Free Will Is An Illusion Philosophy Essay

Published Date: 23 Mar 2015

In my research I shall be investigating whether individuals can hold full moral responsibility for their actions if free will does not exist. Firstly I shall be exploring why it is claimed that free will is an illusion and looking more closely at the deterministic route. Then I shall be looking more closely at moral responsibility to see if we hold full responsibility through determinism/ causality. I will be looking into different areas of determinism from soft and hard determinism and compatibilism; looking at philosophers such as Kane and Hume. I shall conclude in my research that it is possible to hold full moral responsibility but yet be determined. This argument is supported by analogies such as the Frankfurt argument.

Free will and determinism defined

To investigate whether moral responsibility can exist without free will, we firstly have to explore the arguments of free will and determinism. The first approach that will be examined is libertarianism. Libertarianism states that humans have free will, and that there is a free action, therefore denying the thesis of determinism. Determinism being the opposite branch; denying free will and obtaining that for everything that happens in the universe there are conditions, and given those conditions, nothing else could happen or be changed. Already we can see how they conflict, actions cannot be free, but yet determined. Libertarianism is based on the belief that 'not all events in the universe are subject to causation' [1] . After distinguishing both libertarianism and determinism I shall then move on to my next chapter to examine how the both collide with one another; to come to the conclusion that free will is unable to exist because determinism stands to strong. I will now explain what each definition means with philosophers ideas.

Libertarianism-

Libertarians are revolved around an agent being able to do otherwise. If an agent has the choice and decision to do otherwise, then they are therefore free in their action. Kane is a well-known philosopher who defends the position of free will. In order to define what we mean by free will, he first describes what he means by Will. After distinguishing what Kane means by Will, he moves on to explain how our Will is free. He states 'to be a self or person or rational agent was to have reason, or the capacity to reason, and this was essential, as they viewed it, for the existence of anything we could call free will' [2] . In order to have free will, we must be capable to reason, but as Kane explains we also need to recognise the capacity to reason has two kinds; theoretical and practical. Theoretical reasoning meaning intellect and practical reasoning meaning will; this allows us to act rationally as humans. He defines the term rational will as 'a set of powers defined in terms of a family of concepts whose focal member is practical reasoning or deliberation' [3] . Kane moves on to explain what he means by practical reasoning; reasoning about what to be done. This means what one ought to do or should do, or what one chooses or decides; which signifies two kinds of judgements.

The Will 'is a set of conceptually interrelated powers or capacities, including the power to deliberate, or to reason practically, to choose or decide, to make practical judgements, to form intentions or purpose, to critically evaluate reasons for action, and so forth'. Kane describes the meaning of Will, to be rational and to reason. In order to have free will we have to be rational being. We can prove that we are rational beings as we have to have to capacity to reason, which every human attains. Therefore, to have the ability to reason as rational beings enables us to be free in our actions. We are able to look into situations and reason which is the best course of action to take. If we were pre-determined from the beginning of the universe to follow certain actions, then it means our reason would be pointless. Kane claims that being a rational being means we have freedom as humans, because we have the ability to reason.

Humans generally act as if they possess free will. We don't see ourselves as being robots were we are being told how to function, but we like to believe that we are autonomous. We are able to freely choose what path we would like to take without any external factors influencing our decisions. However, it could be claimed that we are affected by the domino effect, our feelings effect our motives, which then effect our actions and so on, so technically we are always being influenced by something rather than being totally autonomous. Skinner explores this area of argument in later chapters with his behavioural studies. Foot explains, our actions may be determined by our past motives, feelings, or desires, but that doesn't necessarily prove that humanity has been pre-determined from the beginning of the universe. Foot comes to this conclusion because 'an action said to be determined by the desires of the man who does it is not necessarily an action for which there is supposed to be a sufficient condition. In saying that it is determined by his desires we may mean merely that he is doing something that he wants to do, or that he is doing it for the sake of something else that he wants. There is nothing in this to suggest determinism' [4] .

Jean- Paul Sartre has an interesting view of human freedom; he argues that human actions usually tend to be something new, something they have never done before, a new experience. They think about going from present, to think about future actions that do not yet exist. Sartre argues that in this sense, humans are capable of standing part from the world, they are conceived and moved by the future that they see which does not exist yet. Sartre states that 'human-reality is free because…it is perpetually wrenched away from itself and because it has been separated by a nothingness from what it is and from what it will be…freedom is precisely the nothingness which is made to be at the heart of man and which forced human reality to make itself instead of to simply be' [5] . Although we may believe this is true, every action we tend to take is a new experience. But this new experience has to have been brought on by past experiences; it can't just be a random act that has never been thought about before. Such as, I want to go on holiday to America. A new experience, I have never been there before. But at some point in my life, past experiences have led me to come to this conclusion of wanting to go to America. Whether relatives have gone before, or someone has recommended it to me. A random thought cannot just appear in our heads, it had to be brought on by past acts/experiences. Therefore, we are under the illusion that we are free, but actually looking beyond the illusion, we see that in reality we are determined in some way or another; environment, heredity, experiences etc.

Hard Determinism/ Causality

However, determinism stands at the opposite end to free will. Determinism states that every event in humanity; decisions, actions, feelings is a consequence of state of affairs. Therefore, we are unable to be autonomous in our actions. Determinism can be placed into two different categories; Hard and Soft determinism.

