Indian Media And War Maturity Media Essay

Published Date: 23 Mar 2015

Indian media has been performing its role as one of the pillars of democracy, by generating public awareness and voicing opinions on security matters in the overall national interest. The public opinion on the legitimacy of an operation plays an important role in the formation and sustenance if the national will in addition to giving strength to the political leadership. Although security of information is a vital issue while conducting military operations, the civil population has to be made aware of the details a appropriate time. Public support is a great morale booster for the soldier. It is therefore important that the civil society is well informed about the truth rather than be fed with rumours.

2. On the other hand, the armed forces must understand the working, compulsions and restrictions of the media, to ensure interaction leading to synergy. It is not possible in the current world for the military to exclude the media and yet expect it to project an encouraging image. The organisational structure of the military is hierarchical in which professional pride and regimental loyalties are intricately interwoven. It does not go in line with democracy and adopts authoritarianism so as to be effective in warlike situations. Since it is battle- oriented, it does not entertain any interference from outsiders. Certain legitimately activities done by the military does not make any sense to civilians who have little awareness about military matters. The military likes to be focussed and left alone to carry out its allotted task.

3. All over the world media- military interaction in order to achieve the national objectives has undergone significant change. There are permanent institutions and clear cut policies on the manner in which the military operations are covered. However the Indian military media policies are obsolete and need a fresh look in order to be contemporary.

4. The involvement of armed forces in internal security operations and Low Intensity Conflicts (LIC) has been increasing in the recent past. Such operations are against insurgents/militants who are intermingled with the civil population. There have been cases in which different versions of the case from the military and the civil population have led to controversies. These controversies are lapped up by the media and are covered so widely that the truth is never amply revealed. Media has to be aware of the sensitivity of the situation and exercise self restraint in order to deal with the issue with maturity.

5. The Gulf War showed the world the magnitude to which media can penetrate the war theatre. Millions around the globe watched the launch bombs and missiles destroying targets in Baghdad. Kargil and Afghanistan showed the details of each offensive in real-time. The coverage was much more than what was available during the previous wars. It is now debated whether what was shown and reported was real or rigged. The core issue is that the advancements in the field of information technology have enabled the media to cover and influence the operations to a greater degree.[1] Therefore it is necessary to analyse the intricate relationship between the Indian military and the media, and to understand the whether the Indian media is mature or is still adolescent.

METHODOLOGY

Statement of the problem

6. To study the maturity level of Indian media coverage during the Kargil war and terrorist attack in Mumbai on 26 Nov 08 in the light of media coverage by the global media in the recent wars.

Hypothesis

7. The level of maturity shown by the media of developed nations far exceeds the maturity of the Indian media in reporting war or war like scenarios. There is an urgent need in synchronise the operations of the military with the Indian media so that both can work towards the achievement of the national objectives.

Justification of the study

8. In spite of being free form government control since a long time, the maturity that is desired form the Indian media has not been visible. Trivial issues are being given wide coverage and important issues are being overlooked. Indian media has shown in the recent past that the coverage has been irresponsible in reporting military operations.

9. Media being a major instrument of formulation of public opinion, it is necessary that matters relating to military operations are covered judiciously. This entails proper training of media personnel so as to operate in the war zone and, their sensitisation on the issues like secrecy of plans, deployment and mobility.

10. Developed nations have embedded media in their fighting formations after necessary training. The national media policy is laid down so that what is covered by the media is in concert with the overall national plan.

11.Indian media needs to be brought to the same level if not to a higher level so that Indian military interests are not compromised by sloppy reporting by the media.

Scope

12. The scope of this study is restricted to the role of international and Indian media in covering the military operations during the Gulf war, Afghan war Kargil war and 26/11 terrorist attack on Mumbai. The scope has been kept narrow because the media revolution has happened in the recent past and therefore the role of the media in future will be dictated by the usage of the newer forms of mass communication.

Method of data collection

13. Data used for this dissertation has been collected from a large number of books, periodicals, magazines, journals that are available in the Defence Services Staff College (DSSC) Library and the internet.

Organisation of the study

14. The study is divided in the following chapters:

1. Chapter- I: Introduction & Methodology. This chapter introduces the subject ‘Indian media and war : maturity or adolescence.' It also lays down the ‘Statement of Problem' providing a justification for the study and defines the scope of dissertation. The chapter also amplifies the importance of media in today's world. The focus is on understanding the effect the media has on military operations.
2. Chapter-II: Interdependence of military and the media for war coverage. This chapter brings out the interrelationship between the media and the military as they have forces working towards clash and also towards co-operation.
3. Chapter- III: International media and war. This chapter brings out the role played by the American and global media during the gulf war. The facts that were covered and the arguments used by the global media will be covered in detail.
4. Chapter- IV: Indian media and war. This chapter studies the role of Indian nedia during the reporting of Kargil war and 26/11 terrorist attacks on Mumbai.
5. Chapter- V: Contentious issues and suggested solutions. This chapter deals with the issues that are contentious and deal with the control of the media. Certain solutions are also suggested.
6. Chapter- VI: Conclusion.This chapter summarises the dissertation.

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CHAPTER II

INTERDEPENDENCE OF MILITARY AND MEDIA FOR WAR COVERAGE.

1. The question is often raised as to who needs whom? Does the media need the military or does the military need the media? The answer is, however, not that simple. Throughout history both institutions have been at odds with each other. The military is perennially popular, but is at its best in battle and functions like a conditioned athlete. However, it too, has its share of incompetence. So when the military makes mistakes, they can be monumental. Besides territory, a large number of lives can be lost.

2. The military are disciplined, hierarchical and live within a homogenous, closed culture that can be and often is hostile to outsiders.

3. The news media, are often unpopular with the brass, for they function independently, without rules, regulations, or even a Code of Conduct except for some that are self-imposed. The media's Newspapers, Radio, TV and Cable have a variety of interests of their own and set goals to be achieved. They have their fulsome share of rogues, incompetents and avaricious vultures. Yet at their best, the media provide the nation with a vital service it can get nowhere else. It is one of the pillars of the state.

