Left Wing Extremism In Urban India

Published Date: 02 Nov 2017

"The countryside as well as the Protracted People’s War will remain as the "center of gravity" of the party’s work, while urban work will be complimentary to it."

-  Muppala Lakshmana Rao, alias "Ganapathi", General Secretary CPI (Maoist)

CHAPTER – I

INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY

1. Dr. Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of India, has said more than once, starting in 2004, that the Maoist [1] problem is the most serious internal challenge that the country is faced with. This fact was reiterated by Pranab Mukherjee, President of India on the eve on 64th Republic Day on 25 Jan 2013 by saying "Figures mean nothing to those who do not benefit from them. We must act immediately, otherwise the current pockets of conflict, often described as ‘Naxalite’ violence, could acquire far more dangerous dimensions".

2. The origin of Naxal movement in India can be traced back to 1960s when Naxalites started operating from various parts of the country. However, Naxalism has emerged as a major internal security threat since merger of People’s War Group (PWG) and Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) on 21 Sep 2004 and formed Communist Party of India (Maoist) to fight against the Indian State.

3. According to ‘Strategy and Tactics of Indian Revolution 2004 [2] ", the stated objective of CPI (Maoist) is ‘the seizure of political power’ and the work in urban areas has a special importance in their revolutionary work. The arrest of senior leaders of CPI (Maoist) from metropolitan cities, their involvement in strikes in Honda/ Maruti Factory at Gurgaon etc. indicates the implementation of naxalite ideology in urban areas of India.

METHODOLOGY

Statement of Problem

4. The purpose of this paper is to study the spread of Left Wing Extremism (LWE) in Urban Areas as an expansion of LWE in India. The spread of LWE in urban areas will not only support the existing LWE but also has the capability to evolve as a spiraling urban insurgency.

Hypothesis

5. Naxalism has been caused due to the socio - economic problems of rural India and the spatial spread of LWE to urban areas is unlikely to sustain.

Justification of the study

6. The study has been focused on urban areas due to following reasons:-

(a) Population residing in urban areas of India has increased from 11.4% in 1901 to 28.53% in 2001 and has reached 31.16% in 2011 census. The continuous shift of population has a direct impact on the LWE which started from the rural area.

(b) Urban areas, being the centre of power, offer suitable conditions for naxalites to achieve their stated objective in a swifter and earlier time frame.

(c) The impact of naxalism in urban areas has far more reaching effects than the rural insurgency.

Scope

7. This study concentrates on availability of conditions in the mega cities of India to carry forward the LWE to these areas in accordance with the latest documents released by CPI (Maoist) towards its urban perspective.

Data Collection

8. The research is based on available publications and material on the internet on the subject and concentrates on spread of LWE in urban areas of India. The views reflected in this paper are entirely personal. Wherever the views of other writers have been included, the same has been indicated through footnotes.

Organisation of the Dissertation

9. The topic will be analysed under the following heads:-

(a) Introduction and Methodology.

(b) Genesis and Evolution of LWE in India.

(c) Urbanisation of LWE.

(d) Future of Urban LWE.

(e) Recommended Strategy to contain spread of LWE in urban areas.

(f) Conclusion.

CHAPTER – II

GENESIS AND EVOLUTION OF LWE IN INDIA

"Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun". 

- Mao Tse Tung 

Introduction

10. The LWE in India has its roots from the idea of communism in the country. Before independence, a section of leaders argued that communism and socialism are ideal for a society like ours, which is divided along caste, religion and ethnic lines. They believed that it was the only way to emancipate the vast number of poor people in India and create a classless and just society. This led to the foundation of the Communist Party of India (CPI) on 26 Dec 1925. However, the ban on communist activities by British authorities precluded the communists to build a nationwide organisation.

11. The following campaigns helped the CPI to gain a strong hold in social and economically backward areas:-

(a) Campaign against the brutal repression of peasants by feudal landlords during the regime of Nizam in the Telangana region.

(b) Tebhaga Movement. It was led by "Kisan Sabha" - peasants’ front of CPI - in 1946 to increase the crop share of peasants from half to two-thirds, thereby reducing the share of feudal landlords to one-third.

12. After independence, the CPI emerged as the largest opposition party at national level. Post 1962 Sino-Indian war, CPI split in two parts:-

(a) CPI (M) (Pro-Chinese). They agreed with China that the Soviet Union was following "Revisionism", "Socialist Imperialism" and "Sectarianism". They also backed Chinese version of the events and blamed India to be the aggressor in 1962 war.

(b) CPI (Pro-Soviet).

13. While the Communist parties were struggling on ideological issues, Charu Majumdar, a young communist leader, was busy preparing his own plans to usher a "revolution" in India. His experience of "Tebhaga Movement" enabled him to organise armed rebellion. He was influenced by Mao Tse Tung and wanted to emulate the Chinese revolution in India. During the years 1965-1967, Charu Majumdar wrote a series of eight articles arguing that the situation in India was ripe for the armed rebellion. His documents formed the foundation for Naxalism in India and were called the "Historic eight documents". He was opposed to CPI/ CPI (M) line of working within the framework of Indian constitution. He argued that the Indian government was a semi-colonial, feudalistic and imperial entity that needed to be overthrown [3] .

Causes of LWE

14. The genesis and evolution of naxalism in India can be attributed to following causes [4] :-

(a) Ideological Inspiration. The success of communist revolutions in

Russia under Lenin and in China under Mao, which aimed at creating a classless society to provide equal opportunities to all citizens, motivated their followers in India to bring such a revolution.