The basic outline of hard determinism is that humans have no free will. This is an incompatible position that both free will and determinism cannot exist. But this raises issues; if hard determinism is true then no one can possible be responsible for their actions? This is my area of investigation which will be explained later in more depth. Hard determinism holds 3 theses; '1) free will is incompatible with determinism and 2) free will (in an incompatible sense) does not exist because 3) determinism is true' [6] . Hard determinism leaves no room for decisions and choice, as our lives have been determined for us. We may believe that we have choices and free will, but this is an illusion. Determinism 'lies within the idea of reductio: every action or event is the strict effect of a cause, and because this cause is itself the necessary effect of a previous cause, and convincing explanation requires a return to the very first cause, in other words the prime mover. Whatever its nature' [7] .

Determinism/Causality is the relationship between cause and effect. It is the thesis that 'every event is causally determined by previous events in accordance with laws of nature' . It is a view that mankind has a say in determining its fate and choices of the agents future. If the agent was free to choose otherwise, then they must be free. They had the decision and to choose otherwise, but also the natural laws is unable to change. The past is fixed and out of anyone's control, to say that if I had done that, the past would have been different (natural laws would have been different). However, the past cannot be changed, and therefore we are not free to choose, as we are always been influenced, determined by our past and natural laws. Determinism is what I shall be arguing for; we are able to hold full moral responsibility through determinism, which again will be explained in later chapters.

Soft determinism

Soft determinism differs from hard determinism. Hard determinism is one strict belief that free will cannot exist, but we are totally determined in our ways. Our choices, decisions, desire have all been determined for us, we are unable to prevent or change these. However, soft determinism is the belief that determinism and free will are compatible with one another. It is possible to believe in both without them conflicting. Compatibilists believe that it is possible to believe in both determinism and free will without being logically inconsistent. Freedom can be present or absent in situations; it's about acting free in according to one's determined motives. Augustine and Hume have different ideas on their view of soft determinism, but yet still sum up the same conclusion that both determinism and free will are compatible.

Augustine is a soft determinism but is also referred as a compatibilist too; we are still determined but nonetheless we are also free. Augustine is a prime philosopher of soft determinism, although his determined differs as he follows the route of theological soft determinism; events are caused by a higher power, known as God, yet we still obtain free will. St Augustine argued that 'just because God is omniscient does not mean that we do not have free will. God has foreknowledge of our choices and the decisions we will make. This does not mean man doesn't make decisions freely; rather it emphasizes God's omnipotence'. Augustine argued for three type of events; those that appear to be caused by chance, those caused by God (such as birth and death), and those caused by us (whether or not we take the decision to lead a morally good life).

Whereas Hume didn't believe there was a higher power affecting agents, but believed that 'soft determinism operates through the mind and allows for flexible response. But it is still deterministic, because the way the various circumstances that constitute moral causes operate is to establish a set of motives or reasons that 'render a peculiar set of manners habitual' [8] . What he means by this view is that soft determinism is about human nature that our morals sentiments are aroused by the characters of agents; where he claims that 'nature has made the minds of all people similar in their feelings and operations' [9] . Soft determinism overall is belief in both determinism in some aspect, and a belief that we still hold free will. They still hold the view of universal causation (hard determinism), that everything is caused by a series of casual events. But it is also possible to hold freedom too, such as we are able to be moral responsible agents. One is able to act in accordance with one's nature, which has been determined by factors such as heredity, family or the environment.

We have now distinguished what we mean by free will, and the different aspects of determinism. In order to answer this research question to find out whether moral responsibility can exist through determinism, we must first prove that free will is an illusion; which is my next chapter.

Free will and determinism compatible?

Free will and determinism collide with one another. My aim in this chapter is to conclude that free will is an illusion; it is unable to be compatible with determinism. My reason for arguing that free will is an illusion is so I am able to investigate whether it is possible for determinism alone (hard determinism) is able to be compatible with moral responsibility. As agents, do we have we the right to take praise and punishment, if our actions that we act upon weren't our choice? However, I first have to disprove free will existing. As Kane states, we would like to believe that 'we feel it is 'up to us' what we choose and how we act; this means we could have chosen or acted otherwise' [10] . But is this the case? My argument is that agents are unable to act otherwise, as there is always an influence of determinism which limits their choices and decisions. I shall be exploring arguments from a free will view, but defending the determinism approach by claiming we are misled to believe that we have free will, it is an illusion.

In Kant's critique of Practical Reason and Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals he argues that we must admit that we are free, otherwise morality cannot exist. Reconstruction of Kant's main argument of free will goes as follows;

'1) we accept morality on intuitive grounds. 2) Morality implies rationality. 3) Rationality implies free will. 4) Therefore we conclude we have free will' [11] . In order for us to maintain morality as agents we must also maintain free will. Kant argues that; 'Firstly, morality involves a law-a moral law-that commands me to act in a certain way. Secondly, this moral law is universal in that we conceive of it as binding on everyone without exception. Since that moral law binds everyone, I cannot, or at least ought not to, excuse myself or a friend for any crime. Evidently, then, morality as a moral law, and indeed, the moral law, is an imperative in that it demands something of every person, and in particular, each persons will' [12] .

