Shaping The Outcome Wwii

Published Date: 02 Nov 2017

Word Count: 3620 Excluding titles, section headings, and footnotes

Karamveer Lalh

Table of Contents

Abstract

Word Count: 226

War is a unique catalyst for human technological development. A significant amount of everyday technology has been modified from its original purpose: to help one side to kill the other. The technological advances since the First World War lead to the development of advanced chemical weapons, major strides in missile development, and the first weapons of mass destruction, the atomic bombs, as well as leading to advances in medical care, the internet, radios, and aircraft development. The impact of the jet engine, despite the excellent airframe of the Messerschmitt Me 262 and technology that was based around it, had a little effect on the War’s outcome due to its late arrival in the War. The Germans had poured vast amounts of research and development into technologies such as the Me 262, and other experimental technologies, such as the V2 intercontinental ballistic missile, the V3 cannon, and a host of other experimental or unconventional weapons, in order to try and swing the balance of the war back in their favour.

This paper will attempt to answer the following question: What were the effects of the Messerschmitt 262 in shaping the outcome of WWII? This will be achieved by examining at primary and secondary sources regarding the development of the technology and examine how the scientists and researchers were able to develop the technology and how the technology shaped the outcomes of the battles that were pivotal in determining the outcome of the war.

Introduction

The Messerschmitt Me 262 Schwalbe [1] was the world's first operational jet-powered fighter aircraft. [2] Work on the aircraft’s design started before the start of the Second World War; however, various problems with the aircraft’s engines stalled the aircraft from attaining operational status with the Luftwaffe [3] until mid-1944. Compared with Allied fighters of its day, including the jet-powered Gloster Meteor [4] , it was much faster, more maneuverable and better armed. The Me 262 was one of the most advanced aviation designs in operational use during World War II; the Me 262 was a very versatile jet powered aircraft including light bomber, reconnaissance and even experimental night fighter versions. This jet, despite its limited deployment, had the potential to turn the war in the favour of the Nazis. Me 262 pilots claimed 542 Allied kills, against the loss of about 100 Me 262s. [5] In order to counter the massive threat it posed, the Allies relentlessly attacked the aircraft fabrication and maintenance facilities on the ground and while they were taking-off or landing. Maintenance problems and a lack of fuel during the deteriorating late-war situation had a major effect on the effectiveness of the aircraft. In the end, the Me 262 had a negligible impact on the course of the war due to its late introduction and the small numbers that were deployed in operational service. [6] This paper will attempt to answer the question: What were the effects of the Messerschmitt 262 in shaping the outcome of WWII?

Research and Development

Several years before World War II, high ranking German government officials foresaw the great potential for aircraft that used jet engines, which were first constructed by German Hans Joachim Pabst von Ohain in 1936. After the successful test flights of the first jet aircraft in the world, the Heinkel He 178, senior Nazi officials decided to adopt the jet engine for an advanced fighter aircraft. As a result, the Me 262 began development as Projekt 1065 (P.1065) before the start of World War II.

The plans for the aircraft were drafted in April 1939, and the original design closely resembled the aircraft that eventually entered service. Technical issues involving the new jet engine significantly delayed the progression of the original design. Funding for the jet engine program was also initially lacking as many high-ranking officials thought the war could be won with conventional aircraft. [7] Prominent individuals who were skeptical of the development of Projekt 1065 included many high ranking officials: Hermann Göring, [8] Willy Messerschmitt, [9] and Major General Adolf Galland. [10] At that time, problems with engine development had slowed production of the aircraft considerably. [11] In mid-1943, Adolf Hitler envisioned the Me 262 as an offensive ground-attack/bomber rather than a defensive interceptor. The Nazi war effort could have benefitted from a high-speed, light-payload Schnellbomber ("fast bomber") to penetrate enemy airspace during the expected Allied invasion of France. His decision resulted in the development of (and concentration on) the Sturmvogel (bomber) variant. It is debatable to what extent Hitler's interference extended the delay in bringing the Me 262 into operation. Hitler did not divert significant resources into the development of experimental technologies until the failure of Operation Barbarossa. It was at this point Hitler concluded that a conventional victory was indeed impossible. (Shrier, 1960) Albert Speer, one of Hitler’s key advisors, claimed that Hitler rejected the advice of the research team developing the aircraft, and that it would be more effective as an interceptor. Because of the devastating attacks on German soil, Hitler pushed for the plane to be developed as a bomber. (Speer, 1970)

The internal conflict surrounding the research and development of the aircraft ultimately pushed back its initial launch date, which proved to be detrimental to the Nazi war effort. Had the aircraft been brought into active service sooner, the aircraft would be less subject to the many issues that plagued the aircraft when it finally entered operational service.

