The History Of Conceptualizing Administrative Discretion

Published Date: 02 Nov 2017

2.1 Introduction

This Chapter provides the conceptual framework to create a deeper understanding of the conceptual dimensions of decentralization namely administrative, political and fiscal. The chapter also discusses all the parameters, of the multifaceted concept of administrative discretion. It then moves on to give a global overview of decentralization reform, its adoption and the various factors motivating it around the world. This part is then narrowed down to Africa and eventually Southern Africa before focusing on Zimbabwe. It traces the historical roots and evolvement of local government in Zimbabwe from the colonial period to the present time. The chapter then examines the UCA in light of the concept of administrative discretion underpinned by discretionary powers to legislate, procure goods and services and management of human resources at local council level.

2.2 Decentralization: An Overview.

Decentralization is a comprehensive term which denotes the transfer of power, authority, responsibilities and functions to sub-national governmental organizations (Olowu, 2001; Rondinelli and Nellis, 1986). A government has not decentralized unless the country contains an autonomous sub-national elected government capable of taking binding decisions in at least some policy area. According to Makumbe (1998) decentralization entails the sharing of central government powers with other institutions, especially those geographically separated or responsible for specific functions, or those given jurisdiction over specific physical locations. Mawhood (1983:18) defines decentralization as the "sharing of part of governmental power by a central ruling group with other groups, each having authority within a specific area of the state". Mawhood, (1983) further states that central to decentralization process are aspects related to power, authority and responsibility, which start from the centre and are then diffused to the periphery. Smoke (1999), concurs that decentralization is a process of subdividing the state’s territory into smaller units and institutions. Power and authority are then devolved to them to perform certain prescribed administrative and political functions within their areas of jurisdiction and specialization. The same power-sharing pattern may be replicated by these intermediate organizations to those below them.

Wamwangi and Kundishora (2003) link decentralization to the concept of subsidiarity, which proposes that functions be devolved to the lowest level of social order that is capable of completing them effectively and efficiently. The term decentralization embodies three dimensions namely fiscal, administrative, and political, (World Bank, 2000; Schneider, 2003: Duncan, 2007). In many instances a decentralization policy that promises success will most likely include a fusion of some aspects of each of these dimensions.

2.3 Administrative Decentralization

Administrative decentralization refers to how much discretion non-central government entities possess relative to central control. From the administrative point of view, decentralization promises more effective and efficient government, as well as an improvement in the quality of the services delivered at local level (Rondinelli and Nellis, 1986). This position is augmented by Crook and Sverrisson, (2001) who note that administrative decentralization is the system which requires local authorities to be the representatives of local collectivities and not the representatives of the state placed in the forefront of the community. There are three major forms of administrative decentralization: deconcentration, delegation, and devolution, (World Bank, 2000; Smoke, 2003; Duncan 2007).

2.3.1 Deconcentration

Deconcentration is often considered to be the weakest form of decentralization and is used most frequently in unitary states. Deconcentration redistributes decision making authority and financial and management responsibilities among different levels of the central government. This may mean shifting of workload from the ministry to its field or local administration, (Rondinelli and Nellis, 1986). In other words it can merely shift responsibilities such as water provision and sewer reticulation from central government officials in the capital city to those working in regions, provinces or districts. Under this setup, local or field administration is done only under the supervision of central government ministries. Interestingly deconcentration has enhanced national governments access to areas of the national territory in which its presence had been limited. This form of decentralization has been used by many of African and Asian countries like Kenya, Tunisia, Tanzania, Morocco, Algeria, Pakistan, Philippine, Indonesia and Thailand in past decades, (Rondinelli et al, 1983). In the Zimbabwean context the government created departments of line ministries to represent its interest at provincial and district levels, however officials at these levels still have to obtain approval from central government. Practically they are rendered implementers and thus can only make operational decisions with all policy related decisions referred to the central authority.

2.3.2 Delegation

Delegation is a more extensive form of decentralization. According to Rondinelli and Nellis, (1986), delegation involves the transfer of responsibility for decision making and administration of public functions from the central government to semi autonomous organizations that are not wholly controlled by the central government, but are ultimately accountable to it. These quasi-autonomous organizations such as local councils usually have a great deal of discretion in decision making for example many developing countries utilizes this practice in the creation of boards, local authorities, corporations or any other separate agencies for carrying out specific functions, (Rondinelli et al, 1983). This forms the basis of authority and responsibility for local authorities including UCs in Zimbabwe, whereby the state has delegated certain functions albeit with limited powers. The delegated functions can still be withdrawn, redefined or completely removed from the local authorities and parceled elsewhere. Even when the state has delegated decision making it still retains the powers to sanction compliance and issue directives and executive orders.