Moral law according to Kant is an act in accordance with the demands of practical reason, it is a categorical imperative (commands us to act in accordance to reason) rather than a hypothetical imperative (action required for a personal motive or desire). Our rationality needs to come from both reason and morality; 'we can use a priori reason to derive necessary actions or duties, the basis on which we are to act, from one of the several formulations of the categorical imperative' [13] . Kant defends his claim that rationality implies freedom. This is because; rationality must appoint rules of both reason and morality. The categorical imperative as an imperative of rationality gives us a command to act in a certain way. It acknowledges us to use our priori reason in order to come to a conclusion of our actions and duties on what we act upon. Kant claims that 'of these formulations, the one that accords best with the conception of freedom is the formula of autonomy' [14] . According to this formula, it means that the categorical imperative instructs the Will to act in a way that it both legislates law for itself, and at the same time subjects to those same laws. But these laws must conform to reason and reason is universal to every rational being. Therefore, Kant concludes that 'when the will acts accordance to this formula of autonomy, it is the autonomous will' [15] , resulting that we must be free as rational beings. However, Spinoza flaws Kant's argument; 'rationalism takes place the most strict identity between 'cause, reason and nature' in which cause is the same thing as reason, reason is the same thing as cause, and cause is the same thing as a necessary causality or determinism. From a given determinate cause there necessarily follows an effect' [16] . This results in the opposite of Kantian approach, as rationality is incompatible with freedom. This is because determinism results in the same causes producing the same effects, like a chain.

Instead of looking at a philosophical approach on free will and determinism, let's take a look at the psychological approach too. Such as B.F Skinner, instead of using analogies Skinner uses hard and reliable evidence of studies and experiments to conclude that we are determined as humans. Skinner was a psychologist but also a very important proponent when it came to the debate of free will and determinism, he was well known for his behaviourist approach. Skinner stands as a hard determinist by stating that;

'If we are to use the methods of science in the field of human affairs, we must assume that behaviour is lawful and determined. We must expect to discover that what a man does is the result of specifiable conditions and that once these conditions have been discovered, we can anticipate and to some extent determine his actions' [17] .

Skinners system was based on operant conditioning, where an agent's behaviour is modified by its consequences - such as reward and punishment. Rather than our 'free will' of choice and desire, we are instead determined or conditioned by our environment. Skinners aim of operant conditioning was to prove that our past experience does determine our actions in the future. If an individual finds something pleasant from their past experience, then their behaviour is likely to be repeated in the future. And vice versa- if the behaviour is followed by an unpleasant consequence then it is unlikely the individual would not repeat it- this is known as Law of effect. In order to prove his hypothesis of determinism skinner used an experiment called the 'skinner box'. The Skinner box was created in order for an animal in the box to manipulate a lever that they can press to access food or water- a type of reinforcement. There was a light on the lever, and only when the light was on the food would be realised by pressing the lever. Through this form of learning the animal was able to realise that the lever they pressed released food when the light was on rather than off, therefore the likelihood was the behaviour of the animal would repeat when the light was on, as it was a positive reinforcement. The animal learnt that the lever would not release any food if the light was off. Skinner relates this to our physical and social environment- the idea that we learn from our behaviour. When we find a positive consequence, we will repeat the behaviour, a negative response, we won't repeat the behaviour. For example, we learn from our peers when the best time is to ask them for a favour. If they are miserable, you know not too. But if they are cheerful you know that is the best time. The reason for this is because we have learnt from our past experience. We have learnt that persons facial expression and emotions when the best time is to ask for a favour wanting a positive reinforcement. Skinner also gives different scenarios in which we learn from past experience which now determined our behaviour today; 'you also know that your professors are more likely to respond to your raising your hand if they are facing you than if their backs are turned. A green traffic light, another type of discriminative stimulus, signal that driving though an intersection is likely to be reinforced by a safe passage' [18] . Skinner's studies shows that we are affected as humans by our past experiences, through reward and punishment, bad and good affects. But these past experiences now determine us as agents, they are constantly influencing us in what we do. The past cannot be escaped and no matter how much someone claims they have free will they will constantly by determined by early/past experiences. We can never be totally free in choice or decision making, it is impossible.

However, Kane recognises this conflict that Skinner picks up on. That we cannot be free because we are always being influenced by external factors, such as heredity, our environment and past experiences. Therefore, to defend the libertarian approach Kane forwards an example linked to B.F Skinner. 'Suppose a young man is on trial for an assault and robbery in which his victim was beaten to death. Let us say we attend his trail and listen to the evidence in the courtroom. At first, our thoughts of the young man are filled with anger and resentment…But as we listen daily to how he came to have the mean character and perverse motives he did have-parental neglect, child abuse, sexual abuse, bad role models- some of our resentment against the young man is shifted over to the parents...We wonder whether some residual responsibility may not belong to him'. Was he determined this way through his upbringing and environment, or was his choice totally free? Kane would claim he was totally free in his decision making, with no influence or deterministic route. To explore the understanding of free will and Skinners claim more Kane elaborates on the idea of 'garden of forking paths'. To illustrate 'suppose Jane has just graduated from Law school and she has a choice between joining a law firm in Chicago or a different firm in New York. If Jane believes her choice is a free choice (made of her own free will) she must believe both options are open to her while she is deliberating' [19] . Therefore, there is more than one path available to her in her future and she believes this choice is entirely her own free will. We can see how determinism threatens the picture of free will but Kane carries on to defends the libertarian view; if we stopped believing in free will then we would lose our sense of morality/ responsibility so free will must exist. But we can't just claim we have free will because we are under the illusion we have more than one choice. There could be a million choices, but the matter of the fact is only one of those choices is going to happen because we are determined. We are unable to choose otherwise. However, it could be argued that our reasoning is just an illusion. We like to believe we have a choice and be able to reason in situations, but it is possible that we have been pre-determined to make choices, but we just reason because we like to believe we are free. It's an illusion. We could deny determinism throughout our past and present future, but it doesn't mean we are not pre-determined.

