Swiss Banks And Jewish Money

Published Date: 02 Nov 2017

Jeffrey Nichols

History 498 27094

Volker Benkert

Table of Contents

Introduction

Chapter 1, Armed Neutrality/Banking History

Chapter 2, D’Amato Hearing

Chapter 3, Volcker Commission

Chapter 4, Bergier Commission

Chapter 5, Eizenstat Report

Chapter 6, Litigation and Restitution

Conclusion

Jeffrey Nichols

Volker Benkert

History 498 27094

14 April 2013

Swiss Banks and Jewish Money, Bergier’s Report and

The International Investigations

Introduction

The wrath of the Nazi war machine moving across Europe left many Jews looking for a way to hide their money and property in the event they were captured. Switzerland’s reputation of discreet banking combined with proclaimed neutrality made their financial institutions an obvious choice for those in fear of the Germans. Estimates that range from several million to several billion U.S. dollars were deposited into Swiss bank accounts by Jews. (D’Amato 1996, 33). Unfortunately, many of them would not survive the war and there would be no record of their demise. Without death certificates or specific bank account information, Swiss banks turned heirs of Holocaust victims away when they attempted to claim their family’s fortunes. Allegations of wrong doing by Swiss banks began to surface during WWII. Although the allegations continued, it was not until the 1990’s when two other independent factors converged prompting inquiries into Swiss banking. First was the fall of communism in Eastern Europe. This opened up boarders and permitted freedom of movement. This new freedom gave access to Switzerland and Swiss banks to people who had not had access in nearly 50 years. They could now travel to Switzerland in search of their family fortunes. The third, and most significant factor into the new rush of inquiries was the significance of 50 years. War documents that had been completed at the end of the war were turning 50 years old. They were being de-classified by the crate full. Documents that had been completed in reference Swiss banking, individual accounts, and financial reserves were being examined. The old information was not consistent with what the banks had claimed in regards to the amount of money that may have been left behind by victims of the Holocaust. Attempts to decipher the newly available information resulted in the commissioning of many independent investigations into the activities of Swiss banks in the period surrounding and during World War II. These investigations produced information about the bank’s behavior that indicated their actions were proper in some regards and improper in others. Individually none of the investigations into the actions of the Swiss banks are complete studies, but together they provide conclusive evidence proving some wrongdoing on behalf of the banks. Swiss banks have paid out enormous reparations as a result of information that was gathered during these investigations. Now, after the last settlement has been reached the question remains, have the banks done enough? This paper will study and compare the four major investigations that were completed. They will be compared for content as well as potential for and actual bias noted in the reports. The Bergier Commission, also known as the Independent Commission of Experts, was the most thorough and wide reaching of the investigations. It also has the most potential for bias, as it was the only investigation commissioned by the Swiss government. The Bergier report will be compared to the three other significant investigations that were completed. The D’Amato hearings, Volcker Commission, and Eizenstat Report were the three most thorough of the international investigations into the handling of Jewish assets by Swiss banks. While the reports were completed independently of one another, all make it clear that actions taken by the banks were unethical, and in some cases criminal. Despite reparations already paid out by Swiss banks, by most estimates this money is only a portion of what they stole from Holocaust victims. The evidence of wrongdoing provided by these reports is sufficient to demand Swiss banks do more than just return money, there needs to be a permanent memory of their actions that serves to both remember their past as well as discourage such behavior in the future.

Chapter I

Two things Switzerland is well known for are their neutrality and their banking system. Swiss neutrality dates back to 1815. The Swiss philosophy of armed neutrality has served them well for nearly two hundred years. Claiming neutrality while the nations around them engaged in war should not be interpreted, as Switzerland was weak. They have a formidable self-defense force. While other nations involved in World War II had two or three percent of their total population under arms, the Swiss had ten percent of theirs ready to go to war if needed (Halbrook vii). Swiss people have ruggedness to their nature. They were informed as the war began that an announcement of Swiss surrender could only be the result of enemy propaganda, and they should consider such a notification a call to fight to the death to protect Switzerland (Halbrook ix). The Swiss took great pride in their ability to defend themselves if need be. This deterrent force combined with their policy of neutrality has allowed the Swiss to avoid the major conflicts that European nations around them have been involved in over the last two centuries.