4. When the two institutions meet during a conflict, clashes are inevitable. The media wants to tell the story, and the military wants to win the war and keep casualties to a minimum. The media wants freedom, no censorship, total access and the capability to get their stories out to their audiences quickly. The military on the other hand, wants control. The greatest fear of a military commander in a pre-invasion scenario is that something might leak out that would tip off the enemy. Otherwise, too, surprise is the most potent weapon in the Commander's armoury. On the other hand, the media fears that the military might stifle news coverage for enhancing their public image or cover up their mistakes. Those are fundamental differences that will never change. At times the military and the patriotic media also have worked together in harmony but usually animosity tarnishes their relationship. There is definitely a need for better understanding between the two. A perfect co-operative union of the media and the military is likely impossible, given the differences in missions and personalities but there are wise heads in both institutions who recognize the mutual need. The media is hungry for stories while the military need to tell their story. Above all they need public support. The media can tell their story and if there is a rapport and understanding, they can tell it well and effectively. Both institutions will work better during the tension and the fog of war if they learn to get along in peacetime.

5. During the wartime when there is a life and death struggle for the military, personally as well as institutionally, patriotism comes to their rescue instinctively and through their long training. Civil media totally lacks such training and has nothing personal at stake. Self-aggrandizement seems to be the raison d'etre of most. War is good for the media business. Despite the excessive costs of sending correspondents for coverage, using expensive satellite equipment and airtime, armed conflict is precisely the type of event on which the media thrives. This is an alarming situation and something must be done during peacetime to remove this dichotomy.

7. It is for the civil media to come forward with the remedy. And for the military to provide its own media to fill the gap and, more importantly to serve as the role model.

Media As A Force Multiplier

8. Many military leaders have become aware that news media coverage of their operations can be a force multiplier. Impressed by Gen. Walt Boomer's example of encouraging favourable news media coverage of the US Marines in the Gulf War - to the point where most observers agree that the Marines received more credit than they deserved, mostly at the expense of the US Army - many military leaders have come to the conclusion that media coverage not only develops public awareness and the support of military units, it has the side benefit of enhancing their morale by informing their families and friends of the activities of the troops. If used prudently, media is indeed a Force Multiplier as it builds public opinion. In the words of Abraham Lincoln:

“Public opinion is everything. With it nothing can fail, Without it nothing can succeed.”

How The Media Gathers Information

9. The media gathers its information from various sources:-

(a) Overt sources :-

1. Press briefings.
2. Press releases/handouts.
3. Supervised visit/tour of battle area.

(b) Covert sources :-

1. Own contacts.
2. Electronic Eaves dropping.
3. Clandestine visits to battle area.

10. With communication networks now blanketing the globe and news organisations developing their capability to report from almost anywhere, with new technology such as satellite telephones, laptop computers, digital cameras and other inventions, transmission of news is possible in real time. Soon commercial, high-resolution photographic satellites will be available to news organizations. The capability of the news media to photograph a battle area during time of war and thereby reveal the location of one's own ground units, ships and airbases could be very detrimental to the national security. This makes censorship virtually impossible.

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CHAPTER III

INTERNATIONAL MEDIA AND WAR

Information Security and the Military Culture

1. Traditionally, information security implies the military practice of reviewing a reporter's newscopy prior to his filing to ensure that no information of value to the enemy was released. This system was effectively used during the Second World War but now technological innovations have called into question the whole concept.

2. The “Vietnam Syndrome” leads most Americans to believe that they lost the war due to the total freedom given to the media in their coverage of the war. Their pessimistic reports tipped the public opinion against the conflict. The tales of atrocities of US troops on My Lai and Iwo Jima and, Jane Fonda's radio speeches from North Vietnam and media reports of US casualties stirred public opinion in USA against the War in Vietnam.

3. In Desert Storm the Pentagon decided to use information security to avoid a Vietnam-like situation. The imperative for secrecy was great, because if Iraqi commanders had had even an inkling of the US attack plan, they could have repositioned their forces, jeopardizing the success of the operation and inflicting significantly higher casualties on Allied Forces.

4. The US Government demonstrated the means to blackout the battlefield anytime it so chose, even in the presence of hundreds of representatives of the World Media. When a television reporter watching the take off of US fighters from a Saudi base began to report that one of the fighter aircraft appeared to be experiencing mechanical trouble, his satellite link was shut down by military electronic counter measures.[2]

5. A British television crew tried to transmit news to London without the knowledge of the PR specialists. Their transmission was intercepted by an airborne AWACs electronic warfare aircraft and they were promptly arrested for this breach of security.[3]

6. The news organizations later challenged this approach. When the Press was kept away from operations at Grenada and Panama, the media actually went to court.

7. Thus in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo, better sense prevailed on the military culture of clamping down news information. This has led to an improved arrangement of security at the source .

Security At The Source

8. “Security at the source”, a preferred approach, is a relatively new concept in which the military strives to develop a plan as far in advance of the operation as possible in order to allow the news media to have broad access to the total action. Where feasible, journalists may be accommodated with the combat forces. Each reporter is first accredited and then given the ground rules with which he/she is expected to comply. Because they will be located shoulder-to-shoulder with the troops, reporters who had questions about the security aspects of the operation could find someone to respond readily without actually turning in their news copy for review. If the Security at the source concept is to work, certain understanding with the media must be reached:-

(a) They must accept that the military can only effectively accommodate a finite number of journalists in combat operations. A mechanism must be developed in peacetime to establish the strength of reporters.

(b) News organizations need to more diligently train their reporters in the area of military operations. The best way to do this is to invite the media for the coverage of peacetime military exercises.

The Fog Of War

9. In wartime, the media serve a variety of roles. With information, they can convey a sense of the fighting to a public divorced from its actual horrors or, with entertainment, they can provide a sense of relief or escape to a public more directly involved such as in a blockade or bombing campaign.

