The Gettysburg Campaign And The Military Tactics

Published Date: 02 Nov 2017

Marina Pedersen

History 240 – Civil War History

Research Paper

General Robert E. Lee’s Folly: The Gettysburg Campaign and the Military Tactics that Came with it

I tremble for my country when I hear of

confidence expressed in me.

I know too well my weakness, that our only hope is in God.

~ General Robert E. Lee

On July 1-3, 1863, a total of 51,000 brave American soldiers lost their lives on the costliest battle of the Civil War and is often described as the war’s turning point. On the first day of the battle, President Abraham Lincoln instructed Major General Joseph Hooker to position the army in and around Gettysburg. The two armies collided as General Lee had concentrated a majority of his forced at Gettysburg, his objective was to destroy and annihilate the Union army. The lower ridges to the northwest of town were defended by a Union cavalry under General John Buford, and then reinforced with two corps of Union infantry. However, two large Confederate corps assaulted them, collapsing the hastily developed Union lines, sending the defenders retreating through the streets of town. The second day of battle is considered the worst. On both sides, most of the armies had assembled overnight. The Union line was formed in a line resembling a fish hook and Lee had launched heavy assaults on Little Round Top, the Wheatfield, Devil’s Den, and the Peach Orchard. On the final day of the battle, fighting resumed on Culp’s Hill but the main event was the brutal attack on the Confederate’s, also known as Pickett’s Charge, when they had charged towards Union lines. Throughout this battle, we can infer that several mistakes were made by the Confederate generals causing the South to suffer huge losses. One of the essential elements of a successful military campaign is the ability of the commander to precisely define his intent and communicate that intent to his key subordinates. In the United States Marin Corps manual, Warfighting, it goes on in explaining that any situation may change and that "understanding the commander’s intent allows us [the subordinates] to exercise initiative in harmony with the commanders". There was significant confusion throughout the Gettysburg Campaign by the entire Confederate chain of command. Lee, as the commander, was responsible for ensuring that his intentions and strategies were clear. As will be seen, he failed to clearly define those intentions and to ensure that his Corps Commanders understood them.

In the spring of 1863, the South was in its second year of fighting for their independence from the United States of America. Despite the support from Queen Victoria of Great Britain, the Confederacy was still unsuccessful in gaining foreign support from others and moreover, the war seemed to drag on forever even though there were anti-war supporters in the North. Additionally, there had been food riots in the city of Richmond, which made the food situation life-threatening, especially in Virginia. Two years of the ongoing war had traumatized northern Virginia farm crops. Because most of the railroads extended in the North, inadequate national railway system limited the ability to transport food throughout the country, especially to the South. With all the damage done by the battles and Union occupation aside, the state of Virginia was having a hard time supporting both herself and Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. In a military way, the most serious opposing factor to the South was General Ulysses S. Grant’s ambitious march down the Mississippi in a persistent effort to take Vicksburg and cut all ties off with the eastern Confederacy from its western states. Conversely, the brightest spot in the Confederate military circumstances was General Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia. They were the bright shining star that the people of the South could look up to in hopes of achieving independence. The reason for this is because within six months, General Lee’s forces had handed the Army of the Potomac two morale-raising victories at Fredericksburg (Dec.1862) and then another one at Chancellorsville (May 1863).

After the death of General Stonewall Jackson, Lee was forced to undertake a major restructuring of the Army of the Potomac. Lee expanded his corps structure from two corps to three corps under James Longstreet, Richard S. Ewell, and A.P. Hill. The new duties for the latter two generals caused some command complications in the upcoming Gettysburg Campaign. As a result of this reorganization and the subsequent shuffling of officers, the Army of Northern Virginia was filled with officers in new stations. These new officers included: two Corps Commanders, three of nine Division Commanders, seven new Brigadiers Generals, and six Infantry Brigades temporarily commanded by Colonels. Moreover, one third of the cavalry officers were newly transferred to the Army from other forces. This could pressure the new officers, who have to learn and retrain everything that they once knew. Likewise, a restructuring of this degree would indicate a need for the army commander to maintain fighter control over his organization until the unit was functioning efficiently.

