South China Sea And East China Sea Disputes Politics Essay

Published Date: 23 Mar 2015

During introduction the paper will draw the aspects related to South China Sea and later on East China Sea issues will be pointed out.

The South China Sea is strategically an enormously important region. Dominance over it is claimed by states of Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam. [1] While China has, over the last 20 years, made general progress towards improving relations with its Southeast Asian neighbours, growing tensions over these competing rights threaten to challenge its effectiveness. Since the military exercises performed by Chinese ships against the US ocean surveillance ship USNS Impeccable in March 2009 in the South China Sea, situation attracted greater diplomatic and press consideration [2] . Some observers see China's behaviour in the South China Sea as a sign of 'assertive' diplomacy. [3] The sovereignty disputes are more than disputes over who owns particular landscapes. They:

"involve major themes of grand strategy and territorial defence, including the protection of sea lines of communication, energy, food and environmental security. They may also be linked to rising populist nationalism. The stakes are too high for imminent resolution; the rulers of states with maritime territorial claims in the South China Sea are convinced that compromise is not in their national interest." [4] 

Actors (also states without claims and non-state actors, such as energy companies) focus not so much on dispute resolution but rather on dispute management, with the aim of preventing conflict and preserving freedom of navigation and over flight. The non-binding Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, signed in November 2002 by China and by 10 ASEAN member states, dedicates the parties to work towards adopting a legally binding law whilst exercising "self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes " [5] 

One must point out that the obligation to "self-restraint" has not put an end "to unannounced and potentially provocative reinforcement of already occupied islands." [6] While diplomats on all sides points out the weaknesses of 2002 declaration, some states undertook one-sided military, bureaucratic and jurisdictional initiatives in the South China Sea, with the sole purpose of changing the political and military status quo. [7] One must say, that China's initiatives have been particularly prominent. [8] Following the Impeccable incident, Washington has been paying increased attention to developments in the South China Sea. [9] Although careful to loose its distance regarding sovereignty disputes, the United States has more aggressively highlighted its interest in protecting the free transit of vessels, both commercial and military. [10] Such passage is vital for America's position in Asia, for the integrity of its regional security, and for its ability to observe Chinese military developments. [11] The US desire to retain this ability to monitor Chinese military development, including the developing Chinese naval base on Hainan, and the Chinese rejection of this right, might be one of the main factors behind the rising tensions. [12] In testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee in March 2009, the commander of the US Pacific Command, Admiral Timothy Keating, argued that :

"The Impeccable incident was a troubling indicator that China, particularly in the South China Sea, is behaving in an aggressive and troublesome manner, and they're not willing to abide by acceptable standards of behaviour or rules of the road " [13] 

Moreover, in July 2009, the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held hearings on 'Maritime disputes and sovereignty issues in East Asia' to observe how these were

impacting on the region and US interests there. In January 2010, the new commander of the Pacific Command, Admiral Robert F. Willard, highlighted to Congress how Chinese naval patrols in the South China Sea had shown an :

'increased willingness to confront regional nations on the high seas and within the contested island chains" [14] 

In February, the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission held an all-day hearing on China's activities in Southeast Asia, with experts reporting about China's growing belligerence in the South China Sea and advising that the United States needed to engage more with the region to protect its interests, including taking a more active interest in dispute management. [15] Concerns over China's actions in these waters continued to grow through 2010. At the ASEAN Regional Forum in Hanoi in July 2010, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made the strongest and most direct public statement of US engagement on the issue to date, declaring that the United States had :

" a national interest in open access to Asia's maritime commons and respect for international law in the South China Sea." [16] 

Calling for a "collaborative diplomatic process", she highlighted US opposition to "the use or threat of force by any claimant", a remark aimed primarily at China. [17] 

This is clashes directly with China's recent statement that the South China Sea is its core interest. [18] Tension was raised when the joint naval and air drills conducted by the US and South Koreaee in the Yellow Sea in July and August 2010 where conducted [19] In response, the Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) carried out military exercises in the South

China Sea and the Yellow Sea. At the same time, there have been renewed tensions in the East China Sea. On 7 September 2010, two Japanese Coast Guard patrol ships collided with a Chinese fishing boat while they carried out "law enforcement activities" in the waters off the

Diaoyu/ Senkaku Islands. [20] Chinese captain Zhan Qixiong was detained on the order of an Okinawa local court, sparking demonstrations in Beijing and diplomatic protests from China [21] On the day of the collision, China's Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, Jiang Yu, demanded that:

"Japanese patrol boats refrain from so-called law enforcement activities in waters off the Diaoyu Islands". [22] 

The Japanese ambassador to China was summoned six times over the incident, once by Chinese State Councillor Dai Bingguo. The event was not resolved until China suspended diplomatic and civilian exchanges with Japan and threatened to stop rare earth exports [23] 