10. Just because they mediate information about the progress of a war to the public, the media can serve not just as providers of ‘straight' news and information but also as agents of propaganda and disinformation. This is because the very processes by which war reports are gathered at source, packaged by journalists and disseminated to a wider audience are subject to a wide spectrum of influences ranging from battlefield censorship to broadcasting standards, deception and disinformation campaigns, official information policy and propaganda. These are indeed the pollutants which constitute that overworked idiom: “The Fog of War”.

11. Journalists have a front seat at the making of history and it is tragic that by the time the historians become involved ‘that first rough draft of history' provided by the journalists has been so widely disseminated by the mass media that it becomes extremely difficult to dislodge the pollutants that caused the fog of war.

Truth : The First Casualty Of War

12. A rule of thumb in both the world wars was to only show pictures of the enemy dead. Own casualty figures have often been minimized and those of the enemy exaggerated. Defeats have simply been omitted or delayed in reporting. Or explained as “strategic retreats”.

13. While still the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, refused to release news that HMS Nelson and HMS Barham had sustained serious damage. In 1971, the news of the surrender of Dhaka was considerably delayed and was relayed only after the pep-talk of PTV programmes. The sinking of HMS Sheffield by an Exocet missile fired by an Argentine Mirage aircraft during the Falkland War was omitted till it became inevitable to be declared. The fall and recapture of Khafji in the Gulf War was constantly misreported. The famous ITN footage of emaciated Muslim prisoners-of-war, which caused an international outrage in 1992, was banned on Serbian TV. Zee TV played hell with the truth during the Kargil crisis.

Operation “Desert Cloud”

14. In August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. In the six-month period prior to the commencement of hostilities, the Pentagon, military and media worked together to develop plans that would make the Gulf War coverage the most comprehensive wartime news coverage in history. It was also the most massive cover-up in history to date.

15. On the opening night of the US attack on Iraq, ABC anchorperson Peter Jennings made what was perhaps a Freudian slip, mistakenly referring to the start of “Operation Desert Cloud” rather than “Operation Desert Storm”[4]. In the light of the fact that many of the US military's most spectacular claims in the Gulf War have since proven to be false, Jenning's slip appears to have been no slip at all.

16. The problem was not simply that the Pentagon and US administration misled the media, but that the media generally swallowed without question whatever the military and the US Government dished out to them. They were reduced to the level of stenographers. By the time the truth began to dribble out in the war's wake, it was too late to erase the dominant image of an inevitable, clean, bloodless, high-tech war.

Some Cover-ups and myths

17. USA beckoned Iraq to Invade Kuwait. A little-noted poll in February, 1991 revealed striking gaps in people's knowledge about the Gulf Crisis. Only 13 percent Americans knew that when Saddam signalled he might use force against Kuwait, the United States through its charming Ambassador in Baghdad had indicated in July, 1990 that it would take no action,[5] which it certainly had none.

18. Saddam offered to withdraw from Kuwait. As early as August, 1990, Saddam had sent messages through diplomatic channels offering to withdraw from Kuwait and release all foreigners in exchange for the lifting of the sanctions, guaranteed access to the Gulf, and sole control of the contested Rumailah oil field.[6]

19. Iraq had no intention of attacking Saudi Arabia. Defence and intelligence officials informed the US administration shortly after the Kuwaiti invasion that Iraq had no intention of invading Saudi Arabia.[7]

20. Iraq posed a major nuclear and chemical weapons threat. Prior to the start of the Gulf crisis, US intelligence officials estimated that Iraq would not be capable of producing an atomic bomb for at least five years. But in November, 1990, President George Bush started claiming that Baghdad will be able to build an atomic bomb in just six months time insisting that the time to attack Iraq was now.[8]

21. Iraqi soldiers did not remove Kuwaiti babies from incubators. Despite scant evidence, the allied media propagated that Iraqi soldiers removed hundreds of Kuwaiti babies from their incubators, leaving them to die on hospital floors of Kuwait City. Seven US Senators invoked the event in their speeches while backing the January 12, 1991 resolution authorizing war.[9]

22. Smart Bombs Won the War. The world was mesmerized by Pentagon-produced videos of Stealth bombers neatly dropping sophisticated laser-guided bombs down the airshafts of designated military targets while mercifully sparing nearby schools, hospitals, homes and mosques. Fewer than 8% of the bombs used by Allied Forces were “Smart” ones and of the 88,500 tons of munitions dropped on Kuwait and Iraq, an estimated 70% missed their targets and caused massive destruction to civilian life and property.[10]

23. The Patriot Missile Performed Flawlessly. Despite tall claims, experts testified before the US Congress in spring 1991 that the much-vaunted Patriot missile may have destroyed only one of the 90 Iraqi Scud missiles fired at Saudi Arabia and Israel. The Patriots actually increased the amount of ground damage as they crashed into of all places! Israeli streets.[11]

24. Muzzling Negative Reports. There was definite attempt to muzzle negative reports. Some examples were quoted earlier. There were numerous other examples. Associated Press (AP) photographer Scott Apple White was handcuffed, beaten, and had one of his cameras smashed when 15 US and Saudi military police officers descended on him as he attempted to photograph the Dhahran barracks where an Iraqi Scud killed 27 G.Is.[12]

25. Iraqi Casualties. There was widespread silence about Iraqi casualties, Greenpeace has calculated that 57,000 to 75,000 members of Iraqi military died during the Gulf War while 3,000 Iraqi civilians were killed in the air war. Tapes of attacks by Apache helicopter pilots which were not released, revealed Iraqi soldiers being killed mercilessly as they were fleeing their bunkers while thousands were gunned down during their retreat on the open highway to Iraq.[13]

26. Saddam Learns from “Vietnam Syndrome”. Saddam Hussein learned his own lessons from the “Vietnam Syndrome”. CNN's Peter Arnett, was permitted to remain in Iraq to report on the other side of the war. He was accused by the White House of “Speaking for the Iraqi Government”, by Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf of “aiding and abetting an enemy” and by Col. Harry Summers, Public Affairs advisor of “treason”.[14]

27. Saddam Hussein used Peter Arnett to his own advantage by trying to create a public outcry in the allied nations by allowing CNN to transmit pictures of the destruction of a Chemical Weapons Complex with freshly scrawled “Baby Milk Factory” in English, parading captured Allied pilots on Iraqi TV, declaring their disapproval of the war and displaying the charred bodies of hundreds of civilians killed by Allied air attacks on air-raid shelters. Unfortunately for Saddam, his ploy did not work. It was merely a drop in the Allied scum tide. Perhaps it helped the Allied propaganda machine by providing a posture of objectivity.