2.3.3 Devolution

Devolution is the third form of administrative decentralization. In comparison to the other two, devolution is the most expansive. In a devolved system, sub-national government units have legally recognized geographical boundaries over which they exercise authority and perform public functions. Elected officials can make laws and raise revenue (Conyers, 1990; Schneider, 2003). Thus, according to the USAID, (2007), unlike deconcentration and delegation, devolution cannot occur in the absence of political decentralization, and for that reason devolution and political decentralization are tightly linked as concepts. Cheema and Rondinelli, (2007), identified what have become universally accepted fundamental characteristics of the purest form of devolution. The characteristics include:

i) Power is transferred to autonomous units governed independently and separately without the direct control of central government;

ii) The units enjoy corporate status and powers to secure their own resources to perform their functions;

iii) The units maintain control over a recognized geographical area;

iv) Devolution implies the need to develop local government institutions;

v) It is an arrangement of reciprocal, mutually beneficial and coordinate relationship

between central and local government.

2.4 Conceptualizing administrative discretion

Administrative decentralization implies the recognition of the discretion of the administrative local government units to carry out functions and duties at that level, (World Bank, 2000; Olowu, 2001; Schneider, 2003; Duncan, 2007). Additionally Rondinelli and Nellis, (1986) assert that local government administrative discretion is the quintessential pivot of all the activity of local sub-national government units. Administrative discretion in local governments is constituted by three dimensions namely legislative authority or powers, discretion to procure and administer services and lastly discretion to manage human resources, (World Bank, 2000; Schneider, 2003; Duncan, 2007). Each dimension comprises specific functions as shown in figure 1 below.

Figure 1: Administrative Decentralisation

Framework

ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION

Human resource management

ï‚• Budget payroll

ï‚• Establishment control

ï‚• Recruitment

ï‚• Career management

ï‚• Performance management

Procurement

ï‚• Management of procurement contracts

ï‚• Comparative participation

of bureaucracy and local elected officials

Legislative

ï‚• Land

ï‚• Social services

ï‚• Law and order

ï‚• Small businesses

Adapted from the World Bank, (2000).

As illustrated in the figure above, each dimension of administrative discretion is constituted by certain functions which have to be performed at sub-national government level. For instance the first dimension of legislative discretion is constituted by the sub-national unit’s powers to legislate over land, social services, and law and order issues. For human resources management, some of the functions include budget payroll, recruitment and performance management.

In short the scope of administrative discretion is examined in light of the sub-national governments units’ exercise of these functions relative to central control. Thus the exercise of these functions is measured on a continuum informed by three variables namely complete, partial or none. The three (3) dimensions are discussed below.

2.4.1 Legislative Discretion

Legislative discretion refers to the powers to make (legislate), change and enforce regulatory decisions and laws (executive), (Pranab and Dilip, 2006; World Bank, 2008). By inference this function should be carried out by local government actors, however Conyers, (1990) asserts that in many of the developing countries, legislative powers have remained the preserve of central government technocrats. Consequently central governments still dominate the legislative arena and they often pronounce legislative changes which impact even on the by-laws of sub-national government units. However there is growing influence of civil society groups and think tanks in legislative processes. These groups propose that the role of central government institutions in administrative decentralization be confined to: the facilitation and enabling of local governments; development and management of the policy and regulatory framework; monitoring accountability by local government authorities; financial and performance audit; and provisions of adequate grants, (Wunsch and Olowu, 1995). This would present an opportunity for central governments to enlarge the legislative powers of sub-national government units. Bahl and Smoke, (2003) observe that one principle of administrative decentralization involves the transmission of an important part of the decision making power in administrative matters from the central to the local government. The local government unit must have power of decision on the collectivity they have been designated by, power which is not in juridical relationship with the central power. This provides the basis for justifying local government legislative discretion, (Wunsch and Olowu, 1995).