Switzerland’s association with banking, specifically discreet banking, began at the conclusion of World War I. The Swiss franc was the only stable currency in Europe and invited investment. Swiss banking secrecy was reinforced in 1934 when a law that penalized bankers for not practicing discreet banking was passed. The law stated, "If any organ, official, or employee of a bank, any auditor or assistant auditor, any member of the bank commission, official or employee of its secretariat deliberately violates, is induced to violate or induces others to violate the professional secrecy clause, he or she shall be fined up to 20,000 francs or be liable to imprisonment of up to 6 months, with the possibility of the two sentences being combined; if the culprit is found to be guilty through negligence, he or she may be fined up to 10,000 francs" (Bergier 1996, 260). The punishment was so great due to recent espionage activities by German tax authorities. Employees of Swiss banks had been known to occasionally provide customer names and other data to the German authorities (Bergier 1996, 260). The strict punishment was put in place to discourage such activities. The concept of Swiss banking secrecy was more than 300 years old at the time and it was engrained in both legal and democratic principals. The rights of every business entity and individual were to be protected in a "sphere of secrecy" (Vincent 60). The Swiss reputation of secret banking has served them and their economy well. Swiss banks and the associated economy has been a pillar of stability throughout modern European history.

With a reputation of discrete banking and a neutrality that was backed by a significant self defense force, it is easy to see why so many looked to Switzerland to hide their family’s fortunes when trying to escape Nazi persecution. What was never considered by many future victims of the Holocaust were the lengths the Swiss would go to protect their way of life. The Swiss knew their defense force, as formidable as it may have been, was no match to the might of the German Army. Collaboration with the Nazi’s was the only way they felt they could delay, if not avoid what many predicted to be an inevitable Nazi invasion. The same banks that were holding the life savings of many of those fleeing Nazi aggression were simultaneously laundering money and gold stolen from Jewish Holocaust victims. After the war, the secrecy laws that Jews thought would protect their assets were cited as reason for denying the heirs of victims’ access to family fortunes. Without specific account numbers, death certificates, and other documentation, the banks turned away those attempting to claim money. In light of what happened during the Holocaust; the murder of millions of Jews, the non-documentation of their deaths, and destruction of their property, it is obvious why the requests for these documents was so unreasonable. As various forms of Swiss collaboration with the Nazis began to surface, along with what many believed to be unethical and exploitive banking practices, several investigations were commissioned. The purpose of these investigations was to determine exactly what involvement the Swiss had with the Nazis, critique the actions of their banks, and explore the potential for Swiss liability. The investigations will be examined in the chronological order of their completion. Many were being conducted simultaneously, yet independent of one another. Bergier makes note of some findings noted in two other on-going investigations in his report, making it apparent preliminary results had been released prior to completed reports.

Chapter II

The first investigation, in April of 1996, was a Senate hearing requested by Senator Alfonse D’Amato of New York. This was to be an investigation into the handling of Jewish finances by Swiss banks. This request came on behalf of his Jewish constituents. D’Amato’s position as head of the Senate Banking Committee put him in a good place to make such a request. The hearing was conducted to demonstrate that the Holocaust victims and their heirs were entitled to an "accounting" (D’Amato 1996, 1). At the time of the hearing, Swiss banks had offered a settlement of 32 million dollars, claiming that was all the Holocaust related funds they were able to locate. D’Amato does not feel this offer is reasonable and goes further to say the banks did not spend sufficient effort locating possible funds. Another issue addressed at the hearing is the bank secrecy laws. D’Amato states the banks have refused to publish the names of account holders whom have been identified as Holocaust victims. The makes note of issues in regards to the secrecy laws, "It's rather ironic that these secrecy laws, originally enacted to shield assets of the Holocaust victims from the Nazis, are now being used as a sword against those victims and their families" (D’Amato 1996, 2). The hearings and research associated with them uncovered a significant amount of unclaimed assets owned by Holocaust victims in Swiss banks. Also brought to light in the hearing were recently declassified documents that provide evidence of not only the Swiss banks wrongdoing in regards to Jewish assets, but their intentional attempts of covering the funds up. The hearing includes witness testimony about first hand experiences dealing with Swiss banks in an effort to obtain family assets. Information from this report as well as others would be cited when reaching a large final settlement provided by the banks to victims. As would be noted by Eizenstat, this settlement did not admit to any fault on behalf of the Swiss banks, they considered it a donation to Jewish organizations.

