Competing And Complimentary Disciplines

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02 Nov 2017

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Competing and Complimentary Disciplines

A Study By

Brandon J Tamplain

Technical Intelligence and Human Intelligence are equally important aspects of the United States’ intelligence collection efforts which have always been at odds with one another in the intelligence community. In this paper I will discuss how the US has historically treated these two disciplines and the standing of each prior to the events of September 11th 2001. I will also discuss the changes to TECHINT and HUMINT in the wake of 9/11, specifically how it influenced the increased use of UAVs and drove the recruitment of human assets.

To start we need to define TECHINT and HUMINT. TECHINT covers the disciplines of SIGINT (Signals Intelligence), GEOINT (Geospatial Intelligence), and MASINT (Measurment and Signals Intelligence) and is conducted via manned and unmanned collection platforms and via satellites. HUMINT is Human Intelligence or espionage. HUMINT largely involves sending clandestine service officers to foreign countries where they attempt to recruit foreign nationals to spy (Lowenthal, 2012).

According to Jan P. Herring (1993) "Purpose is the essence of all effective intelligence operations." Among the basic forms of Intelligence - that is, military, political, economic, etc. - scientific and technical (S&T) intelligence takes a dominant, special role, since it is often supporting each of the other types. Military intelligence specifically, requires good S&T intelligence to gain a better understanding of an enemy's developing weapons abilities. Political or diplomatic intelligence however, often utilizes S&T intelligence to improve a policy maker’s bargaining position, as was done in the strategic arms limitation treaties. Herring further states, "economic or business intelligence is dependent on an understanding of a competitor's technological capabilities to create economic or competitive advantage."

Many scientific and technological advancements have had near synchronous applications in the areas of intelligence and military purpose, the most current being microelectronics and space satellites. One of the first uses of hot air balloons was as a military reconnaissance platform. This method of reconnaissance was perfected during the American Civil War when the combination of photography and the balloon, delivered the capability for the first use of aerial photography for military purposes (Herring, 1993).

There were rapid developments during the 1800s of scientific and technical intelligence, which were contingent upon the collection and assimilation of foreign technologies. The United States textile industry was created from the acquisition and exchange of technical intelligence to the United States from England. Andrew Carnegie reportedly stated that he could not have created his steel industry here in America without the technological intelligence he gathered in Europe. In both cases, technical intelligence was utilized, but the intention was industrial development (Herring, 1993).

World War II saw substantial advancements in the disciplines of scientific and technical intelligence, both collection tools and as the subject of intelligence gathering. According to Herring, "R. V. Jones, Winston Churchill's young scientific intelligence officer, broke new ground when using electronic means to collect information and photographic interpretation to unravel Germany's secret weapon developments." Jones' depiction of a "scientific intelligence service" distinctly outlines both the basis and the operational model for modern scientific intelligence activities. He states, "The primary problem of a Scientific Intelligence Service is to obtain early warning of the adoption of new weapons and methods by potential or actual enemies." He goes on to assess the stages and basic objectives of the adversaries R&D program and postulates how "one must reverse engineer intelligence operations to gather the intelligence and derive insight and, thus, the early warning needed to prevent the organization from being surprised" (Herring, 1993).

Since the early establishment of U.S. collection agencies, the U.S. has excelled at technical collection efforts. According to Kevin M. O’Connell (2004), "aside from what technical intelligence programs can do is the issue of how to undertake them. Historically, what made them successful were an unwavering focus on the conceptualization and development of new capabilities, an emphasis on risk-taking, dedicated and flexible investment, and the nurturing of human capital or people with critical technical talent. Well beyond today’s headlines lie these critical management challenges." According to the National Air and Space Intelligence Center History, "the creation of T-2 Intelligence under Air Mobility Command at Wright Field in July 1945 firmly cemented the move toward a balanced combination of engineering and intelligence. T-2 generated air intelligence; identified foreign aircraft and related equipment needed for study; received, translated, and distributed foreign language documents; and distributed air intelligence products (NASIC History)." To create a more streamlined technical intelligence effort, the Central Air Documents Office (CADO) separated from the organization and became a standalone unit on 1 June 1949. Today this unit is today known as the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC). It continues to publish the Technical Data Digest and provide vital technical information, including published scientific and technical articles dealing with aeronautics, and articles written by US government researchers (A History of NASIC).