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CHAPTER IV

INDIAN MEDIA AND WAR

Kargil - A Watershed For Indian Media

1. We must draw important lessons from the recent crisis in our own backyard, Kargil. We must take cognisance of the brilliant use of media by India to salvage some pride from the mauling it received on the snowy peaks of Kargil. Kargil became one of the worst nightmares for India. It not only caught them napping, but also exposed their extreme vulnerabilities and resulted in very high casualties. Having said that, we must credit the Indians for their resilience and for their highly successful media and diplomatic campaign.

2. The way Indian media responded to the crisis, mobilized its resources and organized Television programmes, newspaper reports, analyses, discussions, features, the famous “rogue army” posters and a wide array of coverage convinced the world that Pakistan was on the wrong foot and the Indians were the aggrieved party. The Chanakyan principles of deceit and lies were fully exploited to dupe their own countrymen. To enhance their lies and sanitize the Indian public from the truth, PTV was banned from Cable networks in India and Pakistani newspapers were blocked on the Internet.

3. They also made a very intelligent use of the Internet and dedicated an exclusive Website www.vijayinkargil.com to spread their propaganda. Trained PR officers manned chat sites on the web. We on the other hand, could not launch an adequate counter attack on the media front. Even their very obvious lies and claims of Vijay or victory could not be exposed. India did not permit media personnel to visit Kargil, Dras or Batalik sectors. Zee TV and the 32 Indian Channels continued to spew venom against Pakistan but we lacked the wherewithal and the will power to tackle them on this extremely volatile front. Obvious lies like Tiger Hill, the use of Mirage-2000 HUD displays with doctored information were continuously being telecast with serious TV News Channels like BBC and CNN re-transmitting them.[15]

Impact and influence of media

4. The Kargil War was significant for the impact and influence of the mass media on public opinion in both nations. Coming at a time of exploding growth in electronic journalism in India, the Kargil news stories and war footage were often telecast live on TV, and many websites provided in-depth analysis of the war. The conflict became the first "live" war in South Asia; it was given such detailed media coverage that one effect was the drumming up of jingoistic feelings.[16]

5. The conflict soon turned into a news propaganda war, in which press briefings given by government officials of each nation produced conflicting claims and counterclaims. The Indian government placed a temporary news embargo on information from Pakistan, banning the telecast of the state-run Pakistani channel PTV and blocking access to online editions of the Dawn newspaper. The Pakistani media criticized this apparent curbing of freedom of the press in India, while India media claimed it was in the interest of national security. The Indian government ran advertisements in foreign publications including The Times and The Washington Post detailing Pakistan's role in supporting extremists in Kashmir in an attempt to garner political support for its position.

6. As the war progressed, media coverage of the conflict was more intense in India than in Pakistan. Many Indian channels showed images from the battle zone in a style reminiscent of CNN's coverage of the Gulf War (one of the shells fired by Pakistan troops even hit a Doordarshan transmission centre in Kargil while coverage continued). Reasons for India's increased coverage included the greater number of privately owned electronic media in India compared to Pakistan and relatively greater transparency in the Indian media. At a seminar in Karachi, Pakistani journalists agreed that while the Indian government had taken the press and the people into its confidence, Pakistan had not.

7. The print media in India and abroad was largely sympathetic to the Indian cause, with editorials in newspapers based in the west and other neutral countries observing that Pakistan was largely responsible for the conflict. Some analysts believe that Indian media, which was both larger in number and more credible, may have acted as a force multiplier for the Indian military operation in Kargil and served as a morale booster. As the fighting intensified, the Pakistani version of events found little backing on the world stage. This helped India gain valuable diplomatic recognition for its position.

MUMBAI TERRORIST ATTACKS ON 26/11

8. Today when no country is left untouched by terrorism, media's coverage of terrorist activities is fast becoming critical. War on terrorism is a test for the Indian media. How much should be broadcast, whether broadcast of terrorist actions amounts to glorifying terrorism and violence and whether it incites people, creates new recruits and gives publicity to terrorists who seek to grab world attention are topics of debate across nations in the post 9/11 world. More so in India after 26/11 Mumbai attacks.[17]

9. Contrary to the authoritative statements of the revisionist historians of war journalism, press freedom and freedom of expression are an advantage, not a handicap, in emergencies. Lies and self-censorship - as the history of the wars of Vietnam or Iraq and back home in Kashmir demonstrate, are in most cases of poor counsel and contribute to the very national disasters we tried to avert. Just as a seafaring captain cannot test his vessel when the sea is calm, so freedom of the press needs to be tested in the heart of a storm, when our bearings are lost and anguish prevails. Media professionals and the media in general have paid a heavy toll to terrorism in recent years. Dozens of journalists have been intimated, kidnapped and assassinated so that they could be silenced. The number of media professionals killed in conflict zones or individually targeted for assassination remains all too high. Some fall victim to crossfire or mine explosions. Most, however, are deliberately gunned down after identifying themselves as journalists.

