The City Of Staunton Fire And Rescue

Published Date: 02 Nov 2017

This is a scene played out many times throughout the year across the nation. It has never happened in Staunton…to date. Among the numerous concerns in this situation several problems rise to the top of the list. What crews were in there, where were they and where are they now? Hopefully the IC has been performing accountability correctly and knows what crews were working inside and their location before the collapse. But what happens when someone was not where they were supposed to be? What if they were free-lancing? What if they were separated from their crew before the collapse?

Who is to blame when things go wrong…the IC or the firefighters or the accountability system or lack thereof? It could be any of those things, more than one or all of them. Lack of training could be a contributing factor as well.

So what is the issue for Staunton? The looming problem is that we may know who is inside and what task the crew was assigned, but being a small department we, unfortunately, must multi-task too frequently. For our department, performing fire suppression, primary search, ventilation and overhaul as the attack crew is not an uncommon occurrence. Why is this concerning? The crew size is only two on the handline; if one firefighter leaves the line to perform another task trouble may be a step away. At some point, this practice will catch up to us and something detrimental will happen.

Data Analysis

In the 222 year history of the City of Staunton Fire & Rescue Department, there has never been a recorded line of duty death according to the Commonwealth of Virginia standards. Although we have experienced on the job injuries, none have come from lack of accountability. So why is accountability a concern for the department? Simple, eventually if current practices continue an unfortunate event may take place. Has luck been on our side? One can speculate as there have certainly been close calls. Since Staunton has not encountered any incidents to discuss, let’s discuss some other incidents nationwide where lessons can be learned.

The focus of this paper will be on several incidents were firefighters have been killed and lack of accountability was a contributing factor in their demise. None of the case studies list lack of accountability as the sole cause, but they will certainly demonstrate how improved accountability may have made a difference in the incident outcome.

The first incident to be discussed will be the Brackenridge, Pennsylvania fire on December 20, 1991, where four volunteer firefighters were trapped and killed in a floor collapse. The four firefighters responding were a mutual aid truck company operating on the ground floor above a basement fire. The floor collapsed, cutting off their means of egress and water supply. These firefighters were following their department’s Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and were wearing their full Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) including Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA). They were doing things by the book yet died due to several unforeseen circumstances. They were unaware of the changing conditions in the basement and were caught off guard by the collapse. Several areas of concern were identified by the United States Fire Administration (USFA) technical report. One area of concern was the lack of a formal command system being established. Another area of concern was the communication breakdown due to several companies switching radio channels due to the amount of radio traffic. In addition to these two problems was the dilemma of personnel accountability. The report states that during the rescue attempts, it was unclear whether the trapped firefighters were on the ground level or basement due to the lack of accountability (Routley, Four Firefighters Killed, Trapped by Floor Collapse, 1991).

The second incident to be discussed is the wood truss roof collapse in Memphis, Tennessee on December 26, 1992 where two firefighters were killed. This incident involved the collapse of light weight roof trusses. The two firefighters were on a hoseline together when the roof came down. A few other firefighters had backed out just prior to the collapse and they were the only ones that knew two comrades were still inside. Accountability played a role in the deaths of these firefighters, although it was relatively minute compared to the other issues. Two major concerns were the fact these firefighters were wearing ¾ boots and station uniforms that were not fire retardant and poor radio communications. Apparently the IC could not communicate over the tactical channel with the company officers and the company officers could not communicate with their personnel and were unsure of their assigned personnel’s location. As stated before, the only reason anyone knew there were still firefighters in the building was due to the ones that had just left the area prior to collapse. Due to the lack of radio communications, the recognition of a potential collapse could not be relayed and even if it could, no one knew who to tell because personnel accountability was almost nonexistent (Routley, Wood Truss Roof Collapse Claims Two Firefighters, 1992).