On 21 May 51, the Air Force established the Air Technical Intelligence Center (ATIC) at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base as a field activity of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. The 1950s were the backdrop that ATIC conducted vital S&T intelligence analysis against for the United States. The Korean War provided ATIC with its first significant instance in which it was able to directly influence military strategies. ATIC analyzed data on the performance characteristics of Russian aircraft in theater. They also developed charts depicting the combat radius of the MiG-15. It provided this information to the Far East Air Force (FEAF). This information permitted FEAF to efficiently develop engagement tactics for its F-86 fighters. ATIC also analyzed captured Russian Ilyushin and Yakolev planes and studied the MiG-15 that defected after the war (NASIC History).

All through the ‘50s, ATIC analysts developed using computers to conduct aircraft analysis. As more personnel were assigned to ATIC, there was an increasing need to build a facility to house the unit. On 18 July 1956, General Watson and ATIC held a ground breaking ceremony for a 100,000 square-foot complex, Building 828. This building would house not only office space, but also the READIX, the Center's first computer (NASIC History).

Immediately after the launch of Sputnik in October 1957, there was an increased emphasis on space analysis. In 1959, the Air Force renamed ATIC in recognition of the importance of the space-based mission. The unit became the "Aerospace" Technical Intelligence Center. Additionally in 1959, ATIC began to study Chinese trends in offensive missiles and space vehicles according to the NASIC History. During this time period, the Center made important advancements to the development of automated and technical systems. Partnering with American industries, ATIC drove the development of automated performance analysis techniques and laid the groundwork for the machine translation of foreign language documents within the Department of Defense. ATIC engineers and scientists also spearheaded the development of sensor, photographic, and reconnaissance systems (NASIC History).

When the Air Force created the Foreign Technology Division (FTD) under the new Air Force Systems Command in July 1961, it gained a formal organization to handle its S&T intelligence mission for the next thirty years according to the NASIC History. Additionally, FTD’s investigation into new foreign technology would provide a yardstick for American research and development to be measured against. By 1961, FTD had automated the process for analyzing photographs. It gained the ability to produce invaluable intelligence on foreign aerodynamic, ballistic missile, and space vehicle systems in 1963. That same year, it developed an automated database as a digital library of scientific and technical information from multiple sources, available for instant retrieval. In the 1970s FTD acquired capabilities in human intelligence targeting, and laser signal analysis. It consolidated all scientific and technical databases into a single, comprehensive scientific and technical database. The use of automated microfilm storage, retrieval, and display equipment improved accessibility to document, processing, retrieval, and dissemination. (NASIC History)

The initials "FTD" are how many people still refer to the scientific and technical intelligence mission at Wright-Patterson. For 30 years the center kept the same name, yet the reputation grew. FTD personnel became known throughout the Air Force and the intelligence community as the experts in Soviet aircraft, missiles, space systems and related equipment performance. The "official" lineage of NASIC started with the establishment of FTD in 1961. From 1961 to 1991, the Foreign Technology Division was the Air Force's Scientific and Technical Intelligence (S&TI) center of excellence for foreign air, space and ballistic missile systems. (NASIC History)