Recently we witnessed a well coordinated terror attack on Mumbai. There is increasing questioning of the media's conduct in the face of such attacks and more so after the live telecast of the 60 hour long Mumbai attacks. Concerned over the way many aspects of its operations got “jeopardized” due to live images being broadcast by TV during the 6- hour siege, the national Security Guard (NSG) is now pushing for restrictions on media coverage wherever its commandos are engaged to combat. Having already raised the issue during its recent meetings with Home Ministry officials the NSG top brass is likely to move a written request in this connection, it is learnt.

10. The force is particularly miffed with the way its operations at Nariman House were broadcast live. Questions are being raised over the way Havaldar Gajender Singh fell to a terrorist's bullet at Nariman House. “TV broadcast our commandoes landing from a helicopter on the roof over Nariman House. By the time our men landed and started taking positions, the terrorists were already waiting for them and opened fire,” an NSG official said.

11. In contrast, NSG officials said, operations at Oberoi “could be conducted more smoothly” since TV channels were kept beyond a one-kilometer radius. “This zone was put under virtual curfew with no access allowed to television crews,” said an NSG commando leading the Oberoi operations “The operations there took the least time, just under 30 hours, as compared to the other two places,” he said. NSG officials said that while terrorists holed up inside probably did not have access to live TV images on the second and third day of operations, they still had phones and were probably getting “instructions” from people watching those live images on TV. The media in turn can question the NSG that was there any spokesman of NSG to guide the media? The media showed what they saw. Can you blame them for showing what was happening?

12. The climate of insecurity generated by September 26 and the subsequent war on terrorism, have provided the government with an opportunity to take restrictive measures which had long been in the pipelines. Some measure restrict “the right to know”, with government agencies withdrawing information that had previously been available to the public. According to the Columbia journalism Review, the rules of war reporting set up by the Pentagon have “never been as tough” as during the campaign in Afghanistan. Steps have also been taken to restrict privacy on the Internet, including restrictions on the use by private citizens - but also by human rights groups and the media - of encryption software to protect their email traffic, and to facilitate wiretapping by the authorities.

13. Appeals to patriotism can be used to muzzle independent media, deterring journalists from questioning government decisions or policies. Some in the United States, according to the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), “found themselves expected to become patriots first and journalists second.” Propaganda and the deliberate propagation of disinformation, a common practice in times of war, further reduce the media's ability to report fairly and accurately. Self-censorship in particularly damaging to reporters' ability to research and publish information. In some cases, it is fed by fear of offending public opinion (and publishers) in others by fear of violent reprisals.

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CHAPTER V

CONTENTIONS ISSUES AND SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS

Causes of the contention

1. Conflicting Philosophies. It must be appreciated that there are fundamental conflicts in the basic philosophies of the two institutions.4 While the military is trained to win i.e. impose its will by fighting, the media is trained to report what it perceives to be the truth at any cost. To win the military needs to project an image of skill, courage, stamina, strength and sacrifice. At the same time it also needs to maintain secrecy of operational plans and conceal some information both from its enemy and its own people. On the other hand the media's role of informing the public enjoins it to overcome secrecy and report even unpalatable but inevitable aspects of war, such as blunders, cowardice, exhaustion, suffering, blood and death.

2. Differing Positions. On account of their conflicting philosophies as well as different outlooks and experiences both the institutions have come to adopt differing positions on some basic issues. Some of the important ones are:-

(a) Operational Security and Troop Safety. Both agree that media must cover war and operations other than war while ensuring that media reports do not impair operational security and troop safety. However, the media feels that since it is responsible for informing the public and has the requisite expertise, it must be trusted not to impair these key issues. But the military feels that it is up to the operational commander to decide which piece of information impairs operational security and troop safety.5

(b)Access to Battlefield. By virtue of its ‘watch dog' and ‘recorder of history' roles, the media considers that it has a right to be at the site of conflict and report independently. While accepting the inevitable media presence in the battlefield the military feels that the presence of a large number of independently moving reporters on the battlefield is not only a drain on military resources and time but also impermissible in certain military situations.

(c)Military Image. While the military considers that the media must assist in projecting a good image as it is necessary for winning wars, the media feels that it must report both good and bad news, irrespective of the consequences.

(d) Military Attitudes.

General military attitude towards the media is characterised by the following :-

1. During peace the military often feels neglected by the media and considers that the media has failed in its duty of educating the public on important issues of national security.
2. The military considers the media to be mostly ignorant of military matters and not too keen to learn either.
3. The military considers the media to be unnecessarily critical, especially during low intensity conflicts.
4. The military feels threatened by the media's probing and questioning and often commanders consider it as unnecessary interference.

(e) Media Attitudes. The general media attitude towards the military is characterised by the following:-

1. A feeling of superiority and self righteousness.
2. It feels that military commanders deny access unnecessarily.
3. It feels that the military is not doing enough to make its jargon to be understood by the media and the public and therefore has itself to blame for the poor coverage in the media.

Access and Controls over Media in Battlefield

3. The imperative of granting the maximum possible freedom and access to the media for covering operations has been aptly stated by none other than Field Marshal SHFJ Manekshaw. While speaking on the occasion of releasing Lt Gen Depinder Singh's book ‘The IPKF in Sri Lanka' on 19 Nov 91 at New Delhi, the Field Marshal recalled that in 1971 journalists were given full liberty to cover the operations and hence they (Armed Forces) received excellent cooperation. He continued “...on the contrary, everything was kept secret in the IPKF operation. If the Press had been given full freedom and taken into confidence, the IPKF operations would have got a good Press” He further deplored that even in anti-terrorist operations in Assam and Kashmir a high level of secrecy was being maintained.

4.Justification for Media Access.

 Why the military needs the media has already been explained earlier. In addition to those essentially military reasons there are some more basic reasons as to why the media needs to be given access to the battlefield in a democracy. These are8:-

1. Freedom of speech and expression is guaranteed by the constitution.
2. Citizen's ‘right to know' is now accepted in all democracies.
3. Media has an important responsibility of informing the public, independently recording events for history and acting as a ‘watch dog' of the public. It must be assisted in performing its crucial role if democracy is to thrive.
4. Soldiers who die in war represent the values of their societies and in democracies these include values mentioned above.

