A Practical Challenge To Cosmopolitan Universalism Philosophy Essay

Published Date: 23 Mar 2015

Universalism is the position that moral values applies universally regardless of culture, religion, nationality, ethnicity, race, gender or sexuality. Universalism is popular position. It can be found in as diverse schools of thought as the Stoics, Christianity, human rights proponents and utilitarian theorists. In this paper, I will use cosmopolitanism as an illustration of universalism. The cosmo-politan outlook is that justice ought to be implemented on a global scale regardless of national borders and cultural and ethnic affiliations. In my opinion, cosmopolitanism is the most coherent formulation of universalism regarding moral values and, thus, it deserves special attention.

For the purpose of this introduction, it might be enlightening to contrast cosmopolitan universalism with relativism about moral values. While universalism holds that there exists some universal moral values, which are applicable in every culture, relativism claims that morality is culturally determined. Likewise, when cosmopolitanism maintain that we have the same duties towards all people, whether they be born on the other side of the globe or in our home city, relativism in contrast argue that we have different duties towards different people solely because of their cultural, social, national or local attachment to us.

I do not kid myself that I will be able to adequately address every interesting aspect of abovementioned debate. Instead, I will strive to analyze the underlying assumptions of cosmopolitanism, namely that moral values are universal, and investigate and discuss whether this universalism is compatible with how humans actually think about each other and moral values. My hypothesis is that this exploration might constitute a practical challenge for cosmopolitan universalism.

I am aware that this pragmatic and experimental approach is not the traditional modus operandi of philosophy. However, I believe that it is an unfortunate tendency that moral and political philosophy often omits empirical considerations about moral and social psychology. I will not elaborate on this tendency - the paper's scope is not infinite - so for the argument's sake, I hope that everyone is willing to assume that there is some value to actual empirical assessments about morality.

Universalism: the stuff of cosmopolitanism

Cosmopolitanism is, as hinted, the theory that there exist universally valid moral principles that ought to dictate our moral duties even across borders and group affiliations. To be more specific, Thomas Pogge (1992) has argued that cosmopolitanism possesses three constitutive elements. He explains:

Three elements are shared by all cosmopolitan positions. First, individualism: the ultimate units of concern are human beings, or persons - rather than, say, family lines, tribes, ethnic, cultural, or religious communities, nations, or states. The latter may be units of concern only indirectly, in virtue of their individual members or citizens. Second, universality: the status of ultimate unit of concern attaches to every living human being equally - not merely to some subset, such as men, aristocrats, Aryans, whites, or Muslims. Third, generality, this status has global force. Persons are ultimate units of concern for everyone - not only for their compatriots, fellow religionists, or such like. (Pogge 1992: 48-49)

Simon Caney agrees with this definition, though he calls the three elements "the worth of individuals, equality, and the existence of obligations binding on all" (Caney 2005: 4). He summarizes cosmopolitanism as the view that "all persons are of equal moral worth and everyone has duties to other human beings" (Caney 2005: 5). Even though all cosmopolitan moral theories share these elements, the specifics of the theories vary greatly. Some might believe that a teleological approach is to be preferred (most rigorously suggested by Singer 1972), while others defend cosmopolitanism from a deontological viewpoint (most famously by Kant). However, as this paper will primarily focus on the claims about generality and the existence of obligations binding all, I will therefore not waste precious space detailing these differences. I will, instead, focus on the claim that we should embrace the view of a single, global community in which moral duties and demands transcend the boundaries of social, national and local groups.

Caney makes (at least) four important assertions about this cosmopolitan version of universalism. The cosmopolitan universalism, Caney notes, implies universalism of scope; that not every value is universal; that there is an overlapping consensus on some values; and that these values are applicable only in certain situations. By universalism of scope, Caney simply means that the content of the universal values apply to everyone in the world regardless of whether they are universally accepted. This is the basic element of universal nature of cosmopolitanism. However, as stated in the second assertion, not every value is universal. Cosmopolitan universalism accepts some differences in moral values from culture to culture. Cosmopolitan universalism, as suggested in the third assertion, even allows different cultural justifications of the universal values as long as they constitute an overlapping consensus. And finally, cosmopolitan universalism asserts that similar actions based on the universal values might actually be right in some situations and wrong in others because of different expectations or conditions. I believe that this is a sound and coherent version of universalism.

Caney suggests one compelling conceptual argument for the universal element of cosmopolitanism. It can be stated as the following:

(P1) There are valid moral principles.

(P2) Moral principles that apply to some persons apply to all persons who share some common morally properties.

(P3) Persons throughout the world share some morally relevant similarities.

(C) There are some moral principles with universal form and universal scope.

