History Of A Compensatory Formula Law Constitutional Administrative Essay

Print   

02 Nov 2017

Disclaimer:
This essay has been written and submitted by students and is not an example of our work. Please click this link to view samples of our professional work witten by our professional essay writers. Any opinions, findings, conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of EssayCompany.

CHAPTER FOUR

The intended Reform:

A compensatory formula

The implementation of the Sachs recommendations requires the insertion, in our electoral system, of a dose of proportional representation based on a party-list vote. This means that, in addition to voting for the three candidates of his choice to represent him in Parliament, the elector shall also vote for a party of his choice. And in voting for that party, he will be voting for members of that party whose name appear on the party-list.

It is crucial to understand that the elector does cast a vote for the members appearing on the party list. Unlike the present best loser system, the seats are allocated to winners and not to losers. Electors will continue to vote for the three MPs of their choice. As a result of the count, 62 members are returned to the National Assembly. And 30 other members will be elected in accordance with the number of votes which their party has polled. And, after all this, the BLS will continue to guarantee that unreturned candidates at the constituency level will, if they belong to the "appropriate community", be guaranteed a seat. On a specified day following the day fixed for the withdrawal of candidatures ,each registered party or party alliance having at least 12 candidates shall lodge with the Electoral Commissioner a list of not more than 30 persons which will be called the "party list".

The Sachs Commission named and called this system as the Model C –,

The third suggestion, known as PR Model C, would tolerate for a higher degree of fairness whilst still heavily choosing stability. This ideal would tend in approval of stability by safeguarding that the number of PR seats was restricted to a number not greater than 30. Approval of the BLS or not, the fact that there will be sixty-two members elected on a constituency basis and directing to only a greatest of thirty elected giving to the compensatory PR system ,will burden the House severely on the aspect of the constituency form of representation. The overstated asset of the principal party created by the

In the House of such party the FPTP will moreover highlight its comparative power. Thus, any party or coalition which gets near to 50% or more of the votes will be certain of such a sizable number of constituency seats that it is suited to form a government could not be endangered by the starter of thirty PR seats. In the elections of 2000, the MSM/MMM alliance obtained 58 out of 70 seats.

If, the PR Model C had been validated and the extra number of PR seats was 20, the alliance would have concluded with a majority that could yet have been more than 70%. If 30 PR seats had been enhanced, it would have ended up with a majority of nearly 60%. Thus, while strongly focused towards protecting

the right to form a government of the leader of a party that on its own gets near to 50% of the national vote, or a pre-election alliance that leads witheven a low percentage, it would introduce a relatively significant correction tothe present gross under-representation of the opposition party or parties. It

should be noted, however, that even if PR Model C would not put at risk aparty or alliance that received nearly half the votes cast, it could make adifference if no single party or alliance received close to 50% or more of thevotes. In such narrow circumstances, it could, if three parties each got more

than 10% of the vote, place the third party in a position to form a post-

electoral alliance with a second party so as to form a majority in the House

and thereby choose the Prime Minister. At this stage, one can only speculate

on how any system of PR would affect electoral and party behaviour. The

practical effect of PR Model C might well be to encourage the creation of post-

election coalitions rather than pre-election alliances. At the moment, the

electoral system gives enormous, and many say, disproportionate, incentives to

form pre-election alliances.

advantage of establishing a balanced ticket known to the electorate in

Some voters might see this as having the

advance. The parties and the electorate generally, however, might prefer the

extra degree of fluidity and voter-choice which PR Model C would introduce. 17

85. The introduction of this system will call for a party list and the application of a

compensatory formula to compensate underrepresentation.

Section I - The Party List

86. Each party will select the candidates to appear on the party list in accordance

with such rules as the party may determine.

87. There will be two notable exceptions.

A. Gender representation and double candidacies

(i) Gender representation

88. Mauritius is already the subject of serious and ardent criticism for the low

level of female representation in Parliament. The present electoral system will

never do justice to the true role of women in society and will never enhance

the empowerment of women. Gender parity must be preserved at

89. We must acknowledge that party establishments are largely male-dominated

and male-orientated. The glaring lack of sensitivity of all party establishments

towards half of the population cannot be a subject of pride and any system

which does not attempt to cure this is not worthy of any consideration18. Only

a party-list system can do justice to women and the role of women in society.

90. We therefore recommend that the first twelve persons on the list shall include

at six persons of the female sex and at least six persons of the male sex, in

whatever order the party decides. This will ensure that within a few years,

political mentalities will have changed to such an extent that women will be

adequately represented in Parliament.

91. We stress that this is not a quota system. Under the system which we

recommend, female candidates will stand for election on a list and will be

elected on their own merit. The only difference being that instead of being

elected on a constituency basis, they will be elected on a national party list

with the same duties and obligations. We are not adopting a system such as

exists in Uganda where a separate electoral college elects a specific number of

women to Parliament on account only of their gender.