Of course, these events may ultimately prove to be just minor indifferences in diplomatic relations. Whatever the ultimate significance, these developments raise fundamental questions about the future directionality of territorial disputes in China's borderline seas. Particularly the importance of the disputes between China, Japan, and the ASEAN nations. The thing is that given their close geographical proximity, disputes in these regions have very different dynamics. [24] In both cases, China, as a dominant power, is an important claimant state. In the East China Sea, on the opposite side of the ocean from China, is Japan, another major regional power in East Asia. Their mutual relationship is strained due to such factors as their competition for regional leadership and the historical memories of animosity between them. [25] 

So far, there has been no military conflict between them per se as a result of the territorial dispute, but political tensions have been intense. [26] In the South China Sea, China faces a group of ASEAN nations (including Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam) that represent a more asymmetric balance of power when compared with

the East China Sea. Given the long-standing nature of these disputes, these frameworks enable us to track the record of conflicts and the shifts in the relative power balances of the claimants, eventually leading to the conclusion that certainty and stability have improved in the South China Sea, with the converse outcomes happening in the East China Sea.

2. Core National Interest

According to Edward Wong, the Beijing-based correspondent for The New York

Times:

"In March [2010], Chinese officials told two visiting senior Obama

administration officials, Jeffrey A. Bader and James B. Steinberg, that China

would not tolerate any interference in the South China Sea, now part of

China's "core interest" of sovereignty, said an American official involved in

China policy. It was the first time the Chinese labelled the South China Sea a

core interest, on par with Taiwan and Tibet, the official said." [27] 

There were no U.S. officials denying the NYT report. It's is clear the Chinese are trying to distance themselves from their self-imposed policy on this one [28] . In March, Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs Cui Tiankai told two senior U.S. officials that China now views its claims to the 1.3 million-square-mile sea on par with its claims to Tibet and Taiwan, an island that China says belongs to Beijing. [29] 

Once the remarks were reported in public Chinese officials felt constrained about denying outright that the South China Sea was a not "core national interest" for fear of provoking a domestic backlash among Chinese nationalists. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has disclosed that at the 2nd U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue in Beijing (24-25 May 2010) the Chinese stated they viewed the South China Sea as a core interest. Clinton stated in an interview:

"…and when China first told us at a meeting of the Strategic and Economic

Dialogue that they viewed the South China Sea as a core interest, I

immediately responded and said, 'We don''t agree with that'. So they were on

notice that if they were -

Question: Was that Dai Bingguo that said that to you?

Yes, yeah. So if they were in the process of extending their efforts to claim

and control to the detriment of international law, freedom of navigation,

maritime security, the claims of their neighbors, that was a concerning matter.

And therefore, we worked with a lot of the ASEAN countries who are directly

impacted and 12 of us raised it a the ASEAN Regional Forum last July to

make it clear that issues like that have to be resolved in accordance with the

rule of law." [30] 

Since the initial report, Chinese officials have been equivocal when questioned

whether or not the South China Sea has been raised officially to a "core interest" or

"core national interest". For example, a correspondent who attended the Shangri-la

Dialogue in Singapore in June 2010 stated that a People's Liberation Army

Major General told him the South China Sea :

"was not quite the same as Tibet or Taiwan". [31] 

The Chinese media frequently use the term "core interest", particularly in the July-

August 2010 period. [32] For example, an editorial in a leading English-language paper

asserted:

"China's tolerance was sometime taken advantage of by neighbouring countries

to seize unoccupied islands and grab natural resources under China's

sovereignty. China's long-term strategic plan should never be taken as a weak stand. It is

clear that military clashes would bring bad results to all countries in the region

involved, but China will never waive its right to protect its core interest with

military means". [33] 

A review of Chinese academic and media commentary on this question concluded:

"While no Chinese official has spoken about what "core national interests"

means, there is a growing chorus from within the country for the People's

Liberation Army to defend these core interests in the disputed region. Recent

news coverage has brought the term "core national interests" into the same

spotlight as "national sovereignty: and "territorial integrity" and raises the

issue of how China defines the term and what it covers." [34] 

Walter Lohman, an expert with Washington-based Heritage Foundation, determined

that :

"China's characterization of South China Sea as a 'core interest'… is just a big

misunderstanding or in the process of being walked back by the Chinese". [35] 

As a result of the foregoing, Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea has generated special concerns. [36] In March 2010, U.S. media reported that Chinese officials told senior State Department envoys that the South China Sea had been elevated to a 'core

interest' along with Taiwan and Tibet and China would not tolerate any interference in the South China Sea. [37] Chinese officials repeated this assertion in private conversations with foreign diplomats and the term 'core interest' was used in Chinese media reports. These statements generated a new level of concern about Beijing's strategic ambitions in the South China Sea. Subsequently, Chinese officials backtracked and now deny making such a

statement . [38] Still , the issue remained as valid.