Today, the U.S. government continues to make great use of scientific and technical intelligence. In addition to being a target of and a tool for intelligence operations, technology has greatly enhanced the analysis and support of intelligence operations themselves. From U2s to satellites, the collection of advanced scientific and technical information has grown. While technology supports all aspects of intelligence, it dominates the collection function through its role in SIGINT, IMINT, MASINT, and even the more recent construct of geospatial intelligence, or GEOINT, which is the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict geographically referenced physical features and activities on Earth in support of national security information needs. These capabilities are sometimes described collectively as technical intelligence sources, or TECHINT. From the exploitation of the electromagnetic spectrum to sensing and identifying unique elements (such as radionucleides), phenomena (such as terrain data), and signatures (such as temperatures or reflectants of certain metals or gases), technical collection helps create important raw inputs to U.S. intelligence. The combination of sensor technology and platform development—satellites, aircraft, and UAV—allows creative combinations for effective collection against our adversaries. (O’Connell, 2004)

General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc.'s Predator drones were introduced to combat in the mid-1990s and deployed in the U.S.'s 1999 Kosovo air campaign for surveillance and reconnaissance. Predators (which have a 20-meter wingspan) were first used in Afghanistan in October 2001 to provide intelligence and a strike capability to Operation Enduring Freedom, the official name used by the U.S. government for the war in Afghanistan. A CIA-controlled Predator drone firing a Hellfire missile killed six suspected al Qaeda terrorists in Yemen on November 3, 2002—the first use of an armed Predator as an attack aircraft outside of a theater of war such as Afghanistan. (Greenemeier, 2011)

The Air Force's large-scale RPA deployment began after 9/11; it had a single RPA in operation in 2001. The Air Force now operates at least four different models of medium-sized or large unmanned aircraft. In addition to its 175 Predators, there are 14 jet-powered Northrop Grumman RQ-4 Global Hawks, the largest RPAs in the Air Force's fleet with wingspans of 35 to 40 meters. About 40 turboprop-powered General Atomics MQ-9 Reapers (a larger version of the Predator) were supposed to be entering the fleet this year. The Air Force also uses the Lockheed Martin RQ-170 Sentinel, a "stealthy reconnaissance aircraft whose existence has only recently been acknowledged by the Air Force," the CBO reports. (Greenemeier, 2011)

Last year, for the first time in its history, the Air Force trained more RPA pilots than fixed-wing pilots. RPAs are often equipped with full-motion cameras, infrared cameras to provide night vision, signals intelligence sensors to eavesdrop on communications and a variety of other sensors. In addition to a pilot, each RPA has a sensor operator who directs the cameras and signals sensors during a mission. All of this information is fed to a system of "exploiters," Air Force personnel who analyze all of that streaming video and other signal intelligence coming in and feed information as needed back to the pilot and sensor operator. Other branches of the military, as well as the CIA, have also come to rely heavily on drones. (Greenemeier, 2011)

On the flipside of the coin however, the United States has a less than sterling track record when it comes to dealing with Human Intelligence. From the disastrous Bay of Pigs Invasion, to the Iranian Revolution, from the Pearl Harbor surprise attack to Iran-Contra scandal, the U.S. Intelligence Community has displayed an appalling ineptitude when dealing with HUMINT centric intelligence efforts.

The Central Intelligence Agency is the "first among equals" in the intelligence community and deserves particularly close independent scrutiny. One of the starkest lessons to be gleaned from looking at past CIA performance is that it has consistently failed to produce top-quality human intelligence against the greatest threats to the United States. (Intelligence Failures, 2004)

CIA suffers from a ponderous bureaucratic structure that makes it sluggish in response to events, impedes intellectual and analytic initiative, and diverts resources from nurturing and keeping analytic talent. The analytic side of the agency, the Directorate of Intelligence (DI), made a failed effort in 1996 to flatten the hierarchy. The well-intentioned effort to cut managerial levels in order to free up resources to devote to analytic talent was predictably suffocated by entrenched bureaucratic interests. Today, a working-level analyst is separated from the director of central intelligence (DCI) by about eight bureaucratic rungs. This is a far cry from the flat and flexible organizational charts of companies that thrive in the information technology era. (Intelligence Failures, 2004)