(ii) Double candidacy

92. The issue here is whether a person may stand as candidate in the constituency

poll and be also a candidate on his party list. This would mean that half of the

candidates in the constituency elections could also be on the party list. Double

candidacies exist in Germany, New Zealand, Scotland, Wales, Japan and other

developed countries and it is up to parties to decide on the number of such

93. Your Committee do not agree that this is feasible in three-member

constituencies such as we have in Mauritius. A general acceptance of double

candidacy would defeat the whole purpose of having a party list while at the

same time creating an inherent risk of infighting during the electoral

campaign, with sly campaigns being conducted against those who do not

appear on the party list.

94. However, after careful consideration, Your Committee recommends one

exception for party leaders. The leader of a party will be able to appear both

on the party list and on a constituency list. The existing prohibition against

being a candidate in multiple constituencies will remain. This will ensure that

the leader of a party securing more than 10% of the votes will stand a

reasonable chance of being allocated a seat even where he loses his

constituency seat, especially if he is on top of his party’s list (his ranking in

the list being a matter for his party).

B. Registration of party lists

95. On the day following the date of withdrawal of candidatures, all political

parties having registered themselves under paragraph 2 of the First Schedule,

may register, with the Electoral Supervisory Commission, a list of not more

than 30 persons. The list shall indicate the order of precedence of each of the

candidates appearing thereon.

96. A number of conditions will need to be satisfied with regard to the list, viz.-

The list shall be signed by the President and the Secretary of the

executive committee of the party filing the list and shall be

accompanied by a resolution of the executive committee of the party

approving that list ;

The candidates appearing on the list must be qualified to be

candidates at an election to the National Assembly.

The list shall be in such form as may be prescribed by the Electoral

Supervisory Commission and shall contain (i) the name, address and

profession of that person and (ii) the community to which that

person belongs ;

Each candidate whose name appears on the party list shall subscribe

to a declaration to the effect that he agrees to his name appearing on

the party list and his signature shall also appear against his name on

the party list ;

No political party or party alliance, even where registered under

paragraph 2 of the First Schedule shall be entitled to register a list

unless it has, at constituency level, fielded at least twelve candidates

who belong to such party or party alliance and who are candidates

for elections.

Within two days following the registration of party lists, the

Electoral Supervisory Commission shall publish, in the Gazette and

in such number of newspapers as may be prescribed, all the party

lists registered with the Commission. The lists shall also be posted

in all polling stations.

The publication shall contain –

the name and symbol of the political party ;

such particulars of the persons appearing on the list as the

Electoral Supervisory Commission may prescribe ; and

(iii) a statement by the Chairman of the Electoral Supervisory

Commission certifying that the list has been registered with

the Commission within the prescribed delay and that, for the

purpose of the election, the persons appearing on the list shall

be allocated seats under the relevant provision of the First

Schedule of the Constitution.

Section II – The compensation for underrepresentation

A. The voting process

(i) The poll

97. On the day of the poll, an elector shall be provided with two ballot papers. The

first ballot paper will contain the list of candidates for election in the

constituency. The second ballot paper will contain a list of parties who have

registered their party lists. They need not contain the lists themselves. The

ballot papers shall be in such form as the Electoral Supervisory Commission

98. On the first ballot paper, the elector shall insert a mark to indicate the three

candidates of his choice in the same manner as it is done now.

99. On the second ballot paper (the"party ballot paper"), the elector shall insert a

mark to indicate the party for which he votes. For instance, an elector may, in

the first ballot paper, have voted for two candidates of Party A and one

candidate of Party B. But on the second ballot paper, he will indicate the party

of his choice, which may be Party A or Party B or any other party appearing

on the list. By voting for a particular party list, he actually votes for the party

which he would like to represent him in Parliament and, at the same time,

votes for those persons whose names appear on the party list in order of

precedence. If his party passes the threshold of 10%, this elector may be

represented in Parliament even if his chosen candidates have not been elected.

The elector shall place his ballot papers in two separate ballot boxes.

(ii) The Count

On "counting day", constituency and party-list ballot papers will be

counted separately. In respect of each constituency, the first three candidates

will be returned to Parliament.

With regard to party ballot papers, a count shall be effected at the level

of each constituency so as to determine the number of electors who have voted

for each party appearing on the list.

The results shall then be returned to the Electoral Supervisory

Commission which will determine to which candidates appearing on the party

list the 30 additional seats should be allocated.