3.Legal aspects

A) Nature and Status of the South China Sea Claims

The vast South China Sea region also includes island chains and submerged reefs that have been the subject of disputes, including the Spratly Islands, the Paracel Islands and Macclesfield Bank.) The area became a possible target for exploration by multinational oil companies. In addition, the likelihood of conflict has increased as international maritime laws have slowly been codified and institutionalized following World War II. Motivated by the desire to extend control over sea-based resources, neighbouring states in the area have increasingly come into verbal conflict and even sporadic military confrontations over sovereignty, sovereign rights, jurisdiction, and arms control efforts in the South China Sea. [39] 

During the 1980s and 1990s, most of the disputing states have found themselves in a race to bolster their claims to sovereignty by gaining occupation of the islands that can support a physical presence or by establishing markers on the islands where physical occupation is not feasible. [40] In some cases claimants have even built structures on features that are completely submerged at high tide, maintaining a physical presence on these island specks under arduous and mind-numbing physical conditions. Currently, Vietnam occupies more than twenty islets or rocks, China occupies eight, Taiwan one, the Philippines eight, and Malaysia three to six. [41] 

The race for occupation of the Spratly Islands has increased the likelihood of international conflict, resulting in three cases of military intimidation in recent years (setting aside China's use of military force against Vietnamese troops to enforce its claim to the Paracels in 1974), the first of which led to military conflict. [42] This confrontation occurred between the Chinese and Vietnamese over the occupation of Fiery Cross Reef (Yung Shu Jiao) in 1988, at which time the PRC sank three Vietnamese vessels, killing seventy-two people. [43] In 1992 the Chinese announcement of an oil exploration concession to the U.S. Crestone Company, combined with the occupation of Da Lac Reef and subsequent deployment of three Romeo-class conventional submarines to patrol the area, aroused alarms among the ASEAN states, which had just called for the non-use of force in resolving the Spratly Islands dispute in the Manila Declaration on the South China Sea. [44] The third incident began with the discovery that the Chinese had occupied Mischief Reef (Meijijiao/Panganiban), a circular reef well within the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the Philippines (following the Philippines' announcement of a desktop oil exploration concession in the "Mischief Reef area"), and involved encounters between military vessels from the Philippines and the PRC in March and April 1995. It was the aptly named Mischief Reef confrontation that has catalyzed the most recent wave of interest and concern over the Spratly Islands issue. That concern was reinforced by PRC military pressures against Taiwan.

B)International Laws Related to the Dispute

The documentary background for the various territorial claims in the South China Sea is quite thin, and the historical records are often contradictory. [45] None of the claimants offers unassailable historical or legal claims. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has used "effective occupation" and discovery as primary considerations in evaluating the legitimacy of island territorial claims, although a feature's location, its history, and whether other claimants have a record of protesting illegal occupation may be considered in determining the legitimacy of sovereignty claims to particular features. [46] Separate from the issues of who owns the islands and rocks and whether the submerged reefs of the Spratly Islands can themselves generate maritime zones is the question of whether the islands can "sustain human habitation or economic life of their own," the minimum criterion for an island to generate its own continental shelf or EEZ [47] . Even if human life can be sustained, islands carry less

weight than continental borders in generating EEZs under the prevailing interpretations of the Law of the Sea. Artificial islands on which structures have been built are entitled to a 500-meter safety zone, but they cannot generate a territorial sea, much less a continental shelf or EEZ. Features that appear only at low tide can generate a partial twelve-mile territorial sea only if they are within twelve nautical miles of any feature that generates a territorial sea. Features submerged at low tide are not subject to sovereignty claims and generate no maritime zones at all. The acceptance by the disputing parties of the prevailing interpretation of these provisions to islands in the South China Sea has the potential to greatly reduce the area of overlapping claims, since some disputants have based their claims on an interpretation that the features themselves can generate an EEZ of up to 200 nautical miles. A strict interpretation of the Law of the Sea provision regarding a feature's ability to "sustain human habitation or economic life of their own" may well leave few if any of the features in the Spratly Islands able to generate an EEZ, greatly reducing the potential area of

