An Estate Contract Law Land Property Essay

Published Date: 02 Nov 2017

In the case of Miss Jones we have to find out whether she has a leasehold interest in the court defined a lease as an exclusive possession of property, for a term, at a rent. James granted Miss Jones tenancy of a self-constrained part of. Therefore, Miss Jones had an exclusive possession of that part. Miss Jones was granted a monthly tenancy. The question is whether such tenancy can be considered as tenancy granted for a term. In recent years courts appear to be willing to accept arrangements that, at the first glance, cannot be considered as having a certain term. pointed out that the lease term should be certain from the very beginning. In Miss Jones case, it is a monthly tenancy. Therefore, it is clear that the tenancy is carried out at least for one month. In other words, the duration of the tenancy can be presumed from the facts. If the payment is made monthly, a periodic tenancy of one week should be presumed. Finally, since the tenancy is monthly ,there is a rent. There is a lease of a self-constrained part of on the part of Miss Jones. According to the a lease can be registered as a Class C charge. Indeed, lease can be considered as an estate contract since it creates a legal estate. As in Mr. Carr’s case, Miss Jones’s interest is binding upon Peter only if it is registered.

The question is whether Fiona is entitled to beneficial ownership by virtue of her contribution to the purchase., citing, pointed out that to establish that there is a beneficial interest of co-habitant, it is necessary to demonstrate that there is a constructive trust. In order to prove that there is a constructive trust, one should demonstrate that: it was a common intention of parties to have a beneficial interest in the property and the claimant had acted to his or her detriment on the basis of the common intention. Since James fully acknowledged that Fiona has an equitable share in, one may observe that there was a common intention to have a beneficial interest in the property. As far as the detriment issue is concerned, Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson pointed out that: ‘In my judgment where the claimant has made payments which, whether directly or indirectly, have been used to discharge the mortgage instalments, this is a sufficient link between the detriment suffered by the claimant and the common intention’. Drawing a parallel with Fiona’s case, one may observe that there is a link between her contribution to the purchase and the detriment suffered by her and the common intention to be a beneficial owner of the estate. According to paragraph registered land is subject to ‘an interest belonging at the time of the disposition to an individual in actual occupation, so far as concerning land of which he is in actual occupation’ is an overriding interest. In explained that this provision, which has been earlier set forth in, protects person, who occupies the property from the loss of her or his rights. He further pointed out that if the purchaser of the land failed to make inquiries about the premises, it is his own risk. Fiona was an occupier and Peter did not make any inquiries. Therefore, as an occupier of the registered land, by virtue of Fiona’s interest overrides Peter’s interest.

The right to remove the items depends on their status. Thus, the foresees that erections, buildings, commons, fixtures, hedges, ditches, fences, waters, water-courses are included in a conveyance of a land. Generally speaking fixtures represent property which is attached or fixed to land. The remove of fixtures would normally cause damage to the real property. By contrast, chattel is a property which is not attached or fixed to the real estate. If items, claimed by Fiona can be qualified as chattels, she has the right to remove them. However, if they are qualified as fixtures, she does not have such a right. Sometimes, the line between chattels and fixtures is blurred. In fact, some chattels may be transformed into fixtures. The courts developed a range of test to distinguish between fixtures and chattels. the court adopted the so called annexation test: the more firmly an item is attached to the land, the more difficult is to rebut the presumption that it is a fixture. In that case the court held that the looms of a mill, which were nailed into beams, which were nailed into a stone floor were fixtures. court adopted the purpose of annexation test: one should assess the purpose of the items’ use. The court held that the tapestries mounted onto the walls were chattels, since they were affixed to the walls as decoration for the better enjoyment of them as chattels. However, the court held pictures and tapestry displayed in an Elizabethan dining room were not chattels, because they were not used as chattels but rather as a part of the overall Elizabethan decoration scheme. The fridge and the washing machine are clearly chattels: they are not fixed to the real property and their removal would not cause any harm to the property. The purpose annexation test also suggests that fitted carpets can be qualified as chattels: they were used for better enjoyment of them as chattels. However, fitted carpets are chattels unless their removal would not do harm to the building As far as the grandfather clock is concerned, it can be held as chattel only if its removal from a recess will not do harm to the building. Finally, it is unlikely that the three crystal chandeliers can be held as chattels: they were not used as chattel but as a part of the overall decoration. Concluding, Fiona had the right to remove the fridge and the washing machine carpets and had not right to remove the chandeliers. Her right to remove the clock and fitted carpets depends on how firmly they are attached to the building and on whether their removal may cause a physical harm to the building.

Mr. Carr’s rights are binding upon Peter only if Mr. Carr’s option to purchase is registered. If the option to purchase is unregistered Mr. Carr’s rights are void against Peter, and thus, Peter is not obliged to sell the outbuilding to Mr. Carr. However, if Mr. Carr’s option to purchase is registered, Peter shall be obliged to sell the outbuilding to Mr. Carr because Peter would be bounded by the option to purchase in the same way as James was. Therefore, he would be obliged to sell the property at the price defined in an estate contract between James and Mr. Carr that is £42,000.

Part B

As it has been mentioned earlier, Mr. Carr holds a legal lease. As far as unregistered land is concerned legal leases not exceeding the 7-year term automatically any subsequent purchaser by virtue of paragraph 1 of. However, in Mr. Carr’s case the lease exceeds 7-year term. Therefore, the lease does not fall under provisions of paragraph 1 of. For this reason Mr. Carr’s lease will be overreached by Peter’s interest. Lease, and thus, the option to purchase can be binding in this situation only when registered. In, explained that an option to purchase constitutes an estate contract. He further pointed out that such an estate contract is protected once it is registered. Lord specified that the registered option to purchase would have been enforceable not only against the land owner but also against any purchaser. the court held that the unregistered option to purchase is void against any purchaser. Therefore, if Mr. Carr’s option to purchase is registered, Peter is bound by it. However, if Mr. Carr’s option to purchase is not registered, it is void against Peter.

Miss Jones has a leasehold interest. This kind of interest is not listed in Therefore, as well as Mr. Carr, she has only equitable interest. This interest is binding on Peter, by virtue of section 3 of the only if Peter had notice of the interest. Equitable doctrine of notice suggests that equitable rights bind all persons other than bona fide purchasers of a legal estate for value without actual, constructive or imputed notice. However, equitable interest can be overreached if the purchaser demonstrates that there is: the absence of notice was genuine and honest, purchase of a legal estate, purchase for value. Among these requirements, the first one raises concerns. Regarding the second and third, it is clear that Peter purchased legal estate and did it for value. Peter simply did not bother to check the third parties rights. It is unclear whether failure to check may give rise to honest and genuine absence of notice. However, it seems that on Peter’s part there was simply negligence: while dealing with real estates any reasonable person would check all rights and conveyances connected with the estate.

Fiona is a beneficial owner of Therefore, the interest can be qualified as ‘an interest equivalent to an estate in fee simple absolute in possession or a term of years absolute’ section. Therefore, at the first glance, it is a legal interest. However, according section a legal estate is not capable of being created in an undivided share in land. Therefore, prior to establish her legal interest Fiona shall prove her share. Unless her share is proven, she does not have a legal interest but equitable one. Therefore, as an equitable interest, it is subject to the same rules as interests of Mr. Carr and Miss Jones. It is difficult to predict whether Peter’s failure to check can pass for genuine and honest absence of notice. If it can Fiona will not recourse against Peter since her interest will be overreached. Otherwise, Peter would be bound by Fiona’s interest.