Strait Of Hormuz And Its Impact Law International Essay

Published Date: 02 Nov 2017

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By: Shayan Heidarzadeh

Table of Contents

Background

Historical Background

The Strait of Hormuz is located between Iran and Oman, and is the only connection between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. Historians suggest that the Strait got its name from an ancient Persian God, Ahura-Mazda. In Iranian ancient religious texts, Ahura-Mazda has also been referred to as Hourmozd which is similar to name of the Strait. [1] 

Strait of Hormuz is very narrow, only 21 nautical miles wide at its narrowest section. The width of the shipping lane in either direction in the Strait is only two nautical miles, which is separated by a two-mile buffer zone. The Strait is deep and wide enough to handle the world's largest crude oil tankers which weigh more than 150,000 tons. [2] 

Strait of Hormuz is the world's most important oil chokepoint due to its daily oil flow of about 17 million billion barrels a day in 2011, which were about 35 percent of all seaborne traded oil, or almost 20 percent of oil traded worldwide. Chokepoints are very critical in global energy security due to the high volume of oil traded through them. The international energy market is dependent upon reliable transport. "Even a temporary blockage of a chokepoint, can lead to substantial increases in energy costs." In addition, chokepoints leave oil tankers vulnerable to theft from pirates, terrorist attacks, and political unrest in the form of wars or hostilities as well as shipping accidents that can lead to disastrous oil spills. [3] 

In order to protect the U.S energy security, it is very important to study these chokepoints. This paper specifically studies the rule of Transit Passage in International Straits, which allows a vessel or aircraft the freedom of navigation or overflight for the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit of a strait, and how the United States should react in case Iran violates this law.

Geopolitical Significance

The large amount of heavy oil tankers and cargo vessels, the narrowness of the Strait, the existence of so many islands and reefs close to the traffic lanes as well as the concern over the sealing off of the Strait under special circumstances require that the traffic through the Strait be governed by special regulations. [4] 

Article 42 of UNCLOS allows the bordering states to implement Traffic Separation Schemes (TSS) in order to reduce the risk of collision. This objective is achieved through the separation of inbound and outbound traffic lanes and imposition of a speed limit. The TSS’s assigned to the Strait of Hormuz consist of three traffic lanes, including one outbound and one inbound, separated by one separation median. The north lane is west-bound and the south lane is east-bound; each of the three lanes is one nautical mile wide. [5] 

The first TSS governs the traffic in Oman’s territorial waters, which passes one mile off the Quoin Island and the second TSS governs the shipping lane that passes close to the greater and lesser Tunb Islands. These Iranian three islands separate the inbound and outbound lanes. [6] 

Because this TSS falls in Iranian territorial waters, under UNCLOS article 42, it gives Iran the right to oversee the movement of vessels since the traffic lane crosses Iran’s territorial waters. Iran is also entitled to receive a fee as compensation for the maintenance of communication services and navigational signs. Besides, the existence of this TSS enhances the strategic importance of the aforementioned islands. For this reason, the Iran has subjected the traffic of vessels towards these islands to certain restriction. [7] 

Geographical location of the Strait of Hormuz also gives military advantage to the coastal states by allowing them to use the strait as a bottleneck in order to control and possibly attack the vessels that attempt to pass the strait. The narrowness of the strait allows only one or two vessels to pass at one time, and therefore the warships would not be able to carry the usual formation that they do in open waters, making them easier targets against potential attacks.

Transit Passage

Transit Passage in UNCLOS

Part III of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is dedicated to the laws governing the international straits. This section consists of eleven articles, which most of them cover the right of transit passage in international straits.

Article 37 and 38 of this section explain that all ships and aircrafts should enjoy the right of transit passage, and that right shall not be obstructed. This article defines the right of transit passage as "the exercise of the freedom of navigation and over flight solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit of the strait between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone." [8] 

Article 39 explains that while exercising the right of transit passage, ships and aircrafts "should proceed through the strait without delay and refrain from any threat or use of force against the sovereignty territorial integrity or political independence of States bordering the strait." These ships should also comply with international regulations for preventing collisions at sea and international regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from ships. [9] 

Article 42 of this section gives the bordering states the power to enact laws and regulations in order to maintain the safety of the navigation in the strait and prevent, reduce and control the pollution, by giving effect to applicable international regulations regarding the discharge of oil, oily wastes and other noxious substances in the strait. Those laws should not discriminate among foreign ships or deny or impair the right of transit passage for those ships. [10] Therefore, under this article, Iran cannot block the navigation for foreign vessels while allowing their own ships to pass through the strait safely.