Pereboom reacts to Kane's argument and re-examines the libertarianism arguments. He argues that 'event-causal libertarianism cannot secure responsibility-conferring control' [20] . He proves this through his own analogy. A business woman; Anne, who is in a dilemma to either decide to stop and help an assault victim, or she can refrain from so deciding. Pereboom argues that 'relevant causal conditions antecedent to this decision-agent-involving event, or, alternatively, states of agents-would leave it open whether this decision would occur, and she has no further causal role of the antecedent conditions already given, whether the decision occurs or not then settled by anything about the agent- whether it be states or events in which the agent is involved, or the agent herself' [21] . Pereboom's argument is that the agent has limited control required for her to be morally responsible. She cannot choose, nor have the desire to act upon this situation by helping the assault victim. She has no choose to do otherwise, and free will collides with this.

Schopenhauer-

Schopenhauer expressed that 'every man, being what he is and placed in the circumstances which for the moment obtain…can absolutely never do anything else than just what at that moment he does do. Accordingly, the whole course of a man's life, in all its incidents great and smell, is as necessarily predetermined as the course of a clock' [22] . A man is able to desire what one wants to do, but his actions are predetermined for him, and isn't able to choose otherwise. To explain this, Schopenhauer implies that determinism relies on two factors of an agent; their motive and their character. Our motive is causality that passes through our cognitive side; one's attention, memory, their reason. And a situation that happens at a particular time in particular circumstances 'depresses the switch on the detonator causing the explosion. This presupposes the nature of electricity and of the materials used for combustion' [23] . Another word, motivation from one's action is rooted from their personal character. This is known as their nature of the will. But what makes an agent determined, Schopenhauer explains is a reaction to the same motive will always differ in every individual. This alternatively makes up their individuality of their character. Schopenhauer calls this the empirical character as 'it is by its means that the way in which various motives affect the given man is determined' [24] . An individual's character, their mental and physical attribute is constant throughout their life, no matter what it is always immutable. 'On looking back over our past, we see at once that our life consists of mere variations on one and the same theme, namely our character, and that the same fundamental bass sounds through it all. This is an experience a man can and must make in and by himself' [25] . It could be argued that one is always changing, their character, and their physical and mental individuality. But no matter what we adapt to, or change our views, our character is always constant throughout our life because it roots back to our motive, which is our character.

It is clear that free will is a weak position, and it could be claimed it is an illusion. Determinism can follow off into many routes, as Skinner has proved- a psychological approach, and Schopenhauer through an approach of our character and motive. But it is clear that determinism holds a very strong stance. Kane recognises the conflict of determinism and free will, but doesn't do much to hold his argument. To claim that just because we feel we can debate about a choice, and we think we can do otherwise does not prove we have free will. It's an illusion that we think is happening, but in reality, we have been determined. As Skinner and Schopenhauer have proved, our environmental, and character determined who we are today and who we will be. Now we have proved free will to be an illusion, this raises another issue. If we are totally determined in our actions then how are we expected to take full responsibility for our actions. If our actions have been pre-determined from the beginning of the universe, or through our character of environmental basis, then how could we possibly take responsibility for our actions? We have no freedom in choosing our actions, therefore why shall we be punished for them?

Is Determinism/ Causal determinism compatible with moral responsibility?

After establishing that the libertarianism view cannot exist, the deterministic route now has to be examined in more depth. Free will is an illusion, admitting this means everything is determined; either through a theological, psychological, behaviour or environmental path. But this raises a significant and relevant issue within philosophy which has been evolved for many centuries; can moral responsibility exist if everything has been determined? How can we claim we have responsibility or take responsibility for our actions e.g. punishment and reward, if we have been determined this way as an individual? Firstly I shall be exploring what I actually mean by moral responsibility so the argument is more specific and clear. Then I shall be deepening my argument to see whether hard determinism can exist with full responsibility of our actions; concluding that through the hard deterministic route it is possible to have full moral responsibility.

Defining moral responsibility and determinism

Concentrating on the issue of moral responsibility, I first have to define what I mean by this. Moral responsibility refers to whether an individual holds full responsibility of their actions and morals they act upon. As Pereboom explains the term meaning 'for an agent to be morally responsible for an action is for it to belong to her in such a way that she would deserve blame is she understood that it was morally wrong, and she would deserve credit or perhaps praise is she understood that it was morally exemplary' [26] . If we take to definition of moral responsibility and link it with determinism (holding that determinism is true and in no form can be compatible with free will) we now start to build an argument. If our lives our determined for us, then why are we held responsible for our actions if our actions are not a choice we can make, they can't be prevented or chosen. Can moral responsibility exist?