(b) Support from China. Chinese Communist Party (CPC) openly backed the left adventurists in India. People’s Daily, the official organ of the CPC, published an editorial on 05 Jul 1967, titled "Spring Thunder Breaks over India", where it hailed the Naxalbari revolt because they believed that ’armed struggle is the only correct road for the Indian revolution’ [5] .

(c) Leadership. The emergence of revolutionary leaders like Charu Mazumdar, Kanu Sanyal in West Bengal and C Pulla Reddy and Seetharamaiah in Telengana boosted the movement.

(d) Land Reforms. The areas of West Bengal and Telengana were famous for landlords exploiting the landless workers. Absence of land reforms added fuel to the fire.

(e) Absence of Development. The virtual absence of civic amenities like drinking water, food insecurity, health care, sanitation, adequate housing education, employment opportunities, electricity and infrastructure alienated the people from the government machinery.

(f) Social Inequalities. The dalits and tribals suffer from numerous discriminatory and exclusionary practices in every walk of life and at all stages denying them entitlements and equal access to opportunities by the higher caste groups.

(g) Structural Violence. The social structure in India is embedded in the caste based Hindu social order. The landless are exploited in terms of low wages, long hours of work, debt-bondage, humiliating treatment and physical assault in the case of non-compliance of employer’s orders.

(j) Gaps in Implementation.

(i) The implementation of PCR Act, 1976 is poor.

(ii) Land Rights. Procedure and practice related anomalies in disposal of land cases, compulsory acquisition of land by the government and large scale migration of the non-tribals.

(iii) Non implementation of Scheduled Tribes and other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Rights) Act, 2006.

(iv) Labour Welfare. The Minimum Wages Act, Equal Remuneration Act and Child Labour Act are violated.

(v) Reservation. Stiff resistance from the higher caste groups who resort to frequent litigation and open agitation against it.

(vi) Development. Non allocation of funds for Special Component Plan and Tribal Sub-Plan by the state governments.

(vii) Participation. Compromise of elected candidates from reserved constituencies. Non amendment of Panchayati Raj laws in accordance with PESA, 1996.

15. Ideology [6] . The CPI (Maoist) describes India as backward, semi-colonial and semifeudal. It is committed to Marxism-Leninism-Maoism theory. Its objective is to wage protracted people’s war on the lines propounded by Mao, seize/capture state/political power and herald a New Democratic Revolution (NDR), under the leadership of the agrarian class. This NDR would be conducted through guerrilla warfare by establishing base areas in the villages and then encircling the towns and cities, before the final Long March to capture political power. The CPI (Maoist) considers the Indian caste system as "obnoxious" and holds that the dalits are "victims of untouchability, caste discrimination and upper caste chauvinism". The struggle against casteism and untouchability should also be carried on in the ideological, political and cultural spheres. In order to advance the already ongoing revolution, the CPI (Maoist) has identified the principal and immediate tasks before the party. These include:-

(a) Intensification and advancing of people’s war to establish people’s political power.

(b) Building a mighty mass movement against the imperialist the policies of liberalisation, privatisation, globalisation inspired by them.

(c) Exposing, isolating and defeating Hindu fascist forces, besides exposing all other fundamentalist forces.

(d) Resisting and defeating state repression and demanding the repeal of all black laws.

(e) Fighting US and Indian expansionism and hegemony.

Evolution of Naxalism in India [7] 

16. First Phase: Naxalbari. Naxal violence started as an agrarian revolt in 1967 by the Santhal peasants of Naxalbari district of West Bengal. They were led by revolutionary Communist leaders like Charu Mazumdar and Kanu Sanyal. This uprising received the support of CPC. However, subsequent Naxalite slogans like "China’s Chairman is our Chairman," led the Chinese to deride them as infantile Communists. They formed the third Communist Party – Communist Party of India – Marxist-Leninist (CPI (ML)). It turned towards violent annihilation of class enemies through rural rebellions in Bihar, Srikakulam in Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal (Debra, Gopiballabpur and Burdwan districts).

17. By 1970, it began to enter the urban areas of Calcutta. Between 1970 and 1971, there were 4,000 incidents of naxalite violence. Concerted police operations were launched. These culminated in Operation Steeple Chase1 (1 July-15 August 1971) in which the army provided the outer cordon for joint operations with the police. This broke the back of the movement and crushed the first agrarian rebellion in India. It is noteworthy, however, that this revolt occurred in the plains of West Bengal and Bihar where the communication infrastructure was fairly well developed and gave the distinct advantage of a vehicle-based mobility deferential to the security forces. It also merits emphasis that the Santhal tribes were largely armed with bows, arrows, dahs and spears. The naxalite movements also suffered serious demoralisation and a series of splits (pro and anti-Lin Biao factions). It weakened from 1972-77. The imposition of the emergency led to a major crackdown that brought the movement to a virtual standstill. The Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) had emerged in Bihar. This led to the formation of caste armies like the Ranvir Sena and the struggle degenerated into caste violence.

18. Second Phase: People’s War Group (PWG). In the 1980s, there was a second upsurge of the left wing violence. The various naxalite groups had merged in April 1980 to form the PWG. Insurgency in the plains was easily combated as the mobilisation, firepower and movement deferential lay entirely with the security forces. In response, the PWG shifted the struggle towards the forested tribal areas in Adilabad in Andhra Pradesh. The terrain here was far more difficult and the forest tribes better suited for guerrilla warfare than the lower caste peasants of the plains. Forest Committees and armed squads or dalams were formed. The struggle, thus, shifted from Bengal to Andhra Pradesh and Bihar and from there it spread to Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh and Orissa by 1991.