Analysis moves painstakingly slowly through the bureaucratic structure, and iconoclastic views that challenge conventional wisdom are very likely to have their edges substantially smoothed in the laborious review process. Analysts suffer considerable frustration. Their charge is to write analyses for the senior levels of the national security policymaking community. Even uncontroversial analysis suffers from pronounced dumbing-down effects as it passes up and through the chain of command. More often than not, policymakers are substantially more conversant with international issues than CIA managers, who in the review act more as overpaid editors — without the technical expertise of professional editors — to make analysis more understandable for themselves rather than the far more expert consumers in the policy community. (Intelligence Failures, 2004)

The production of intelligence analysis takes the form of an inverted pyramid. One or a few junior analysts, for example, might draft a piece of intelligence analysis. It then passes through a chain of command loaded with GS-15 and Senior Intelligence Service (SIS) managers, who typically impose more stylistic than substantive changes. The piece of analysis then passes to a current intelligence staff stuffed with GS-15 or higher individuals, who further massage the analysis into stale and boring prose before publication in the President’s Daily Brief or the more widely disseminated Senior Executive Intelligence Brief. (Intelligence Failures, 2004)

The President’s Daily Brief travels with CIA briefers downtown each workday morning to be read by the president and his key national security policy advisers, including the vice president, the national security adviser, the secretaries of defense and state, and the chairman and vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On some occasions, the DCI may lead the president’s briefing team. The direct and personal provision of intelligence to the commander-in-chief gives CIA the lead for strategic intelligence in the community. The CIA briefing teams are able to learn first-hand the policy concerns and intelligence interests of key policy players. The policymakers, in turn, are able to ask questions about raw intelligence reports and multi-source analyses as well as task CIA for follow-up or new analyses. (Intelligence Failures, 2004)

CIA briefers return from policy community runs to Langley each morning with tasking in hand. Unfortunately for analysts, that tasking slowly and laboriously flows down the chain of command, reaching them only late in the day. In many instances, analysts may be able to write a piece of analysis in relatively short order, only to be confronted with the time-consuming and cumbersome internal bureaucratic process. The wisest and most seasoned analysts opt to wait for managers to go home for the evening before drafting an analysis in order to avoid several rungs of review by the agency managers. (Intelligence Failures, 2004)

The agency today operates on a top-down organizational model rather than the bottom-up model that succeeds in the private information-technology sector. Agency analytic managers frequently push down orders for intelligence analyses. Such orders often force analysts to produce analyses whether or not there is a critical mass of classified intelligence that fills knowledge gaps in publicly available information and assessments for policymakers. The analysis produced by this top-down approach often strikes policymaker consumers as shoddy, incompetent, or simply inconsequential. It is no wonder that the 1996 Brown Commission found that "Often what they [policymakers] receive fails to meet their needs by being too late or too unfocused, or by adding little to what they already know." (Intelligence Failures, 2004)

This top-down cultural ethos has grown stronger over the years, in part because the agency does poorly in training, nurturing, and retaining experts. As the working-level analytic workforce becomes younger and more inexperienced, the aging ranks of agency managers are increasingly insecure about the quality, timeliness, and policy relevance of analysis. They compensate by micromanaging the production cycle. Micromanagement, in turn, discourages analysts and stifles intellectual innovation among inexperienced and more seasoned analysts alike. (Intelligence Failures, 2004)

Now that I’ve discussed the history behind TECHINT and HUMINT, let’s take a look at their status prior to 9/11, and how that contributed to the attacks on that day. Technical Intelligence often provides information that, in the face of an overall poor understanding of an issue or problem, has high potential to be misunderstood or misinterpreted. While America’s SIGINT function took great advantage of the architectural stability and predictability of global communications in the 1970s, it has, for the past decade, struggled to keep up with the explosive rate of change in communications technologies and methods. There is not only an exponentially greater volume in communications, but also a much greater diversity in the types and methods used to secure them. Similar conditions are emerging in the GEOINT arena, as commercial sources of imagery and mapping data proliferate in the context of a rapidly changing environment for geographic information systems (such as maps and geo-rectified data bases). Historically, access to technically sophisticated sources of intelligence was tightly controlled and handled on a need-to-know basis. A premium was placed on protecting intelligence sources and methods. (O’Connell, 2004) Before September 11, 2001 collectors worked independently in separate stovepipes. Intelligence collection was operated independently from other collectors. It included completely distinct processing systems and usually unique exploitation, dissemination and receiving systems as well, which resulted in inconsistencies and data reproductions. The duplication of effort lead to time consuming analysis and rendered the received intelligence ineffective. An imbalance existed between collection and processing capabilities. The Intelligence Community was, and still is, unwilling to make cross-program, cross INTEL budget tradeoffs, while budget priorities are not given by the end user. This led to an intelligence failure caused by lack of funds.