Bahl and Smoke, (2003) further argue that local governments are more effective regulators because they are better able to ascertain and aggregate their constituents’ preferences than regional or central governments. This improves allocative efficiency, (Romeo, 1999; Ribot, 2001). The World Bank, (2008) further posit that in a well-designed administrative decentralized system, regulatory discretion of the local government extends to the following areas: local economic development, land use planning and management, zoning, and some aspects of public safety, public health, social protection, education, and environmental protection,. It frees local managers from central constraints and, as a long term goal, allows them to develop organizational structures tailored to local circumstances, (Bahl and Smoke, 2003). In this regard, local government councils will be free to make laws and operational decisions consistent with the laws of the land and government policies without interference by central government institutions.

2.4.2 Discretion to Procure and Administer Services

In addition to the regulatory authority, local government also needs discretion to procure goods and services from the private sector or other entities to ensure efficient service delivery to citizens, (World Bank, 2008). In bid to foster procurement discretion, in 1993 the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law adopted the Model Law on Procurement of Goods and Construction to inform country Procurement Regulations. Procurement contracts can take many forms including service or management contracts, leases, concessions, joint ventures, and full or partial ownership. According to World Bank, (2008), the procurement process can be divided into the following phases: specifying goods and services to be procured, designing the contract, selecting suppliers, appraising technical and financial qualification of the bidders, managing the bid process, finalizing the bid process and contract management. Thus decentralization laws should provide clear guidance on the roles of different branches and levels of government in all of the above mentioned steps of procurement processes. In a well-designed administrative decentralization system, local governments should have discretion in all these stages.

2.4.3 Discretion to manage human resources

The World Bank, (2008) note that local government discretion over human resources and employment policies should ideally cover the following:

pay policy discretion (setting overall wage rates as well as local hardship and remote allowances),

budget transparency (paying staff from one’s own budget),

budget and establishment of control (controlling staff numbers and authority to remove surplus staff),

recruitment discretion (recognition as the formal employer),

career management control (vertical and horizontal mobility, including transfers to other units within the local government system)

Performance management (directing and supervising activities and tasks, conducting evaluations, and exercising the ability to discipline and fire).

The World Bank, (2008) however also note that, decentralization of the human resource management is a complex process. Local governments may be limited in the management of certain levels of personnel working within their purview. Part of the personnel that performs local government functions could be hired by the central or provincial government. Local governments, on the other hand, are allowed to hire additional staff on a contract basis. In some instances, functionaries are transferred to the local government but operational control is retained by the central government. These practices create different types of personnel working simultaneously under local government jurisdiction. Failure of the legal framework to clearly define the responsibilities and accountability channels of different types of personnel compounds confusion and reduces efficiency. Ribot, (2001) observed that discretion over these functions allows the local government to hold staff accountable and to allocate staff efficiently by aligning their skills with local activities while managing financial resources. For example, pay policy discretion and performance management not only enhance the accountability of the local staff to the local government but also gives the local government authority over managing fiscal resources. In other words, if the local governments are not in control of each of the above mentioned functions, the structures of accountability remain misaligned.

2.5 Fiscal decentralization

Fiscal decentralization refers to how much central governments cede fiscal impact to non-central government entities. Financial responsibility is a core component of decentralization. Fiscal decentralization transfers three things to local governments and private organizations: (a) funds to deliver decentralized function; (b) revenue-generating power and (c) authority to decide on expenditures, (World Bank, 2000; Smoke 2001; Schneider, 2003; Duncan, 2007).

The World Bank, (2000) lists five forms of fiscal decentralization, these include:

i) Self-financing or cost recovery through user charges;

ii) Co financing or co production arrangements through which the users participate in providing services and infrastructure through monetary or labor contributions;

iii) Expansion of local revenues through property or sales taxes or indirect charges;

iv) Authorization of municipal borrowing and the mobilization of either national or

local government resources through loan guarantees; and

v) Inter governmental transfers that shift general revenues from taxes collected by

the government to local governments for general or specific uses.

2.6 Political Decentralization

Political decentralization refers to the degree to which central governments allow non-central government entities to undertake the political functions of governance, such as representation, (World Bank, 2000; Smoke 2001; Schneider, 2003; Duncan, 2007). Political considerations frequently play a role in local government decentralization, for example making government more democratic and legitimate and getting the population to participate more. The purpose is to bring the local authorities closer to the people and to increase transparency and accountability as well as enhance service delivery. Political decentralization assumes that decisions made with greater participation will be better informed and more relevant to diverse interest in society than those made only by national political authorities. According to Schneider, (2003), the concept implies that the selection of representations from local electoral jurisdictions allows entireness to know better their political representatives and allows elected officials to know better the needs and desires of their constituents.