(P1) asserts that moral skepticism is wrong. Caney find this claim uncontroversial [1] and moves on to (P2), which according to Caney is even less controversial because it is merely a truism. The contentious premise is thus (P3), which holds that people around the world holds some properties in common. Caney argues that all humans share the same needs and vulnerabilities such as we require food, water, shelter, rest, companionship, security and respect to live and function. Furthermore, there might also be some universal goods such as life, bodily health, friendship, play and so forth that we all strive for. Either way, Caney finds it plausible that we share some common properties that are morally relevant. Therefore, Caney believes that (C) can be inferred and universalism as understood in cosmopolitanism is established.

Caney also delivers six conceptual counterarguments against this cosmopolitan universalism. I have shuffled the order a bit but the arguments can be stated as the following:

Universalism is flawed because it is committed to the idea of a human nature.

Universalism is false to the experience of moral reflection.

Universalism is impossible because moral argument takes place within historical traditions.

Universalism is proved wrong because of widespread moral disagreement.

Universalism is too abstract.

Universalism is unable to provide an account of moral motivation.

(1) holds that there is no clear human nature shared by everyone and, thus, it is wrong to suggest that we all share some morally relevant similarities. Caney rejects this counterargument because it confuses commonality with identity. The view of communality holds a few properties in common, such as the capacity to feel pain, while identity delivers a detailed and throughout account of what it is to be human. Universalism is, of course, about communality but not identity.

(2) advances that universalism is wrong because it implies that moral reasoning is about discovering or inventing moral values. But in actuality, we interpret the appropriate moral values from our social practices. When we reason about morality, we do not believe that we discover or invent and follow universal principles. Rather, we believe that we try to observe and obey to the shared values of our specific culture. However, this does not ring true with our experiences regarding moral reasoning. We do not argue that slavery or rape is wrong because of the specific consensus in our culture but because we sincerely believe that slavery or rape is universally wrong.

(3) claims that we all look at moral dilemmas from our own unique and specific point of view in history and society, and, thus, the universal view that equates everyone everywhere is impossible. However, even though we might be influenced by our societal position and our historical traditions, this does not mean that universalism is wrong. Universalism does not presuppose that we view moral dilemmas outside history or culture. Universalism only needs (P1)-(P3).

(4) proposes that the extensive disagreement between cultures invalidates universalism. Even one of the most basic moral values - that everyone should be treated equally - can be unanimously agreed upon. But a lot of the supposed disagreement is not really disagreements. Even though there are many culturally and religiously different rationalizations, there is also a lot of convergence and overlapping consensus on moral values such as it is wrong to kill innocent people and steal. Moreover, the mere fact disagreements do not really refute universalism and support relativism. It is conceivable for there to be widespread disagreement about questions with an objective and correct answer. For instance, many people did not believe that the Earth was flat. However, the simple fact of this disagreement does not mean the shape of the Earth was a relative matter.

(5) argues that universalism is too abstract to have practical relevance in the real world. Moral values should be formulated with acute regard to the specific historical, economic and social contexts in which humans live. For instance, cosmopolitanism might encourage democracy but democracy is only a viable option under certain socio-economic and cultural conditions. Universalism does not take this into account. On the contrary, cosmopolitan universalism is rather explicit about it being universal in scope and jurisdiction. However, Caney believes that this objection is flawed inter alia because it does not disprove universal principles, it just "shows that they should be combined with a proper recognition of historical and social circumstances" (Caney 2005: 40). Furthermore, while democracy might be conditional to certain historical circumstances, not every moral principle is limited in this manner. Take the opposition to murder, for instance. This opposition is not as dependent on historical specifics.

(6) posits that universalism fails to motivate human beings. This objection maintains that moral principles apply to people only if they can motivate them but that universal moral principles fail to do just that. Only culturally specific principles can do this and only criticism that draws on local understandings can have an effect. Caney replies that universal principles might actually resonate with some people and even if they do not and no one is inspired to action by them, this does not invalidate them. He concludes that "even if political philosophy does not induce any change, it is relevant" (Caney 2005: 42).

Caney believes that his argument for universalism and his treatment of the six counterarguments show that cosmopolitan universalism is a plausible and defensible position. I will not go into detail with the elements of Caney's cosmopolitanism. As mentioned, I am more interested in the universal aspect of every cosmopolitan theory than the exact recommendations.

Ought implies can

One of the main opponents of cosmopolitan universalism is communitarianism. Where cosmopolitan universalism insists that its moral principles as universally true, communitarians argue that the standards of justice depends on the particular societies and vary from context to context. I will not delve into the finer aspects of communitarianism, which is a wildly diverse theory in itself; however, I would like to introduce what I call the philosophical anthropology of communitarianism.