5.Benefits of Free Media.

Free media bestows the following benefits to the national cause9:-

1. Free flow of information and ideas brings out the truth to the people.
2. Superior merits of truth reveal to the people which facts and ideas to believe.
3. Diversity of news and views convinces the people that the news flow is free and trustworthy.

6.Justification for Controls over Media.

 Having said so much for a free media on the battlefield it remains to be said that every freedom has certain limits. In India such curbs are sanctioned by Clause 2 of Art 19 of the Constitution. The main reasons for imposing certain controls over the media on the battlefield are:-

1. To ensure that operational security and troop safety are not impaired.
2. To ensure that conduct of operations is not hampered needlessly by the  presence of a large number of journalists moving about on their own.
3. To ensure that proper perspective is maintained while miseries of war are being reported, especially in the visual media.
4. To sustain the national resolve to win.

7.Effects of Excessive Restrictions on Media.

Overdose of the best of medicines may kill. Similarly excessive restrictions on media have profound ill- effects. Some of them are:-

1. Media may begin to publish the enemy's version of the story. This effect is more pronounced in low intensity conflicts.
2. Loss of credibility of the media.
3. Restricting access has the effect of curbing on-the-spot reporters, who know the truth and consequently strengthening arm- chair commentators, who base their views on third party reports.
4. Stonewalling the media does not reduce its ability to hurt with bad reporting but cripples its ability to help us with good reporting.

Training

8.Media Training for the Army. Even though media training is a much talked about subject there is very little of actual training that an officer undergoes let alone troops. The first rudimentary lessons of media handling are taught only at the Defence Services Staff College. Even the officers selected for a tenure in the DPR undergo only a familiarisation training for six weeks including a brief period of attachment with news agencies or leading news papers. As yet there is no formalised system of training formations in media handling during exercises. On the other hand in USA, the Joint Readiness Training Centre, Fort Chafee has been conducting ‘Media on the Battlefield' training for soldiers since 1990. Media training has been incorporated into their combat training. Media representatives (played by their Public Affairs personnel) appear during exercises to interview soldiers and commanders. The interviews are videotaped and played back later to bring out lessons.

9.Training for the Media. A beginning was made in this direction when the DPR started the War Correspondents Course of six weeks duration for the national media. From 1995- 96 onwards this course has been thrown open to the regional media too. The course provides a primer on the three services, which is not really adequate for a defence correspondent. Field training by way of incorporating the media in exercises is also not conducted.

Drawbacks

10. The drawbacks in the media policy are as follows.

1. Lack of Well Defined Policy. A clear well defined media policy laying down the broad objectives, priorities, techniques and the means for different type of operations is lacking. Whatever policy one could gleam from published literature is far too overtly propaganda oriented to enhance the credibility of the Army.
2. Citizens' Right to Know. The media policy of the Government of India is yet to recognise the ‘Right to Know' as a basic feature of democracy. This is borne out by the constraints imposed in dealing with media by the Official Secrets Act (OSA) 1923, which itself is based on the British OSA 1911. As per the Act, both the communicator and the receiver of any unauthorised information are guilty irrespective of its damage potential. Given the prevalent tendency to over- classify documents from the security angle, almost any information on defence can be construed as unauthorised.
3. Lack of Transparency. This is apparent from the fact that media is not permitted to cover the various exercises and tactical operations during low intensity conflict. Sadly folly of such lack of transparency has been driven home at great cost during the recent Charar -e- Sharif episode.
4. Neglect of Regional Media. This is a serious drawback considering that regional media has greater impact on the local population, especially on emotive issues involved in low intensity conflicts.

SUGGESTIONS

Changes in Media Policy

11.Statement of Policy. It is vital for the Army to formulate a comprehensive media policy. The media policy must be in support of the army's actions during war, LIC/CI operations, and peace, and must take into consideration media requirements after consulting eminent media personalities. The media policy should:-

1. Support the military plan at every stage of operations.
2. Provide battlefield access to the media.
3. Be a consistent policy as frequent changes in policy leads to loss of credibility.
4. Have separate strategies for the pre- conflict, conflict and post- conflict stages.

12.Evolution of Policy. It is important that the media itself be taken into confidence while evolving such a policy. Considerable and as far as possible open debate and discussion with eminent media persons, PR experts from the industry, institutions such as the Press Council of India and academic bodies involved in teaching mass communications must precede declaration of the media policy.

13.Feedback System. The Army must institute a regular feedback system to gauge the effect of media coverage of defence related issues on different categories of audience viz citizens from different regions and strata, troops and families of troops. Well known private organisations may have to be requisitioned to conduct opinion polls amongst the people at intervals of time. Military Intelligence (MI) Directorate must institute measures to get direct feedback from troops and their families. This information must form the basis for formulation of media objectives and selection of propaganda themes and media.

14.Transparency and Media Pools. Transparency must form a corner stone of the media policy as it will lead to greater public understanding and awareness which in turn will lead to greater appreciation and public confidence on the armed forces. This openness must be reflected in positive encouragement to the media to cover operations and exercises without endangering operational security and troop safety. An affective way of achieving this is by forming ‘Media Pools' at different levels from services headquarters to corps. These pools must be composed of accredited and security-cleared representatives of different national and regional media and nominated by their parent organisations. These pools must be activated during war, low intensity conflicts and war and kept in readiness to be moved to the scene of action at short notice. Such a system will facilitate the media to cover operations in remote locations by being present at the scene of action, which it cannot otherwise do and at the same time facilitate the army in planning for, handling and assisting media without compromising on security.