Article 44 expressly prohibits the States bordering the straits from hampering transit passage and requires them to give appropriate publicity to any danger to navigation within the strait of which they have knowledge. This article also expressly indicates that there shall be no suspension of transit passage. [11] Under this article, by blocking the transit passage in the Strait of Hormuz, Iran violates the international law.

Iranian Deceleration on UNCLOS

Article 310 of UNCLOS allows a State, when signing, ratifying or acceding to the Convention, to make declarations or statements, however phrased or named, with a view, to the harmonization of its laws and regulations with the provisions of the Convention, provided that those declarations or statements do not try to exclude or to modify the legal effect of the provisions of this Convention in their application to that State. [12] 

Iranian delegate signed the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on December 10th 1982, and upon signing the Iranian government made the following declaration:

"It is the understanding of the Islamic Republic of Iran that:

1) Notwithstanding the intended character of law making nature, certain of its provisions are merely product of quid pro quo that do not necessarily try to codify the existing customs. Therefore only states parties to the Law of the Sea Convention shall be entitled to benefit from the contractual rights created therein.

The above considerations pertain to the following:

The right of Transit passage through straits used for international navigation (Article 38).

The notion of "Exclusive Economic Zone" (Part V). - All matters regarding the International Seabed Area and the Concept of Common Heritage of mankind" [13] 

In this section, Iran declared that it would apply the transit passage regime only to those states that had ratified the convention. As to other states which have not yet ratified the UNCLOS, such as the United States, it would apply the provisions of the 1958 Geneva Convention. Both of these rules of passage prohibit the unjustified blocking of passage of all vessels. Therefore, Iran, by its own declaration, is obliged to respect the transit passage rights of all vessels flying the flag of states party to UNCLOS, both commercial and military. [14] 

"2) Iran recognizes the rights of the Coastal States to take measures to safeguard their security interests including the adoption of laws and regulations regarding the requirements of prior authorization for warships willing to exercise the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea."

"3) The right referred to in article 125 regarding access to and from the sea and freedom of transit of Land-locked States is one which is derived from mutual agreement of States concerned based on the principle of mutuality." [15] 

Article 125 gives Land-locked States the right of access to and from the sea for the purpose of exercising the rights provided for in the Convention including those relating to the freedom of the high seas and the common heritage of mankind. To this end, land-locked States shall enjoy freedom of transit through the territory of transit States by all means of transport.

"4) The provisions of article 70, regarding "Right of States with Special Geographical Characteristics" are without prejudice to the exclusive right of the Coastal States of enclosed and semi-enclosed maritime regions (such as the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman) with large population predominantly dependent upon relatively poor stocks of living resources of the same regions." [16] 

Article 70 allows "Geographically disadvantaged States" the right to participate in the exploitation of an appropriate part of the surplus of the living resources of the exclusive economic zones of coastal States of the same sub-region or region on an equitable basis, while taking into account the relevant economic and geographical circumstances of all the States concerned. [17] 

"5) Islands that situated in enclosed and semi-enclosed seas which potentially can sustain human habitation or economic life of their own, but due to climatic conditions, resource restriction or other limitations, have not yet been put to development will and have full effect in boundary delimitation of various maritime zones of the interested Coastal States." [18] 

Article 121 gave each island its own territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf. This article also notes that rocks that cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf. [19] 

The reason for this declaration by Iran is the status of the disputed islands of Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb and Abu-Musa. Both Iran and United Arab Emirates claim these islands; however, the islands have been under the control of the government of Iran. These islands are very small and do not have any natural resources and are for the most parts undeveloped. The three islands were first seized by the Shah after British withdrawal from the Gulf in the early 1970s, and were then occupied by Iranian troops in 1992. In 1995, the Iranian Foreign Ministry claimed that the islands were "an inseparable part of Iran." Iran has since rejected a 1996 proposal by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) for the dispute to be resolved by the International Court of Justice, an option supported by the UAE. [20] 

Iranian Domestic Law of the Sea

A closer look at the Iranian domestic law of the sea reveals that, at least for the most parts, Iranian lawmakers adapted the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. For example the definitions of territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic shelf and high seas; and the laws regarding Marine Scientific Research are exactly similar to those in the UNCLOS.