The Confederate leadership, faced with the tactical situation as described above, had three general options to consider when looking for ways to relieve the Union pressure on Vicksburg. Two of these strategies had to do with sending out a large size of Lee’s army and sending it west. The first option was to provide for direct corroboration of the forces around Vicksburg. The second option was a proposition to envision Bragg in Tennessee and launching an offensive north towards Ohio; in turn, this will force the Union forces to retreat from their march down the Mississippi River. For the third option, which was strongly favored by Lee, was to launch a campaign into Maryland and Pennsylvania. To Lee, the solution to the strategic problem would be provided by the Army of Northern Virginia as they successfully jived on towards the north, into the heart of the Union and ending the war once and for all. Even though his intent was still not as clear to his officers, Lee had the utmost confidence that his army had the ability to act out all of these options. Because of the Confederate victory at Chancellorsville Lee was extremely encouraged that the Gettysburg Campaign had a high probability of success. He proposed that if he could threaten Philadelphia, Baltimore, and, especially, Washington, the Lincoln administration would be forced to withdraw forces from the West to defend against attack. In addition, this would thus lift the pressure on Vicksburg and permit farmers in Virginia to grow and harvest food and supplies undisturbed by neither the Union nor the Confederates. Even though the South had a great weakness in strategic resources, along with the rising anti-war emotions boiling in the North, Lee felt an offensive move at that time would possibly bring the North to the bargaining table. This "bargaining table" was to be the South’s way to independence

The fact that Davis approved of Lee's plan for an offensive maneuver was not without some reservation. This is where the first questions concerning Lee's intent begin to surface. President Davis wrote a letter to Lee on May 31st talking about how he never fully understood Lee's interpretation or purpose for the movement. This was also when the origins of the debate between Lee and Longstreet, another general that was at Gettysburg, over the conduct of the campaign and the battle began to emerge. The conversations between them were mostly about the tactical decisions and actions that they plan to carry out during the actual engagement. At the time the campaign into Pennsylvania was approved, Longstreet thought that he had an agreement from Lee about the conduct of upcoming operations. Even though the army was going on an aggressive position, it would only engage and fight the enemy from the strategic defensive. Lee denied that he ever said anything to Longstreet about the particular subject. This is an example, and a clear failure, to convey Lee’s plan which resulted in disastrous consequences later. In fact, a review of the literature and the records available also indicates that General Lee may not have clearly defined his ultimate intentions to himself. This entire conversation was more of a "he said-he said" situation.

As mentioned previously, confusion and disarray among the Confederate chain of command appeared even during the planning stages of the campaign. This is not very good if you’re trying to unleash an all-out operation to take down the Union for good. For example, at Chancellorsville, Lee made his first error in the campaign by issuing a somewhat unclear order to General Stuart. Lee told Stuart that, if there was no enemy threat at his front, he was to take three of his brigades and move across the Potomac. Then, he was to place himself on Ewell’s right in order to guard the infantry’s flank, watch for enemy movements, and gather supplies. However, the orders offered Stuart some freedom and did not make clear the precise intent of Stuart’s eventual position on Ewell’s right. This means that because Lee was not clear on his instructions, Stuart had free leeway to interpret what Lee’s orders really meant. Unfortunately for Lee, Stuart was the kind of officer who preferred to operate somewhat independently. What Lee did not realize is that an officer who liked working independently can lead to disastrous results. Furthermore, Lee trusted Stuart’s decision, which is surprising given that Stuart had failed him so miserably on his first invasion of the North in 1862. Lee’s head was obviously not in the right place. But even this early in the campaign Lee and Longstreet were not operating in unison. Lee wrote to Longstreet on 17 June.

"I have heard nothing of the movements of General Hooker either from General Stuart or yourself and therefore, can form no opinion of the best move against him. If a part of your force could have operated east of the mountains, it would have served more to confuse him, but as you have turned off to the Valley, I hope it is for the best at any rate, it is too late to change from any information I have" It is apparent that from the tone of this letter Lee wanted Longstreet to keep a percentage of his Corps east of the Shenandoah, which is where Lee launched his campaign.

As the opening phase of this great campaign ended, Lee’s army was moving to consolidate against a foe they only knew was nearby, while Meade’s army cautiously positioned itself to engage Lee once the situation dictated. The former was groping in relative darkness, blinded by a lack of intelligence, trying to ensure it was ready once the Federal army’s position became apparent, while the latter was seeking out their opponent, probing and preparing methodically. Both armies were roughly equivalent in strength, and both had seen some turmoil in command and organization. They had moved north stretched out, but now they were consolidating like two great snakes coiling to strike. One army, Lee’s, had long been the defender of its home soil, but now was the invader, while Meade’s army now found themselves defending Union soil for only the second time in the war. All the elements of a historic and inevitable clash were in place, and soon that fight would come.