opportunities and threats to Turkey. There are two ways in front of Turkey one of which is to increase its economic power in the Middle East rather than political and military one; second one is to intervene every conflict and feed prejudices and return back to cold war situations. Every step before growing economically enough in this region and become center of attention will be insufficient and born dead. Double check and strategic thinking are being needed now in Turkey more than ever before for foreign policy towards the Middle East.

http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Paul_Salem_FINAL.pdf ( tesev raporu-imaj)

http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Uneasy+neighbors%3A+Turkish-Iranian+relations+since+the+1979+Islamic...-a0238749340 (iran)

http://www.academia.edu/388443/The_New_Turkish_Foreign_Policy_in_the_21st_Century_A_Neorealist_Assessment_of_the_Rationale_Behind_It ( changing Turkish foreign policy)

http://www.meforum.org/3129/turkish-foreign-policy ( new foreign policy, Israel kismi)

http://www.turkishweekly.net/op-ed/2987/the-turkish-model-in-the-arab-spring-discourse-and-foreign-policy-metaphors.html ( turkish model)