Ogletree and Oberle examine whether we have the right to hold individuals responsible for their actions; blame and punish them, if they could not have done otherwise. In a research study by Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer and Turner (2005); 'examining people's thoughts on moral responsibility in a deterministic world, participants were asked to imagine a deterministic universe in the next century with a supercomputer that could predict all aspects of the future, including human behaviour, based on naturalistic laws and the current environment' [27] . The results showed that a high percentage of participants still believed that a bank robber was still morally blameworthy; 83% .These participants believed that even in a determined world; we are unable to prevent or choose our actions and desires that moral responsibility still exists. Also similar results were found within a scenario of an agent saving a child's life, 88% of the participants believed that they were praiseworthy. Also with 62% answering that the agent could not have chosen otherwise when saving the child. These scenarios and results imply that the majority of individuals believe that we are determined, we are unable to do otherwise, but also it is possible to have moral responsibility, to have praise, blame and punishment. Clark (2003,2005) and Stace (1952) 'believe that behaviour consequences should not be justified by what is fair or deserved but by what is best for people and society as a whole. These views on the effectiveness of consequences in changing behaviour are obviously based on a scientific determinism wherein 'responsibility' and 'determinism' are necessarily compatible' [28] .

However, Galen Strawson goes into depth to explain how these results don't prove that determinism and moral responsibility are compatible. Strawson's is well known for his regress argument in which he takes the view; 'you cannot make yourself who you are' [29] . He states that free will according to him is 'is the thing you have to have if you're going to be responsible in this all-or-nothing way... That's what I think we haven't got and can't have' [30] . He takes his view from Schopenhauer's famous quote of 'A man can surely do what he wants to do. But he cannot determine what he wants' [31] . Strawson implies that we do what we want as an individual because it is the circumstances in which we are in, because of who we are as a person. But to have ultimate responsibility for our actions we have to be ultimately responsible for the person we are. But Strawson point is we cannot choose how we are, therefore we cannot be ultimately responsible for what an individual does. He calls this is Basic argument; '1) Nothing can be causa sui- nothing can be the cause of itself. 2) In order to be truly morally responsible for one's actions one would have to be causa sui, at least in certain crucial mental respects. 3) Therefore nothing can be truly morally responsible' [32] . If an agent is to be truly responsible for how one act, then the agent must be responsible for how one is, morally. But what Galen's argument is suggesting, this is impossible. If we were to be truly responsible for our actions, then we would assume that we had a choice in our actions, in a reasoned and conscious fashion. But this isn't the case; only if one has already has some principles of choice in the light of which the agent chooses how to be. Galen now argues that for one to be truly morally responsible, then the agent must be responsible for having those principles of choice. But this requires 'that one must have chosen them, in a reasoned and conscious fashion. But that requires that one have principles and choice. And thus the regress' [33] . Therefore moral responsibility and determinism cannot be compatible, it contradicts itself, for one to be morally responsible for their actions, then they must hold a choice in their reasoned and conscious decision making, but this is impossible because they have no choice in how one wants to be.

Strawson depths his argument to explain how an agent cannot choose how they want to be in life. He claims that one is the way they are because of their early experience (through environment, peers, family, punishment, reward) and their heredity. But these factors aren't controllable; an individual can't expect to be held morally responsible if they were unable to choose their early experience, or heredity. If they were able to choose these factors, then we could claim that individuals would be 100% morally responsible, but this isn't the case. Strawson moves on to state that later on in life, individuals can't claim to have true responsibility for the way one is, by trying to change the way they already are (because of heredity and past experiences). If one tries to change, their degree in their success in trying to change will automatically be determined for them again. This is because it always roots back to past experience, heredity- it can't be escaped, it will always be an influence on their life and reflects on how one was. It can be referred to as a domino effect, one experience will lead to another, and another etc. Strawson does admit that some minor changes may not be the cause of heredity or early experiences; they could be completely random factors. But what Strawson is claiming is that 'it is absurd to suppose that indeterministic or random factors, for which one is ex hypothesi is no way responsible, can in themselves contribute in any way to one's being truly morally responsible for how one is'. Strawson is not challenging that people can't change the way they are, in certain respects it's possible. But people cannot be supposed to change that majorly in themselves that they become truly morally responsible for the way they are.

However, Mele develops a critique of Strawson's regress argument; he concentrates on the aspect of; to be truly responsible for how one is, one must have chosen to be that way. Mele starts with an example to carry out her argument;

'The case of Betty, a six year old child with a fear of the basement. Betty knows that no harm has come to her or others when they have ventured into the basement, and she recognised that her older sister has no fear of the basement. Betty decided that her fear is 'babyish', and that she will take steps to overcome it. Her plan is simple but effective: she will make periodic visits to the basement until she no longer feels afraid there. If Betty succeeds in eliminating her fear in this way, this is an instance of intentional self-modification' [34] .

Mele argues that the case of Betty wanting to overcome here fear, the case of 'intentional self-modification' is possible. There is no reason to suggest that they stem from an 'infinitely regressive series of choices' [35] . Her decision to phase out her fear rests on her desires and belief which ground her choice and judgement, it does not rest on her attitude that she chooses to have as Strawson suggests. Mele adds that 'if it is claimed that true responsibility for any choice, requires that the agent have chosen 'in a conscious, reasoned fashion' and attitude that grounds the choice, it is being claimed, in effects, that the very definition of true responsibility entails that the possessing such responsibility for any choice requires having made an infinitely regressive series of choices' [36] . Strawson's argument is flawed, he suggests that to be truly morally responsible for the way one is, we must have chosen to be that way- Strawson's idea is about attitude. Whereas Mele argues it's not about our attitude but it's our desires and belief which makes us morally responsible for our actions, which is proved through the analogy of Betty.