The Iranian government, however, reserved the rights to enact other laws and regulations in order to maintain the safety and security of the region. Iran reserved the right to pursue and apprehend any person who is convicted of a crime in Iranian court, in its Territory Sea, Exclusive Economic Zone and High Seas. They also reserved the right to stop and conduct search on any ship in its Territorial Sea or Exclusive Economic Zone, if it is deemed necessary for the safety and security of the region. The Iranian government also reserved the right to stop and revoke the permit to conduct Marine Scientific Research for foreign vessels at any time. [21] 

Iran is also a party in the "Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter" which is an agreement to control pollution of the sea by dumping and to encourage regional agreements supplementary to the Convention and Iranian lawmakers put special importance on the issue of marine pollution and reserved the right to enact laws and levy fees on ships and vessels in order to protect its marine environment and natural resources in its territorial sea and exclusive economic zone. They also reserved the right to pursue, convict and penalize individuals or entities that violate the abovementioned laws.

Cases Concerning Transit Passage

Corfu Channel Case

Corfu Channel is a central case in the history of the straits regime, and some familiarity with it is crucial to an understanding of the regime’s development. The Corfu Channel Case arose from a sea mining incidents that occurred in October of 1946, in the Corfu Strait between Albania and Greece. On the day of the incident, two British destroyers entered the Corfu Strait, believing that the channel, which was in Albanian waters, was safe. [22] That part of the channel had been swept for mines in 1944 and check-swept in 1945. The first destroyer struck a mine and got badly damaged. The second destroyer was sent to the assistance and struck another mine and was also seriously damaged. Forty-five British officers and sailors lost their lives, and forty-two others were wounded. [23] 

Britain filed a case in the International Court of Justice. In its judgment, the Court noted that it was Albania’s duty to notify shipping and especially to warn the ships proceeding through the Strait of the danger to which they were exposed because they had the knowledge of the fact that the strait was not safe. The Court noted that "nothing was attempted by Albania to prevent the disaster, and these grave omissions involve her international responsibility." [24] 

The court also held that "the Albanian claim to make the passage of ships conditional on a prior authorization conflicts with the generally admitted principle that States, in time of peace, have a right to send their warships through straits used for international navigation between two parts of the high seas, provided that the passage is innocent." [25] 

The court also noted that Albania’s allegation that the passage on October 22 was not innocent and it was a political mission and that the methods employed showed an intention to intimidate was not correct. The Court examined the case and concluded that the passage was innocent in its principle, "since it was designed to affirm a right that had been unjustly denied, and in its methods of execution". [26] This is the first time that the right of transit passage through an international strait has been brought to the International Court of Justice.

Passage Through The Great Belt Case (Finland V. Denmark)

In May 1991 Finland instituted proceedings against Denmark in respect of a dispute concerning passage through the Great Belt (Storebaelt), and the project by the Government of Denmark to construct a fixed traffic connection for both road and rail traffic across the West and East Channels of the Great Belt. [27] 

The effect of this project, specially the high-level suspension bridge over the East Channel, would have permanently closed the Baltic to deep draught vessels that were over 65 meters high, and therefore would have prevented the passage of drill ships and oilrigs that were manufactured in Finland because they needed more than that clearance. [28] 

The Government of Finland requested the Court to adjudge and declare:

"(a) That there is a right of free passage through the Great Belt which applies to all ships entering and leaving Finnish ports and shipyards;

"(b) That this right extends to drill ships, oil rigs and reasonably foreseeable ships; [29] 

The right which Finland was concerned about was the right of passage through the Great Belt of ships, including drill ships and oil rigs. The court believed that right was of particular importance because, according to Finland, the East Channel of the Great Belt was for certain vessels the only passage-way to and from the Baltic. [30] 

Denmark, while acknowledging that there was a right of free passage through the Danish Straits for merchant ships of all States, denies that there was a right of transit passage for structures up to 170 meters high, on the grounds that such structures are not actually ships but floating buildings. [31] 

Denmark contended that the construction of the East Channel Bridge will hardly represent any practical interruption for the passing of drill ships and oil rigs, inasmuch as most of the units in question will be able to take another route, and the remainder will be able to pass under the planned East Channel Bridge if left partly unassembled until after passage of the bridge. [32] 

In the order regarding provisional measures, the court said that the right of transit passage through international straits is of the most fundamental navigational rights in the seas. This case was later dismissed on September 4, 1992, when Finland and Denmark reached a final settlement regarding this matter.

Closure of Strait of Hormuz

Background

Since December 2011, a number of Iranian government officials openly threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz to traffic. These threats were mostly in response to the increasing likelihood of sanctions by the United States and European Union that could reduce Iran’s oil export earnings. Previously, United Nations and multilateral sanctions had sought to reduce Iran’s ability to develop its nuclear program by undermining its ability to develop its energy sector but not directly targeting Iran’s ability to export oil. [33] 

This section first examines whether or not closure of the Strait by Iran is acceptable by international law, then it covers the effects of this closure on international markets. Finally this section studies different options that the U.S has in response to the closure of the Strait.