19. The Third Phase: Left Wing Violence. From 1990 onwards, India began to globalise its economy. Liberalisation was opposed strongly by the left wing extremists. A series of mergers now took place to strengthen the Maoist upsurge. On 21 Sep 2004, the PWG of Kondapally Seetaramiah and MCC of Kanai Chatterjee finally merged to give a pan-India orientation to LWE in the form of CPI (Maoist). The spread of extremism thereafter has been dramatic as shown in the following chart :-C:\Users\SUDESH\Desktop\naxal to maoist.jpg

CHART 1: FATALITIES IN LEFT WING EXTREMISM 2005 - 2012

Source : http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/maoist/data_sheets/ fatalities naxal05-11.htm (Accessed 26 Jan 2013)

20. Stages of People’s Protracted War. The three stages of protracted war, enunciated by Mao Tse Tung, during the Chinese civil war are as under [8] :-

(a) The Strategic Defensive. In this phase, the nascent guerrilla organisation was formed and increased its influence by selective terrorist actions against the state functionaries and their supporters - its aim at this stage was survival and consolidation.

(b) The Strategic Stalemate. Mao then used space to extend the war in time and exhaust the state of its will to fight. Company and battalion-size guerrilla bands were formed and extended the war in space and time for one to two decades by employing hit and run tactics of raids and ambushes.

(c) The Strategic Counter-Offensive. Once the stage was set by extended guerrilla warfare, the regular People’s Liberation Army was formed to effect the switch to conventional military operations that would deliver the coup de grace and destroy the exhausted armed forces of the state.

21. Organisation of CPI (Maoists). The party structure at the central level consists of the Polit Bureau (PB), the Central Committee (CC) and the Central Military Commission (CMC). The following departments are under the direct command of CMC [9] :-

(a) The Central Technical Committee (CTC).

(b) Regional Commands (RCs).

(c) Special Action Teams (SATs).

(d) Military Intelligence (MI).

(e) Publications and Editorial Board of ‘Jung’.

(f) Central Military Instructors Team (CMIT).

(g) Communications.

(h) Tactical Counter Offensive Campaign (TCOC).

(j) Peoples Liberation Guerilla Army (PLGA).

22. The CPI (Maoist) also have an intelligence set-up known as the Peoples Security Service (PSS) and at the State level, there are State Committees, State Military Commission, etc., going down to Zonal Committees, Area Committees, etc.

Strategy and Tactics of Left Wing Extremists

23. The extremism by LWE can be described as a "democratic revolution through tactical offensives in the protracted people’s war of strategic defensive" at one level and "terrorism disguising itself as class struggle and social justice" at another level. Over the last three decades, Naxallites have developed their strategies with the objective to disorganise and confuse by politics and defeat by force. They have formulated their grand strategy of protracted war, military strategy of armed struggle with guerilla style and political strategy of using the democratic contradictions of Indian polity to their advantage.

24. LWE is following both home grown as well as borrowed strategies and tactics from Peru, China, Vietnam and Nepal. Few of their foreign borrowed strategies are as under :-

(a) China. The following Chinese tactics have been blindly followed by the Indian Maoists :-

Use few to defeat many and use many to crush few.

(ii) Misleading the security forces and catch them unawares.

(iii) Tactics of concentration to conduct raids and dispersion to protect oneself and politically organize masses.

(iv) Tactics of fighting no battle unprepared.

(b) Vietnam. Maoists are using the Vietnamese tactics of guerilla warfare and mobile warfare and even the slogan of Dien Bien Phu ‘Dare to win and dare to fight’.

25. The following strategies have been adopted by the Maoists through various PB and CC meetings in the recent past:-

(a) All India Special Conference of CPI (ML), 1995 adopted Joint Action Committee for democratic rights.

(b) Ninth Congress of PW, 2001 adopted Formation of a peoples guerilla army, regional bureaus, central publishing bureau, sub-committee on political education, sub-committee on mahila movement etc.

(c) CC Meeting, 2004 provisionally decided to convert PGA to PLGA.

(d) Fourth Meeting of PB, 2006 formulated the strategy to fight Salwa Judum, start international websites and internationalise issues.

(e) Ninth Congress of CPI (Maoists), 2007 formulated the strategies to transform prisons into political universities, turning PLGA into PLA, guerilla war into mobile war, support to nationality struggles, dalit struggles, SEZ and displacement struggles etc.

Funding of LWE

26. Source of Income. The Maoists run an elaborate extortion network in the red corridor to fund the extremism. The all-India annual collection of CPI (Maoists) is estimated to be close to Rs. 2000 crore [10] as per the seized cashbooks and other papers of Maoists. The various sources of funds are as following:-

(a) Party Members. Membership fee is collected from part-time Party Members in accordance to their income [11] .

(b) Local Population. Villagers or tribals are asked to donate a day’s earning every month to the party fund as a token of carrying on the tribal’s fight. Maoists terrorise industrialists, businessman, contractors, tendu leaf traders and even poor villagers. The extortion can either be cash or kind i.e grains, pulses or other material.

(c) Government Development Funds. The developments funds reaching panchayat and NGOs are grabbed by the Maoists in collusively with the elected rural body members.

(d) Extortion of illegal miners in Orissa, Jharkhand and West Bengal and paper mills and inter-state transporters in Maharashtra.

(e) Collection of fee for resolution of personal and local disputes.

27. Expenditure of Funds. The extorted money is spent on the following :-

Maintenance of Committees and Technical Mechanism.

(b) Military Needs.

(i) Maintenance and management, fatigue needs and training of PLGA forces.