The next incident that points out an accountability issue is the February 14, 1995 fire that claimed the lives of three Pittsburg, Pennsylvania firefighters. This fire occurred in a single family dwelling that contained four levels. The number of levels contributed to confusion on the fireground as to the location of the missing firefighters. Some other issues that were identified were the lack of an initial incident commander until a later arriving acting Battalion Chief showed up, lack of crew integrity for most units on scene, poor radio communications and reduced SCBA performance according to standards at that time. The fire was a basement fire, which was the lowest level in the dwelling. Depending upon where you entered the structure, it was either one floor down or two floors down. No one identified this issue during the incident which contributed to confusion about the location of the missing firefighters, especially since three other firefighters become lost and were rescued. Unfortunately, even though this group of firefighters from Engine 17 was one of the only crews to stay together as a company; they failed to enact emergency procedures that may have saved their lives. They did not appear to have activated their PASS devices nor radioed for assistance. There were several firefighters working in functions and companies that they were not familiar with which also contributed to the issues. Once the Battalion Chief arrived and assumed command, he was unaware of who was inside and what functions were being performed by which company. Again, lack of personnel accountability became a major issue in losing these firefighters (Routley, Three Firefighters Die in Pittsburgh House Fire, 1995).

Another fire that hits close to home is the Chesapeake, Virginia incident where two firefighters became trapped in an auto parts store on March 18, 1996. As with the other examples there was more than one contributing factor to their deaths yet the oversight of personnel accountability was pointed out. The caused by an electrical short quickly consumed the roof area resulting in the collapse of the light weight roof trusses. The collapse trapped Firefighters John Hudgins and Frank Young. The Chesapeake Fire Department had specific policies address personnel accountability and the establishment of an Accountability Officer and Personnel Accountability System at incidents such as this. However, due to limited manpower neither was established and once the incident deteriorated this became a major factor in the loss of the two firefighters. Even though the operator of Engine 3 knew his crew had entered at one time, he could not see where they entered but assumed they had exited the building prior to the collapse. Radio communications were a major issue also because the single channel became quickly overrun with dispatching other companies, various other radio traffic from the fire and dispatching other emergencies on the same channel. Due to this, no evacuation order could be given over the operational channel. Water supply was not established prior to the crew entering and the fire quickly overwhelmed the capabilities of the hoseline. Everyone on scene had assumed that the crew of Engine 3 realized the magnitude of fire and exited the building with everyone else. No one could contact them on the radio due to all of the other radio traffic. The initial response size was only 10 personnel, not nearly enough to handle a fire in a commercial building. The later arriving companies were too late to help the trapped firefighters. The need for personnel accountability early in the incident was greatly overlooked and created a situation where no one knew the two firefighters were missing until it was too late. Rescue efforts could not be performed due to the amount of fire and only a recovery effort could be done after the main body of fire was extinguished (Routley & Stern, Two Firefighter Deaths In Auto Parts Store Fire, 1996).

Three out of four of the examples involved a collapse of some type. Each of the four had several common factors in the demise of the firefighters but the one most common fallacy was a deficiency of crew accountability. Each of these examples comes from the mid-90s yet the fire service still has issues with personnel accountability presently. These reports show that accountability seems to become an oversight that is seldom thought about until it is too late. Personnel management and accountability are a necessity for every incident no matter the size of the department.

Existing Risks

No one will argue that firefighting is not dangerous or without risks. But is the fire service taking unnecessary risks with firefighter safety due to insufficient personnel accountability? As fire service leaders, it is imperative to ensure every one of our members goes home after each shift or incident. If crew management and accountability is not stressed as being a top priority then why are we here? In recent years the fire service as lost on average approximately 100 firefighters per year. The causes of death vary but some deaths can be attributed directly to lack of personnel accountability on scene.

Other risks are not technically related to the hazards of the fire but rather to the lack of training, technology and funding available to develop a system that is simple to use, easy to learn and functional. There are many systems available to assist with crew accountability. Finding the appropriate one that will perform the tasks a department desires is extremely difficult and potentially expensive.