Legality of Closure

When studying the legality of closure of the Strait by Iran, the most important question for legal scholars is whether this closure is a legitimate countermeasure to the sanctions under the international law. This section tries to answer this question by reviewing three international law standards that govern this matter.

Under the UNCLOS, a coastal state can only hinder ships from entering its territorial waters if their passage harms "peace, good order or security," as they would no longer be innocent. UNCLOS also emphasizes that the right of transit passage and innocent passage through straits shall not be suspended. [34] Iranian politicians and scholars have raised the question whether passing foreign oil tankers can still be included under the regime of "innocent passage", if Iran’s own oil exports are disrupted by the United States or the European Union due to the sanctions.

Under the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts drafted by United Nation’s International Law Commission, a blockade of an international strait as a reaction to sanctions is also arguably not permitted as a legitimate countermeasure. Under the Draft Articles, "an injured State may take countermeasures only against a State which is responsible for an internationally wrongful act." [35] 

Whether U.S. and EU sanctions against Iran are such a "wrongful act" is a question of perspective. The United States and European Union believe that, it is actually Iran that committed that wrongful act by failing to comply with its international obligations by not fully cooperating with the International Atomic Energy Agency and not addressing all requests concerning the Iranian nuclear program. However, Iranians believe that the wrongfulness of Iran’s compliance or noncompliance with international obligations is disputable.

Under the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts, the rights of transit passage "continue to apply" even "in times of armed conflict", and ships have transit passage rights through all straits. [36] 

However, under this law, this right is not absolute. Legal scholars believe that "vital security interests" can entitle a country to close an international strait "temporarily" in cases of armed conflicts. However, this closure only applies to the vessels that are not neutral in conflict.

Because of the location of the Strait between Iran and Oman, under the San Remo Manual, a full closure of the Strait of Hormuz for belligerent vessels in an armed conflict would only be acceptable in the case of an alliance between these two countries, and the right of transit passage could not be suspended for vessels from states that are neutral in the conflict. [37] 

Economic Effects of Closure

Being the most important chokepoint in the world, over 17 million barrels of crude oil goes through the Strait of Hormuz every day. If Iran were to follow through with its threat to block the Strait, the economic impact would be immediate. Energy experts believe that the price of oil would start to soar and could rise 50 percent or more within days. [38] 

Iranian economy, which is already weakened by the sanction, relies on exporting at least two million barrels of oil a day through the strait. A blockade means that China, which is Iran’s most important oil customer and a major recipient of Persian Gulf oil, will not receive the oil it needs, and this in fact will weaken the Iranian-Chinese diplomatic relationship. Iran does not want to deteriorate its relationship with China because the Chinese have invested heavily in Iranian oil fields and have also opposed Western efforts to sanction Iran over its nuclear program. [39] 

Energy experts believe even a partial blockage of the Strait of Hormuz could raise the world price of oil within days by $50 a barrel or more, and that would quickly push the price of a gallon of regular gasoline to well over $4 a gallon. "You would get an international reaction that would not only be high, but irrationally high," said Lawrence J. Goldstein, a director of the Energy Policy Research Foundation. [40] 

More than 85 percent of the oil and most of the natural gas that flows through the strait goes to China, Japan, India, South Korea and other Asian nations. But a blockade would have a ripple effect on global oil prices. Since Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates all rely on the strait to ship their oil and natural gas exports, a blockade might undermine some of those governments in an already unstable region. Europe and the United States have strategic oil reserves and could get some Persian Gulf oil through Red Sea pipelines so they would probably feel the least direct impact. [41] 

Energy experts also believe a crisis in the region would most likely be gradual. They believe that Iran at first will use threats as a way to increase oil prices and shipping costs for the West, and if the sanctions get tougher, they might resolve to block the Strait completely. Energy analysts believe that if Iran continues its threats to close the Strait of Hormuz, transportation costs will go higher, sending energy prices soaring on global markets. So far, insurance companies have not raised prices for covering tankers, but shipping companies are already preparing to pay bonuses for crews facing more hazardous duties. [42] 

Sincerity of Iranian Threats

At its January 23, 2012, meeting, the European Union agreed to an embargo to take full effect by July 1, 2012. As a result of the European Union decision, some Iranian leaders immediately reiterated the threat to the Strait. Some others threatened to immediately cut off exports to the European Union and thereby deny the European Union time to identify alternative suppliers, however, to this date, none of these threats had been actualized. [43] 