(ii) Purchase of arms, ammunition and explosives, vehicles and uniforms.

(iii) Production and R&D of arms, ammunition, communications, intelligence, logistics, supply, medicines and other such important departments.

(c) Political and ideological training of Maoists.

(d) Publishing of revolutionary literature and propaganda.

(e) Boosting urban networks.

(f) Fighting court cases for jailed comrades, jail expenses and financial help to families of jailed/ killed comrades.

(g) Monthly remuneration to Maoist cadre.

(h) Investment in gold and other assets like land.

Government’s Approach to Resolve the LWE Problem in Rural Areas [12] 

28. The Government’s approach is to deal with LWE activities in a holistic manner, in the areas of security, development, rights of local communities, improvement in governance and public perception. 83 affected Districts in nine States have been taken up for special attention on planning, implementation and monitoring of the security situation and development schemes.

30. Development Related Measures

(a) Monitoring of Implementation of Flagship Programmes. The Planning Commission has been monitoring implementation of Flagship Programmes in focus districts affected by LWE and also reviewing the progress of implementation of the following schemes:-

Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY).

National Rural Health Mission (NRHM).

Ashram Schools.

Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA).

(v) Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA).

(vi) National Rural Drinking Water Programme (NRDWP).

(vii) Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana (RGGVY).

(viii) Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS).

(ix) Indira Awaas Yojana (IAY).

(x) Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006.

(b) Integrated Action Plan (IAP). The aim of this initiative is to provide public infrastructure and services in 60 LWE affected/contiguous Districts. This Scheme has been extended to 18 more LWE affected Districts, taking the total coverage to 78 Districts. Rs. 1,090 crore was been released so far during the year 2011-12.

(c) Road Requirement Plan. The Ministry of Road Transport & Highways has been implementing the project costing Rs. 7,300 crore for LWE areas, under which major roads critical for connectivity in these areas have been taken up.

(d) Provision of funds on a 100% grant basis for establishment of hostels for Scheduled Tribe girls and boys as well as Ashram Schools in Tribals sub-plan areas.

(e) The Ministry of Environment and Forests has given general approval under section 2 of the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 for diversion of forest land in LWE affected areas from 1.00 ha to 5.00 ha for activities like schools, dispensaries/hospitals, electrical and telecommunication lines, drinking water, water/rain water harvesting structures, minor irrigation canal, non-conventional sources of energy, skill upgradation/ vocational training center, power sub-stations, rural roads, communication posts; and police establishments like police stations/outposts/border outposts/ watch towers in sensitive areas and laying of optical fiber cables, telephone lines & drinking water supply lines.

(f) The Ministry of Environment and Forests have also decided that no compensatory afforestation in lieu of the forest land diverted in accordance with the above said general approval shall be insisted upon for 60 IAP Districts.

(g) IAY. Rs. 462.04 crore was released in 2011-12 to LWE affected districts. The ceiling of per unit cost of IAY house has been increased from Rs. 45,000 to Rs. 48,500 for LWE affected districts.

(h) PESA. Effective Implementation of the Provisions of the Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 (PESA) and the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 has been emphasized time and again with the State Governments concerned. The Ministry of Panchayati Raj has constituted a Committee under the Chairmanship of Member, Planning Commission to look into the aspects of Minimum Support Price (MSP), value addition and marketing of Minor Forest Produce (MFP) in Fifth Schedule Areas.

(j) The stipulation of 80% utilization of funds for further release of funds under Backward Regions Grant Fund (BRGF) has been revised to 60% utilization of funds. Changes have been made to ensure quick release of funds from State to the local bodies under BRGF.

31. Civic Action Programme. During the Financial year 2011-12 an amount of Rs. 20 crore has been provided to CAPFs to undertake Civic Action Programme in the LWE affected States. This is a successful scheme which aims to build bridges between the local population and security forces.

32. Surrender and Rehabilitation Policy. The Guidelines for surrender-cum rehabilitation of Left Wing Extremists has been put in place. The rehabilitation package, inter alia, includes a stipend of Rs. 2,000 for three years, vocational training, immediate grant of Rs. 1.5 lakh and incentives for surrender of weapons.

33. Central Scheme for Assistance to Victims/ Family of Victims of Terrorist and Communal violence. The broad aim of the Scheme is to assist families of victims of Terrorist, Communal and Naxal violence. An amount of Rs. Three lakh is given to the affected family under the scheme, irrespective of the number of deaths in a family in a particular incident. However, if the breadwinner and the householder of a family die/are permanently incapacitated in separate incidents/occasions the family would be entitled to get assistance on each occasion. The assistance given to the beneficiaries of naxal violence under this scheme is in addition to ex-gratia payment of Rs. One lakh paid under SRE scheme.

Latest Trends of LWE

34. The Maoists have refused to participate in the democracy or undertake peace talks with the Government of India. They aim to bring a fundamental change in the nature of Indian state by adopting the strategy of a protracted armed struggle which entails building up of bases in rural and remote areas and transforming them first in guerilla zones and liberated zones, then conducting area wise seizures and circling cities and finally seizing political power and achieving nation-wide victory. The recent trends to fulfill this agenda are explained below :-

(a) Growing Militarisation. CPI (Maoist) has achieved mastery over use of IEDs and gunfire with procurement of sophisticated weaponry and intensive training. The expanded cadre engages security forces in prolonged encounters countering the principles of guerilla tactics.

(b) Urbanisation. Since 2007, there is a sudden spurt in maoist activities in urban centres. Arrest of senior maoist leaders from Delhi, Kolkata, Mumbai, Bhubneshwar, Raipur and many other cities indicate a significant shift in thet strategy. The college students of Maharashtra and West Bengal have reportedly been targeted by the Maoists to increase their ideological presence in cities.