In short political decentralization often requires constitutional or statutory reforms, the development of pluralistic political parties, the strengthening of legislatures, creations of local political units, and the encouragement of effective public interest groups, (World Bank, 2000; Smoke 2001; Schneider, 2003; Duncan, 2007).

Decentralization-Global Overview

2.7.1 Historical background to decentralization

According to the World Bank, (2008) decentralization is a global trend and by the turn of the new millennium had been adopted by more than 75% countries worldwide. It has some form of sub-national government structure, whether to maintain control or to deliver public services across the country, or both, (Smoke 2001; Schneider, 2003; Stijnsmans, 2004; Duncan, 2007). Stijnsmans, (2004) further note that sub-national structures range from elected state, provincial, municipal or local governments with high degrees of discretion, to local agents of the central state with minimal discretion with numerous variations in between.

Litvack, et al. (1998) asserts that during the 1930s – 1940s, there was a centralizing tendency in much of the world. Under communism in Central and Eastern Europe, United Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) and China as governments sought to consolidate their authority. This resulted in attempts at central economic planning in much of the developing world, (Litvack, et al. 1998). According to Blair, (1997), the period after World War 11 however witnessed the emergence of a strong desire to decentralize governance. Litvack et al, (1998) asserts that this was necessitated by divergent circumstances which include the advent of plural politics in Africa that encouraged decentralization as countries attained their independence. The tremendous expansion of democratic space across Latin America led to the emergence of decentralized forms of government. The transition from command to market economies in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the need for government to enhance access to public services in East Asia all powerfully outlined the need for reforms, (Litvack et al, 1998). In Eastern Europe, Hungary and Slovakia had by 1990 enacted fundamental laws establishing local governments patterned after the Council of Europe’s European Charter, (Inman and Rubinfeld, 1998). The basic treaties of the European Union specify subsidiarity as a principle which denote that government functions should be carried out at the lowest level that can perform those functions effectively and efficiently, (Inman and Rubinfeld, 1998; Stijnsmans, 2004).

In the 1970s in some countries and since the 1980s in many more, there has been a strong tendency to decentralize, with most countries adopting some form of decentralization, (Inman and Rubinfeld, 1998; Stijnsmans, 2004). In that period, the decentralization movement across the world focused on deconcentrating hierarchical government structures and bureaucracies. According to the Online Sourcebook on decentralization and Local Development, deconcentrating was seen at first as a more efficient way of organizing the work of public administrations, which would make it possible to appreciate the usefulness of each category of citizens. It was thus considered a condition for the efficient functioning of the state. But it was also admitted that the necessity for coordination and that of having the general interest prevail in government action, meant that the state could not cede all its powers to local jurisdictions. Stijnsmans, (2004) also note that other considerations associated with democratization came to reinforce the trend toward deconcentration, which appeared to be a means of reducing the dissatisfaction of citizens toward local jurisdictions. 

According to Cheema & Rondinelli, (2007), the deconcentration period was succeeded in the mid-1980s by another wave of decentralization which included political power sharing, democratization, and market liberalization in its implementation of decentralization, The emerging trend expanded the focus of decentralization to look beyond the redistribution of state power to a broader objective involving the government-citizenship relationship, (Blair, 2000; Stijnsmans, 2004). This new version of decentralization combined devolutionary decentralization with democracy at the local level, (Blair, 2000).

In short, the global trend towards decentralization has been driven by:

The failures of the central state to be sufficiently responsive to citizen needs and regional differences

The failure of centralized economic planning to deliver results

Democratization in large parts of the world, bringing with it demands by local communities to control their own resources in accordance with local needs and priorities

Urbanization and the growth of large, complex cities, necessitating more responsive systems of city governance

Donor pressures on governments to decentralize as a way of improving service delivery at the periphery, and of getting around obstructions at the centre, (Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007; USAID, 2009; Olowu, 2010).