The philosophical anthropology of communitarianism is its general account of what it means to be a human amid other humans. Basically, communitarianism holds that we see of ourselves "as members of this family or community or nation or people, as bearers of that history, as citizens of this republic" (Sandel 1984: 90). In other words, we are constituted by our actual commitments and attachments, and cosmopolitan universalism neglects this important fact:

To imagine a person incapable of constitutive attachments such as these is not to conceive an ideally free and rational agent, but to imagine a person wholly without character, without moral depth. For to have character is to know that I move in a history I neither summon nor command, which carries consequences nonetheless for my choices and conduct. It draws me closer to some and more distant from others; it makes some aims more appropriate, others less so. (Sandel 1984: 90-91)

The point of this swift change of scene is not that I want to defend the communitarian belief that we owe some sort of loyalty to our nation because our identity is tied to our nation. I simply want to note the philosophical anthropology of communitarianism. That is to say, I actually appreciate the cosmopolitans' arguments, yet I believe that they might be guilty of overlooking an important detail that the communitarians in a roundabout way pick up on: Our nature as human beings. The point is that cosmopolitans are very casual when portraying their moral theories' compatibility with our actual dispositions and temperament as humans.

In other words, cosmopolitan universalism seems to neglect the important fact that 'ought' implies 'can'. I think that we only ought to do something if we can actually do it. It is silly to demand that we prevent crimes being done on the other side of the world right in this moment since it is not a realistic demand. Similarly, I would argue that a moral theory that orders extreme acts of altruism such as sacrificing the life of yourself and your family for the benefit of a handful of strangers is not making realistic demands. History and psychology show that it is simply not within the capabilities of ordinary humans to do something like that. Of course, the demands of cosmopolitanism are not quite as ludicrous. But I still believe that it is a worthwhile endeavor to examine if the 'oughts' of cosmopolitanism are easily or strenuously achieved. This argument obviously mirrors Caney's counterargument (6) but instead of being speculative, my analysis is concerned with facts.

To reiterate, I will in the following sections explore how the demands of cosmopolitanism correspond with our nature as humans. My aim is to investigate if there is a mismatch between our cognitive faculties and the demands of cosmopolitanism. As a parallel, it is obvious that humans are limited when it comes to raw data processing. We cannot multiply twenty-digit numbers in our heads and it would be inappropriate to demand that we do. Likewise, my objective is to investigate if we are fundamentally limited when it comes to reasoning about and acting on the universal decrees of cosmopolitanism. One can say, while Caney contends that humans have common needs and seek common goods, I want to examine if we also have common deficiencies.

What's the deal with humans?

Humans are amazingly complex. Even the most unexceptional undertaking such as writing this very word is the result of computational brain activity and motoric movement way beyond the scope of other animals and present-day artificial intelligence. Consequently, I will not even dare to outline the fine characteristics of the human nature and the accompanying spectrum of societies. It is a mammoth task that would definitely be a step too far away from the subject of this paper. Instead, I will focus on the parts that are relevant for this paper. This means that I will try to explain the processes and emotions that govern group behavior. I have chosen group behavior for the simple reason that the cosmopolitan universalism leads to the view of a global moral community in which social, national and local affiliations are morally insignificant; in other words, a world which orders significantly less or maybe even none discriminatory and prejudiced group behavior.

Before I move on, it is probably a good idea to define groups and group behavior. I follow Henri Tajfel (1982) in the following characterizations.

Firstly, a collection of individuals must fulfill two criteria to be a group: an external criterion and an internal criterion. The external criterion simply stipulates that there must be some consensus amongst nonmembers that the group exists. Usually, this external acknowledgment results in naming and labeling the group such as "Danes," "liberals" or "students." In return, the internal criterion demands that the members of the group identifies with the group. That means that they must be aware of their membership, they must place some evaluative value on their membership and they must have an emotional investment in this awareness and evaluation. So, it is only when these two criteria are satisfied that it is possible to talk about groups.

Secondly, group behavior is about how and why individuals simplify their impressions of other individuals to form ideas of ingroups and outgroups and how they act upon these ideas in relation to these groups. In other words, it is about both prejudice and discrimination. Group behavior is not to be confused with group action, which is when a lot of individuals coordinate and take action in order to achieve a shared goal. In contrast, group behavior is usually uncoordinated and the individuals might not act upon shared goals. Obviously, this means that group behavior is not studied and explained on a collective level. The study of group behavior is social psychology, not sociology.

So, just how common is group behavior amongst humans? The short answer is very common. An overwhelming and comprehensive body of research shows that humans tend to have very strong group biases. We simply favor members of our own group and discriminate against members of other groups.