One of the first items brought up in the hearing is the refusal of Swiss banks to contact the rightful owners of funds once they were determined. A lack of transparency is cited, as well as a lack of effort. "I am concerned that previous efforts to identify and quantify these assets have not been sufficiently thorough or transparent, and what I mean by that is open or independent" (D’Amato 1996, 2). A previous search for Jewish accounts that was conducted in 1962 by the Swiss banks is cited. The hearing found the search was "woefully inadequate" (D’Amato 1996, 2). It was limited to accounts that had owners with Jewish sounding names and had died before the war. There was no effort made to identify victims who may have died during or after the war. Even after the Swiss legislature passed a law demanding a review of dormant accounts from the Nazi era, there was no enforcement mechanism in place to ensure compliance with the law (D’Amato 1996, 3).

While the lack of notification mentioned during the Senate hearing would be mentioned in other reports, it was done with a clarity and directness here that the other reports lack. D’Amato takes accusatory tones with the banks when he speaks to their attempts to both conceal Jewish funds and their later efforts to hide what they had done. He describes their behavior as "less than cooperative" (D’Amato 1996, 3). It is further said that, "It's deplorable, that this issue has not been re-solved along with the fact that we find more and more information and the attitude of Swiss banks to date appears, at the very best, to be mostly insensitive and, at worst, deliberate, a deliberate cover-up. I think these hearings will help shed some light on that. One would think that this is an issue which the Swiss banks would treat with the greatest of sensitivity instead of apparent callousness" (D’Amato 1996, 4). The D’Amato hearing makes note of the exorbitant fees charged by the banks to survivors requesting an account search. Most of these searches produced no results, and in the rare occasion when an account was identified, the banks required documentation, such as death certificates to prove rightful ownership. This documentation was simply unobtainable by the family due to both the nature in which their loved ones had died as well as the passage of time since their death (D’Amato 1996, 3). Swiss banks were clearly hiding behind the secrecy laws that had been established to protect their customers. After repeated requests, the banks conducted yet another search for Holocaust victim assets, and were able to locate 775 more dormant accounts (D’Amato 1996, 3). The banks lack of cooperation only added further suspicion and prompted further investigation.

As previously mentioned, the hearing included testimony from Greta Beer (Deligdisch), A Romanian immigrant, and victim of the Swiss banks. Beer tells the story of her father; a wealthy business owner who had chosen to deposit his money in a Swiss bank because he thought it was a safe haven. Beer stated in her testimony, "the sky over my city so close to the Russian border, communism and the danger of the Nazis coming from the north, and this was the only safe haven. My father used to open a so-called; we called it chiffre account, numbered account. My father used to talk to us children, my brother, Otto Deligdisch, who now resides in Boston, Massachusetts, and he used to say, don't worry, kids. You have nothing to worry about. You are provided for. The money is safely deposited in Switzerland" (D’Amato 1996, 6). Her father would fall ill and pass away in 1940. While in the hospital he signed a power of attorney over his finances to his wife, Beer’s mother. Beer recalled traveling to Switzerland with her mother in the 1960’s attempting to gain accesses her father’s accounts. They went from bank to bank being told the statute of limitations had expired and all accounts had been closed (D’Amato 1996, 7). It is estimated the Deligdisch accounts were valued at several million dollars in the 1930’s. The family had yet to receive any of that money.