But Hospers believes that determinism takes all responsibility away from man like Strawson. He claimed that everything is determined, both internally and externally. He believes that we are unable to make any choices freely, our desires choices and decisions are all derived from a deterministic route, and therefore we could not possible hold moral responsibility. Hospers points out that if man could not have the choice to have done otherwise, then he cannot be held morally responsible for his actions. Therefore he should not be punished just for the sake of it. Although he does admit that punishment is an advantage to society, it makes sense to punish people as a deterrent and to protect people from dangerous individuals. He gives a scenario that a man is faced by choice, whether to kill or not to kill. 'Moralists would say, here is a 'free choice'- the result of deliberation, and action consciously entered into. And yet, though the agent himself does not know if, and has no awareness of the forces that are at work within him, his choice is already determined for him; his conscious mind is only an instrument, a slave, in the hands of a deeps unconscious motivation which determines his action' [37] . If humans lack freedom then they also lack moral responsibility, we cannot be responsible for an action if we cannot control that action. And in the words of Hosper, we could not choose otherwise which means we are unable to control our actions. He sums up his argument in three aspects; '1) all events and actions are causally determined by previous events and the laws of nature. 2) Causal determinism rules out human freedom and personal responsibility. 3) So, humans are not free, and neither are they personally responsible for what they do' [38] . If this is the case, then punishment makes little sense, why should individuals be held morally responsible for their actions, why should praise exist? The saint should no more be praised than the criminal should be punished.

Nichols and Knobe Paper

A paper written by Nichol and Knobe gives a very different account of moral responsibility and determinism. This paper provides experimental evidence 'that we all subscribe to an idea of moral responsibility that is inconsistent with determinism, but that we also make judgements of responsibility consistent with determinism' [39] . Many philosophers concentrate on the idea of peoples intuitions, but what Nichols and Knobe realise is that little has been said on why people have the intuitions they do; the psychological process that generates peoples intuitions. Analysing this area, could have a major impact on debates about the compatibility of moral responsibility and determinism. Nichols and Knobes present a hypothesis in order for their experiments; 'People subscribe an incompatabilist theory 2) of moral responsibility but that the other subsystems within their minds can lead them to arrive at compatibilist judgments in certain contexts' [40] . Data in order to support these hypothesis shows that peoples responses to moral responsibility can dramatically change depending on how the question was formulated. Such as, a question which triggered off a person's emotions, relating more to the question personally gives a more compatibilist response. Whereas a more abstract, theoretical question triggers a more incompatabilist response. So we can start to realise already that the moral responsibility cannot be defined to either a compatibilist or incompatablist view.

Nichols and Knobe move on to produce a hypothesis scenario, relating to affect blame and the attribution of responsibility. A scenario in which they ask people whether they think the agent is morally responsible or not. This differs from what philosophers tend to concentrate on, such as Frankfurt style because this checks to see how peoples intuitions are affected. It is a more personal approach, to focus on the role of affect in generating intuitions about moral responsibility. Their hypothesis is they 'when people are confronted with a story about an agent who performs a morally bad behaviour, this can trigger an immediate emotions response, and this emotions response can play a crucial role in the persons intuition about whether the agent was morally responsible' [41] . Watson gives an example of this from the Robert Harris case (1987). Watson provides people with quotes from a newspaper of how Harris brutally murdered innocent people, showing no remorse. But he also presents is equal detail of the horrible abuse Harris went through as he was growing up. Watson proves that a readers intuitions about the case may be swayed by her emotions, rather than simply working out their theory of moral responsibility. They would believe it was unpreventable, it was not fault. He states that 'previous studies of peoples moral responsibility intuitions all featured deterministic agents and therefore were designed in a way that would tend to trigger affective reactions. Our own study provides an opportunity to see how people's intuitions are altered when the stimuli are designed in a way that keeps affective reactions to a minimum' [42] . Even still, if we are determined as a person, moral responsibility can still exist. For example, a child was pre-determined to be abused as a child. That child then grows up as an adult and has a baby of their own, and abuses their child (like a domino effect). We can all admit this is wrong, some would argue that it is unpreventable because the adult was abused as a child, they didn't know any different. But the adult has to take some responsibility, as we all know right from wrong. Yes, he was wrong for abusing his child and it was unpreventable, but what we have to remember is for the sake of society he has to be punished. If we all just claimed, I was determined this way, I was determined to make that act, then there would be no difference between right and wrong. There would be no praise and punishment, and society would be a mess. There would be no order, no justice. So if we were to look at moral responsibility through the eyes of society and law, as Bentham would say 'the greatest good for the greatest number'. People may have been determined, but they also need to be held morally responsible.

However, Laplace argues that society doesn't necessarily matter. It should revolve around the indivudals. They shouldn't be punished if they have no choice or done otherwise. Laplace states that

'We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past and the cause of its future. An intellect which at a certain moment would know all forces that set nature in motion, and all positions of all items of which nature is composed, if this intellect were also vast enough to submit these data to analysis, it would embrace in a single formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the tiniest atom; for such an intellect nothing would be uncertain and the future just like the past would be present before its eyes' [43] .

Everything according to Laplace is pre-determined, there is no such existence as choice, chance and certainty as the past completely determines the future. Every particle in the universe can be predicted through laws of classical physics. This 'intellect' Laplace described has been renamed as Laplace's Demon. This demon knows the position and forces on all the particles of the universe at one time. Due to the position of the demon, it is possible for the demon to predict every event in the future in detail. Laplace claimed that the 'the demon could predict where your body would be, and how it would be moving next year from its knowledge of the positions and velocities of the particle in the universe a million years ago'. The laws of physics predict our future, it is pre-determined for us from the start of the universe. Laplace's analogy of the demon gives an insight to what we mean by causal determinism. But the question raise not is; is casual determinism compatible with moral responsibility? Or is moral responsibility just an illusion like free will.

Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP)

The principle of Alternative possibilities states that if determinism is true, then one cannot be morally responsible for their actions. This is because a person can only be morally responsible for their actions is they had the choice to act otherwise. But this has been a dispute among philosophers for many years.

Harry Frankfurt sets out to disprove and attack the principle of alternative possibilities, to prove that we are denied from freely choosing alternative possibilities. Frankfurt argues that an agent could have done otherwise only if causal determinism is false. A standard case for Frankfurt goes as follows;

'Chad has just entered a voting booth and is about to vote for either Mr. Good or Mr. Bad. It turns out that is Chad is going to decide to vote for Mr. Bad at t2 and do so at t, his brain will be in brain state BAD at t. Unbeknownst to Chad, a computer chip has been implanted in his brain and is programmed to do the following. If it detects that Chad's brain is in brain state BAD at t1, the chip will do nothing. If it does not detect that Chad's brain is in brain state Bad at t1, the chip will make an impulse that causes Chad to decide to vote for Mr. Bad at t2 and do so at t3. In fact, if so happens that at t1, the computer chip detects that Chad's brain is in brain state BAD. So, the computer chip does nothing and on his own, Chad decides to vote for Mr. Bad at t2 and then does so at t3' [44] .

Frankfurt argues that first glance of this analogy seems that Chad is morally responsible for his action of voting for Mr. Bad. However, he concludes that PAP is false; 'it is not true that one is responsible for what one has done only if one could have done otherwise', because Chad could not have done otherwise with the computer chips interference, either way he could only come to the conclusion to vote for Mr. Bad. He argues that 'the principle of alternate possibilities is false. A person may well be morally responsible for what he has done even though he could not have done otherwise. The principle's plausibility is an illusion, which can be made to vanish by bringing the relevant moral phenomena into sharper focuses. To deepen the argument he talks about a clever demon or intervener who is able to interfere with one's decision if the agent is planning on making a different decision from the demon. The demon then blocks any alternative possibilities from the agent's mind, so it could be argued that the agent is then left to freely choose the one possible course of action which is desired by the demon.

However, this possibly can't be the agents free choice, the demon is doing the choice making and limiting the agent's decision making to choose the course of action the demon desires. Therefore, how could the agent possibly be morally responsible? The agent has no other alternative possibility. Also, it has also been argued by Widerker through 'principle of reasonable expectations' that in order for the demon to know whether to block an action there would have existed a prior sign, knowledge that the action was going to happen. Therefore the agent freely chooses this knowledge. Widerker argues that 'an agent is morally blameworthy for a given act only if, in the circumstances, it would be morally reasonable to expect the agent to have done something else…this plausible principle presupposes that there is something else the agent could have done in the circumstances and thus provides support for PAP'.

However Mele and Robb set out to establish a successful argument against PAP to prove that we do obtain moral responsibility within casual determinism. To present their argument they use an example of a scenario that concerns how it is that Carl decides to steal Ann's car, this is known as CAR. The scenario goes as follows; Carl has various decision nodes in his brain. The only way Carl is able to make a decision is if a node is activated in his brain. The node is like a button, it gets activated when it gets depressed by either the right or left arm of a seesaw. Every arm of the seesaw in Carl's brain holds a cup, and when the arm moves down and depressed the button beneath the cup-then Carl makes a decision. Carl has to consider making a decision for the bb to enter the cup. For example 'say that one decision node, STEAL, corresponds to the decision to steal Ann's car, and another, NOT STEAL, not to steal it. We can visualize Carl's consideration of what to do in the following way' [45] . Carl is not choosing where is move his bb, instead the movement merely mirrors what Carl is considering at the moment. For instance 'even if Carl is about to decide to steal the car-that is, even if Carls bb is nearly in, say the right cup of the seesaw about STEAL-at the last instance, Carl may decide not to steal the car-that is, NOT STEAL may become depressed by, say, the right arm of that node's seesaw since Carl's bb landed in the seesaw's right cup' [46] . Carl's decision is under normal circumstances; however Mele and Robbs have slightly altered this case in three ways in order to prove that Carl is morally responsible for his actions, whilst he is also determined.

The first way in which this scenario has been altered is; all the seesaws in Carl's brain have a right arm bias. This effects Carls brain as if a bb happens to land in both the right and left of the seesaws cups at the same time, then the right arm is biased. This right arm will tip downwards depressing the button below it, which will therefore clarify Carl's decision. Secondly, in addition to Carls bb in his brain, there is also another bb affecting him; known as the black bb. The black implanted in Carl's brain is at t2. This implanted black bb does 2 things to affect Carl's brain; it disables all the decision nodes in Carl's brain except for STEAL. And just before t2, it lands in the left cup of STEALS seesaw. This ensures that if Carl's bb isn't in that seesaws right cup at that time, then the left arm will move downwards. Therefore, this activates the decision node thereby causing Carl to decide to steal Ann's car at t2. Thirdly, both the Black bb and bb land in their seesaw cups at the same time, bb in the right and black bb in the left cup. However, because of the seesaws right arm bias, this results in the right arm tipping downwards depressing the button at t2. Therefore, Carl decided on his own to steal Ann's car. Even if Carl's bb did not land in the right cup of STEALS seesaw just when it did, the left arm containing black's bb in its cup would have tipped downwards. Therefore, this scenario proving that either way Carl would have still decided to steal Ann's Car.