Nonetheless, if the National Incident Management System (NIMS) is followed and no freelancing on the fireground occurs, then crew accountability should be easy. It is amazing that some emergency service agencies still do not use NIMS, even here within the Commonwealth of Virginia. Even though training is offered, some departments do not take advantage of training opportunities even though NIMS is federally mandated. These departments are putting their members at risk even though they may know who is on scene because they are a small department, will they always know where those members are should some catastrophic event occur? The reality is that it does not have to be a small department that may not know where the firefighters are within a building fire if training is not provided, policies are not in place and there is not an understanding of the importance of accountability.

Goals and Objectives

As stated before, the City of Staunton Fire & Rescue Department has not had any line of duty deaths or injuries associated with the lack of personnel accountability. Even though this may be the case, the current system used is flawed and needs updating.

The goal is to maintain zero firefighter line of duty deaths and injuries due to lack of accountability. The main objective is to develop an accountability system that aides in tracking firefighters on the fireground. Another objective is to increase personnel awareness through training and practical exercises.

The goal and objectives appear to be relatively achievable. First step to achieving the goal is to ensure all personnel understand the importance of personnel accountability and their roles has it relates to accountability. Each individual must make a conscious decision to report their whereabouts to their supervisor and not allow freelancing. It would only take seconds for them to become lost, start to panic and realize that no one knows their location to appreciate the importance of accountability. Yet, we cannot allow that lesson to be learned! We must train our personnel on the system and show them case studies where accountability was lost and firefighters died as a result. Practical exercises are perfect times to stress the importance of accountability, whether it is firefighting tactics, technical rescue or hazardous materials exercises. Another requirement is to find a system that actually tracks personnel on scene. Some argue that a good Incident Commander (IC) using NIMS correctly can tell you where everyone’s location at any given time. This is not necessarily true unless you have personnel continuously reporting their moves in the building throughout the incident. Even with everything laid out on a command board, if the personnel are not relaying their positions, accountability is lost. This is the most common factor in all incidents where personnel accountability was compromised; the IC not being aware of where crews are located.

Available Systems

There are numerous systems available to assist with personnel accountability. Some systems are very similar and others are very different. The price range varies greatly depending on what options you want the system to do for you. If you require a simple system to identify who is on scene and their location; a name tag system may be a simple solution. Some departments require the latest greatest computer-aided system with bar code scanners and tracking software. These two types of systems have one common fallacy; the personnel. If the personnel do not turn their tags in or have their bar coded tags scanned, accountability is lost. Even if the tags are collected or scanned, if they do not report where they are in the building and if they change locations, accountability is lost.

FDNY is close to solving the accountability issue with their system. The system they have developed is a multi-part system. It has a Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tag sewn into the bunker coats, an Electronic Ride List (eBF-4), Handie-talkie (HT) application, Electronic Fireground Accountability System (EFAS), Pak-Tracker and an Electronic Command Board (ECB) and portable tablets (Raynis, FDNY's Fireground Accountability Program, 2012). Even with all those components, the system is not perfect and it still relies on radio transmissions from the company officers to report the location of their personnel on the fireground. Another issue with this system is that it is not available for other departments to use. FDNY’s Research and Development section along with some other departments within FDNY have developed many components of their system. Scott® has developed the Pak-Tracker to assist in tracking downed firefighters and is only carried by the Rescue and Squad companies. During my conversation with Chief Stephen Raynis, he said the system is working, yet has lots of work to become the efficient system that FDNY demands. He stated that because of all the components, it still is dependent upon individuals entering information into computers and transmitting crew locations. Another concern he stressed was the expense the system would cost. Even though most of the computer programs where developed by FDNY, the cost of outfitting over 10,000 firefighters with RFID tags will be very expensive (Raynis, Deputy Assistant Chief, 2012).

