The Soviet War Memorial

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02 Nov 2017

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The Treptower memorial became an arena for the political struggle that included the Soviet Union, its satellites, the United States, and the countries of Western Europe. Although veterans’ cemeteries and memorials on foreign soil were built on the same grand scale as Treptower and have made use of equally triumphal imagery , Treptower distinguishes itself from other postwar European memorials by imposing a symbolic history of World War II that was broadly propagandistic and subtle in its diplomacy. Its value as a source of propaganda stemmed from the story it told of Soviet triumph in the Great Patriotic War. For decades the soldier’s statue at the center of the Treptower complex was a major symbol in Soviet war commemoration. As a comparison, the primary war memorial in Moscow, erected in 1958, was not finished until 1995. Although massive in size, Treptower had a subtle diplomatic goal as well: to help establish and legitimize Soviet-German relations in the aftermath of World War II in a manner that would make a former mortal enemy become an ally. Following the war, several existing memorials in Berlin were considered for restoration. This depended on their relevance to military and authoritarian traditions in German history. Treptower was the result of the Soviet effort to imprint its version of victory on a conquered nation.

Section I

The strategy of the Treptower Soviet War Memorial design addressed three groups with overlapping cultural codes: the Soviet military and government, German communists, and German non-communists. Settling on a message that was acceptable to all three groups was difficult, hence the use of imagery that could support several interpretations. The central point of the memorial complex is the statue of a Soviet soldier with a crushed swastika at his feet and a child cradled in his arms. A seemingly unassailable representation of Soviet victory, the statue’s design allows for changing interpretations. The Soldier may stand for the Soviet army or the Russian people. The swastika may stand solely for the Nazis, or the entire German nation and population. The child could represent future Soviet generations or generations of Eastern European nations. This asks the question of whether Germany was or was not included in the latter representation. Was Germany simply liberated from Nazism, or further reborn into communism? The symbols could be for interpreted from a variety of political viewpoints, making some issues clear and obfuscating others. For example, the soldier was not, placed atop a fallen eagle, a recognizable and traditional symbol of the Germany. This would have implied that Germany, and not just the Third Reich and fascism, was to blame for World War II. The story of the war told on the sarcophagi also held some ambiguity by remaining vague or even silent on key themes. The range of possible interpretations is intentionally limited, as continued use of those themes in a seamless account would present a more constrictive and reductionist narrative. Soviet and German communist leaders seized upon Treptower’s interpretive flexibility during commemoration ceremonies, during which they made specific interpretations to match their political agendas.

Immediately after the end of World War II, the Soviet Military Administration (SMAD) of East Germany constructed numerous veterans’ cemeteries and memorials in greater Berlin and other occupied territories to commemorate victory and to honor the fallen. Tiergarten, the first Soviet memorial constructed in Berlin, held the remains of 2,500 Soviet soldiers who died in the Battle of Berlin. It was dedicated on November 11, 1945. An architectural competition for a larger, more encompassing Soviet memorial was held in 1946. The winning entries were chosen and scheduled for construction in the Pankow and Treptow districts of Berlin. German architects participated in the competition, but the winner was a Soviet team, which included Stalin’s favorite sculptor, J.W. Wutschetitsch. The design team acknowledged the advice from the SMAD in Berlin. The site at Pankow held the remains of over 13,000 Soviet soldiers. Although this significantly outnumbered the approximately 5,000 Soviet soldiers interred at Treptower, the latter would become the primary Soviet war memorial in Germany. Built between 1947 and 1949, Treptower was the largest and most elaborate Soviet memorial. It became central point of Siegstag (Victory Day) and Befreiungstag (Liberation Day) commemoration ceremonies. Location and ease of access were deciding factors in selecting Treptow over Pankow. The fastest route from Pankow to any transit station in the Soviet sector was two miles. Treptower Park, was only one and a half miles from the nearest station. The Berlin blockade was approaching and tension between the east and the West were rising. As a result, the SMAD chose Treptower for its security secure and practicality. The Tiergarten memorial was passed over because it was located in West Berlin. Locations in central Berlin were dismissed, as the SMAD worried that a gigantic Soviet soldier towering over the historic Prussian and German landmarks on Unter den Linden would significantly hurt their efforts to be accepted as liberators. The Treptower location gave the Soviets their tradition of triumphal gestures while simultaneously allowing them to avoid political slip ups.

The Treptower memorial was constructed in the socialist realism style, which became the Soviet state policy of experession under Stalin in 1932. A visitor’s journey through the complex is a structured and choreographed experience, common to ritual landscapes. One enters the complex through a triumphal arch with Soviet imagery on which is inscribed a brief acknowledgement to the soldiers who fell defending the "socialist homeland." On the other side of the arch is the Motherland sculpture, a statue of a mother mourning for the son she lost to the war. Once passing Motherland, the visitor turns and proceeds up an incline between two enormous stone pylons representing lowered Soviet flags. The granite used in the pylons, and throughout Treptower, was taken from the ruins of the Reich Chancellery. A bronze Soviet soldier, each facing the center of the complex, takes a knee in front of each pylon. The view through the pylons stretches across a courtyard made up of manicured lawns, ending with the massive statue of the Soviet soldier. Visitors descend a set of stairs on the periphery to pass between the center plaza containing the soldiers’ remains. Flanking this is a series of sarcophagi, which tell the story of the war though bas-reliefs and inscribed text. Eight sarcophagi on either side were made with identical pairs of bas-reliefs and quotations by Joseph Stalin. The north side is inscribed with Russian and the south side bears German text. The Soviet soldier stands on a pedestal containing a mausoleum, and the entire monument sits on a sloped hill representing a kurgan, an ancient Russian burial mound.