overlapping claims. Even if these islands were capable of generating an EEZ, it is unlikely that they would be considered able to generate one of 200 nautical miles. [48] After sovereignty of the islands is decided, the question of how EEZs might be defined is critical to determining the size and scope of the areas where negotiations might be necessary to resolve territorial disputes. The Law of the Sea Convention stipulates that in areas where EEZs overlap, the dispute should be settled through peaceful negotiation among the parties concerned, or the parties might voluntarily agree to third-party mediation or to judicial consideration by the ICJ. There is a slowly evolving body of international legal precedents for evaluating the validity of various claims based on the Law of the Sea, and many disputants have found creative ways to avoid sensitive sovereignty issues through limited bilateral joint resource development schemes. The Chinese and Vietnamese claims to sovereignty in the South China Sea are both based on historical claims of discovery and occupation. [49] The Chinese case is better documented, but the extent of the Chinese claims remains ambiguous and contradictory. [50] The Japanese occupied the Spratly Islands during World War II and used the island of Itu Aba (Taiping Dao) as cover for surveillance and as a supply depot, but the Japanese claim lapsed with their defeat in World War II. [51] Taiwan's claims to Chinese ownership of the South China Sea are similar to those of the PRC, and there has been some evidence of coordination of positions on the Chinese claims in the Indonesian Workshops on the South China Sea. The Philippine claim is based on the "discovery" of the unclaimed islands of "Kalayaan" (Freedomland) by an explorer, Tomas Cloma, in 1956. This is one of the most challenged claims, and the U.S.-Philippines security commitment has been consistently interpreted by the United States as excluding Kalayaan. The Malaysian claim is based on its continental shelf claim. The Bruneian claim is also based on a straight-line projection of its EEZ as stipulated by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. [52] 

C) China's Claims over the Spratly Islands in detail

Rightly or wrongly, many Western academics have emphasized China's approach to handling its claims in the South China Sea as a critical test of Beijing's role as a regional and global power in Asia in the twenty-first century. [53] 

In particular, many ASEAN analysts worry that China has since the late 1980s been working to acquire a blue-water navy and other offensive force projection capabilities, such as longer-range aircraft, aerial refueling capabilities, and more modern, harder-to-detect submarine technology, with potential negative implications for the security interests of neighboring countries in Southeast Asia. The People's Liberation Army navy has adopted a strategic doctrine of "offshore active defense." [54] This doctrine envisions a midterm (10-15 years) ocean-going naval capability in which the PLA navy would be able to assert "effective control of the seas within the first island chain," presumably including Taiwan and the South China Sea. [55] Although the Chinese navy is currently limited in its offshore capabilities and although development of indigenous production capability is taking place at a rather slow pace, concerns among Southeast Asian countries about the future development of the PLA's force projection capabilities have heightened ASEAN sensitivities to Chinese naval actions in the South China Sea region. Off-the-shelf purchases of foreign military technology such as SU-27s, Kilo-class submarines, and other military equipment from Russia that could speed up China's military development have attracted notice from China's neighbors; however, the time required to learn new technologies and integrate them into China's existing force structure and to make them operational suggests that any increase in China's military capacity will be "incremental rather than dramatic" [56] . In response, some Southeast Asian countries have begun to take limited but significant military modernization steps of their own, meant to enhance their command and control capabilities, thereby creating the potential for a regional arms race around the South China Sea. There is conflicting analysis of China's strategy and tactics in pursuing its claims to the Spratly Islands area. Given the PRC's limited capability to take and hold the islands it claims, some see a pattern of "hot-and-cold" tactics by China that is intended to throw the other claimants off balance until the PRC is able to enforce its claim through intimidation or force. [57] These analysts point to Chinese "salami tactics," in which China tests the other claimants through aggressive actions, then backs off when it meets significant resistance. [58] China's ambiguity on the extent and nature of its claims is regarded as a tactical plot to stall or defer any attempt to achieve a negotiated settlement until China is prepared to get what it wants through military strength. [59] 

Other analysts emphasize that while the political issue of sovereignty is a particularly sensitive one during a period of political transition in Beijing, the top goal of the PRC leadership for the foreseeable future is to maintain a stable environment conducive to China's economic development. These analysts assert that China's defense strategy of "active defense" is still focused primarily on continental defense and the ability to react to localized conflicts. [60] China's actions in the Spratly Islands area are seen as primarily defensive, preserving China's options vis-à-vis the other claimants as the Law of the Sea is applied. In addition, some experts have suggested that the South China Sea dispute cannot be solved in isolation from China's other maritime disputes in the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea. [61] These experts suggest that China may feel landlocked and therefore "geographically disadvantaged." [62] Such a condition might make these maritime border disputes more difficult to settle because the strategic stakes for a China encircled by discrete maritime boundaries would be too high. Given the reverberations from sporadic military confrontations in the South China Sea in recent years, all parties have reason to be vigilant for opportunities to pursue progress on the Spratly Islands issue.