FDNY’s system, in my opinion, seems to be a model system. It identifies what firefighters are riding the apparatus once they climb inside the cab. The eBF-4 serves as a backup and checklist to the RFID tags. The HT radio application interfaces with the EFAS when the emergency alert button is depressed; the radio is identified and checked with the riding list to see who has that radio. The EFAS registers every radio transmission and mayday calls from distressed firefighters once the alert button is depressed. The ECB identifies each unit on the fireground which the riding list can be pulled from the eBF-4 (Raynis, FDNY's Fireground Accountability Program, 2012).

The only thing to make this system better would be a three-dimensional holographic simulation of the building with each firefighter location pinpointed in the building. One day that may be a reality but not any time soon. So with the FDNY system not being available to other departments, where does that leave the City of Staunton Fire & Rescue Department?

The first step for us is to identify what system will fit our current needs and available budget. A consideration into that decision is finding a system to use regionally. I currently serve on a committee to find a solution to this very issue. The cities of Harrisonburg, Staunton and Waynesboro along with the counties of Augusta and Rockingham share a common goal in discovering a system that fits everyone’s needs and available budget. As a committee we held meetings over the past year to discuss the issue, specifically where we are now and where we want to be with our personnel accountability. Vendors have provided demonstrations of their products and a sole system has not provided us with what we desire. A system that mirrors FDNY’s system is the goal. For now we must replace the aluminum tag system and dry erase command boards currently being utilized. I have recommended a plan and suggested a temporary fix until the system we aspire to have becomes available.

Process Description

As I stated, the process of determining a suitable system for the five regional departments has been ongoing for a year. The committee has assessed several systems and has selected a temporary replacement until a suitable solution is found. The Passport® System seems to fit our current dilemma. It is cost effective, easy to use and seems to be easy to implement and train all personnel on its use. We evaluated other tag systems that had plastic tags with clips, other systems similar to Passport®, simple computer based systems and complex computer systems. However the committee is recommending the Passport® System.

The system is easy to use. It consists of two Velcro name tags, one will remain with the firefighter and the other will be attached to an apparatus tag. Each tag will be color-coded to identify the personnel’s rank, i.e. red for company officers. The company officer tag will be place on the apparatus tag first, followed by the operator which will be placed upside down and the next tags to be added will be the firefighters riding in the rear of the cab. Once the apparatus arrives on scene, the tags will be collected by the IC and placed on the command board (CB). It will be each task supervisor’s responsibility to maintain crew integrity and accountability and report such during the Personnel Accountability Report (PAR) checks throughout the incident. At the termination of the incident, the company officer will collect the apparatus tag from the IC and place it back on the apparatus. It will be imperative that companies stay together as much as possible. If they cannot do so, the personnel must ensure command knows who they are assigned to and what task they will be performing in order to maintain the CB reliability.

Plan Implementation

The City of Staunton Fire & Rescue Department is current using a very similar system to the Passport® System. We have a Velcro tag system and the aluminum tag system that is used regionally. The transition to the new regional system will be easy for us. The department plans to purchase new apparatus tags, personnel tags and command boards to match the rest of the region.

As far as implementation throughout the rest of the region, the committee will meet in January 2013 to finalize the procedures and standard operating guidelines to be utilized. The committee will then propose guidelines to the area fire chiefs for approval in February or March 2013. Once approved by the fire chiefs, the procuring of the materials will need to be addressed as to whether one agency will take the lead on procuring the materials for implementing the system or if each locality will be responsible for procuring their own materials. Funding for the Passport® System is strictly the responsibility of each locality. With budget approvals and lead time on procuring the materials it is anticipated that training will be scheduled in June 2013 with a region-wide system implementation date of July 2013.

System Evaluation

Once the system has been implemented, the committee plans to meet quarterly to discuss any issues and required changes that need to be addressed. The committee will review call data from each localities’ reporting systems to verify any firefighter injuries or causalities and to review information to see successes or failures with the new system. The search for a computer-based system will continue along with the evaluation of the Passport® System.