Operational Service

On 19 April 1944, Erprobungskommando 262, the first Me 262 squadron, was formed as a test unit to introduce the 262 into service and train a core of pilots. Major Walter Nowotny was assigned as commander after the death of original leader Captain Thierfelder in July 1944, and the unit renamed Kommando Nowotny. This unit holds the distinction of having mounted the world's first jet fighter operations. Trials continued at a slow pace, with initial operational missions against the Allies in August 1944 allegedly downing 19 Allied aircraft for six Me 262s lost, although these claims continue to remain questionable to this day, due to their inability to be cross-referenced by official allied sources. Regardless of their veracity, these numbers were promising, and impressed the German High Command, and thus development, and construction of further Me 262’s continued.

Later on in the conflict, Nowotny, ignoring his superiors, chose to fly a mission against an enemy bomber formation on 8 November 1944. He claimed two P-51D Mustangs destroyed before suffering engine failure at high altitude. Then, while diving and trying desperately to restart his engines, [12] he was attacked, by other Mustangs, and killed in action. Following Major Nowotny’s death, [13] the Kommando unit was withdrawn from service in order to better train and revise combat tactics, in order to maximize the 262's strengths. It was determined that the pilots, who were not effectively trained for jet combat, needed to revise their tactics in order to pose a threat to allied air superiority. This further delayed the overall combat readiness of the aircraft, further reducing any possible impact it may have had.

By January 1945, Jagdgeschwader 7 (JG 7) had been formed as a pure jet fighter wing, although it was several weeks before it was operational. In the meantime, a bomber unit—I Gruppe, Kampfgeschwader 54 (KG 54)—had been re-equipped with the Me 262 A-2a fighter-bomber for use in a ground-attack role. However, the unit lost 12 jets in action in two weeks for minimal returns. These losses forced the German high command to reconsider how they planned to further develop the fighter. These delays further pushed back wide scale deployment of the fighter. [14] 

Jagdverband 44 (JV 44) was another Me 262 fighter unit, formed in February 1945 by Lieutenant General Adolf Galland, who had recently been dismissed as Inspector of Fighters. [15] Galland’s influence drew many of the most experienced and decorated Luftwaffe fighter pilots from other units that had been grounded by the lack of fuel and other mission critical supplies. By now, most Nazi supply lines had been damaged, and could not keep up with the increase in demand that was a result of the relentless pressure of Allied forces. (Shrier, 1960) During March of 1945, Me 262 fighter units were able, for the first time, to mount significant attacks on Allied bomber formations, whereas previously the Me 262 was delegated to an experimental role. On 18 March 1945, 37 Me 262s of JG 7 intercepted a force of 1,221 bombers and 632 escorting fighters. They shot down 12 bombers and 1 fighter while losing only three Me 262s. Although a 4:1 ratio was exactly what the Luftwaffe would have needed to make an impact on the war, the absolute scale of their success was minor, as it represented only one per cent of the attacking force. In 1943 and early 1944, the United States Air Corps had been able to keep up offensive operations despite loss ratios of 5% and more, and the few available Me 262s failed to inflict sufficient losses to hamper their operations. This failure represented a significant blow to the Nazi War Effort. Without air cover to protect their industrial base, the troops at the front lines found it increasingly difficult to maintain offensive operations.

Several two-seat trainer variants of the Me 262, such as the Me 262 B-1a, served with 10 Staffel, Nachtjagdgeschwader 11, near Berlin. These few aircraft accounted for most of the 13 Mosquito fighters lost over Berlin in the first three months of 1945. However, actual intercepts were generally or entirely made using Wilde Sau [16] methods, rather than AI radar-controlled interception. As the two-seat trainer was largely unavailable, many pilots had to make their first flight in a jet in a single-seater without an instructor. This lack of instruction meant that a significant number of the forces pilots were inadequately trained as to how to handle the jet when in combat.