When Rick Ames was arrested by the FBI on February 21, 1994, it had a major impact on the CIA. The lapse in internal security that allowed Ames to perpetrate his crimes would prove significantly detrimental to HUMINT efforts for years to come. One of the first actions was the turnover of CIA counterespionage efforts to the FBI, which would prove to be almost as detrimental to the agency as Ames. (Baer, 2002)

The ax-man the FBI appointed to gut the CIA was Ed Curran. His first act was to fire all the analysts who served as the CIA’s knowledge base on Soviet espionage. Next he reopened every unresolved counterintelligence case in the CIA’s books. He didn’t care if an employee was retired or had transferred to a new non-sensitive job, his intention was to spread fear and paranoia throughout the CIA, which he accomplished quite successfully. (Baer, 2002)

A casual friendship struck up on a foreign vacation became a suspicious contact which resulted in a polygraph. Anxiety became stress which resulted in a failed test. Soon Curran had a "new case," and as the witch hunt continued, cases mounted to the ceiling. Being under an active FBI investigation, regardless of the quality of the evidence, meant no promotions, no overseas assignments, no sensitive clearances. By late 1995 more than three hundred agents were under suspicion, not to mention the CIA employees terrified they would be caught up in the bloodbath through no fault of their own. (Baer, 2002)

Ed Curran’s purge of the CIA had the predictable effect of making more risk averse than it had already become. Agents weren’t just scared to meet foreigners on their vacations, they were afraid to meet them professionally as well. No one was meeting anyone. There were no requests for approval of new agents, no contact reports. All over the Islamic world, cells were forming, ancient grudges were boiling to new surfaces, the west was being targeted for destruction, and we didn’t have a real ear to the ground anywhere. (Baer, 2002)

Worst of all, the CIA had seemed to have stopped caring about its own people, especially agents taking the greatest risks. One instance in 1996 a CIA surveillance team in Sarajevo was fired upon during an attempted car-jacking. The branch chief responsible for Bosnia had spent two years in South America doing administrative work and knew nothing about Bosnia. Worse, she had refused to make a familiarization trip to Sarajevo and didn’t speak Serbo-Croatian. The most damning was that she suggested the couple be subjected to a Personnel Evaluation Board and reprimanded for not giving up their car. Politics had seeped into the lowest levels of the CIA, into operations. The agency had become an ocean liner; turning it would take decades, assuming its management wanted to change course. (Baer, 2002)

Is it any wonder that with the intelligence services being in such disarray that we failed to connect the dots prior to 9/11. The good news is that despite these intelligence short comings, these situations can be rectified. Today, various technologies create the means for governments,

intelligence services, and even individuals to gather and interpret information about others that was historically held only in the coffers of intelligence services in Washington and Moscow. (O’Connell, 2004)

Because of the information and communications revolution, access to this information is often exceptionally fast and relatively inexpensive. Beyond the realm of sophisticated technical intelligence systems, an entire slate of commercial technologies has both explicit and implicit utility as a tool of surveillance and intelligence. Modern cities are replete with video surveillance, for example, and the prevalence of GPS embedded in navigational and other technologies is designed to help one find out where he or she is. Other modern conveniences, such as credit cards, Internet portal access, electronic toll paying, electronic car safety, and security systems not only help pinpoint people’s location but also identify many of their habits. Although strong concerns certainly exist within the American public about the intelligence community’s access to and use of these data, they are clearly of potential value as intelligence sources. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s Total Information Awareness (later Terrorism Information Awareness) program, for example, was envisioned as arraying these and other data sets in the hopes of identifying anomalies and improving efficiency in the use of existing intelligence information about suspected terrorists. (O’Connell, 2004)