Stuart Eizenstat, who was in the midst of investigating his report at the time of the D’Amato hearing was also called on to testify. Eizenstat was able to report on some preliminary findings prior to his final report being released. He makes note of the 775 accounts totaling 32 million dollars that had been previously identified by Swiss banks as belonging to Holocaust victims. Eizenstat states that despite those accounts being identified 30 years before this hearing, there has been no effort made by Swiss banks to locate the account’s rightful owners or distribute the funds (D’Amato 1996, 15). Eizenstat further suggest that on the occasion excess funds are identified and owner are not, the money should be distributed to Holocaust survivors, who have been largely uncompensated for the last five decades.

Another person who testified during the D’Amato Senate hearings was Hans J. Baer, representing the Swiss Bankers Association. Baer had been called upon to answer questions regarding actions Swiss bank had taken in the past, and what they were currently doing to rectify the problem. First, Baer informed D’Amato of an "independent commission of distinguished individuals whose experience and integrity are well known was being established" (D’Amato 1996, 27); this would also be referred to as the Independent Commission of Eminent Persons, or the Volcker report. When questioned about the 32 million dollar account value previously provided by Swiss banks, Baer needed to clarify. He claimed that figure represents the total amount in dormant accounts. Victims of the Holocaust did certainly not own all of those accounts, so that figure may be high. This caused problems with the hearing panel as they all believed that figure to be amazingly low.

Chapter III

The Volcker Commission was established in May of 1996 and was a comprehensive study to determine if assets of Holocaust victims still remained in Swiss banks. Paul Volcker was the Chairman of the Federal Reserve and his committee was made up of representatives from several Swiss banks as well as various Jewish organizations. Their completed report discussed measures taken by the Swiss banks to avoid paying out claims made by Holocaust victims and their heirs. Volcker finds what he describes as, "confirmed evidence of questionable and deceitful actions by some individual banks in the handling of accounts of victims, including withholding of information from Holocaust victims or their heirs about their accounts, inappropriate closing of accounts, failure to keep adequate records, many cases of insensitivity to the efforts of victims or heirs to claim dormant or closed accounts, and a general lack of diligence, even active resistance" (Volcker 1996, 13). Despite a request from the Swiss Government in 1962 requiring their banks to produce a report of accounts likely held by holocaust victims, the numbers of identified accounts were incredibly low. Another request made in 1995 by the Swiss Bankers Association resulted in similarly small reporting. The establishment of this committee and others were the result of the banks failure to adequately comply with the requests.

Volcker’s report includes very specific numbers of accounts and dollar amounts assigned to those accounts. While Bergier’s report is more about establishing and documenting the actions of the banks, Volcker’s report is based on the assumption the banks had acted improperly. The bank’s conduct is more of a concluding remark in his report. Volcker attempts to reconstruct accounts from as far back as 1945 by following the trail of money. His commission believes they are able to reconstruct about 60 percent of accounts held by Swiss banks in 1945 (Volcker 1996, 12). The information obtained by Volcker confirmed what had been previously alleged by victims, and would be used as justification for the multiple lawsuits that would follow these reports.

Unlike Bergier, Volcker’s investigation was unable to find sufficient evidence to prove claims of intentional destruction of documents. He believed the missing records could just as easily been a result of the fifty years that had passed prior to his commission being established. He actually believes the documentation provided by Swiss banks was fairly thorough given the amount of time that had passed. Bergier’s report was more critical about missing files. This may have been due to Bergier’s unrestricted access to information. He may have been able to locate more discrepancies or have had a better picture of what actually occurred. Volcker also makes mention of the secret nature of the Swiss banking system. Like Bergier and D’Amato, he believes the same system that the Jews thought would protect their assets would also deny their heirs access (Volcker 1996, 15). Volcker’s report makes an effort to provide the most accurate estimations as possible in regards to the amount of money that was deposited by Jews who would later become victims of the Holocaust. He believes total Jewish wealth in the late 1930’s to have been $12.1 billion U.S. Dollars. It is furthered estimated that $3.0 billion would have been liquid assets available for immediate transfer to Swiss bank accounts (Volcker 1996, 17). Accounting for inflation, but not interest, this $3.0 billion dollars would be equivalent to $51.5 billion dollars today.