Since then, the Iranian authorities regularly announced that Iran would not close the Strait of Hormuz without a reason. However, Iran's Defense Minister Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi said that "in the event of a military attack on the country, [Iran] would not hesitate in taking any necessary measures to protect its sovereignty, one of which would be to shut down the strategic oil cargo passage." [44] 

International law scholars and economists believe that Iran, because of its own dependence on commerce through the Strait, would not actually attempt to close the Strait. Oil exports are vital to the Iranian government’s fiscal health and the Iranian economy as a whole. Iran relies on the Strait not only for its oil exports, but also for the shipment of some needed food and medical products, although Iran could attempt to re-route imports through ports outside the Strait, or with established overland trade routes through Pakistan or Iraq. Therefore, the likelihood that Iran might attempt to close the Strait increases if a broad embargo on purchases of Iran’s oil emerges.

Iran may also fear that closing the Strait would provoke an armed conflict with the United States. Iran might be concerned that such a conflict would lead to U.S. military action not just to reopen the Strait but also to destroy its military and nuclear infrastructure.

Further, by threatening traffic through the Straits, Iran may risk alienating other nations, including its neighbors and customers, and further isolating itself. Most of the oil from the Persian Gulf goes to Asian nations. China is Iran’s largest customer of the Iranian oil and Iran is China’s third largest source of oil imports. [45] 

Possible Iranian Attack Scenarios

Rather than closing the Strait, some experts believe that Iran would use its capabilities to disrupt, threaten, harass, and otherwise create substantial instability for shipping in the Gulf. Similar to attempting to close the Strait, employing these low- intensity tactics could cause the United States and its partners to think twice about increasing economic, diplomatic, or military pressure against Iran.

Iran might begin with a less violent option and progress over time to more violent ones, or implement a combination of highly violent options from the outset. Iranian government might declare that the Strait of Hormuz is closed to shipping, without stating explicitly what the consequences might be for ships that attempt to transit those waters.

Iran might also use its speedboats to harass, block the path of, or fire warning shots at ships transiting the Strait or other parts of the Gulf, or use them, and shore-based rockets, artillery, and cruise missiles, mini-submarines, or swimmers, to selectively attack selected ships transiting the Strait or other parts of the Gulf.

One of the bigger concerns of the United States has been that Iran could attempt to place mines in the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf, which is considered an act of war by the U.S. administration. Mining the Strait of Hormuz would certainly violated the freedom of navigation right as it is described under the Law of the Sea, particularly the right of transit passage.

Iran had performed several mining operations in the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman since the Islamic Revolution. Traditionally, IRGCN uses the IRIN logistics or amphibious vessels with a large flat open deck to storing and dropping the mines. Despite the fact that the amphibious craft operated from IRIN vessels, the mining was always conducted and controlled by an IRGCN special missions unit. The April 1988 mining that inflicted $96 million in damage to the USS Roberts was conducted by one of those vessels. [46] 

U.S. Options in Response to Closure

Even though the probability of closure of the strait is minimal at most, the United States should consider all of the possible responses. In general we can categorize these responses in two categories of militaristic and diplomatic responses.

Diplomatic Response

Multilateral nuclear talks could provide a diplomatic means to reduce any threat Iran posed to traffic through the Strait. Since 2006, Iran has negotiated with "P5+1," to identify steps that could assure the international community that Iran’s nuclear program is purely peaceful. [47] 

Iran has shown interest in resuming nuclear talks, perhaps in an attempt to head off broadening sanctions. On December 31, 2011, Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator, Saeed Jallili, stated that Iran would respond positively to an October 2011 letter by EU foreign policy director Catherine Ashton to enter a new round of nuclear negotiation. [48] However, and despite comments by Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad on January 26, 2012 welcoming new talks, no formal response has been sent. [49] 

Recently Iranian officials said that it is hopeful to move forward during talks with major world powers over its controversial nuclear drive, the state broadcaster and ISNA news agency reported. However, Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi said: "This issue will not be solved overnight, and understanding this issue is very important and opens the way" to a solution. [50] 

Progress on these talks could motivate the United States and the European Union to weaken sanctions, which in turn could reduce Iran’s motivation to threaten traffic through the Strait.