Efforts to build confidence among the parties might serve as a buffer to the further escalation of tensions. One result of the Mischief Reef (Meijijiao/Panganiban) incident in February 1995 was to bring high-level attention to the dispute. [63] It also catalyzed a united ASEAN reaction, to which China has responded in a cautious and seemingly conciliatory manner, and prompted the U.S. government to issue a policy statement (discussed below), which has been welcomed by ASEAN. [64] In the latter half of 1995, China agreed in concept to establish bilateral "codes of conduct" in the Spratly Islands with both the Philippines and Vietnam that include pledges to resolve the Spratly Islands dispute peacefully, although the PRC has ignored Philippine requests to return to the status quo ante by vacating Mischief Reef. [65] 

These new developments in the dispute may open the door for further progress. Currently no military in the region is capable of forcefully asserting its claims, relations in the region are generally cooperative, and assessments of the resource potential of the region show significant benefits only over the long term. [66] All these positive factors are subject to change, but there may be a window of opportunity to pursue progress through political negotiations that forestall military escalation. On the other hand, an overemphasis on the South China Sea's current resource and strategic potential may force the Spratly Islands dispute to be seen in zero-sum terms. The heightened scrutiny resulting from the symbolic and psychological issues attached to the Spratly Islands raises questions about how one correctly identifies potential "winners" and "losers" in this dispute. China's preoccupation with its

own political transition and increasing feelings of nationalism in the region are also complicating factors that increase the potential for conflict.

4.New actors in the region

A) Sino-Indian rivalry comes to a new level

In mid-September 2011, the rivalry between India and the PRC has entered a new level, what is more, escalated the conflict in the South China. For the first time, India "came out of the Indian Ocean". In that time in Hanoi hosted the head of the Indian Foreign Minister SM Krishna. [67] There would be nothing special about that visit if it wasn't for the info published 3 days sooner. [68] The Indian state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Videsh Ltd. (ONGC Videsh) started two projects, exploration and exploitation, carried out jointly with Vietnamese partners. Oil and gas will be sought in the contested zone of the Paracel Islands.

China's reaction was of course easy to predict. In a statement, Beijing reiterated its previous position:

"We hope that third countries do not get involved in the dispute. We also hope that states would respect and outside the region will contribute to resolve the dispute through bilateral channels, countries in the region. " [69] 

Delhi response was clear and overwhelming:

"Our relationship with Vietnam and any other countries based Always on international law, norms and conventions. [...] Cooperation with Vietnam in the field of energy and to strengthen the energy security of India is very important. " [70] 

It's a strong response, given the fact that the PRC still refuses to resolve the disputed South China Sea based on relevant UN conventions.

For its part, India treat the entrance to the South China Sea as revenge for "the prevalence" of China in the Indian Ocean. For over 20 years, the PRC is building in the region, "the triangle of support" - based on Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Burma (Myanmar). Many years of Sino-Pakistani cooperation has definitely ani-hindu policies and includes not only military issues. The Chinese have a lot invested in the construction of Gwadar port on the oil in the Strait of Hormuz near, with whom they want to run the pipeline to Xinjiang (Uighur). In Sri Lanka's flagship cooperation project is the construction of Hambantota port. [71] Equally worrying for India is also a Sino-Burmese cooperation. In exchange for it's help in the modernization and expansion of infrastructure, China gained access to bases in Mergui and Thilawie and on the islands of Coco and Haigyi. All these facilities have been modernized, expanded and adapted to the needs of the Chinese Navy. [72] The Chinese submarines were given the opportunity to operate in the waters of the Bay of Bengal, which India has so far recognized for his exclusive water views. Another Chinese military base are installations for electronic identification on the island Zedetkyi Kyun. [73] The Chinese also engaged in the construction of deep-water ports for container ships in Sittway and Kyukpyu and the oil port in the region of the island Ramree, where the pipeline would go out again, this time to the province of Yunnan. This port, along with Pakistan's Gwadar significantly reduce China's dependence on maritime transport of oil and reduce the time of transport. This samy China will be able to afford to conduct foreign policy harder. To this must be added the amount of participation of the Chinese Navy in anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia.

Sino-Pakistani alliance took on even greater importance upon the announcement of plans to create rail links and highways in Xinjiang to the Middle East. New lines are run through Afghanistan, but the Chinese are very interested in building connections easier through Kashmir. Needless to say, that the appearance to Delhi was antagonising. In this situation, India treat rapprochement with Vietnam, as an "strike back". It is also proof of the growing confidence of Indians who decide to finally move beyond its current domain. [74] 

While the alliance with Pakistan is decidedly anti-Indian character, the remaining actions in the Indian Ocean are not. [75] All investments of the Gwadar port at the head of the general aim to strengthen the position of China in the world by reducing connections with the countries of the Persian Gulf. Military installations in Burma, in turn, can also be seen in context of South-East Asia. However, because of long standing conflict and the increasingly stronger presence of the PRC in Central Asia and South America , Indians perceive the Chinese action as directed against themselves. Needles to say, throughout Asia, only India has the potential to become a peer competitor and a counterweight to China.

B) Russia walks in

At the expert level, Russia has come to realize that the South China Sea will generate

the key challenges to Southeast Asian security in the years to come. [76] At the official level,

however, Moscow hasn‟t yet outlined its position on this issue. [77] 

But along with upward trends in relations between the Russian Federation and ASEAN, the task to do it is becoming increasingly urgent due to the following reasons.