B. Allocation of additional seats

The system is not a complicated system except if one stubbornly

refuses to understand it. The Electoral Supervisory Commission shall –

on the basis of returns effected by each Returning Officer, count the

total number of votes which have been cast for each party in the

"second ballot";

discard from consideration all parties who have polled less than

10% of the total votes cast ;

divide the total number of votes polled by each party having polled

10% or more of the votes [a] by the aggregate of one (1) and the

number of candidates of that party who have been returned at the

level of the 21 constituencies (1+ b); The formula to be applied will

therefore be [ a / (1+b)]. In other words, where a party has, say, 20

returned candidates at constituency level, the number of votes polled

by that party in respect of its party list is divided by 21. The result is

the "PR figure".

The PR Figure of each party indicates whether that party is

underrepresented. Where a party has a high PR figure, this means

that it is underrepresented and, as a result, the first additional seat

shall be allocated to the party with the highest PR figure ;

Since the allocation of that first additional seat may have upset the

representation of parties, another PR figure needs to be recalculated

by dividing the total number of votes polled by that party (a) by the

aggregate of one (1) and the number of seats held by that party as a

result of the previous exercise.

this process shall carry on until all 30 additional seats have been

The following illustration, taken from the 1976 results19 will reveal

that the exercise is not as complicated as it reads –

Independence Party obtained 456 177 votes and secured 25 seats.

MMM obtained 469 420 and secured 30 seats.

PMSD, obtained 200 559 votes (more than 10%) and secured 7 seats.

One can immediately see that the PMSD was grossly underrepresented.

This under representation may have contributed to the ensuing political

instability of the late 1970’s.

The following tables indicate how the compensatory system would

Total votes per party

IP

Seats

25

To compensate for this underrepresentation, a PR figure would be

worked out for each of these three parties as follows –

IP

PR Figure

456177/ (1+25)

17,545.27

MMM

PR Figure

469420/ (1+30)

15,142.58

This operation indicates that the first additional seat would be allocated

to the PMSD which would, at that stage, have 8 seats.

The allocation of this additional seat to the PMSD lowers its PR figure.

The dividing figure remains the same for IP and MMM but is (1 + 8) for

The figures are provided by the Electoral Commissioner’s Office. It is assumed, for the present

purposes, that electors voted on a strict party line. This is not a correct assumption as it was as from

1982 that electors started voting "bloc".

20

Still on the assumption that votes were cast on party lines.

PMSD. The PR figure will therefore remain the same for IP and MMM but

will decrease for PMSD which will, however, still have a higher PR figure.

IP

PR Figure

456,177/ (1+25)

17,545.27

MMM

PR Figure

469,420/ (1+30)

15,142.58

The second additional seat is therefore allocated to the PMSD.

For the third additional seat, the dividing figure still remains the same

for IP and MMM but is (1 + 9) for PMSD. The PR figure will, once again,

decrease for PMSD. The process goes on as in the following table –

IP

Seats

25

25

25

25

25

26

27

27

28

29

29

30

30

31

31

31

32

32

33

33

34

34

34

34

35

35

36

36

36

37

37

MMM

Votes

469,420.00

15,142.58

488.47

15,142.58

15,142.58

15,142.58

15,142.58

15,142.58

15,142.58

15,142.58

15,142.58

15,142.58

15,142.58

15,142.58

15,142.58

15,142.58

15,142.58

15,142.58

15,142.58

15,142.58

15,142.58

15,142.58

15,142.58

15,142.58

15,142.58

15,142.58

15,142.58

15,142.58

15,142.58

15,142.58

15,142.58

The above table indicates how the compensatory PR formula allows

for fairness while striking a balance with the requirement of stability. Indeed,

the IP/PMSD coalition would have had a clearer majority in the Assembly and

would have probably avoided the instability of the late 70’s. The initial results

meant that the MMM was overrepresented in Parliament. This would have

been corrected by providing 9 additional seats to the PMSD and 12 to the

Independence Party.

One can also insert an additional guarantee to provide that the party

having won the most seats at constituency level is guaranteed to have at least

50% + 1 of the seats in the Assembly even where its PR figure is the lowest.



rev

Our Service Portfolio

jb

Want To Place An Order Quickly?

Then shoot us a message on Whatsapp, WeChat or Gmail. We are available 24/7 to assist you.

whatsapp

Do not panic, you are at the right place

jb

Visit Our essay writting help page to get all the details and guidence on availing our assiatance service.

Get 20% Discount, Now
£19 £14/ Per Page
14 days delivery time

Our writting assistance service is undoubtedly one of the most affordable writting assistance services and we have highly qualified professionls to help you with your work. So what are you waiting for, click below to order now.

Get An Instant Quote

ORDER TODAY!

Our experts are ready to assist you, call us to get a free quote or order now to get succeed in your academics writing.

Get a Free Quote Order Now