Our ingroup bias is so deep-rooted that we even act upon them when we are assigned to random and meaningless groups. The most famous demonstration of this is the Minimal Group Paradigm study (Tajfel et al. 1971). In this experiment, 64 teenage boys from the same school were divided in two groups and told that they participated in a study of visual judgments. They were then shown a varying number of dots and asked to estimate how many dots there were shown. The first group of boys was told that people have an innate tendency to either overestimate or underestimate the number of the dots but that neither of these tendencies was related to accuracy, while the other group was told that some people are simply more accurate than other. After the boys had estimated the amount of dots shown, the boys were asked to help with another experiment about monetary decisions. For the ease of this other experiment, they were told that they had been grouped on the basis of the visual judgments that they had just made. In reality, the two groups of boys were randomly split up between "underestimators" and "overestimators" and "better accuracy" and "worse accuracy". The boys were then told that in the new experiment their task would be to assign real money to the other boys, but that they wouldn't know who exactly they were rewarding or penalizing, just that they didn't have to worry about rewarding or penalizing themself. So, the boys were handed forms that they had to fill out where some of the boxes read "these are rewards and penalties for member no. _ of your group" or "these are rewards and penalties for member no. _ of the other group." Tajfel (1970) considers the results "striking" and "at a very high level of statistical significance." (Tafjel 1970: 101): A large majority of the boys - regardless of they were "underestimators" or "overestimators" or have "better accuracy" or "worse accuracy" - gave significantly more money to members of their own group than to members of the other group. Despite the fact that a lot of the boys were close friends, despite the fact that their own monetary rewards were not affected by their choices and despite the fact that the amount of money was not inconsequential. Tajfel concludes:

Inasmuch as they could not know who was in their group and who was in the other group, they could have adopted either of two reasonable strategies. They could have chosen the maximum-joint-profit point of the matrices, which would mean that the boys as a total group would get the most money out of the experimenters, or they could choose the point of maximum fairness [which is would mean that the boys gave everyone the same amount]. Indeed, they did tend to choose the second alternative when their choices did not involve a distinction between ingroup and outgroup. As soon as this differentiation was involved, however, they discriminated in favor of the ingroup. (Tajfel 1970: 101)

This experiment is not a one-off. Other experiments have shown exactly the same. Marilynn Brewer (1979) has reviewed the earliest of these experiments, while Elliot Aronson et al. (2009) have discussed later experiments. The consensus seems to be that even when we are not involved in any conflicts of interest and have no past history of attitudes of intergroup hostility, we are susceptible to discriminating behavior. This holds true even when we have absolutely nothing to gain from favoring our group. The only thing needed to achieve discrimination is minimally salient groups. Even if these groups are completely randomly made and irrelevant to the decision at hand.

Furthermore, this tendency to discriminate is complemented by a tendency to hold intergroup prejudices. We believe that ingroups and outgroups are more homogeneous than they really are and we overvalue the ingroup and devalue the outgroup. Susan Fiske (2008) has gathered a lot of research on the subject. I will only turn my attention to one of these studies (Rabbie & Wilkens 1971). In this study, 72 male subjects were randomly divided into groups of three and paired with another group. Then the paired groups were led to expect to engage in an interactive task either in competition with the other group or independent of the other group. Both prior to the interaction phase and after the interaction phase, the men were asked to rate the ingroup and outgroup members on six traits. Before interaction, the men showed significant bias in the difference between ingroup and outgroup ratings. Following interaction, whether the task was performed in competition or independently of the other group, the degree of bias in favor of ingroup members increased significantly. Thus, not only do the minimal group demarcations produce prejudices but the effect of actual interaction enhances favoritism toward ingroup members even when there is no competition.

Why we do as we do

It is safe to say that group behavior significantly shapes human behavior: The tendency to form ingroups and distinguish them from outgroups is one the most well-established facts of social psychology. However, it is one thing to document this behavior but it is a something completely else to explain it. It is no surprise, then, that they are as many different explanations as there are psychologists trying to explain the behavior.

It seems reasonable to try and explain our group behavior by the role it plays in our actual and everyday social life. Henri Tajfel and John Turner (1986) have done just that. Their hypothesis is called the Social Identity Theory. It stipulates that being a member of a group gives a sense of identity and self-esteem. When we see ourselves as part of a group, we give ourselves a sense of belonging in the social world and that betters our self-image. As one might expect, we then try to increase our self-esteem by enhancing the status of our group and by discriminating and holding prejudiced views against other groups. Fans of different sports teams are good examples of this. They faithfully follow and enthusiastically cheer for their own team while sincerely loathing the rival teams. And it is all done because they want to feel a sense of belonging and boost their self-esteem.

Another possible explanation is the Optimal Distinctiveness Theory by Brewer (1991). This theory states that we want to attain an optimal balance between the need to belong and the need to feel distinct and unique. Groups can simultaneously fulfill these two needs. We can feel that we belong to a group but nevertheless feel distinct from the other groups in our environment.

Other functions of group behavior and group bias have also been suggested, for instance self-insight and ingroup cooperation (Aharpour & Brown 2002), uncertainty reduction (Hogg 2000) and social interaction (Deaux et al. 1999). All of these explanations share the observable notion that groups play an important role in constructing our identity.

There is a lot of truth to be found in these explanations. But the task of this paper is to figure out if we are so fundamentally limited in our reasoning and behavior that cosmopolitan universalism is unrealistic. Thus, I have to answer the question that goes is this behavior innate?

I believe that it is both useful and possible - with a bit of ingenuity and elbow grease - to divide the answers to this question along the lines of the debate over whether nature or nurture molds human character and behavior. In other words, some emphasizes the effect of our social environment and human malleability, while other accentuates our evolutionary past and instinctive nature.