The publishing of Volcker’s report resulted in the re-opening of these cases by many of the involved banks. Volcker’s report was even cited by Bergier due to its thoroughness and ability to obtain accurate estimations of Jewish wealth and deposits at the time. The amounts cited are staggering and show how widespread the abuses and victimization of the Jews by Swiss banks was.

Chapter IV

The Bergier Commission, also referred to as the Independent Commission of Experts (ICE), was created in December of 1996 by the Swiss government. Jean-Francois Bergier was a well-known and respected historian, and as such, was selected to lead the commission. Bergier spends a great deal of time in his report discussing Swiss history. He makes an effort to set up the events that would lead to the corruption of the Swiss banking system. While this appears to be a precursor to a biased report in which he justifies the actions taken by his country’s banking system, it does not happen. He simply makes note of historical events that occurred and were likely the reason banking officials made the decisions they ultimately made. He does not use this information as an excuse, but instead, as a means of understanding.

As previously mentioned, Bergier was tasked with a wide range of topics to address in his investigation. His inquiry goes beyond Swiss banking and includes actions taken by the Government. Areas such as the Swiss policy on refugees, trade relations with both axis and allied nations, and gold transactions are some of the other areas addressed in his report. This paper will solely focus on the actions of Swiss banks in regards to assets deposited by Holocaust victims, dormant accounts, and transactions involving goods suspected of being looted. The actions of the Swiss government will be mentioned only when directly related to an action taken by Swiss banking, such as the passage of laws.

Bergier was given complete and total access to all relevant documentation and materials. Despite this, he stated in his report, "As important as privileged access to archive material was for ICE, there was no guarantee that it could make events dating back over half a century fully transparent. This is because corporate archives tell only part of the story and only one of many possible stories" (Bergier 1996, 38). Bergier’s ability to obtain all related documentation was still not enough to determine everything that transpired. At times, a lack of information was also used as evidence.

Despite some missing documentation, Bergier was able to uncover questionable behavior by some banks. There are, for example, numerous instances of what appears to be intentional lack of documentation and unaccounted funds. The estimated value of accounts that was not included in 1945 balance sheets was 20 billion francs (Bergier 1996, 257). While all of this money cannot be directly attributed to deposits made by Jews, there a few other reasons the Swiss banks would intentionally fail to document deposits. While missing documentation resulted in suspicion in some cases, concrete evidence of malfeasance was obtained from documentation that remained.

In regards to Swiss banking’s relations with Holocaust victims, Bergier’s report focuses on two areas. First is the signing over of Jewish assets under duress. German foreign exchange controls became increasingly strict once the Nazis came to power. It was considered a violation under the Law of Treason against the German economy for German citizens as well as foreigners living in Germany to not register foreign currencies and securities they held abroad (Bergier 1996, 274). Further legislation required all foreign deposits be made with a German foreign exchange bank. Violation of this law could result in the death penalty. Victims of the Nazis were also subjected to physical and psychological pressure to turn over their assets. It was discovered during Bergier’s investigation that Swiss banks routinely complied with their customers’ requests to transfer their accounts to German banks. Documentation was discovered that indicates Swiss knowledge that these requests were made under duress (Bergier 1996, 275). One bank alone, Credit Suisse, transferred 8 million francs worth of securities to Deutsche Bank. Swiss Bank Corporation transferred another 14 million francs to the Reichsbank (Bergier 1996, 275). These transfers all appear suspicious in nature and were likely requested on behalf of their customers or by customers under duress. Another example of these types of transfers occurred after the annexation of Austria in 1938. Once Nazi legislation was introduced, securities began to be rapidly withdrawn from Swiss accounts. The Jewish population, who was subjected to persecution and pressure, handed over considerable assets to the Reichsbank. Some were also forced by local authorities to declare the existence of accounts in Switzerland. The banks transferred the corresponding amounts directly to the Nazi Treasury (Bergier 1996, 275). A similar story appeared in Poland after the Nazis overran them in 1939. Once the Nazis were in power, the Polish bank Lodzer Industrieller began to transfer sizable assets to an account at the German Reichsbank in Berlin (Bergier 1996, 276). Swiss banks were not required to comply with the transfer request, but argued there was no reason not to. Through documentation Bergier was able to discover the banks complied with transfer orders from foreign customers without authenticating signatures or looking out for their customers best interest. The banks were concerned with interests they still had in Germany and developed a policy of avoiding "friction and unpleasantness" with the Nazis whenever possible (Bergier 1996, 277). This approach was clearly in the best interest of Swiss banks and not their customers. The handing over of their patron’s finances to the Nazis, despite the knowledge, or at least presumption that this was being requested against their will, was inexcusable.