(c) Alliances with Islamist/ Northeastern Militant Organisations. Maoists are reaching out to other militant organisations active in J&K and North East India for better arms, ammunition and ideological support. Army intelligence is reported to have proved a close connection between the Maoists and the terrorist organization Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) [13] . Also, Maoists are learnt to have fraternal ties with 21 groups spread over as many countries across the globe stretching from Peru to New Zealand.

(d) Media Management. Maoist intellectual support is on the rise amongst academicians and activists. They are increasingly getting involved with diverse issues of local, regional, national and international importance. They have been supporting demands for separate states like Telengana and Vidarbha with an eye to the eventually setting up of a communist state in India [14] .

CHAPTER – III

URBANISATION OF LWE

"The importance of the urban struggle is extraordinary". 

- Che Guevara

Introduction

35. The infiltration of naxalites from Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ) to urban centres of India is the latest development in maoist strategy. While recruitment of cadre for military activities is focussed on rural belts of India, the cities have become their targets for recruitment of sympathisers and logistic support. In 2007, two senior members of CPI (Maoist) were arrested in Mumbai carrying modern weapons and using city as their base for operations. In 2008, approximately 400 rebels attacked the urban towns of Daspalla and Nayagarh in Orissa .In Sep 2009, Naxalite leader Kobad Ghandy was arrested in Delhi while attempting to garner support from students, scholars and workers. In 2011, a group of college students was arrested in Pune for spreading naxal ideology through street plays and musical programmes.

36. The CPI (Maoist) has come out with two documents - Strategy and Tactics of Indian Revolution, 2004 and Urban Perspective : Our Work in Urban Areas, 2007 - dictating their doctrine, strategy and tactics, especially for urban centres. The Union Ministry of Home Affairs stated in Lok Sabha on 13 Dec 2011 that naxalites of CPI (Maoist) have established a firm base in the Golden Corridor Area. This shift in strategy and solidification of urban support presents a new trend of the LWE and an array of new challenges for the Government of India.

Characteristics of Urban India

37. Urbanisation in India was mainly caused after independence, due to adoption of mixed system of economy by the country which gave rise to the development of private sector. The main causes of urbanisation in India are [15] :-

(a) Expansion in government services, as a result of Second World War.

(b) Migration of people from Pakistan after partition of India.

(c) The Industrial Revolution.

(d) Eleventh five year plan that aimed at urbanisation for the economic development of India.

(e) Economic opportunities are just one reason people move into cities.

(f) Infrastructure facilities in the urban areas.

(g) Growth of private sector after 1990.

38. In terms of urban population distribution, India will be mainly dominated by the 11 cities identified as Mega cities (population above 4.0 million), which are as under :-

TABLE 1: PROJECTION OF POPULATION IN MEGA CITIES

IN 2026 (IN MILLION)

City

2001

2025

City

2001

2025

Mumbai

16.36

26.38

Hyderabad

5.53

9.09

Ahmedabad

4.51

7.73

Delhi

12.79

22.49

Pune

3.75

6.79

Kanpur

2.69

4.60

Surat

2.81

5.70

Jaipur

2.32

4.29

Chennai

6.42

10.12

Kolkata

13.21

20.56

Bangalore

5.68

9.71

Source : Census of India, 2001 and World Cities, UN-Habitat, 2008-09

39. Characteristics of Urban Areas. City forms the central point of urban sociology. A place is legally made a city by a declaration by a competent authority. Sorokin and Zimmerman enumerate eight characteristics in which the urban world differs from the rural world [16] . These are:-

(a) Occupation.

(b) Environment.

(c) Size of community.

(d) Density of population.

(e) Heterogeneity.

(f) Social differentiation and stratification.

(g) Mobility.

(h) System of interactions.

40. Social Effects of Urbanisation in India [17] . Urbanisation has far reaching effects on larger societal process and structures. The following social effects have direct bearing on spread of LWE in urban areas:-

(a) Family and Kinship. There is a disruption of the bonds of community and the migrant faces the problem to replace old relationships with new ones and to find a satisfactory means of continuing relationship with those left behind.

(b) Caste System. Caste is a rural phenomenon whereas class is urban and that with urbanization, caste transforms itself into class. But it is necessary to note that the caste system exists in cities as much as it does in villages although there are significant organisational differences.

(c) Status of Women. The status of urban women, because of being comparatively educated and liberal, is higher than that of rural women. Increasing number of women have taken to white-collar jobs and entered different professions.

(d) Migration and Housing. Migration has become a continuous process affecting the social, economic and cultural lives of the villagers. The excessive migration from rural areas and unpreparedness of cities to accommodate the migrants has resulted in large slums in mega cities. In some homes, five to six persons live in one room.

Need for Urbanisation of LWE

41. The CPI (Maoist) has decided to spread its tentacles in urban areas for the following reasons:-

(a) Disruption of the state power and the administrative machinery of the government.

(b) Opportunity to influence the highly concentrated working class to further their movement.

(c) Availability of cadres and leadership, having various types of capabilities, essential for the people’s war and for the establishment of liberated areas.

(d) Exploitation of dialectical relationship between the development of the urban movement and the development of the armed agrarian revolutionary war.

(e) Logistic Support.

(i) Supplies or contacts for supplies of arms and ammunition, spare parts, medical supplies, etc. are only available in the urban areas.

(ii) Technical help in the form of repairs and maintenance of fighting, communication and other equipment of the PLGA, development of new technologies for the people’s war are easily available in urban centres.