Despite its deficiencies, the Me 262 clearly signaled the beginning of the end of piston-engine powered aircraft as effective warplanes. Once airborne, it could accelerate to speeds over 850 km/h, about 150 km/h faster than any Allied fighter operational in the European Theater of Operations. Due to the high speeds of the Me 262, German pilots needed new tactics to attack American bombers. In the head-on attack, the closing speed, of about 320 m/s, was too high to attack enemy aircraft. Even when approaching from the rear, the closing speed was too great to effectively use the aircrafts’ guns.

Captain Eric Brown [17] , who tested a captured the Me 262 noted:

"This was a Blitzkrieg [18] aircraft. You whack in at your bomber. It was never meant to be a dogfighter, it was meant to be a destroyer of bombers... The great problem with it was it did not have dive brakes. For example, if you want to fight and destroy a B-17, you come in on a dive. The 30mm cannon were not so accurate beyond 650 yards. So you normally came in at 600 yards and would open fire on your B-17. And your closing speed was still high and since you had to break away at 200 yards to avoid a collision, you only had two seconds firing time. Now, in two seconds, you can’t sight. You can fire randomly and hope for the best. If you want to sight and fire, you need to double that time to four seconds. And with dive brakes, you could have done that." [19] 

It was evident that the Germans themselves did not know how to effectively use their own fighters in the most effective fashion, until it was far too late in the war for it to make a measurable impact to its outcome.

Eventually, German pilots developed multiple techniques to effectively to counter Allied bombers' defenses. They switched to rocket equipped Me 262s and developed a technique that would have pilots approach from the side of a bomber formation, where their silhouettes were widest, and while still out of range of the bombers machine guns, fire a salvo of rockets. One or two of these rockets could down even the famously rugged B-17 Flying Fortress, the aircraft that made up a bulk of the bomber force in the European Theater of Operations. Any strike on an enemy aircraft meant its total annihilation. [20] This technique was very difficult to counter, as B-17 squadrons were ill adapted to squadrons of fast planes flanking them. [21] 

Though this tactic was effective, it came too late to have a real effect on the war, and only small numbers of Me 262s were equipped with these rocket packs, as these were becoming increasingly expensive to produce. This method of attacking bombers set the standard until the invention and mass deployment of guided missiles, many years later. Some nicknamed this tactic "the Luftwaffe's Wolf Pack", as the fighters often made runs in groups of two or three, fired their rockets, then returned to base, similar to the hunting techniques of wolves. USAAF General Carl Spaatz expressed the fear that if greater numbers of German jets appeared, they could inflict losses heavy enough to force cancellation of the Allied bombing offensive by daylight, which would have had a substantial impact on the course of the war.

Once in the air, the Me 262 was difficult for its opponents to counter because its high speed and rate of climb made it extremely hard to intercept. As with many other jets, the Me 262's engines did not provide a significant amount of thrust at low air speeds, and throttle response was limited at best. [22] Another disadvantage all early jet engines shared was a relatively high risk of their engines bursting into flame if the pilot used the throttle too aggressively (as is common in a dogfight). Pilots were instructed to operate the throttle gently and avoid quick changes. Later in the war, German engineers introduced an automatic throttle regulator, but it only partly alleviated the problem. On the plus side, thrust at high speed was much greater than on propeller-driven aircraft.

Despite the incredible speed of the Me 262, American pilots soon were able to exploit the plane’s multiple weaknesses. The engines had an abhorrently bad throttle response. Pushing the engines too far often resulted in them bursting into flames. The handling on the aircraft was very poor. The high speed of the aircraft, gave little opportunities for the pilots to correctly align their shots, making them ineffective at dog fighting. Aircraft that are moving at slower speeds have the ability to make tighter turns. If a fast Me 262 was chasing a slower moving fighter, all the slow fighter would have to do is pull a steep turn, and the Me would overshoot. Unfortunately, for Me 262 pilots, the allied pilots were quick to exploit this weakness as the cruising speed of Me 262s alone was up to 200 km/h faster than that of any piston-engine fighter of the period. Oberst Johannes Steinhoff experienced this problem when he encountered a dozen Russian fighters early in 1945, the much higher speed of his Me 262 making it extremely difficult for him to set his sights on the small Russian fighters. He recalled:

"I passed one that looked as if it was hanging motionless in the air (I am too fast!). The one above me went into a steep right-hand turn, his pale blue underside standing out against the purple sky. Another banked right in front of the Me's nose. Violent jolt as I flew through his airscrew eddies. Maybe a wing's length away. That one in the gentle left-hand curve! Swing her round. I was coming from underneath, eye glued to the sight (pull her tighter!). A throbbing in the wings as my cannon pounded briefly. Missed him. Way behind his tail. It was exasperating. I would never be able to shoot one down like this. They were like a sack of fleas. A prick of doubt: is this really such a good fighter? Could one in fact, successfully attack a group of erratically banking fighters with the Me 262?"

When its speed was carefully managed pilots eventually came to realize that the aircraft could be an effective dog fighter if special attention was made to maintain its effective maneuvering speeds. The controls were light and effective right up to the maximum permissible speed and perfectly harmonized. Nazi engineers eventually realized that by adding full span leading edge slats, in three unconnected sections on each wing, helped increase the overall lift produced by the wing by as much as 25 to 35% in tight turns or at low speeds, greatly improving how effectively the aircraft could handle. [23] Many pilots soon found out, the Me 262's clean design also meant that it, like all jets, held its speed in tight turns much better than conventional propeller driven fighters, which was a great potential advantage in a dogfight as it meant better energy retention in maneuvers. Luftwaffe test pilot and flight instructor Hans Fey stated, "The 262 will turn much better at high than at slow speeds, and due to its clean design, will keep its speed in tight turns much longer than conventional type aircraft." Unfortunately, discoveries such as this were made too late for them to be a turning point in the campaign against Allied day bombers.

The high speeds of the Me 262s meant that the planes were impossible to beat in a head off. [24] As a result, Me 262 pilots were relatively safe from the Allied fighters, as long as they did not allow themselves to get drawn into low-speed turning contests and saved their maneuvering for higher speeds, where their engines’ performances would be reduced. Parallels were drawn in the Pacific war where American fighters had to face off against the more maneuverable, but slower Japanese fighters. [25] 

Eventually when the pilots became comfortable enough with their planes, they posed a formidable opponent for any Allied force. Eventually Allied pilots soon found out that the only way to effectively defeat a squadron of Me 262s and the even Me 163 Komet rocket fighters, was to eliminate the jets before they had a chance to get airborne. Luftwaffe airfields identified as jet bases were frequently bombed by medium bombers, and Allied fighters patrolled over the fields to attack jets trying to land. The Luftwaffe countered by installing extensive AA gun turrets along the approach lines to protect the Me 262s from the ground—and by providing top cover during the jets' takeoff and landing with the most advanced Luftwaffe single-engined fighters, the Focke-Wulf Fw 190D and (just becoming available in 1945) Focke-Wulf Ta 152H. Nevertheless Allied fighter patrol patterns over Me 262 airfields resulted in numerous losses of jets and serious attrition of the force, preventing them to ever maintain a strong enough aerial presence to pose a significant threat. [26] 

Conclusion

The Me 262 was an exceptional fighter aircraft for its time; however, its defeat came not from the battlefield but rather the boardroom. Senior Nazi officials, who failed to see the worth of the aircraft significantly, slowed development of the technologies needed to build and fly a fighter aircraft effectively. By the time the design produced something tangible, there were many issues with the aircraft that prevented it from turning the tide in the losing air battle over Europe. Asides from the performance issues with the fighter’s engines, the aircraft represented a significant threat to Allied air superiority at a time where the Luftwaffe was considered to be nearly defeated. However, the fighter entered the war too late to make a significant contribution to the German war effort. Even though the fighter enjoyed a kill to destroy ratio of 4:1, the aircraft was produced in too few numbers for this to have been a significant impact. The Allies countered its potential effectiveness in the air by relentlessly attacking the aircraft on the ground and while they were taking off or landing. The aircrafts’ multiple maintenance problems, lack of trained technicians, as well as a lack of fuel during the deteriorating late-war situation also reduced the effectiveness of the aircraft as a fighting force. In the end, the Me 262 had a negligible impact on the course of the war due to multiple causes related to the introduction, design, functionality, maintenance, and production of this jet fighter aircraft.