Since the 1980s and well into the 21st century, decentralization has been accepted in the development and governance discourse as a key feature of the public sector reform, democratization processes, good governance, and enhanced service delivery at the sub-national government level, (Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007; World Bank, 2008; USAID, 2009; Olowu, 2010). However, as argued by Wunsch, (2003) for the decentralization reform to achieve these ideals it is imperative for central governments to enlarge the discretionary powers for sub-national government units. Thus central governments are increasingly opting for a divorced role from local governments’ daily affairs and concentrating on creating an enabling environment and institutional framework. This seems to have motivated political decentralization in much of Latin America heralded by Bolivia’s 1994 Law for Popular Participation (LPP). Proponents of decentralization in that country divided up all of the national territory into 311 new municipalities to ensure that each Bolivian citizen would enjoy municipal representation, (USAID, 2009). China adopted a robust transfer of fiscal authority to sub-national governments and this played an important role in the stunning economic transformation that she has experienced in recent decades. According to the Chinese model of fiscal decentralization reform-minded provinces were given the space they needed to shift away from policies of state socialism and toward a more pro-market orientation. In the early 1980s the Chinese central government introduced the "fiscal contracting system" in which lower-level governments contracted with higher-level governments over the terms of revenue sharing. Unlike most developing countries, where the collection of tax revenues is highly centralized and the national government transfers revenues downward, Chinese sub-national governments enjoy significant tax-collecting authority and share revenues upward, (USAID, 2009).

2.7.2 Decentralization in Sub-Sahara Africa

In African political and administrative history, decentralization is explained in four phases, (Wunsch & Olowu, 1995; Olowu, 2001; Schmidt, 2003). These phases are directly linked to the end of social and political crisis, (United Cities and Local Governments, 2007) The first from 1945 to early 1960s is described as the ‘golden age’ of local government, second phase 1960-1970, third phase late 1970s to late 1980s and final phase from 1990s to present.

2.7.2.1 Phase 1: The Golden Age

In this period in the aftermath of world war 11, central governments not only in Africa but the world over wanted to gain legitimacy and win the loyalty of citizens, (Therkildsen, 1993; Blair, 1997; Litvack et al, 1998). It seems central governments were not overly concerned with how decentralization would diminish their powers, but enhancing the legitimacy of the state as a whole. Consequently they designed local government in a way that promoted increased active involvement of local officials and populations in the betterment of their community, (Wunsch & Olowu, 1995; Blair, 1997; Litvack et al, 1998; Schmidt, 2003).

2.7.2.2 Phase 2: Reversal of Gains

According to Olowu, (2010), during the second phase from early 1960s to late 1970s, there was reversal of the earlier gains made in the first phase as far as decentralized governments were concerned. Central government were intent on entrenching their political control and deal with emergence of cessetionist tendencies. This is particularly true for countries like Malawi which had embraced a decentralization programme in the early 1960s until the one party regime reversed the process as from 1967 as the central government sought to entrench its position. In Uganda it was seen as an opportunity to open political opportunities at the local levels that allowed for greater participation by all former warring factions in the governance of the country. Interestingly as noted by Binswanger and Deininger, (1997) the World Bank and other international development agencies reinforced the re-emerging centralization tendencies. They preferred funding central governments for various projects such as dam and road construction even at the local level to local governments.

2.7.2.3 Phase 3: Economic Crises

The third phase, from late 1970s to late 1980s, was precipitated by the economic crises of the 1970s and the international financial institutions’ adoption of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), (Schmidt, 2003; Ndegwa, 2002) which emphasized decentralization and local governments as solutions to central governments’ expenditure problems, (Olowu 2001). According to Nsibambi, (1998) it is a means for central governments to relinquish some fiscal and administrative onus. Interestingly it was during this period that Botswana consolidated its decentralization reform which had suffered in the early post-independence era from many of the same problems local government faced in Africa. In 1970, the central government decided to further decentralize financial and human resources management to local councils, (Picard and Tordoff in USAID 2000). Since then local government has been a major component of Botswana's political system. Swaziland faced with burgeoning urban growth and deteriorating urban conditions in the face of diminishing state financial resources resorted decentralized urban governance reform. It witnessed a gradual decline in the state involvement in urban governance. In fostering its decentralization and local governance in Swaziland, the government expanded substantially the effective authority and resources of urban governments.

2.7.2.4 Phase 4: Democratization Era

Finally the current phase (four), from the 1990s to the present, has been necessitated by the trend of democratization, which began sweeping across governments favoring centralization, and Africa in particular, during the late 1980s into the early 1990s and which placed decentralization at the centre-stage of development in order to achieve genuine popular participation, (Olowu, 2001, Stijnsmans, 2004). According to De Muro, et al, (1998), changes in this era were also catalyzed by former colonial powers such as France which exerted pressure for political reforms in all French -speaking countries.

