Chinese Conquerors And French Imperialists

Published Date: 02 Nov 2017

The history of Vietnam is one of struggles against foreign oppressors, the most prominent of which are undoubtedly the Chinese. For approximately a thousand years the Vietnamese attempted to oust their Chinese conquerors and later French imperialists as well as Japanese militarists. It became a constant struggle for liberation and independence. An ardent nationalist arose named Nguyen Ai Quoc, who organized guerrilla warfare against the French and Japanese, became the leader of the Vietnamese Communist Party in 1930, and established the Vietnamese Independent League in 1941. As a result of the Geneva conference of 1954, North and South Vietnam was divided along the 17th parallel, governed by communist Ho Chi Minh, who was actually none other than the patriot Nguyen Ai Quoc, and Catholic Ngo Dinh Diem respectively. The United States, fearing the domino effect in which any country that fell to communism would trigger a chain reaction, supported the Diem regime of South Vietnam, despite its unpopularity if not lack of support by the Vietnamese countryside peasants (Worth). Ho Chi Minh, however, had won the hearts of many Vietnamese in his participation in the emancipation of Vietnam from French rule in the First Indochina War and was seen as first and foremost a nationalist and secondly a communist. The Geneva Accords also called for a "general election" to be held in two years time; however, Diem refused this agreement, provoking the Vietnamese communists who had yearned to unite the two Vietnams under their rule (Hoyt). The Vietminh or Vietcong (VC), a Communist guerrilla force that operated in the South, soon proved immensely troublesome for the Diem government. Although they lacked technological superiority such as U.S. tanks, artillery, and planes, the Vietcong guerrilla tactics of attacking with mortars and guns and concealing themselves in jungles and tunnels proved effective against U.S. troops that were confused and unaccustomed to this unconventional form of warfare (Englar). Fully utilizing the Ho Chi Minh Trail, a series of jungle roads that winded along neighboring Laos and Cambodia, the North Vietnamese supplied the Vietminh with supplies of food and ammunition in an attempt to weaken the South and achieve what they believed was a completely justified reunification of North and South Vietnam that the majority of Vietnamese people desired (Worth).

In general, American involvement in the Vietnam War can be summarized as a democratic crusade that turned into a foreign challenge and eventually in the eyes of many Americans a financial and political burden (Hoyt). Pham Van Dong, an aide and successor to Ho Chi Minh, noted that "Americans do not like long, inconclusive wars" and thus North Vietnam was bound to win (Oberdorfer). By 1967, although more than 400,000 American troops were committed to the war, it seemed to reach a stalemate; consequently, North Vietnamese leaders met in Hanoi in July of 1967 and planned a bold offensive that would tip the scales in their favor. The subsequent Tet Offensive, a massive surprise VC and North Vietnamese military campaign primarily planned by the North Vietnamese general Vo Nguyen Giap that targeted more than a hundred southern Vietnamese cities and villages, achieved that goal and then some as it resulted a drastic change in American foreign intervention and public sentiment as well as fear in South Vietnamese civilians (Hoyt).

Weeks before the decisive series of military attacks, the VC had commenced their infiltration of cities arming themselves with the increased supplies of ammunition sent by way of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Although they tried to keep the operations covert and clandestine, the U.S. did intercept enemy tapes and orders; nevertheless, U.S. advisers refused to believe that North Vietnam had such military capability and discounted the information gathered. They underestimated the military prowess of the North Vietnamese (Worth).

Usually during Tet, Lunar New Year celebrations and festivities among the Vietnamese people that occur at the end of January, troops would call a temporary two-day cease fire in which no attacks were supposed to take place, and both sides did; nonetheless, Tet in North Vietnam was inconspicuously moved one day earlier in preparations for the deceptive Tet Offensive of 1968 (Worth).

About a week before the actual offensive, the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) actually launched an attack on U.S. marines at Khe Sanh on the 21st of January. The battling would continue for a relatively longer period all the way to mid-March when the communist threat ended. Khe Sanh was near the DMZ, demilitarized zone, and was crucial to the Allied command of northern provinces in South Vietnam. There were two possible motives for the attack on Khe Sanh. Either the North Vietnamese were truly devoted to seize the position or they used it as a diversion to distract American forces from the subsequent attacks on South Vietnamese cities. American commander General William C. Westmoreland had always held a firm belief that the NVA would heavily target Khe Sanh, even so far as to believe that NVA and VC attacks on Saigon, the capital of South Vietnam, were diversions. Throughout the course of the war, Khe Sanh's defense had been often improved with the addition of another base and cement bunkers as well as the installation of rocket launchers and mortars. From the start, the NVA was successful in overrunning and closing off Route 9, a major supply route for the Americans, forcing them to resort to transport planes that flew perilously under communist artillery shells and mortar through the airfields to deliver supplies. The NVA tried to secure strategic positions such as Hill 861A and Hill 64 but were usually held off. From February 21st to the 23rd, the Khe Sanh base was heavily bombarded by the NVA; regardless, the Americans gained the upper hand when they decided to release B-52 bombers, considerably reducing the communist troop strength in the trenches just outside of Khe Sanh (Worth). Carrying more than 50,000 pounds of bombs per B-52 bomber, the heavy bombardment killed thousands of NVA soldiers. Having held the Khe Sanh base for 77 days, the U.S. had garnered an impressive and important military victory (Englar).