The Nazi regime killed many foreign customers of Swiss banks. While parts of the victim’s assets were given to the Nazis, the rest remained in Swiss bank accounts. After the war, Swiss banks made no effort to locate the owners of the remaining accounts. They simply let the money sit there, for decades. The banks would utilize this money for investments, and in many cases elected to stop paying interest on the accounts (Bergier 1996, 449). They did however continue to charge service fees. In some cases the fees applied to these accounts would result in a zero or negative balance. The banks made no mention of these accounts or went as far as giving false information. One example of this was the Union Bank of Switzerland. After a request, this bank reported that it was unable to locate any assets that may have belonged to victims of the Holocaust. Bergier was able to find documentation however showing Union Bank freezing accounts of it’s customers whom had been deported and were likely deceased (Bergier 1996, 445). In a statement made by Union Bank in 1950, it was noted they felt the best solution in regards to dormant accounts was to never mention them. Union Bank as well as many other Swiss banks was finding this approach more and more difficult under increasing pressure from individuals and Jewish organizations (Bergier 1996, 445). In 1954, representatives from Switzerland’s largest banks met to discuss the issue of dormant accounts. They decided they needed to adopt the same policies in dealing with the inquiries that were coming in from heirs of Holocaust victims. The banks decided to look to Swiss legislation, citing the need to only maintain transaction records for 10 years (Bergier 1996, 446). Citing this rule, they agreed to not give out any information on any transaction beyond the 10-year mark, making most of the wartime deposits and withdrawals no longer available. While this approached helped, the issue of their handling of dormant accounts did not entirely go away.

Another step the banks devised to limit account inquiries was to begin charging fees to investigate the accounts in question. In the 1950’s they would charge 25 francs to conduct a search. This amount steadily increased to nearly 1000 francs in the 1980’s (Bergier 1996, 446). The fees charged to do a search for an account would often be more than balances after 40 years of fees were applied and no interest accrued.

Union Bank of Switzerland devised yet another way to conceal the accounts. It was decided to transfer funds from all accounts that had been dormant for over 10 years to a general fund. This transfer would make it impossible to determine the size of the original account. This practice did not come to an end until 1996 when the Bergier Commission was established and a Federal Decree demanding the conservation of files was enacted (Bergier 1996, 447).

Once WWII was over, surviving Jewish depositors and their heirs began efforts to retrieve their capital from Swiss banks. This often resulted with the receipt of information that there was no record of them having an account, or being told those funds had been transferred and were no longer available. It was common practice for the Nazis to have Jewish detainees sign over all of their assets to them. Assets that had been transferred to the Reich were left out of reports of unclaimed funds. Banks referred to the statute that only required them to keep files for ten years as justification for any missing documents (Bergier 1996, 443). The banks argued Swiss law was on their side and believed they had done nothing wrong in regards to the concealment of funds. In one example Credit Suisse disclosed only one-fifth of the accounts that they identified as belonging to Holocaust victims. This type of concealment was commonplace. In total, 46 banks reported 739 accounts worth 6.2 million francs (Bergier 1996, 453). Given Credit Suisse’s ratio of disclosure it is safe to assume the value of the accounts is many times greater than what the banks provided.