First, business interests will play a direct role as the joint Russian-Vietnamese company Vietsovpetro develops oil reserves in a contested area. [78] In December 2010, Moscow and Hanoi signed an agreement to extend this cooperation. [79] Second, Russia has to give substance to its statements about "desire for strengthening cooperation with ASEAN, including the security issues" [80] . Third, in case an outbreak of confrontation occurs, Russia - whether it likes it or not - will be dragged into the overall instability. With these factors in view, a necessity for Russia to develop a nuanced and problem-solving approach to the South China Sea issue is evident. What kind of policy will Moscow follow? It seems that the most effective option must be twofold. [81] First, Moscow should dissociate itself from any developments that can provoke tensions, including all kinds of interferences in the dispute with demonstrably positive intentions. [82] Second, Moscow should do its best to increase the overall cooperative potential of the region and actively participate in creating its new security architecture. It can be argued that Russia‟s potential contribution in mitigating tensions over the South China Sea issue shouldn‟t be underestimated. This position can be substantiated by the following examples :

a) Energy.

In not too distant future, Russia‟s role in ensuring Asia-Pacific energy security will be sufficiently bigger - especially if the pipeline from Eastern Siberia to Pacific Ocean becomes operational, as was recently stated, in 2012 (in other words, two years ahead of the schedule) [83] . No less significant effect will be produced by delivering oil from Russia to China via the pipeline Skovorodino - Daqing. According to Chinese estimates, the pipeline will carry 15 million metric tons of crude oil annually until 2030. [84] The Russian factor in maintaining Asia-Pacific energy security will rise in prominence after the capacities of the LNG plant within the Sakhalin II project are upgraded and expanded.Currently, new facilities aimed at producing extra 5 million tons per year are being developed. Apart from it, building another LNG plant on Sakhalin island is under consideration. [85] 

Additional prospects to expand the delivery of Russian energy resources to Asia-Pacific

may appear after the introduction of gas pipeline between Sakhalin-Khabarovsk-Vladivostok with the annual projected transportation capacity of 30 billion cubic meters. [86] 

In this context, two additional factors need stressing.

First, systematic outbreaks of instability in Arab countries lead to uncertainty concerning safety of resources supplies from Middle East to Asia-Pacific economies. Second, the development of atomic energy sector in the region as an alternative to oil and gas will presumably slow down after the Fukushima nuclear accident. The cooperative paradigm of Russia - ASEAN relations in energy sector is expected to strengthen after the parties adopted ASEAN-Russia Energy Cooperation Work Programme. [87] It focuses on coordinating efforts in:

"capacity building programmes, development of alternative and renewable energy resources, energy infrastructure, peaceful use of nuclear energy, coal, oil and gas exploration". [88] 

All this, if further developed, will bring energy security in the region to a higher level

and therefore - lessen contradictions over oil and gas reserves of the South China Sea. In this

sense, Russian positive influence upon the way the issue will evolve could be significant.

b) Cargo transportation.

Russia is attaching special importance to the development of Northern Sea Route, as outlined in "The Foundations of The Russian Federation‟s State Policy in the Arctic until 2020 and Beyond" [89] . In both cases, a great deal of problems remains and their solution is sure to be difficult and time-consuming. Nevertheless, these directions, if given more practical substance, with a lapse of time could make cargo traffic via the South China Sea and particularly - the overloaded Straits of Malacca - somewhat less intensive. All this should be viewed through the prism of the coming APEC Summit in

Vladivostok. [90] In this regard, two points are noteworthy. First, the agenda of the Summit-2012 will give high priority to cargo transportation and energy cooperation as earlier Russia emphasized their importance. [91] Second, after the Summit these directions will be put under a more scrupulous international spotlight and therefore receive impetus for further development.

c) Strategy

Last but not least, Russia‟s participation in the East Asia Summit will probably produce a stabilizing effect on the overall strategic situation in the area. In future, politico-security issues are likely to dominate the agenda of the Summit, and taking into account growing prospects for clash of interests between the US and China, Russia and ASEAN can be natural partners in creating the space for cooperation. The Russian Federation seems to share this line of thought as currently at the expert level it is examining the potential of the niche for itself .This coincidence of Russia-ASEAN interests may strengthen the cooperative vector of the EAS meetings with a "multiplier effect" upon the situation in the South China Sea. But here a fundamental question arises - how do Russian transfers of arms to several countries involved in the dispute fit this scenario? In fact, these transfers do not undermine it. The argument that Russian arms may be used as "bargaining chips" in negotiations between the claimants to the disputed archipelagoes is hardly plausible. In the regional situation as we know it today the possibility of armed clashes over the islands is quite low. In this light, apprehensions expressed by some Chinese observers that Vietnam‟s

acquisitions of Russian submarines and jet fighters can give it more courage to challenge

China look somewhat exaggerated. [92] The nature of Vietnams military modernization is non-aggressive and doesn‟t aim to undermine the status-quo in the South China Sea, an opinion shared by internationally-renowned experts. [93] While nothing like the genuine solution to the South China Sea issue is in sight, keeping these contradictions within peacefully manageable bounds looks like the maximum of what can be achieved. Whatever Russia may do to contribute to it will be surely welcome.