CAR intends to show that Carl is morally responsible for his actions, even if he could not have done otherwise. Carl on his own was able to make the decision to steal Ann's car, but also at the same time the right arm of STEALS seesaw depresses the node's button at t2. Carl understood and on his own made that decision, being totally responsible for his actions, but also we have to bear in mind the important fact is that Carl could not have choose to do otherwise. This is due to the interference of black's bb (disable all decision node's besides STEAL). Therefore, Mele and Robb's seem to collapse PAPS argument and ensure that through the example of CAR it ensures that we are determined, but yet we are morally responsible for our action.

Also other studies such as Nahmias (Nahmias, morris, Nadelhoffer and Turner 2006) used scenarios, like PAP to prove that by believing are actions are determined, it does not reduce our responsibility for moral actions. One scenario is as follows; 'the universe is re-created many times, always with the same natural laws and the same beginning conditions; participants are told that everything happens exactly the same in all re-creations of the universe. Jill, a person in this universe, is portrayed as stealing a necklace at the same time in every re-creation of the universe. Of the participants in the study, 77% though Jill was morally responsible. Comparable results were found for identical twins Fred and barney, who wither reared by a selfish (Fred) or kindly (Barney) family who, upon finding a wallet with 1000 in it, chose either to keep or return the wallet'. [47] Just like Mele and Robbs argument, these studies implies that just because we don't have the choose to do otherwise, doesn't mean we don't have moral responsibility. This may just suggest that people are unwilling to give up their notion of moral responsibility, but if we think we are morally responsabile in our actions then doesn't this mean we held just a bit of responsibility? Such as, an individual has a car crash and serious injures someone, we could claim this was determined to happen. However, the guilt of seriously hurting the other injured party, doesn't this suggest we may just hold a bit of moral reponsability?

This debate of whether moral responsibility can exist through determinism holds a strong stance. Frankfurt's PAP argument is strong in defending his claim that moral responsibility cannot. However, Mele and Robbs case against PAP using their own analogy of CAR flaws their argument. The laws of nature determined Carl's decision to steal the car by the seesaw depressing the node's button. Carl could not have done otherwise because of the black's bb. But Carl made his own decision to steal the Ann's car too it was just the fact of the seesaws right arm bias that determined him. Therefore, Carl made his decision to steal Ann's car, being totally morally responsible for his action. This flaws Frankfurt's argument but realises a secure and strong argument of how it is possible for an agent to be determined, but yet hold moral responsibility.

Conclusion

In conclusion to this research, I hold that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism. Firstly, I flawed the idea of free will existing, but proved it is an illusion. As Skinner proved, we are constantly being influenced by external causes. Our past experiences, heredity, and environment. The study of the Skinner box supporting this claim; the animal knew that the leaver will only realise food when the light was on. The animal learnt this over a period of time, therefore it learnt from past experiences that the leaver would not realise food if the light was off. The same in any circumstances, a child learns not to do certain acts, such as kick or punch, otherwise it would be punished. We experience things every day, and this is what influences us when making decisions or choices in the future. We are unable to escape our past; therefore we can never be totally free. Some may believe that we are free, but this is an illusion as I have earlier proved.

Kane's argument of free will is outdated and weak. We can't suggest that just because we are rational beings enables us to have free will. Yes, being rational allows us to reason as humans, but this doesn't necessarily mean we are free. We may believe we have reason and this contributes to our decision making, but in reality we are pre-determined in decision making because we are constantly being influenced by past experiences. Such as, an individual could come to reason not to exceed the speed limit. But how has this individual come to the conclusion of this? This is not a random choice. The individual has had past experiences of police pulling over people for exceeding the limit, with fines and the loose of licences, or they could have seen a TV commercial warning them. The littlest past experience we think has no effect, or we can't even remember having the experience, this will always affect us. And it will affect us in decision making. We are unable to claim that we made a freely choice, when there is always something external influencing us.

Strawson's argument of humans being pre-determined therefore we are unable to attain moral responsibility, seems a reliable and fair argument. Yes, to be truly moral responsible we must have chosen to be that way in the first place. If we try to change the way one is, we are automatically determined again because it all roots back from our past experiences. Therefore we cannot be morally responsible. However Mele succeeds in Flawing Strawson's arguments by using the analogy of Betty and her fear of basements. Strawson's argument relies more on our attitude- we are unable to choose who we are. But Mele's rests on desires and beliefs that ground our choice and judgement which is proved through the analogy of Betty. She desired to overcome this fear, which she does, suggesting she is able to be morally responsible and determined because of her desires.

Mele and Robbs also succeed in the case against PAP using their own analogy of CAR; which proves that individuals are able to attain moral responsibility but yet are determined too. Carl was determined to make the decision of stealing Ann's car by the bias of the seesaws right arm. But yet he was held responsible for his choice because Carl also made his own decision entirely on his own to steal- but yet Carl could not have done otherwise. Mele sets out throughout this research to hold a very strong stance on her argument- flawing both Strawson and Frankfurt. Therefore concluding that it is possible for an agent to have moral responsibility but yet be determined.