(iii) Propaganda and publications to fulfill the needs of the rural movement is also available in the urban centres.

Maoists’ Mission in Urban Centres [18] 

42. The mission of Maoists in urban centres is "To create both open and undercover urban militia that will supply cadre to strengthen ‘people’s war in rural areas’ and help create liberated zones".

Urban Tasks of CPI (Maoist) [19] 

43. The following urban tasks were decided upon by the CPI (Maoist) :-

(a) To get specialisation in urban work, depute naxal forces and leadership in a time bound programme.

(b) Develop the class struggles in the urban area by concentrating mainly on the working class. Develop the secret network in the urban areas and build a powerful movement of the workers: specially in the core sector.

(c) Build a vast student and youth movement which will act as a big recruiting ground for the party.

(d) Build up a strong urban revolutionary movement oriented towards people’s war.

Targets of Urban Perspective Plan of CPI (Maoist)

44. The naxals have targeted following sect of the society in urban areas in the recent past :-

(a) Students organisations.

(b) Workers in unorganized sectors.

(c) Tea plantation labourers of Northeast.

(d) Engineers.

(e) Sanitation workers.

(f) Intelligentsia.

(g) Slums in towns and cities.

46. The commonality between mega cities mentioned in Table 1 and the target cities/ areas of urban LWE highlights the thorough study carried out by the naxals before selecting the targets for urban LWE.

Maoist Activities in Urban Areas

47. The following noteworthy activities have taken place in urban areas which clearly indicate the urbanisation of LWE :-

(a) Golden Corridor Area.

(i) Angelo Sontakke alias Sunita Patil, a former teacher, secretary of ‘Golden Corridor Committee’ was arrested in Thane on 25 Apr 2011 [20] .

(ii) CPI (Maoist) PB Member and then Maharashtra State Committee Secretary, Sridhar Krishnan Srinivasan and Vernon Gonsalves, a member of Maharashtra State Committee were arrested in Mumbai on 20 Sep 2009 [21] .

(iii) Seven members of Kabir Kala Manch - a group of students performing cultural activities - were booked by Anti - Terrorism Squad in Apr and May 2011 for spreading naxal ideology [22] .

(iv) 10 -15 hostellers from Chandpur city and slum dwellers from Mumbai were recruited by the naxals [23] .

(v) Arms workshop was busted in Neral, Raigarh district in Mar 2011. This workshop was reported to be supplying arms for urban plan in western belt [24] .

(b) Delhi.

(i) Kobad Ghandy, in charge of South Western Regional Bureau and Sub-Committee on Mass Organisations (SUCOMO), was arrested from New Delhi in Sep 2009 [25] .

(ii) Minister of State for Home, Jitendra Singh told the Rajya Sabha in Aug 2012 that "A number of ‘front organisations’ of the banned CPI-Maoist had organised demonstrations/agitations supporting the cause of the workers of the Maruti factory [26] . Their objective was essentially to exploit the situation to gain a foothold among the working class in the National Capital region (NCR)".

(c) Kolkata [27] .

(i) Kanchan alias Sudip Chongdar, West Bengal State Secretary of CPI (Maoist) was arrested in Dec 2010 from Kolkata.

(ii) State committee leader Telugu Deepak alias Venkateshwar Reddy was arrested in Mar 2010 from Kolkata.

(d) Chennai. Jayant alias Kunal, accused for murder of CPI-ML Jharkhand MLA Mahendra Singh, was arrested from Chennai in Aug 2007 [28] .

(e) Bastar. Ghassu alias Rajberia, president of Jantana Sarkar of Hareli, was arrested from Bastar in Sep 2011 [29] .

48. Main Objectives of CPI (Maoist) in Urban Area. Work in the cities and towns involve a number of tasks. All these tasks can be combined under the following heads or objectives : -

(a) Mobilise and Organise the Masses. This is the main activity of the Party. It is the Party's task to organise the working class, as well as other classes and sections like the semi-proletariat, students, middle class employees, intellectuals, etc. It also has the task of dealing with the problems of special social groups like women, dalits, and religious minorities and mobilizing them for the revolutionary movement.

(b) Build the United Front. This involves the task of unifying the working class, building worker-peasant solidarity and alliance, uniting with other classes in the cities, building the fronts against globalisation, against Hindu fascism, against repression, etc.

(c) Military Tasks. While the PGA and PLA in the countryside perform the main military tasks, the urban movement too performs tasks complementary to the rural armed struggle. These involve the sending of cadre to the countryside, infiltration of enemy ranks, organizing in key industries, sabotage actions in coordination with the rural armed struggle, logistical support, etc.

CHAPTER – IV

FUTURE OF URBAN LWE

The final objective of the revolution is the capture of the cities, the enemy’s main bases, and this objective cannot be achieved without

adequate work in the cities.

Mao Tse Tung

Introduction

49. The Maoists assess that presently, India has a larger proportion of the population in urban areas and a much larger working class than at the time of the Chinese revolution. This increases the relative importance of urban work in the particular conditions of the Indian revolution.

50. It is fairly easy for the Maoists to establish bases in urban areas. As a well-known authority of the Maoist movement, K. Srinivas Reddy said "because of the anonymity it accords, it becomes easy for the Maoists to stay and operate in urban centres". An urban presence serves the Maoists in providing rest and recuperation, catering to their logistics requirements and mobilisation (targeting students, youth and industrial workers).