One of the more significant parts of the Tet Offensive was the attack on the southern capital of Saigon. It was initiated with a coordinated attack of 100,000 communist troops. Because of Tet, Saigon was not entirely protected as as many as half of the the Army of the Republic of (South) Vietnam (ARVN) had taken leave (Worth). The combined NVA and VC forces targeted among others the Saigon presidential palace, provincial headquarters, secret police headquarters, radio stations, and the U.S. foreign embassy, many of which they managed to occupy but could not hold (Hoyt). During the attack on the U.S. embassy, a rocket managed to kill to kill two U.S. military police; nevertheless, the marines in the lobby stood their ground and were eventually strengthened by the 101st Airborne Division, which killed the remaining VC around the vicinity. The Saigon radio station was also briefly controlled by the VC, but the communication wires had already been cut, preventing the VC from spreading propaganda to cause a general uprising by the South Vietnamese civilians. In conjunction with the attack on Saigon, Tan Son Nhut airbase, the headquarters for U.S. military forces, was also attacked in an effort to restrict American troops from reinforcing those in Saigon. The communists there were soon defeated by the ARVN Eighth Airborne Battalion and the American 25th Infantry Division. The VC attacks on cities were utterly unsuccessful militarily (Worth).

Another important area where the communists launched an attack was Hue, another strategic area sixty miles south of the DMZ. Lieutenant General Ngo Quang Truong, commander of the First Division of the ARVN was given the task of defending Hue. On January 31st, the second day of the Tet Offensive, communist forces attacked the Hue citadel with rocket fire, forcing General Truong into a defensive position and taking the southern half of Hue. Thereafter, they constructed a new political regime, searching and murdering 3,000 civilians. Many victims were later discovered buried in mass graves. As ARVN reinforcement units arrived, General Truong initiated a counterattack. Other reinforcements slowly but surely regained territory as they engaged in house-to-house fighting. By February 10th, southern Hue was retaken and by February 24th, everything was reclaimed, including the Hue Imperial Palace. The victory at the Battle of Hue is often attributed to both the First Division's direction of operations inside the citadel while refusing to surrender to the communists and the U.S. marines clearing southern Hue and their successive attack on the communists in the citadel. In the end, 5,000 of the NVA and VC were killed in contrast to only 200 U.S. troops and 400 ARVN troops killed (Worth). There were indeed also "mini-Tet offensives that occurred in May and August of the same year; however, they were much less effective and of little impact (Hoyt).

Significance

Militarily, the Tet Offensive was disastrous for the North Vietnamese who suffered immensely heavier casualties and from a weakening of the VC; nonetheless, psychologically and politically, the Tet Offensive amounted major victories. Fear was instilled into the hearts of the South Vietnamese as the communists were able to infiltrate even the southernmost Vietnamese cities (Worth). The optimistic U.S. government had falsely claimed that the war effort was in fact being won. President Lyndon B. Johnson's optimistic yet disillusioned administration was contradicted by the major Tet Offensive launched by North Vietnam ("Tet Offensive"). Vietnam being America's first television war did more harm than good. Portraying the war's awfulness and endlessness, the media transformed into an instrumental force in shaping American views against the war. All the more, the American public had accepted the stories and statistics offered to them until their perceptions were shattered as they witnessed and heard more violent reports of the fighting in Vietnam and the actual military capacity of North Vietnam. The credibility of the Johnson administration suffered tremendously as more and more Americans began to distrust Johnson and rally in peace protests against the war. American strategy changed after the Tet Offensive as they came to realize that the war could not be won. Instead of sending more troops to Vietnam, efforts were shifted to concentrate on peace talks and the slow withdrawal of U.S. troops for the next five years, an extremely bitter pill that Johnson had to swallow as he had intended not to withdraw nor lose the war. The American public reasoned that if they could not flat out win the war, then they should get out. In his momentous speech on March 31, 1968, Johnson spoke of trying to achieve peace in Vietnam, only using aircraft and naval attacks north of the demilitarized zone where it was evident that there was an enemy buildup of troops. L.B.J. ended with hopes for peace and declaring that he would not accept another term as president. The Tet Offensive represented a turning point in the deadlocked war. A developing group of advisers including some of his "wise men" had changed L.B.J.'s mindset towards the Vietnam War and the process of deescalation and disengagement of U.S. troops had begun. In mid-May of 1968, North Vietnamese diplomats arrived in Paris for peace talks. Ironically, the U.S. had won the battles but lost the war as their high-tech advantage lost out to the passionate national will of the communists. Essentially, direct U.S. intervention in the Vietnam War was to end, signaling an eventual Communist regime in Vietnam (Hoyt).