The extreme proponents of the first school of thought contend that humans are incredibly malleable and receptive to our social surroundings and that almost none of our behavior is inborn. They believe that children like candy because parents use candy as a reward for eating vegetables. They argue that teenagers are inspired to compete in looks and fashion from getting grades at an early age and participating in spelling bees. They claim that boys are aggressive and fight with each other because they are given weapons as toys. And they assert that group biases are the product of an education and upbringing that exacerbates racial, ethnic, national, political and gender-specific differences instead of reducing them. The most clear-cut statement of this belief probably belongs to the famous anthropologist Ashley Montagu who wrote: "Man is man because he has no instincts, because everything he is and has become he has learned, acquired, from his culture, from the man-made part of the environment, from other human beings" (Montagu 1973: 9). [2] This belief that humans are supremely malleable can be traced back throughout human history. The most famous supporter of the view is Karl Marx who argued that the modes of production dictate the social life and that "it is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness" (Marx 1859). Of course, the consequence of this view is that any statement about our natural capacity for language, our instinctive love of family or our innate tendency to group behavior is fundamentally erroneous. This would be great for cosmopolitan universalism because implementing cosmopolitanism - both morally and politically - would then only be a question of restructuring the social and political worlds in a way that eliminates group biases.

However, the idea of extreme malleability flies in the face of overwhelming empirical evidence that clearly suggest that there exist some innate behavioral tendencies (Barkow, Cosmides & Tooby 1992). To be fair, none of the aforementioned psychologists who tried to explain group behavior by its social function would probably challenge this objection to the extreme nurture position. They all accept that our evolutionary past have greatly influenced the human mind. Thus, the question I should really try to answer can be reformulated to how innate is our group behavior?

This question leads to the second school of thought that holds that a significant amount of our behavior can be explained by evolutionary psychology and behavioral genetics. The extreme proponents of this thought argue that they have found specific genes which greatly affect IQ levels, personality, antisocial behavior and sexual orientation. They have even found genes that increase the chances of having certain preferences for arm folding and hand clasping. They also believe that group behavior stems from actual genetic differences between groups. This theory is called the Genetic Similarity Theory (Rushton 1989, 2005). The theory postulates two things: Firstly, it hypothesizes that we tend to be more helpful and kind to those who are genetically similar to ourselves and that we tend to be more hostile to those who are less genetically similar. This is a relatively uncontroversial hypothesis that on a surface level resembles the idea of kin selection. Secondly, The Genetic Similarity claims that the members of an ethnic group to some degree are genetically similar. We simply share more genes with people in our ethnic group than people from different ethnic groups. The supporters of this theory point towards research which show that a grandfather has about the same genetic overlap with his grandchild in contrast to a random person from his ethnic group as a random person has with another person taken from within his ethnic group compared to a person from outside his ethnic group (Salter 2006). Therefore, ethnic groups are comparable to very large extended families. So, group biases are a spillover product of our innate tendency to favor our own ethnic group and group behavior is not so much about social identity as it is about spreading our genes. Kevin MacDonald concludes:

This in turn suggests a genetic basis for xenophobia independent of the theory of groups - that the liking and disliking of others facilitated by this system is independent of whether the other is a member of a socially designated (culturally constructed) ingroup or outgroup. (MacDonald 2001: 68)

The Genetic Similarity Theory does not bode well for cosmopolitan universalism. If it is true, cosmopolitan universalism is not just difficult but directly against our natural tendency to spread our genes by furthering our own ethnic group. However, the Genetic Similarity Theory and the extreme proponents of the innateness might have went a bridge (or ten) too far when determining how innate our group behavior is. Bluntly put, ethnicity is not genetic category. Humans are actually a remarkably uniform species. The chimpanzee subspecies living just in Western Africa have higher levels of diversity than humans (Ebersberger et al. 2002). Besides a very small fraction of genes influencing visible physical features, there is no evidence to suggest that there is a distinct biological basis for different ethnic groups (or races, for that matter). [3] So even though there might be many locally differentiated ethnic groups, they all share a single lineage (Templeton 1999). Furthermore, the genetic differences within ethnic groups are much, much greater than the differences between these groups. The differences among groups only constitute 3 to 5% of our genetic variation (Rosenberg et al. 2002). Even Jews who deliberately only procreate with other Jews tend to be genetically similar to their non-Jewish neighbors. [4] Finally, the supporters of the theory - and the extreme proponents of innateness in general - sometimes sound like they believe that we literally strive to replicate our genes. If that is how we worked, there would be enormous queues outside every sperm bank. But we do not act like that. That is because the evolutionary pressure of spreading our genes only means that our inherited cognitive and emotional systems have a design that would have led to survival and reproduction in the environment in which our oldest ancestors lived.