51. The current trend of naxal activities in urban areas brings out the various types of mass organisations of urban movement. These organisations are:-

(a) Secret Revolutionary Mass Organisations, These organizations remain strictly underground and propagate the Party's revolutionary line among the masses rousing them for armed struggle. They openly call upon the masses to participate in the people's war, propagate the central task drawn up by the Party at any given time, secretly organize the masses into struggles and directly serve as the base for recruitment for the Party and the people's war. They perform the important task of propagating the Party line among various sections of the masses.

(b) Open and Semi-Open Revolutionary Mass Organisations, They openly propagate the politics of New Democratic Revolution and prepare the people for armed struggle.

(c) Open Legal Mass Organisations. They are formed on an explicit political basis with some or all aspects of an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal programme, and with a programme of action and forms of struggle that broadly fall within a legal framework.

Factors Effecting Urban LWE in India

52. The following factors are preventing the spread of LWE in urban areas [30] :-

(a) Parliamentary Democracy. Democratic party-system is well entrenched in the cities and urban areas and hence it is extremely tedious to dent the political ethos in cities and towns.

(b) Governance. Strong administrative machinery precludes the prospects of spreading of urban LWE.

(c) Industrialisation. The trade unions, which are potential fertile regions of fomenting dissatisfaction amongst the urban proletariat; already has established political parties ensconced in.

(d) Infrastructure. The presence of the Maoists in key industries, like defence production, telecommunication, etc is poor.

(e) Over Cautiousness. The failure of urban movement in 1972, during phase I of LWE, has imposed a serious caution in the leadership of LWE.

(f) Deficiency in Leadership. The elimination of leadership in urban areas has caused a setback to the LWE urban movement.

53. The following factors are favouring the spread of LWE in urban areas :-

(a) Urbanisation Pattern of India. The slum areas of urban offer an opportunity of implementing the ‘ghettoisation’ strategy of LWE.

(b) Anonymity. The huge population base of urban areas affords anonymity to the naxals to silently carry out their activities.

(c) Unemployment. The unemployment in India is not only restricted to rural areas, it has spread its tentacles equally in the urban areas, especially with the economic recession since 2008.

(d) Migration. The uncontrolled migration from rural to urban areas has stretched the capacity of cities, leading to corruption and crime, lack of basic amenities cum essential services, which acts as a catalyst to aggravate the conflict situation.

(e) Religious Divide. The naxals may exploit the divide between the Hindus and Muslims to create unrest and propagate their ideology.

(f) Education System. The current education system in India provides an opportunity to naxals for exploiting the student base in promoting their activities.

(g) Support from Jehadi Terrorists. The jehadi terrorists have established bases in urban areas, which can be utilised by the naxals to give impetus to urban LWE.

Likely Strategy of LWE in Urban areas

54. Based on the factors effecting spread of LWE in urban areas, the recently released documents of CPI (Maoist) and study of latest trends, the anticipated strategy of naxals is as under :-

(a) Patient approach and avoidance of direct confrontation with the state forces.

(b) Terror acts in cities are unlike as it will wean away the support of population to LWE.

(c) Secret activites will be carried out to solidifying their bases in the urban areas.

(d) Establish urban bases for supplying spare parts, medicines, arms, recruits and ideologues to the rural guerrilla zones.

(e) Venture into cyber warfare to inflict damages to the state body.

(f) Propaganda through student-worker organisations.

(g) Penetration into white-collar jobs, intelligentsia and youth to sustain urban insurgency.

55. After studying the urbanisation pattern in India, it emerges out that the naxals have to face challenge at all levels to sustain in urban areas. The continuous elimination of CPI (Maoist) leadership from urban areas indicates the infestation of naxals in these areas, however, the timely action by the police, on reliable intelligence, has been able to keep the spread of urban LWE under a check. The present strategy of Government of India to deal with naxalism, has been successful, however, implementation of innovative methods are inescapable for fighting naxalism in the country.

CHAPTER – V

RECOMMENDED STRATEGY TO CONTAIN SPREAD OF LWE

IN URBAN AREAS

Naxalism today afflicts the Central India parts where the bulk of India’s mineral wealth lies and if we don’t control Naxalism we have to say goodbye to our country’s ambitions to sustain growth rate.

- Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, 24 Dec 2010

Introduction

56. Naxal violence has been steadily marking its presence in urban areas despite being a rural phenomenon. However, given the difference in social fabric and socio-economic conditions between rural and urban areas, the naxals are struggling to win dig their heels in the urban areas. Inspite of failure of naxal urbanisation in 1972 and the current problems, their tenacity to penetrate into urban areas is amply clear.

57. There is a need for a proper understanding of the ideology and strategies of the naxalites to develop an adequate response mechanism. Maoist threat needs to be tackled on a high priority basis before it assumes unmanageable proportions. The Government’s holistic approach in dealing with rural LWE - simultaneous addressing of the issues of security, development, rights of local communities, improvement in governance and public perception - has shown positive results in the last year [31] . The government needs to undertake measures to target naxal intellectuals in order to stall their penetration in urban areas. The recommended strategy for containing the spread of LWE is given out in succeeding paragraphs.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Prevention Strategies

58. Strengthening Intelligence. Coordinated effort by centre and state agencies and real time intelligence sharing is a pre-requisite to check spread of LWE in urban areas. The benefits of real time intelligence sharing in anti naxal operations in rural areas are evident from the decline of LWE in the CRZ. Conventional methods of gathering human intelligence (HUMINT) and technical intelligence (TECHINT) may not yield desired results in urban areas. Owing to the global links of CPI (Maoist), regional and international networking of friendly intelligence agencies is a must.