15.Accreditation of Defence Correspondents. Requisite qualifications for defence correspondents, such as a degree in defence studies and the War Correspondents course must be made mandatory for a journalist to be accredited as a defence correspondent. The accreditation must be reviewed periodically at which time other criteria such as attendance of a refresher / specialisation course must be insisted upon. Efforts must be made to grant accreditation to adequate number of representatives of regional media, especially in areas affected by or having the potential for low intensity conflicts.

16.Self Restraint by Media. Self restraint by media is any day preferable to pre-censorship and will only enhance media credibility. A list of sensitive issues on which the media must exercise restraint and different sets of security guidelines for covering defence matters during peace, exercises, low intensity conflict and war must be evolved in consultation with the media and notified to the media and their organisations such as the Press Council of India.

17.Joint Security Review. A system of joint security review must be worked out in consultation with the Press Council of India and eminent media persons to replace the system of pre- censorship during peace and operations. This will go a long way towards enhancing the credibility of the armed forces.

18.Budget and Resources. The PR budget of a defence establishment of this size must be increased manifold. As the saying goes “If you pay peanuts you get only monkeys”. The expenditure on the monthly ‘Sainik Samachar' published in 13 languages can be reduced without affecting its readership by eliminating some of the language editions and converting it into a broadsheet. On the other hand expenditure on training and provision of resources such as number of PROs, their transport, equipment and communications needs to be enhanced.

19. Rapport with Media. A conscious effort needs to be made to build up a rapport with media at all levels and more so at the level of senior commanders and staff officers. Interaction by way of organising seminars and guest lectures, mutual visits, inviting articles of eminent media persons in professional military journals and writing papers for professional media journals must be encouraged at all levels as a matter of policy. Such a policy will pay handsome dividends in the longer perspective.

20. Official Secrets Act. Section 5 of the Official Secrets Act 1923 must be revised to incorporate the damage potential of a piece of information as the overriding factor in determining whether or not its discloser and receiver are guilty. Such a recommendation has already been made by the Press Council of India in 1982 and 1990. Such a step will be a big stride towards recognition of the ‘right to know' in a democracy.

Changes in Training

21.Training of PROs. Upon selection for the Corps of PR all officers must be put through an orientation course in media interaction for duration of three to six months. The syllabus and course material must be evolved in consultation with leading management institutes, Indian Institute of Mass Communications and media organisations including the Press Council of India. The faculty must also be drawn from these organisations. This course should be followed by an attachment with different types of media organisations, such as newspapers, periodicals, wire services, radio and television for a period of up to six months. A refresher course must be compulsory after another five to six years of service. All officers must be encouraged to obtain degrees in mass communications, public relations and journalism. Selected officers can be sent to leading institutes. These officers must continue to attend all arms courses as applicable for others. PR units must be exercised in all formation level exercises and war games.

22.Training of Other Officers. Media and its handling must form part of the curriculum at all stages of an officers career starting from pre-commission training in the academies to post-commission training in all arms courses right up to senior levels. Commands and Corps must also hold cadres and seminars on this subject for the benefit of other officers. Innovative methods of media training must be incorporated in all exercises and war -games for commanders and staff officers.

23.Training of Troops. Dealing with media must form a part of various promotion cadres for Non Commissioned and Junior Commissioned Officers. In addition troops must be briefed regularly and practised in handling media persons during exercises.

24.General Staff Pamphlets. All aspects of media interaction by the army including the role and effect of media in various operations must be published as a General Staff publication. Current series of publications on ‘Operations of War' and ‘Counter Insurgency' must be modified to incorporate a chapter on ‘media' in each operation.

25.Training of Media Persons. Efforts must be made in consultation with the Press Council of India, various media organisations, University Grants Commission and leading universities conducting courses in journalism to incorporate defence awareness programmes and specific aspects of defence journalism in their curricula. Scope of the War Correspondents course must be enhanced and it should be made a compulsory prerequisite for accreditation as a defence correspondent. An advanced/ refresher course should be designed for interested senior defence correspondents. Training should also be imparted by incorporating media in various formation level exercises and war- games.

Suggested Measures for the Media

26. Media Advisory Committee. The Union Government must appoint a multidisciplinary committee comprising leading personalities in different media, academicians in the fields of sociology, psychology and political science, senior retired service officers, bureaucrats and police officers to advise it on effective media and information policies. Such a committee will prove to be of immense value in fighting the low intensity conflict on a psychological plane effectively. The media, both private and government controlled, must cooperate whole heartedly with such a committee.

27.Press Council of India. This must be enlarged to include eminent persons with experience in the fields of defence and national security, preferably retired senior service officers. Its powers must be increased to enable it to evolve and enforce a code of conduct. Training of journalists must form part of its responsibility on the lines of Indian Medical Association.

28.Broadcasting Council of India. This must be set up on similar lines as the Press Council and have television and radio in its scope. Video magazines must also be included in its ambit.

29.Awareness of Defence Issues. The media must improve its awareness of defence related issues by making concerted efforts in conjunction with the DPR or its successor. It must utilise every opportunity to interact with the defence services by way of seminars, courses and visits.

21

CHAPTER -VI

CONCLUSION

1. After assimilating the role of the media in war, and getting a glimpse of the impact of technology on news reporting, the role played by media in two recent conflicts, it must raise questions in our mind that whereas the military trains hard and well to achieve its goals and reach a level of specialization yet we call upon the media, which is perhaps the only career which starts its profession with zero specialization and most reporters don't know the difference between a company and a brigade, a destroyer and a Fleet Tanker or an F-16 and M-16, to tell the story of the military. This is all the more valid in view of the general level of education in our country.

2. That makes it all the more imperative for building greater harmony and understanding. We will keep shooting ourselves in the foot if we don't realize the potentials of media as a force multiplier and a weapon of war. Failure to recognize and counter enemy usage of media could lead to avoidable military failures. We must realize that decisions are no longer based on events but on how the events are presented. So we must lay greater emphasis on the role of media in war and train for it in peacetime.