Recently, Vietnam struck a deal with Russia for six of its diesel-electric Kilo/ Project 636 Class fast attack submarines. Both the Su-30MK2 fighters and the Kilo/ Project 636 Class fast attack submarines have superior operational and combat capability. Their operating radius can cover the entire South China Sea. Vietnam has now become a major purchaser of Russian arms. [94] In the past, Russia has zealously sold submarines, frigates, helicopters and Su-30MK2 fighters to Vietnamese forces. These advanced weapons will no doubt enhance Vietnam's air and naval forces in the South China Sea region. The greater power projection will give Vietnam more courage to challenge China, thus putting more pressure on China in the South China Sea. As Vietnam asserts more control over the region, there is greater potential for the current disputes to intensify. [95] 

In going through with these weapons sales, Russia's purpose is quite clear - to involve itself indirectly in the South China Sea disputes. [96] This is further demonstrated by Russia's willingness to train Vietnamese forces how to use the advanced weaponry.

In addition to arms sales, Russia has also interfered in the dispute by cooperating with Vietnam to conduct offshore oil exploration in the South China Sea. Because of its limited capacity for deep-sea oil exploration, Vietnam has been actively looking for foreign oil companies to cooperate with. Of these, Russian firms are an important partner. In the 1980s, the Soviet Union helped Vietnam develop eight oil fields in South China Sea, turning Vietnam from a net crude oil importer to an exporter. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, cooperation between Russia and Vietnam did not stop. Instead, the two countries have further strengthened their energy cooperation. [97] 

Russia knows perfectly well that equipping the Vietnam with powerful submarines will aggravate the already-inflamed South China Sea disputes. However, it continues to sell advanced weapons to Vietnam for its own economic and political benefit. These foreign arms sales have never been simply for economic gain; Russia views the sales as a way to intervene in regional affairs. [98] Likewise, in partnering with Vietnam in oil exploration in the South China Sea, Russia has not only made huge profits, but also gained increased power to check China's economic development.

While Russia has not been directly involved in the South China Sea territorial disputes, with its arms sales and stake in Vietnamese offshore oil exploration, it has shown that can wield considerable influence behind the scenes.

On the other hand Russia has managed to sell China enough military hardware to arm a medium-sized European country. [99] The lion's share of the goods went to aviation. The PLAAF (People's Liberation Army Air Force) and PLANAF (the air arm of the Chinese Navy) received about 200 multi-purpose fourth generation fighter-bomber Su-27s and Su-30s of various modifications, along with a license to produce 200 Su-27s and 250 Su-30s domestically. [100] As for the latter (a considerably modernized version of the Su-27), - both purchased and manufactured - China is planning to have over 500 of these aircraft. [101] Also on the agenda this year, is the purchase by Beijing of 40 Il-76 heavy air transports and Il-78 air tankers. [102] 

The Chinese Navy has not been left out of the arms contracts; its inventory increased by 12 Kilo class diesel, and 4 Sovremenny class destroyers. [103] In addition to the fact that the submarines are considered as possibly the most capable and quietest such vessels in the world, the destroyers are equipped with arguably the most lethal anti-ship cruise missile, the supersonic SS-N-22 Sunburn (or according to the original Russian nomenclature, R-270 Moskit). The Moskit, even by admission of American naval experts, poses a serious threat to US ships (including, possibly, aircraft carriers). [104] 

China's air defense capabilities also have been greatly enhanced by the acquisition of 12 battalion units of S-300 PMU-1 and 27 complexes of Tor M-1 SAMs. [105] The former is known as at least comparable to the American Patriot, and the delivery of eight units of the even more sophisticated PMU-2 modification of the system is expected shortly. Since most of these weapons are intended as protection for the ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan, Taipei's unease about the deal is understandable.

Likewise of concern for Taiwanese leaders, as well as China's other neighbors, were Russian-Chinese military exercises carried out from 18 to 25 August 2005-the first time in more than 40 years. [106] The scale of the event was considerable; it encompassed 10,000 military personnel, as well as approximately 70 ships and submarines. While the Chinese participated mainly with personnel (around 8,000) and sea vessels (some 60 ships and submarines), the main contributions from the Russian side were advanced air assets, such as 2 Tu-95MS Bear strategic bombers, 4 Tu-22M3 Backfire long-range bombers, Su-24M2 Fencer bombers, Su-27SM Flanker fighters, 10 Il-76 Candid transport aircraft, an A-50 Mainstay air warning command and control aircraft, and an Il-78 Midas air tanker. [107] The public, formal objective of the manoeuvres was coordination in the fight against international terrorism, but few missed the real implications for conventional warfare :anti-terrorist military actions do not require the use of strategic bombers and large scale amphibious operations-whereas an offensive against an island state might. One may only surmise who proposed the scenario, but the message sent by the exercise seemed clear enough: The Asian-Pacific region is a domain of Russia and China, and no one else should challenge their influence there.