59. The current counter-terrorism structure consists of the Multi Agency Centre (MAC) and Subsidiary Multi Agency Centres (SMAC), National Investigation Agency (NIA) and National Security Guards (NSG). The integration with National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID) and Crime and Criminal Tracking Network System (CCTNS) will further refine the intelligence network in the country [32] .

60. Identification of Perpetrators of LWE. Due to anonymity and high density of population, the urban areas are suitable for insurgency. The activation of mass organisations like trade unions, associations and NGOs by the naxalites is an emerging phenomenon and is required to constantly watched. The leadership and cadre of urban LWE must be identified and kept under vigilance.

61. Target Hardening. The sensitive targets must be put under surveillance and protection. CCTV, metal and explosive detectors and X-ray scanners should be installed throughout the urban area, starting with high incident areas and key facilities. The latest technology to detect suspicious activity and control damage should be put in key places.

62. Community Policing. The urban LWE can be effectively fought by involving the public. This includes creating societal awareness to keep a watchful eye on tentative or errant behavior in the neighbourhood and sharing of information of suspicious movements with the law enforcing agencies.

 

63. Cyber Cells. Highly advanced cyber crime units must be setup to counter the cyber threat emanating from tech-savvy urban naxalites.

64. Empowering Municipal Corporations. The cities are jostling with their own problems of over population, scarce infrastructure, crime and corruption. The naxals have developed wherewithal to exploit these shortcomings and spread their influence. There is a need to improve public services and safety in cities to prevent the naxalites from creating ghettoisation and support their mass organisations.

Deterrence and Operational Strategies

65. Specialised Counter-Insurgency Forces. The success of Greyhounds of Andhra Pradesh in controlling rural naxalism can be replicated with certain changes in urban areas. Every state should have its counter-insurgence commando force, akin to National Security Guard (NSG) at centre. This force must be equipped with state-of-the-art technology and equipment and trained for the specialised tasks.

66. State Police. The law & order subject will always remain with the state government and LWE is presently being classified as a law & order problem. So, state police forces must be equipped and trained to undertake the mantle of effectively combating the threat of urban LWE. Also, the deficiency in police cadre should be filled up at the earliest to improve the police to public ratio in all LWE affected states.

67. Anti-Terror Laws.. National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) is essential to be implemented and LWE activities should be brought under its jurisdiction. At the same time, a seamless integration of NCTC with NIA is equally essential.

68. Lucrative Surrender Policy. A suitably lucrative surrender policy be introduced at centre level for motivating the naxals who have joined the LWE due to compulsions and not the ideological reasons. Rehabilitation of surrendered naxals must be carried out after imparting suitable capacity skills to them.

Development Strategies

69. Development of Urban and Rural Areas. To alleviate the inherent shortcomings of the mega cities, the development activities of the cities must be taken up on priority. The expansion of cities to accommodate the migrants will also ease out the pressure from core of the cities. The rural areas be developed alongside to prevent exodus of population towards cities in search of the employment and educational opportunities. New sub-urban areas may be created in the vicinity of rural areas to relieve the mega cities of accommodating people beyond its capability.

70. Education. Higher education facilities must be created at tehsil/ block level. Focus on skill development education must be diverted for enabling the youth and middle aged in starting small scale industries. Special higher education loans be sanctioned for naxal hit areas.

71. Employment. The educated unemployed youth are most vulnerable for recruitment in naxal organisations. Generation of jobs through NREGA has truly affected a lot of lives, however, it is still insufficient. Involvement of men and women in local industries and setting up of new industries in rural belts will engage the youth.

72. IAP. The efficient implementation of flagship programmes under IAP will demonstrate the ‘Will of government" towards successful implementation of its plans and solidify peoples’ faith in the governance.

CHAPTER - VI

CONCLUSION

Ideologically, though the epicenter of the left wing extremism for the most part is rural, it is the urban intelligentsia that provides legitimacy, authority

and moral force to an otherwise defeatist ideology.

Rabindra Ray

73. The LWE in India is an outcome of socio-economic repression of a segment of rural society, however, the emerging face of LWE shows its presence in urban areas. The existence and characteristics of urban areas of India do not augur with the conditions desirable for sprouting of such a movement. The urban population mainly consists of people migrated from rural areas in the quest of employment and higher studies. These people barely have an intention to venture into anything other than their own agendas. So, where does the naxal ideology finds its targets? LWE doesn’t find the targets but creates its targets from the oppressed, poorly/ under unemployed and the tender minded youth in urban areas.

74. Urban insurgency has adversely affected the countries across the globe like Peru, Venezuela, Nepal, Chechnya and most recently Iraq. The internal turmoil affects the social security, economic prosperity, international standing and overall growth of the nation. The situation of LWE in rural India is a matter of serious concern, however, the LWE malaise can be controlled in next seven to ten years provided the current approach of Government of India - security and development - is vigorously followed alongwith concerted efforts of individual states. Capacity building to check the current violence will also be start point in preventing the spread of LWE to other areas.

75. The infestation of naxals in urban areas is an indication of desperation of naxalites to divert the attention of security agencies and give LWE a new dimension. The success of Maoism in China cannot be templated to India due to the difference in style of governance, mindset of Indian population and the prevalence of other insurgencies in India.

76. Global linkages of Indian Maoists have given the LWE much desired visibility and propaganda in the international arena. Also, the links with terrorists groups of Jammu & Kashmir and Northeast might change the philosophy of LWE in urban areas. The internal security of India largely hinges on the way LWE is handled in the next few years.

77. Future studies on linkages - external and internal - of naxalites may be undertaken to bring out the efficacy of current counte- naxal strategy of Government of India and recommend changes and additional measures for a successful counter- naxal strategy for India.