3. No country has yet come up with a completely satisfactory media policy on terror. However there are a few examples for us to follow. The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) has an exemplary set of reportage guidelines for War, Terror and Emergencies. Calling for reportage to be quick, accurate and responsible, BBC guidelines call for proper terror lexicon, avoidance of the term terrorist and use of words which specifically describe the perpetrator such as “bomber”, “attacker”, “gunman”, “kidnapper” “insurgent, and “militant” instead . Since the attacks on the London Underground in July 2005, reporters are exhorted not to play with the emotions of the audiences by reporting on events in a sensational manner. Guidelines say that ‘if we receive a bomb warning or other credible and specific threat whether by phone, fax, email or text message, or even posted to a message board or received by tape, the first priority is to pass it on to the appropriate authorities. We must not reveal the current code words normally used by groups giving bomb warnings. We should not reveal security details or other sensitive information not widely in the public domain which might assist an attack - priority areas that the Indian media seems to have glossed over completely.

In a similar, but not as detailed fashion, US public broadcaster PBS (Public Broadcasting Service) defined a set of Editorial Standards and policies in the 1970s. This was completely revised in June 2005 in the post 9/11 scenario to further increase transparency. Under the heading of “Unacceptable Production Practices”. reporters and their camera crews are admonished to refrain from covering terrorist's activities or similar states of emergency as soon as it becomes evident that their presence influences the outcome of the events themselves.

4. The USA PATRIOT (United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism) Act instituted after 9/11 gives overriding powers to the Government and its broad terms of the power mean that it can be used against practically anyone criticizing the US Administration's approach to combating terror. The media pledged to obtain official authorization before interviewing “terrorists” on the air live, ban journalists from acting as independent mediators during a crisis situation, be mindful of the tone of their coverage, and comply with a series of other restrictions.

5. The Mahinda Rajapaksa Government in Sri Lanka - a nation that has faced the scourge of terrorism for years - on October 10 last year notified a new set of norms to regulate all aspects of private television broadcasting, including classification of stations and services, issue, revocation, and duration of licenses, fee structure, territorial coverage, ownership, duties and responsibilities of private television broadcasters, content of broadcasts, and extended powers of the ministry.

6. More ink equals more blood, claim antiterrorists specialists who say that newspapers of coverage of terrorist incidents leads directly to more attacks. It's a sad example of win-win in what they call “common-interest game”. Terrorists get free publicity for themselves and their cause. The media meanwhile makes more money “as reports of terror attacks increase newspapers sales and the TV viewers” . Therefore the conclusion-- coverage cause more attacks, and attacks caused more coverage-- a mutually beneficial spiral of death that they say has increased because of a heightened interest in terrorism since September 11. 2001. One partial solution; deny groups publicity by not publically naming the attackers. But then the question can be asked won't the attackers become known because of informal channels such as the Internet? Not necessarily, experiences show us that in virtually all cases several groups claim responsibility for a particular terrorist attack.

7. While India is yet to frame its set of guidelines on coverage of terrorist acts despite such strikes every few months, it is high time that we do so in right earnest. This should be the top priority of the next government when it comes to power.

21

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Books.

(a) Impacts of Nuclear Power by S Kumar (2009)

(b) Nuclear Reactor Technology by S Kumar (2009)

(c) Nuclear Proliferation by S Kumar (2009)

(d) Indo-Us Nuclear Deal: Seeking Synergy in Bilateralism -

by PR Chari (2009)

(e) India in a changing Global Nuclear Order - Editor Arvind Gupta (2009)

(f) Energy Security -Editors DR Parag Diwan & Dr AN Sarkar (2009)

2. Magazines.

1. Force Jul 09
2. Defence Digest Sep - Oct 08
3. India today Oct 08.

3. Newspapers.

1. The Hindu dt 16, 17 Jul 09 & 03 Aug 09
2. TOI dt 12 Jul 08 & 18 Jun 09
3. Hindustan Times dt 11 Jul 08
4. The New Sunday Indian Express dt 16 Mar 08.

4. Internet.

1. www.ipcs.org
2. www.idsa.org,
3. www.ipcs.org
4. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States-India_Peaceful_Atomic_Energy

Cooperation_Act

(e) Lok Sabha Secretariat New Delhi June, 2007/Asadha, 1929 (Saka)

(f) www.meaindia.nic.in

[1] Columnist Gp Capt SULTAN M HALI

[2] Kennedy, William V., The Military and the Media-Why the Press Cannot be Trusted to Cover a War, Praeger Publishers, West Port USA, 1993, p.x.

[3] Taylor, Philip M., The War and the Media, Keynote address at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, 1995.

[4] Gottschalk, Marie, ‘Operation Desert Cloud: The Media and the Gulf War, World Policy Journal, p. 451.

[5] Ibid., p. 471

[6] Gittings, John, ed., Beyond The Gulf War : The Middle East and The New World Order, London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1991, p.6.

[7] Royce, Knut, ‘The Butchery of Baghdad', Newsday, January 27, 1991.

[8] Lewis, Paul, ‘U.N. Experts Now Say Baghdad Was Far From Making an A-Bomb Before Gulf War', New York Times, May 20, 1992.

[9] Emmons, Garry, ‘Did PR Firm Invent Gulf Stories', In These Times, January 22-28, 1992.

[10] Gellman, Barton, ‘U.S. bombs Missed 70% of Time', Washington Post, March 16, 1991.

[11] Los Angeles Times wire service, ‘Study : Patriots Missed', New York Newsday, March 1, 1991.

[12] Fialka, John J., Hotel Warriors : Covering The Gulf War, Washington DC : Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 1991, pp. 56-57.

[13] Balzer, John, of the Los Angeles Times, cited in William Boot, ‘The Pool', Columbia Journalism Review, May-June 1991, p. 26, and(fn1) p. 23

[14] Schechter, Danny, ‘Gulf War Courage', Z Magazine, December, 1991.

[15] Columnist Gp Capt SUL