Section II

The first series of Soviet war memorials constructed in Eastern Europe were meant to represent the debt owed by liberated nations to the Red Army. They are also served to mark conquered grounds. Treptower became the largest and most elaborate of these memorials. This is compared other European capitals that were taken by the Red Army at great cost, such as Budapest, where Soviet war memorials did not approach the scale of Treptower. Only during the Leonid Brezhnev era were memorials of equitable size built in the Soviet Union. All of these "supershrines" however, were built for the purpose of emphasizing the invented tradition of Soviet military commemoration ceremonies. Michael Ignatieff identified this tradition as the "Cult of the Soviet War Dead," a "conscious attempt to draw meaning for the rituals of the present from the vast reservoir of past suffering". The memorials gained legitimacy from the Soviet losses during World War II, but they also contributed to the invented tradition that served the Soviet state. They facilitated forgetting as well as remembering and fiction as well as truth. Treptower became the primary temple of the Soviet War Cult on German soil, in the middle of the former Reichshauptstadt (imperial capital). At this early stage in the establishment of the Soviet War Cult, the state developed a formula for speaking and writing about the war – one for the Soviets and another modified formula for Germany. The design for Treptower, the primary Soviet sacred space on German soil, did not fully conform to either formula. It mediated between the official Soviet state narrative of the war and the more fluid German context.

Section III

Soviet historical writing as well as the press were carefully controlled for the purposes of propaganda. In the immediate postwar era, they were considered too potentially inflammatory to be trusted to mere historians. In place of actual historical research, a collection of Stalin’s speeches was substituted, and a method of interpretation was developed by incorporating portions of Stalin’s postwar speeches into the official historical narrative. The first of these methods were developed during the war, when the Soviet press was filled with stereotypical imagery displaying Soviet society in monolithic unity, with patriotism transcending any and all differences, including class, occupation, gender, and ethnicity. Particular focus was given to the bond between the Soviet people and the army. After the war, the credit for the victory over fascism was divided among the four pillars of Soviet wartime society: the party, the army, the people, and Stalin. Joseph Stalin’s image grew from a prominent figure before the war to the greatest commander in Russian history. By leading the army through a series of accomplishments, Stalin eclipsed the generals and the army leadership faded into the background. Seemingly of no consequence during the war, the party now surged to receive glory. At the other end of the spectrum, the people of the Soviet Union, who had previously received a great deal of credit for their role in defending Russia, now had to "give way to the political megalomania of the regime."

Although Marxism-Leninism was the philosophical basis for a unified socialist Europe, the foundation of Soviet society and the driving force behind the necessary war of liberation, deviations in this ideology occurred during and after the war. First, the role of the Communist party was intentionally blurred during the war in order to increase support from the Soviet populace and the Western Allies. The party returned to the forefront after the war, as a state-building imperative replaced survival as the Soviet government’s main focus. Second, the postwar illumination of Stalin clashed with the Marxist-Leninist theory that a society is shaped by its own structure, and not by leaders. Third, Marxism-Leninism viewed imperialist regimes as enemies. The people were thought to provide the revolutionary forces required to begin the march to socialism. During the war, in order inspire resistance, the Soviet government described the German people as "monstrous fiends invested with all possible satanic traits." By the end of the war, this image was softened and aimed more towards the German population that the Soviet people. It was suggested to the German people that they would not be abused if they cooperated with the incoming Red Army. Ultimately, Marxist-Leninist teachings served as a foundation for Soviet writings and propaganda about the war, but both Stalin and the military departed from that ideology before the war was even over.

Section IV

The Soviets developed a specific mode of communication for the German context which was different than the method used inside the Soviet Union. Soviet-German discourse emphasized humanism and liberation, as opposed to victory and socialism. Communism and socialism as identities were marginalized in the Soviet political strategy towards Germany. Following the war, the Soviet government wanted a united and neutral Germany. German communists called for the "erection of an antifascist, democratic regime, a parliamentary democracy" to be independent from the Soviet system. Soviet state cultural policies (mixed with residual Marxist-Leninist teachings) called for the German people to be reeducated in humanism as a prerequisite for becoming socialists. The goal was to ease the German population into accepting its own Communist party, as well as the SMAD. As a result, after the founding of the GDR in 1949, social programs in East Berlin usually bore the terms "democratic" and "new Berlin" instead of repetitive uses of "socialism."

The role of Stalin in East Germany was altered with the establishment of the GDR. Stalin was the Soviet head of state but in Germany he was not held up as the "greatest commander of all ages." The cult of personality was nearly nonexistent until the founding of the GDR, which coincided with Stalin’s seventieth birthday. A more moderate version of the Stalin cult was introduced in East Germany. Walter Ulbricht, general secretary of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), called Stalin the "pioneer and standard-bearer of peace throughout the world" and thanked "General Stalin and the entire Soviet people" for liberation. Towards the German people, the Soviets did not direct the burden of guilt after war. They were to be counted among the "liberated." In May 1945 the SMAD-published Tägliche Rundschau stated on its front-page that the Red Army came not to destroy but to liberate. Stalin, who in the final days of the war encouraged the Red Army to punish the Germans, emphatically declared them as liberated.



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