As one might have guessed by now, I propose to take the middle ground in the debate over nature versus nurture. To call my position the middle ground might sound like a cheap rhetorical trick, but it actually is the middle: I see great value in evolutionary psychology. A considerable chunk of our behavior, reasoning and emotions are clearly products of evolution. Our concept of beauty, while differing on the specifics, overall corresponds to signs of health and fertility just as if it has evolved to help us find the fittest mate. Hundreds of such traits, from fear of snakes to the idea of the self being distinguished from others, from envy to crying, from taboos to moral sentiments, can be found in every society ever documented (Brown 1991). However, I do not dismiss social explanations. Culture is important. For instance, ethnic differences are mostly products of culture. The language, habits and norms of specific ethnic groups are obviously culturally determined. Additionally, theories such as Social Identity Theory might also be more apt to utilize if we want to understand and be able to counteract everyday existing group behavior. But most importantly, it is actually really difficult to clearly distinguish nature from nurture and vice versa. Pierre van den Berghe - who tries to take the middle ground himself albeit fails to do so [5] - explains why nature and nurture (and environment) cannot be separated:

All three levels are intertwined. Genes are selected through environmental pressures, and they impose limits on culture. Culture grows out of biological evolution and responds to multiple environmental forces, but it also shapes the ecology and therefore the biological evolution of our entire planet. (van den Berghe 1981: 6)

So, what is the middle ground explanation of group behavior? Substantial evidence suggests that humans have a need to belong. We simply share a desire to form and maintain interpersonal relationships. This need for belonging somewhat resembles the Social Identity Theory but it is explained evolutionarily. That is to say, forming and maintaining social bonds is extremely conducive for both our ability to survive and for our chance of reproduction. Humans are simply too weak to live as lone individuals. Roy Baumeister and Mark Leary list a couple of reasons:

Some survival tasks, such as hunting large animals or maintaining defensive vigilance against predatory enemies, are best accomplished by group cooperation. Children who desired to stay together with adults (and who would resist being left alone) would be more likely to survive … Adults who formed attachments would be more likely to reproduce than those who failed to form them. (Baumeister & Leary 1995: 499)

Furthermore, the competition for scarce resources, which has always dominated human life, additionally enhanced the benefits of belonging to a group:

There a several potential, although debatable, advantages to forming a group under conditions of scarcity. For example, groups may share resources and thus prevent any individual from starving … and groups may appropriate resources from nonmembers … What appears less debatable is the severe competitive disadvantage on the lone individual confronting a group when both want the same resource. When other people are in groups, it is vital to belong to a group oneself, particularly a group of familiar, cooperative people who care about one's welfare. (Baumeister & Leary 1995: 499)

Thus, the need for belonging and the Social Identity Theory can easily be explained by evolutionary selection without suggesting genetic similarity between the members of the group. Similarly, the Optimal Distinctiveness Theory can be merged with evolutionary psychology and used to explain why humans not only have a drive to seek inclusion but also to exclude (Brewer 1999). The Optimal Distinctiveness Theory stated humans seek to strike a balance between the need to belong and the need to feel distinct. The need for belonging has already been explained. The need for distinctiveness counteracts this need because it probably would lead to too large groups if humans only strived for inclusion. Large groups require a lot of obligatory sharing and regulation of cooperation and the mutual dependency would be very thin and obscure. Thus, human survival is furthered in smaller groups. So, as we become part of a group, the need for belonging is satis¬ed, but then the need for distinctiveness and the tendency to exclusion and outgroup hostility are activated, just as the Optimal Distinctiveness Theory prescribes.

In all probability, the aforementioned explanations are only the tip of the iceberg. Some suggest that humans have an extraordinary tendency to coalitional aggressiveness (Tooby & Cosmides 1988), which would further group behavior and biases, while others argue that ingroup favoritism functions as a minimally demanding mechanism for mutually beneficial cooperation (Hammond & Axelrod 2006). It has even been proposed that the human brain is wired to view superficial differences as essential differences (Gil-White 2001). If we see two things that resemble each other, we judge them to be members of the same kind and we infer that they share many properties in common. For instance, having seen that one lion has sharp teeth, runs fast, and eats meat, we might infer that other lions do too. This is, obviously, a helpful innate tendency because it systematizes our knowledge about our surroundings. Simply put, it helps us to know what fruits to eat and what animals to avoid. But the tendency can deceive us when it is concerned with other humans. It might lead us to believe that superficial differences - such as different skin pigmentation because of different exposure to sun radiation - are essential differences. This might mean that stereotypes and prejudices spring into existence easily regarding humans who look and behave differently.

Please don't be you

There are substantiated and well-grounded reasons to believe that group behavior and group biases are rooted in evolutionary selection and are somewhat innate. I am aware that cosmopolitanism and universalism does not necessarily deny this fact or the fact that people care more about their relatives and ingroups and less about foreigners and outgroups. Nonetheless, I still believe that these facts are a challenge for universalism and, hence, cosmopolitanism. It is not a normative or conceptual challenge but a practical one: If humans seek ingroups and discriminate against outgroups and, thus, are ill-equipped to truly view everyone as part of the same moral community, then cosmopolitan universalism might not be achievable.