What if #1

If the Tet Offensive did not occur, American opposition to the Vietnam War would not have mounted to such a powerful force as it did. Pressure to withdraw U.S. troops from the war definitely arose from opposition to the war on the American home front, not from any heavy military losses in Vietnam. Peace candidates such as Democratic Senator Eugene McCarthy would not have arisen, or at least would not have a strong, viable platform with which to run for the presidency. Republican Richard Nixon, therefore, might not have won the presidential election either, and his policy of Vietnamization might not have been enacted. It is, nonetheless, true that the Americans might still not have the support of the Vietnamese people; however, many believed that the North Vietnamese populace was also on the verge of surrender, so it is a possibility that the U.S. might have been able to maintain its military position in Vietnam long enough to force the North to surrender or at least set up more agreeable peace conditions. The absolute distortion of U.S. victory to defeat in the Tet Offensive would also not have occurred. North Vietnam, then, would not benefit from the propaganda benefits of the Tet Offensive, thus, further weakening its citizens' morale and culminating in a U.S. victory and a Democratic government installed in Vietnam. Even today, we see that Vietnam is to many people a weak, corrupt Communist nation that is standing on its hind legs. Other global powers have recognized the deprivation of civil liberties such as those to peacefully assemble and to free speech in Vietnam by the police. The communists had luckily received unforeseen indirect aid from the American media, enough to perhaps have tipped the scales in their favor.

What if #2

If John F. Kennedy had not been assassinated, American foreign policy and involvement in the Vietnam War would have been a lot different. Assuredly, Kennedy had a better grasp of the Vietnam situation. He understood that the war was not for the United States to win or lose but for the South Vietnamese people to rise up or be subdued. He comprehended that there was virtually nothing that could have replaced the necessary national will of the Vietnamese people to win the war. Accordingly, Kennedy would not have been so rash or bold as to have as many American troops over to Vietnam or at least use them for an alternative purpose aside from directly fighting with the North Vietnamese Army or the Vietcong. He might have put more emphasis on the South Vietnamese government leadership of Ngo Dinh Diem. Diem's administration was perhaps corrupted by a select few family members that he had decided to trust such as his younger brother Ngo Dinh Nhu; nevertheless, Diem himself proved to be an adequate and able leader. Those that succeeded Diem proved to be quite unfit for the job. Under the right leadership and with U.S. military support, the South Vietnamese would have been more than capable of competing with and defeating their communist counterparts.

Summary

I chose this particular topic because of my interest in finding more about the Vietnam War. Also, my father, who served in the South Vietnamese army during the last few years of the war, strongly encouraged me to explore this event of the Vietnam War. I wanted to acquire a better sense of communist North Vietnam and discover if they had just a different set of social and political beliefs and institutions or if they corresponded with the communism that many have grown to fear and grimace at in a more direct fashion. My newfound knowledge has drastically altered my beliefs on this subject in that I have a better sense of part of my country's past as well as have glimpsed into the workings of Communist Vietnam. Previously, I was entirely skeptical to have read of such oppression of the Vietnamese people by communists like Ho Chi Minh. I now have a better knowledge base on the subject and am more inclined to delve into this further.

Works Cited

Englar, Mary. The Tet Offensive. Ed. Julie Gassman. Minneapolis: Compass Point, 2009. Print.

Hoyt, Austin, prod. "Vietnam, a Television History: Tet 1968." By Austin Hoyt. Narr. Will Lyman. Episode #6. American Experience. Prod. Sharon Grimberg. PBS. WGBH, Boston, 27 Oct. 1997. Television.

Meyerson, Joel. Images of a Lengthy War. 1986. U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington DC. Wikipedia.org. Web. 15 Apr. 2013.

Oberdorfer, Don. "Tet: Who Won?." Smithsonian 35.8 (2004): 117-123. History Reference Center. Web. 16 Apr. 2013.

Staaveren, Jacob Van. Interdiction in Southern Laos. 1993. Center of Air Force History, Washington DC. Wikipedia.org. Web. 15 Apr. 2013.

"Tet Offensive." Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia, 6Th Edition (2013): 1. Literary Reference Center. Web. 16 Apr. 2013.

USAF. Stratofortress. circa 1965-1966. U.S. Air Force. WWW.af.mil. Web. 16 Apr. 2013.

Wolfe, Frank. Vietnam War Protest in Washington, D.C. 1967. National Archives. WWW.archives.gov. Web. 16 Apr. 2013

Worth, Richard. Tet Offensive. Ed. Lee Marcott. Philadelphia: Chelsea, 2002. Print.