Bypassing the Strait

One of the options that the U.S is currently pursuing is to bypass the Strait of Hormuz altogether and transport the oil out of the Persian Gulf via alternative means. In the Persian Gulf region, only Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have pipelines able to ship crude oil outside of the Gulf. [51] 

Iraq has a pipeline that can be used to bypass the Strait of Hormuz by transporting oil from the north of Iraq to the Turkish port of Ceyhan. This pipeline can pump about 0.4 million barrels per day, however, it cannot transfer additional volumes of oil to bypass the Strait unless it receives the oil from another pipeline called which links northern and southern Iraq. Since the war on Iraq, portions of that pipelines got damaged and are closed, and repairs and renovations to this pipeline could take several years to complete. Therefore, in order to use the northern pipeline in the case of closure of the Strait, the U.S must invest in repairing the southern pipeline. [52] 

Saudi Arabia has a pipeline called the Petroline that is 745 miles long. The Petroline system consists of two smaller sections, a 56-inch pipeline and a 48-inch pipeline, with a total capacity of about 4.8 million barrels per day. The 56-inch pipeline has a capacity of 3 million barrels per day. The 48-inch pipeline had been operating in recent years as a natural gas pipeline, but Saudi Arabia recently converted it back to an oil pipeline. [53] 

Saudi Arabia also has two additional pipelines that are parallel to the Petroline system and bypass the Strait of Hormuz, but both of them are designed to move natural gas liquids and not crude oil, therefore they would not be helpful in case of closure of the Strait. The first one is the Abqaiq-Yanbu that is designed to move 290,000 barrels of liquid natural gas liquids per day. The second one is called the Iraqi Pipeline that runs through Saudi Arabia is used to move liquid natural gas to the western coast of Saudi Arabia. This pipeline was originally built to carry 1.65 million barrels per day of crude oil from Iraq to the Red Sea, but Saudi Arabia later converted it to carry natural gas, and converting it back to a pipe that can carry crude oil will be both expensive and time consuming. [54] 

There are also other pipelines in the region that have been out of service for a number of years due to damage in wars, disuse, or political disagreements, and would require a complete renovation in order to get utilized for transportation of crude oil out of the region and bypassing the Strait of Hormuz [55] 

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) recently constructed a 1.5 million barrels per day pipeline called the "Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline" that runs from Habshan, in southwestern part of the country to the port of Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman, bypassing the Strait of Hormuz.

When operating at peak capacity, this pipeline will be able to export up to 1.5 million barrels per day, which more than half of UAE's total net oil exports. However, the UAE currently does not have the ability to utilize the full capacity pipeline completely. [56] 

The total capacity of all of these pipelines together is only 6.2 million barrels per day, which is less than half of the 17 million barrels per day that is getting transited through the strait, and the United States should consider this important fact when it comes to planning its strategy regarding the Strait.

Another problem with bypassing the strait is the great cost that is attributed to the bypass operation. In order to maintain the flow in most crude oil pipelines, chemicals called Drag Reduction Agents (DRA) need to be added to oil. This is because of the fact that flow in pipeline is turbulent and causes drag and energy loss while pumping. By eliminating this loss of energy, the hydraulic gradient is made less steep and the oil flows faster for the same amount of energy lost. DRAs should be injected into pipelines at every pumping station because DRA molecules are fragile, and tend to break down when passing through a pump. The DRAs leave no residue on pipeline walls, and are easily removed in refining process. [57] 

These DRAs cost about $30 per gallon and if we consider all the pumping stations that it needs to go through, the DRAs would cost just under $1 per barrel of crude oil. Therefore in case of a full bypass, the cost DRA alone will be over $17 million per day. [58] 

Installing injection pumps to inject DRA in the pipeline will be an additional $500 million. In order to have a constant flow in the pipelines, the current pumps in the pipelines need to be upgraded, upgrading the pumps and the pump impellers will add an additional cost of $463 million. [59] 

In order to buffer the reverse flow that happens as a result of increased flow in the pipelines and to help segregate the crude oil into batches by type. (Super Light, Light, Medium, and Heavy), it is likely to require extra storage tanks. Adding one million extra barrels of tankage comes at a cost of $23 million. [60] 

Overall as we see here, the cost of bypassing the Strait will be over a billion dollars, and the fact that oil is not a sustainable form of energy, make it difficult for the oil companies to invest this much to bypass the strait to transfer oil out of the Persian Gulf.

Military Response

On the same day that Iran made its threats to close the Strait, a spokeswoman for the U.S. Navy’s 5th Fleet, which is responsible for the Persian Gulf region, stated, "Anyone who threatens to disrupt freedom of navigation in an international strait is clearly outside the community of nations; any disruption will not be tolerated." Also, Department of Defense press secretary George Little reportedly stated, "Any attempt to close the strait will not be tolerated." [61] 

This section first covers some of the recent military conflicts in the area surroundings the Strait. After that it examines the naval capabilities of the Iranian government and discuss different scenarios that might happen in case of a military conflict.