Moreover on August 10th 2011, after years of secretive work, the Chinese navy launched its first aircraft-carrier on its maiden voyage. The carrier was bought from Ukrainians but it is and old Soviet made carrier - Varyag [108] 

It is possible that Russia, wanted to send message to the rest of the world - We are still a Superpower. China, quite possibly, views this partnership in the Pacific as temporary and likely is playing its own game.

5.Have regional institutions enhanced peace ?

Perhaps the deeper impact of the new regional institutions will be felt in the future as their

effects on foreign policy reveal themselves. Closer examination points to a more skeptical

assessment, however. organizations designed to increase regional economic integration can enhance regional security and reduce the risk of military conflict in two ways. If regional economic organizations increase regional economic exchange, they should con-

tribute to peace. Although the effects of economic interdependence on military conflict between states remains controversial, most scholars agree that cross-border trade and investment have the same positive effect in reducing military conflict even conflict short of war as democracy.A second direct effect of international organizations on conflict has inspired less consensus among researchers: membership in intergovernmental organizations has been shown to have positive, negative and no overall effect on violent disputes and war among their members. On the other hand, preferential trade agreements, since they stimulate greater economic ties among members than non-members, appear to enhance the effects of economic interdependence in reducing conflict. Global establishments that include forums or negotiations for intensive information exchange are more likely to reduce conflict risk by lowering the possibilities for misreading an opponent's resolve or capabilities. Some may also provide an arena for negotiation and dispute resolution. Finally, international organizations may socialize their members into habits of co-operation and new norms of behavior. Even institutions with an economic purpose may have such spill-over effects into the domain of security. But evaluating these effects is tricky. governments may join regional organizations when they

already intend to liberalize their economies or reorient their foreign policies. whether Asia's new regional economic institutions will lessen the likelihood of military conflict requires answering two difficult questions: how much do peace-inducing levels of economic exchange depend on these organizations? how likely would military conflict be if Asian governments did not belong to them? economic interdependence in Asia has grown by most measures to levels that rival those in Europe and north America. At the same time, foreign direct investment and cross-border production networks have driven trade integration in key sec-tors (such as electronics and automobiles). China is central to these networks; its trade with Asia

now represents half the trade within the region.Whatever the consequences of this burgeoning

economic exchange for regional security, regional institutions can claim little credit. Until 2000, APEC and the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) were the sole regional economic organizations with trade and investment liberalization agendas. Both were marginal to the China focused pattern of economic links that were established in the 1990s. The universe of new preferential trade agreements (PTAs) that populate the region may be more likely to contribute to deeper economic integration and positive security effects. Any interdependence effects will be shared outside the region, however: most of the PTAs concluded, under negotiation, or proposed by Asian governments involve non-Asian partners. existing agreements are heavily biased toward ASEAN rather than northeast Asia, where the risks of international conflict are higher. Finally, many of these agreements are relatively "light" in their provisions: they do not aim, at least initially, at deeper integration through the elimination of politically sensitive "behind-the-border" barriers to trade and investment. Although PTAs have been shown to reduce the use of military force between members, the new Asian PTAs are too recent and too restricted in geographical scope and policy coverage to claim a role in deepening regional economic interdependence. A common format, inspired by ASEAN, characterizes most Asian regional institutions. Governments have been reluctant to delegate much authority to the permanent staff of these organizations - when a permanent staff even exists. Individuals and corporations play no direct role in these organizations. There are no regional courts, for example, in which individuals can pe ition against violations of regional agreements. decision-making is consensual. Membership is not used to enforce policy changes on governments that want to join the club, in sharp contrast to the european union model. ASEAN itself has begun to move away from the model that it inspired, building at least on paper - more formal and binding structures. The ASEAN+ 3 Chiang Mai Initiative, which grew out of the Asian financial crisis, has also taken the first steps toward multilateralization of its network of bilateral swap agreements, laying the foundation

for more robust financial co-operation. The other key regional economic and security institutions ASEAN + 3, the east Asia Summit and the ASEAN Regional Forum have not introduced significant changes in the dominant template for regional organizations.Regional economic organizations of this design are likely to have, at best, weak effects on military conflict. Although regional summits provide a venue for occasionally engaging other governments, thin institutional cores do not promote continuous information exchange. diverse memberships produce organizations that lack cohesion; membership rules are not based on common cooperative ends but rather geographical proximity. Finally, Asian regional economic organizations rarely link economic agendas or negotiations with political or security issues. The "Asian way" of regional institutions is not unique: countries in other developing regions have the same suspicion of intrusion from regional overseers and work