The Bergier report concludes by summarizing many of the deficiencies they were able to locate with Swiss banking practices both during and after WWII. The report is over 500 hundred pages long and paints Swiss banks in a very negative light. Bergier and his commission of experts were the most likely to demonstrate bias in their report. Bergier is a well-respected Swiss citizen and the Swiss Parliament had hired him. Great potential existed for the commission to minimize or justify the wrongs it discovered. While some compliments are given to both the nation and the banking system, they in no way demonstrate bias. Bergier is very harsh and blunt with his assessment of Swiss banks and the actions of the nation as a whole. While historical facts are cited to help explain why decisions may have been made, greed seems to be the overall motivation of the banks.

Chapter V

The Eizenstat report was another large investigation published that exposed the dealings of Swiss banks during World War II. Stuart Eizenstat had served as the U.S. Ambassador to the European Union as well being involved with the International Trade Administration. He would later go on to serve as the Secretary of the Treasury for Bill Clinton. His report was a study into the actions of wartime neutral countries in respect to Nazi gold and other looted assets. His report is 205 pages in length with less than 25 percent of that being devoted to the war years. The rest of the report covers Swiss action during the period after the war. Eizenstat attempts to provide Swiss opinion in his report, but this is met with some resistance by both the Swiss Government and Jean-Francois Bergier. Eizenstat claims the Swiss actions during the war were "business as usual", and what should have been expected of a country claiming neutrality (Bergier 1996, 31). Upon completion it was noted the report mainly focused on Switzerland, giving very little attention to Argentina, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, or Turkey. This negative attention did not sit well with the Swiss Government, who felt they were receiving an unfair share of the blame. One area of the report that was of particular interest to Bergier was the study into the potential prolongation of the war due to financial dealings with neutral countries. In regards to the Eizenstat report, Bergier writes, "In the general conclusion of the Eizenstat Report, a specifically American perception of neutrality again emerges. As other studies have shown, the Swiss and the US conceptions of neutrality diverged radically" (Bergier 1996, 31). Bergier then goes on to be critical of the United States citing the abandonment of its isolationist stance taken after World War I. He feels there are "considerable divergences and misunderstandings that persisted over decades between the USA and Switzerland" (Bergier 1996, 32). While Bergier does not have the same issues with a second report completed by Eizenstat due to the "multilateral scope and comparison"; or the inclusion of information about other neutral nation’s actions, he does still raise a point of contention. Bergier does not believe the report’s findings that suggest Switzerland influenced the course of the war to a significant degree can be substantiated (Bergier 1996, 518). While Bergier was initially excited that the Eizenstat report would address this topic, he did not agree with the conclusion that was reached. Bergier does not feel the American perspective on Swiss actions is necessarily accurate due to different philosophies on foreign policy. He does not argue facts or figures that were cited, but simply the American’s opinion, and the conclusions that were reached.

Eizenstat’s report not only covers the actions taken by Swiss banks, but also speaks to how those actions may have prolonged Germany’s ability to wage war. His report reveals anti-Semitic sentiments expressed by Swiss government officials that seemed to be socially acceptable at the time. Eizenstat believes these sentiments may be partially responsible for why the banks acted the way they did with Jewish finances (Eizenstat 1997, 84). While Eizenstat’s report speaks to the handling of Jewish finances, the central focus of this report is Swiss trade with Nazis and the deposits of looted gold and assets. It is in this area his report is the harshest toward Swiss banks. Eizenstat claims the banks knew during the war the gold they were accepting from the Germans was stolen. It was easy to prove this fact because the German pre-war gold reserves were well known, and they were depositing more than they were supposed to have. Swiss banks would convert the gold to hard currency, allowing the Germans to spend money on the supplies and equipment needed to keep their war machine moving. Eizenstat also brings attention to action that took place well after the war. He cites an agreement that was made in 1946 in which the Swiss Government claimed they would have their banks return all assets to European banks and Holocaust victims. They subsequently elected not to, claiming there was insufficient evidence that such funds existed in their banks. Eizenstat argues the Swiss Government has not done enough to rectify this situation. He feels the government is leaving it up to Swiss banks to negotiate their way out of any culpability for their wartime actions. Eizenstat also places blame with the American government, claiming there should have been more action taken against the Swiss in order to force a response from them and demand repayment of looted assets (swissinfo.ch 2001).