History of Conflicts in the Strait

Since the Islamic revolution in 1979, the number of military conflicts in the Persian Gulf and areas surrounding the Strait of Hormuz has raised significantly. In April 1988, in Operation Praying Mantis, the U.S. Navy waged a one-day battle against Iranian forces in and around the strait. This operation was launched in retaliation for the mining of the USS Roberts by Iranian navy. During this operation U.S. forces attacked and disabled two oil platforms and sank one frigate, one gunboat, and six armed speedboats. Two days after the battle, the USS McCormick was directed to escort a U.S. oiler out through the Strait of Hormuz. While the ships remained alert, no hostile indications were received, and the clash was over. [62] 

On November 6, 2003, the International Court of Justice ruled that "the actions of the United States of America against Iranian ships and Oil Platforms in April of 1988 (Operation Praying Mantis) cannot be justified as measures necessary to protect the essential security interests of the United States of America."

ICJ also dismissed Iran's claim that the attack by United States Navy was a breach of the 1955 Treaty of Amity between the two countries, because the 1955 treaty protected only "freedom of trade and navigation between the territories of the parties" and, due to the US trade embargo on Iran at the time, no direct trade or navigation between the two was affected by the conflict. [63] 

In July 1988, an Iranian passenger jet was shot down and its 290 passengers were killed while flying over the Strait of Hormuz, in the Iranian airspace by the United States Cruiser USS Vincennes. According to the United States Government, the crew of USS Vincennes identified the Iranian Airbus as an attacking F-14 fighter. [64] 

In February 1996, the United States agreed to pay Iran $61.8 million in settlement to discontinue a case brought by Iran in the International Court of Justice relating to this incident. This compensation was explicitly characterized by the United States as being on an ex gratia basis, and the U.S. denied having any liability for what happened. [65] 

More recently, a series of naval stand-offs between Iranian speedboats and U.S. warships in the Strait of Hormuz occurred in December 2007 and January 2008. U.S. officials accused Iran of harassing and provoking their naval vessels; Iranian officials, however, denied these allegations. These confrontations later ended with no casualties on either side. [66] 

Iranian Naval Force

Iranian navy is divided between the two branches, the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy (IRIN), and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGC Navy). The IRIN has around 18,000 active sailors and controls the larger coastal combatant ships and submarines. IRGC Navy has around 20,000 active sailors and mostly controls the smaller and faster missile and patrol boats.

The IRIN, with its larger ships, is usually assigned to patrol the more open waters of the Gulf of Oman; the IRGC Navy, with its lighter fleet, is assigned to close-in waters of the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf. The IRGC Navy has been perceived as more willing to undertake operations not fully vetted by senior political leaders, whereas the IRIN is considered more traditional and restrained in its approach. IRGC is also a greater threat the U.S forces because of its small fleet and unconventional tactics, such as "swarming," which is characterized by deployment of dozens, or perhaps even hundreds of cruise missiles or other armed small boats, to converge on and attack a discreet target. [67] 

According to the latest published intelligence, the Iranian naval forces in the region of Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman consists of the following units:

Submarines: Iran has 3 Russian made Kilo class submarines, 3 Iranian made SSI class submarines, and 22 Ghadir class midget submarines. Torpedoes launched from Iran’s submarines could potentially inflict devastating damage on a warship. Iran’s decision to base its three Kilo class submarines outside the Strait of Hormuz suggests that the ships would be used during a confrontation to threaten surface ships operating in the Gulf of Oman. [68] 

Destroyers: Iran currently has 3 British built Damavand class destroyers. These destroyers were bought before the revolution. Even though these vessels are still operational, they are mostly used for training.

Frigates: Iran has 4 British Built Alvand Class and 6 Iranian Built Mouj Class Frigates. These ships carry anti-ship and ant-submarine weapon systems as well as surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missiles.

Missile Boats: Iranian Navy has 3 Hamze class Corvettes as well as 10 Chinese Hudong-class missile boats and 14 Iranian build Kaman class missile boats. The corvettes are equipped with front and aft cannons and anti-air guns. The missile boats carry "Silkworm" super-sonic anti-ship missiles. These vessels can also pose potential threats to the U.S forces in case of a conflict.