Technology also assists in conducting intelligence analysis by helping analysts sort, manage, highlight, and share data. Modern computing and communications capabilities allow for the use of complex models, such as exploratory modeling and social network analysis to understand multilayered relationships among people, events, and technologies. Within the realm of intelligence sharing, technology provides the foundation for expanded collaboration among analysts from diverse disciplines, agencies, and geographic locations, usually focused on a specific problem, like the activities of a terrorist cell or the status of the North Korean nuclear program. Data storage, communications, collaboration tools, and data mining technologies are of particular importance. (O’Connell, 2004)

To fix the CIA, they have to start listening to people again, no matter how unpleasant the message is. They have to go out into the world once again and start talking to people, people who can go where it can’t, see what it can’t, and hear what it can’t. (Baer, 2002) HUMINT therefore remains an important element of intelligence gathering. It is essential that intelligence services maintain a physical presence in the regions that tend to provide access or safe-havens to terrorist organizations. In addition, third party services are an important source of information, although they must be evaluated carefully due to inherent biases associated with these types of sources. Iraq is a good example of the importance of physical presence as well as the problems associated with third party intelligence. (Lewis, 2004) The CIA needed today is one with the guts to walk into the wilderness and deal with what it finds there, one with thousands of human eyes and ears, out listening where the ones who will do us harm hatch their evil schemes. (Baer, 2002) The CIA needs to be able to utilize the information gleaned from TECHINT sources by having the HUMINT sources to be able to verify and exploit the intelligence provided. Conversely sources and intelligence developed by HUMINT assets needs to be able to be verified and expanded upon by TECHINT assets such as UAVs, manned collection platforms, and satellites for the most coherent intelligence picture.

Although HUMINT has numerous shortfalls, it still remains one of the most valuable ways of dealing with terrorist organizations. The United States must overcome its inherent dislike for clandestine operations and provide sufficient funding and authority to actively pursue more effective and reliable means of HUMINT collection. The world of international terrorism does not project a black and white image. The counter-terrorism efforts require viewing the responses in shades of gray, where intelligence resources must work together to piece the puzzle of potential attacks together to best respond and hopefully thwart, or at least mitigate, the efforts of terrorist groups. (Lewis, 2004)

Lowenthal, M. (2012). Intelligence: From secrets to policy . (fifth ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press.

Herring, J. (1993, June). Creating Successful Scientific and Technical Intelligence Programs Retrieved from http://www.cuaed.unam.mx/puel_cursos/cursos/d_gcfe_m_tres/modulo/modulo_3/modulo3/creatingsuccessfulscientificandtechnicalintelligence.pdf

O'Connell, K. (2004). The role of science and technology in transforming american intelligence. Retrieved from http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/0817946624_139.pdf

National air and space intelligence center history. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.afisr.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-120627-049.pdf

Air technical intelligence center and the soviet threat. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.nasicaa.org/chapter02.pdf

Greenemeier, L. (2011, Sept 03). The drone wars: 9/11 inspired advances in robotic combat. Retrieved from http://www.livescience.com/15908-drone-wars-september-11-anniversary.html

Policy Review. (2004, Febr 04). Intelligence failures: The wrong model for the war on terror. Retrieved from http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/7217

Baer, R. (2002). See no evil, the true story of a ground soldier in the cia's war on terrorism. New York, New York: Crown Publishing.

Lewis, R. (2004). Espionage and the war on terrorism: Investigating u.s. efforts. Retrieved from http://www.watsoninstitute.org/bjwa/archive/11.1/Espionage/Lewis.pdf



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