The universalist might object that it is possible to supersede our instinctive nature. As humans, we have the unique capability to surmount our emotional impulses, make rational judgments and act upon these judgments. We can overcome our innate biases and give reason supremacy. But is this true? Can we ignore our feelings when making moral judgments? There is no uniform consensus about an answer to this question but I would like to refer to some studies that point in the same direction. However, it is important to note that this tentative answer is debatable and far from certain.

There is an abundance of work on moral psychology, but Jonathan Haidt's work, in particular, is interesting. He has primarily studied how we reason when faced with moral dilemmas. In one study (Haidt 2001), test subjects were asked about how they feel about the following story:

Julie and Mark are brother and sister. They are traveling together in France on summer vacation from college. One night they are staying alone in a cab-in near the beach. They decide that it would be interesting and fun if they tried making love. At very least it would be a new experience for each of them. Julie was already taking birth control pills, but Mark uses a condom too, just to be safe. They both enjoy making love, but they decide not to do it again. They keep that night as a special secret, which makes them feel even closer to each other. What do you think about that, was it OK for them to make love? (Haidt 2001: 1)

The majority of the test subjects answered that Julie and Mark did something morally wrong. Some reason that what they have done is illegal; however, sex between siblings is not illegal in France. Others contend that the siblings are damaging their close relationship by having sex with each other; but it is quite clear from the story that their relationship has not been strained by the sex. A few mention the dangers of inbreeding; yet the siblings used two forms of birth control. The test subjects eventually run out of reasons. However, even though they cannot explain themselves, they still insist that the siblings did something wrong. This phenomenon is called moral dumbfounding. Haidt suggests that the existence of moral dumbfounding shows that our moral judgments are primarily based on impulsive emotions and that our conscious thought-processes and explicit reasons follow as post hoc justifications. Other studies support this conclusion. Some show that increased activity in the parts of the brain associated with disgust and negative emotions is a very solid indicator of subsequent negative moral judgments (Sanfey et al. 2003). Others demonstrate that test subjects who are hypnotized to feel disgust when they read an otherwise neutral word judge moral transgressions significantly harder if the word are included in the description of the moral violation. What is more, these hypnotized test subjects are even prone to fabricate reasons to support moral condemnation in stories that include no moral transgressions at all (Haidt & Wheatley 2005). But most interestingly, people who have damaged the parts of the brain that are responsible for our feelings also seem to lose the ability to act morally. These people maintained full abstract knowledge of right and wrong and showed no deficits in intelligence but they had trouble making decisions regarding even the most trivial dilemma. They slowly but surely alienated everyone around them and eventually their lives fell apart. The most famous example is Phineas Gage. In a tragic and cruel accident, Gage severely damaged the parts of the brain that are responsible for emotions. Before the accident, Gage was a highly respected, polite and considerate man. After the accident, he started to swear and behave inappropriate. He began to lie all the time, he could not control his temper and he could no longer hold down a job (Damasio 1994). Surely, this indicates that our moral judgments are significantly and profoundly shaped by our impulsive emotions. Haidt (2001) concludes that our emotional gut feelings have ultimate primacy. Without them, moral behavior is next to impossible. The role of reason, then, is reduced to the ability to frame our judgments and actions in a positive light. Thus, reason is not an internal scientist trying to figure out the truth in difficult dilemmas. Reason evolved because the ability to use arguments to polish our reputation was useful for our ancestors since they lived in small groups where ostracism was certain death.

This hypothesis might sound counterintuitive to everyone trained in philosophy. We often reason our way to a judgment that contradicts our initial and impulsive emotion. But ordinary reasoning is obviously not philosophical reasoning. Actually, ordinary reasoning is more about confirming than examining. For instance, in one study (Perkins, Faraday & Bushey 1991), people were asked to find any argument - both for and against - that where relevant when discussing particular social issues. The experiment showed two obvious and predictable outcomes: firstly, people created a lot of arguments for the side they supported, but not that many other-side arguments, and secondly, people with high IQs found more arguments than people with low IQs. But most interestingly, the people with high IQs did not find significantly more other-side arguments, only more my-side arguments. The conclusion was that "people invest their IQ in buttressing their own case rather than in exploring the entire issues more fully and evenhandedly" (Perkins, Faraday & Bushey 1991: 95). So ordinary reasoning is clearly not philosophical reasoning. In my opinion, this hints that very few people actually manage to give primacy to the cold and calculating reason. As I said, I acknowledge that there is disagreement on this issue (Greene et al. 2001, 2004, 2009), but I follow Haidt (2007, 2012) in proposing that humans foremost follow impulsive emotions when deciding in moral dilemmas.