Patrol Boats: The IRGC Navy is equipped with several patrol boats. These small boats include 5 Chinese CAT-14 missile boats that can be armed with cruise missiles and torpedoes; as well as about 200 Iran-made PEYKAAP class patrol boat; and over 100 Swedish-made Boghammer class fast boats. Iran also has an unspecified number of small boats designed in Italy but made in Iran itself. Theses boats are equipped with recoilless rifles, rocket launchers, surface-to-air missiles, and anti-armor guided weapons. [69] 

Mines: Iran is believed to possess as many as 5,000 mines of different types of mines, including moored mines, advanced mines such as the MDM-3, SADAF-02 mines that can be dropped from aircraft. Detecting and clearing mines once they have been placed in the water can be difficult and time-consuming task. Mine- clearing operations could be made more challenging if they are undertaken while U.S. and coalition forces are also attempting to counter other Iranian forces, such as speed boats, mini-submarines, and shore-based cruise missiles. [70] 

Anti-Ship Missiles: The IRGC Navy also controls several batteries of CSS-C-2 "Seersucker" and China-made C-801 and C-802 anti-ship missiles emplaced along Iran’s coast. These missiles can be readily deployed anywhere along the Iranian coast. Beginning in the mid-1990s, Iran purchased the advanced C-801/802 anti-ship missiles for both its surface fleet and coastal defense forces. These missiles are far less susceptible to jamming and have a range of sixty-seven nautical miles. Therefore they can reach most of the Persian Gulf tanker route and become a big threat for the ships passing the strait in case of any conflict. [71] 

U.S Navy Response Scenarios

Although U.S. officials’ statements have addressed Iran’s threat to close the Strait outright, experts believe that the United States will also engage Iranian forces in case of harassment or interference with the free flow of commerce in the Strait of Hormuz by those forces. U.S. military will have three general options in case of a military confrontation. These options will vary in severity and could range from a defensive scare tactic to full on attack by the means of naval and air forces.

The first and most likely option will be clearing mines in the Strait by U.S forces, and organizing convoys or establishing a protected shipping corridor, and defending cargo ships and oil tankers against Iranian attacks and harassments.

The second option is more aggressive and involves the United States forces engaging in air strikes against shore-based Iranian anti-ship weapons and supporting surface-to-air missile batteries, radars, and command-and-control facilities.

The third option is even go broader and involves attacking shore-based Iranian assets that are not involved in Iran’s effort to close the Gulf, including targets believed to be associated with the development of an Iranian nuclear weapon capability. [72] 

As already discussed in this paper, the United States forces have to face different Iranian forces in the region, including Iranian mines, speedboats, anti-ship missiles, and submarines.

United States has stationed a limited number of mine-clearing assets at the Persian Gulf. These assets include four mine clearing ships and one squadron of mine clearing helicopters. Although this number of assets is not enough to counter Iranian mines, they can be useful to buy additional time for the United States to transport additional mine-clearing ships and helicopters into the area. [73] 

U.S. forces can engage with Iranian speedboats using their ship-based guns and missiles as well as land and sea-based airplanes and helicopters armed with missiles, rockets, guided bombs. U.S. might choose to initially keep its warships out of confined waters in the Strait until the threat posed by the small patrol boats has been neutralized. This strategy could reduce the risk to U.S. warships but at the same time it might lengthen the time for reopening the Strait. [74] 

While detecting and destroying a Kilo class submarine that is under the water and is waiting quietly near the Strait of Hormuz can be difficult, Diesel-electric submarines such as the Kilo class have a "submerged endurance" of no more than a few days, which makes them vulnerable to attack when they surface or when docked at ports. [75] 

Even though the United States Navy is capable to eliminate any threat in the Persian Gulf and re-open the Strait of Hormuz, every military operation comes with substantial costs and potential casualties. For this reason, the United States should keep the military option as a last resort and try to resolve the situation using diplomatic means.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Strait of Hormuz is, strategically, one of the most important Straits in the world, and the fact that it is controlled by a politically unstable country make it even more important in the international community.

Closing the Strait of Hormuz to traffic is against all international and customary law. "UNCLOS" and the "Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts", closing any international strait is illegal and not a valid countermeasure in response to sanctions. Even under "San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea," a country can only close a strait which is fully in its territorial waters against a belligerent state’s vessels and not any other neutral state vessels.

In order to keep this important artery open, the United States has to keep all the options on the table. Even though the multilateral nuclear talks have not been successful yet, the United States, with the help of other superpowers in the world, should keep pushing Iran to solve this matter diplomatically. However, in case all these diplomatic endeavors fail, the U.S. should be ready to act with full military force to defeat any Iranian attempt to close the Strait. If that

Finally, the United States should give incentives, such as tax credits, to international oil companies in order to encourage them to invest in the technology to bypass the Strait of Hormuz, and also invest in more sustainable form of energy.