Eizenstat is the first to bring up the idea that after all that has occurred, money may not adequately address and settle this issue. Other reports attempt to determine losses suffered by Jewish victims in order to begin the restitution process. Eizenstat notes the financial settlements are important but should not be the final word on the Holocaust. "The final objective must be remembrance" (Eizenstat 1997, 4). Once the Holocaust survivors and their heirs have passed away, there will be little memory of any type of cash settlement they received. Something more permanent may be in order and also may be more appreciated by descendants of victims. Eizenstat does not provide a suggestion however as to what he feels would be appropriate to adequately remember the Swiss bank’s role in the Holocaust.

Chapter VI

Fortunately, by the mid 1990’s Swiss banks had begun to acknowledge the mistakes made by their predecessors and were becoming more willing to make amends. These investigations were part of that process. There had been small settlements reached in the 1960‘s and 1970‘s but they only totaled about $9 million dollars (D’Amato 1996, 62). These payouts were more an attempt of the banks to clear their name as no real investigation was completed. After the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, Jews were able to move more freely throughout the region. They were able to attempt to claim monies deposited nearly fifty years earlier. Unlike what occurred in the 1940‘s, the banks were no longer denying being in possession of Jewish assets, but instead were attempting to locate those assets, a daunting task after half a century.

The extensive research that was conducted during the previously mentioned reports revealed the nefarious behavior by the Swiss banking system during and after the Holocaust. When the 775 dormant accounts that were mentioned in the D’Amato hearing were located, it was determined they were worth 38.7 million Swiss francs (Braillard 15). As a result of this finding the banks decided it would be appropriate for them to make a donation to a fund set up for victims of the Nazis. The three largest banks in Switzerland contributed 100 million Swiss francs to the fund (Braillard 18). The fact that the banks had only claimed to have located 38.7 million francs but then made a 100 million franc donation is evidence of their knowledge the smaller amount was just a portion of what they were in possession of.

Approximately a year and a half later, Switzerland’s two largest banks were ready to make a settlement. They made an offer of $600 million U.S. dollars and called it a "Global Settlement" (Braillard 29). They had hoped this settlement would be sufficient enough to end all future claims and clear their names from any future litigation. They also alleged this offer was as high as their institutions could bear. Their offer was not accepted. Two months later an agreement was reached. Swiss banks agreed to pay $1.25 billion U.S. dollars to Holocaust survivors (Braillard 31).

Conclusion

Despite a seemingly unimaginable sum of money being paid to Holocaust victims by Swiss banks, their restitution is not about the money, but the victims, and those who victimized. In his book, Holocaust restitution: perspectives on the litigation and its legacy, Michael Bazyler says "one of the most important results of the Holocaust restitution movement was that it forced dozens of countries to re-examine their role in the Second World War" (Bazyler 6). The money paid out has reached over one million victims of the Nazis but there is still more that can be done. Major gaps exist years after the last accords were reached (Bazyler 297). This leads to the question of what else can be done. Is it unfair to burden the Swiss with a past that many of them were not alive for?

Multiple investigations have not only brought evidence of unethical behavior committed by Swiss banks to light, but have demonstrated how steps were taken by banks to cover up their actions. Since these investigations have been completed, Swiss banks have made sizable payouts to claimants of stolen funds. These payouts and their amounts confirm the bank’s guilt, but also indicate how rampant the cases of wrongdoing were.

Without convincing evidence it would be difficult to justify further payouts by Swiss banks, but it seems as though further reparations need to be made before they can make amends with their wartime past. Switzerland is one of the few European nations that do not have a Holocaust memorial. They certainly played a role in the oppression of the Jews; maybe a permanent acknowledgement of their mistake would be appropriate. Another suggestions could be a renewing financial benefit such as scholarship offerings to descendants of Holocaust victims. As suggested by Eizenstat; the "final objective needs to be remembrance" (Eizenstat 1997, 4). So far, the Swiss have not accomplished this. Once the last recipient of reparations paid out by Swiss banks passes away, so does the last person who received any form of apology for the wrong doing committed by Swiss banks.