The universalist might object that none of this means that cosmopolitan universalism is wrong. For instance, it would be absurd to claim that just because rapes are widespread in human societies, because we can explain the advantageousness of this tendency in our ancestors' environment and because we as humans are limited in our ability to overcome our tendencies, any moral theory that prohibits rape is wrong. Likewise, it would be absurd to claim that universalism is wrong.

There are three possible answers to this objection. Firstly, yes, the practical challenge does not prove that universalism is wrong; it only stipulates that it is difficult to attain. Secondly, cosmopolitan universalism would actually gain a lot if it could answer this practical challenge. If we share a deep-rooted need for group identity and cosmopolitanism somehow can account for this in more constructive ways than through racism, ethnocentrism, religious conflicts, genocides and wars, this would greatly benefit cosmopolitanism. Thirdly, there is a difference between conscious acts of rapes and almost unconscious group biases. Some studies show that categorization and discrimination based on groups is probably part of the spontaneous and emotional processing of information that comes before cognitive reasoning (Lamont & Molnar 2002). In other words, our group biases are rapid, preconscious and almost pervasive, [6] and this makes it way incredibly more difficult to thwart than whatever tendency to rape there might exist.

It is all about the nation states

This is not the first time someone argues that cosmopolitanism is difficult or even downright implausible. Actually, it is a common criticism. Usually, however, the argument is that the principles of justice can only apply on a national level where steady and durable institutional cooperation exists. Additionally, some might even argue that without nation states, our modern principles of justice would never have had a chance. Andreas Wimmer succinctly notes:

The main promises of modernity - political participation, equal treatment before the law and protection from the arbitrariness of state power, dignity for the weak and poor, and social justice and security - were fully realised only for those who came to be regarded as true members of the nation. The modern principles of inclusion are intimately tied to ethnic and national forms of exclusion. (Wimmer 2002: 1)

There might be a case to be made for this challenge as well. However, I chose to focus solely on psychology and group behavior because I found that aspect more scientifically supported. Also, as I wrote earlier, it would be a mammoth task to undergo a complete assessment of human nature and human societies and I dare not do that. Instead, I would like to deliver a quick and, truth be told, skin-deep remark that similarly pinpoints nation states as especially interesting.

Earlier, I alluded to communitarianism as an opponent to cosmopolitan universalism. This is true but cosmopolitanism also faces a slightly more competent challenger, namely nationalism. Nationalism holds that:

the duties we owe to our fellow‐nationals are different from, and more extensive than, the duties we owe to human beings as such. This is not to say that we owe no duties to humans as such; nor is it to deny that there may be other, perhaps smaller and more intense, communities to whose members we owe duties that are more stringent still than those we owe to Britons, Swedes, etc., at large. But it is to claim that a proper account of ethics should give weight to national boundaries, and that in particular there is no objection in principle to institutional schemes-such as welfare states-that are designed to deliver benefits exclusively to those who fall within the same boundaries as ourselves. (Miller 2003: 11)

This proposition avoids some of the pitfalls of communitarianism [7] and it might also be more suitable to our natural tendencies than cosmopolitanism. Unfortunately for nationalism, the theoretical arguments for nationalism that I know of are not particularly persuasive. For instance, David Miller (2003) posits that we have a stronger reason to try to find a child that has gone missing if it is our own child, if it is from our village or if it is our compatriot. But this is a questionable claim. Nils Holtug responds that:

… suppose that two children - both perfect strangers to me - have gone missing and I am in a position to help only one of them. Perhaps I can only provide transport for one. It seems to me almost obscene to ask them about their nationalities before I decide whom to help. (Holtug 2011: 153)

This is, of course, just one of Miller's many arguments for nationalism. I will not go into detail about the others but I feel that nationalism at least deserved to be mentioned. Likewise, I will not categorically state a preference for either well-suited but ill-inferred nationalism or for well-grounded but improbable cosmopolitanism. [8] 

Everything, revisited

To summarize, universalism holds that moral values applies universally regardless of culture, religion, nationality, ethnicity, race, gender or sexuality. The most coherent version of universalism is cosmopolitanism, which contends that justice ought to be implemented on a global scale regardless of nations, cultures, ethnicities, religions and so forth. However, the cosmopolitan version of universalism faces a difficult practical challenge: It flies in the face of our inherent propensities as humans. And, as I argue, if a moral theory's actual demands are in too much conflict with our innate tendencies, the theory might have to reconsider its demands. As mentioned, this argument mirrors Caney's counterargument (6) - that universalism and cosmopolitanism is without any motivational force - but my practical challenge tries to be (just about) grounded in facts. So, cosmopolitans might have coherent arguments for their universalism. But what good is that if it is too difficult for the majority of the human population to grasp them and act on them? If group behavior is an immanent part of human nature and we cannot easily ignore this tendency, what hope does universalism have? If universalism just chooses to ignore such natural facts, does it not risk becoming a moralistic ideology? No one expects a lizard that evolved in the rain forest to behave appropriately in the desert. Similarly, can we really expect that humans are completely compatible with every theoretical fabrication of a moral and just world?

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