The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) embraced this notion of decentralization and local government starting with the launch of the SADC Local Government Ministers Forum in 1999, (De Visser et al, 2010). According to De Visser et al, (2010), key to this forum is the need to encourage the adoption of constitutional frameworks that promote effective local governance, infrastructure investment and sustainable service delivery, and the incorporation of local government as a sector into SADC’s formal structures. Ndengwa, (2002) observes that it was against this background that informed Mozambique’s decentralization project, starting in 1994. It initially foresaw a radical devolution approach for both 23 urban centres and the 128 districts. This resulted in the gradual implantation of relative autonomous local governments with elected leaders, an executive organ and legislative assemblies. In South Africa, the fall of apartheid brought about a new approach towards governance which emphasized dispersion of administrative onus on local governments, (De Visser, 2010).

Nevertheless, it seems the main driving forces and motivations for decentralization reforms, especially in Sub–Sahara regions, are economic crises in countries like Mauritania, and Botswana and significant changes in the political circumstances in South Africa and Mozambique. Nsibambi, (1998) further points to the advent of SAPs which forced central governments to relinquish some fiscal and administrative onus to local governments, for instance in Tanzania in the 1990s, Swaziland and Zimababwe. In a nutshell, the move towards a decentralized system, which is now rapidly spreading across the developing world, has been triggered by changing economic , political circumstances and donor influence. Whereas ethnic, historical, and cultural or linguistic identity have been critical in engendering decentralization in the past, economic arguments are currently gaining importance as a major source of sub-national legitimacy, (Wunsch and Olowu, 1995).

2.7.4 Performance and Limitations of Decentralization in Africa

Whilst decentralization has been embraced as a key component of public sector reform, Rondinelli, 1997; World Bank 2000; Mutizwa-Mangiza 2000; Therkildsen, 2000) and posited as the panacea to challenges of local governance, (Nsibambi, 1998; Olowu, 2001), its portrait in Africa is a mixed one. On a positive scale almost all countries have sub-national governance structures, including local deliberative or representative assemblies usually at the lowest practical level of districts, towns or communes, (Wunsch and Olowu, 1995; Rondinelli, 1997; World Bank, 2008). In addition, more countries are in the midst of reviewing and revising these structures either to increase their number or to give them greater legal and operational definition with increased powers and responsibility. To this end countries like South Africa and Malawi have constitutionalized local governance, whilst in Zimbabwe there is ongoing debate to entrenched decentralization in the constitutional reform exercise which started in 2009.

Ndengwa, (2002) is of the view that, weak institutions such as markets for land, labour and capital, information systems, fiscal systems, legal and regulatory systems, and democratic institutions and processes continue to militate against the decentralization reform in Africa. Further to that, the Duncan, (2007) asserts that the character of local governance in Africa reflects the limits imposed by the historical and contemporary governance profile at the national level. According to the USAID, (2007) three limitations are especially important:

The unitary structure of the state as a starting point of decentralization. The unitary model which prevails in Africa tends towards centralization of power at the national level and at the executive.

The colonial heritage of the administrative state. Ndengwa, (2002) asserts that colonial ethos and structures of local governance largely circumscribe what these countries consider legitimate expansion of local authority. For instance countries with British administrative traditions have a parallel system of sub-national administrative tiers which co-exist with and often dominate local authorities. Whereas in countries with the French tradition, the role of the tutelle, represented by functionaries of the central state, effectively neutralizes local authorities however decentralized, (De Muro, et al, 1998). Only Madagascar, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Eritrea can be said to have diverged from this pattern essentially founded upon colonial administrative systems, (De Muro, et al, 1998; Ndengwa, 2002).

The poverty and lack of capacity at the local community level. In Africa, capacity limitations are defined in terms of shortage of equipment, qualified personnel, lack of effective management information, (World Bank, 2000; Ndengwa, 2002). The World Bank, (2000), also noted severe resource constraints owing to local governments’ narrow bases, inadequate fiscal resources from the centre as capacity limitations. As such local governments cannot reasonably be expected to discharge their responsibilities in such circumstances. The situation is further exacerbated by central governments which cite capacity limitations as reasons why decentralization should not or cannot take place or should proceed slowly. However, the converse is also true sometimes, in that the failure of the central state has at times opened up opportunities for dynamic responses at the local level using local capacity.

Decentralization in Africa has also largely been negatively affected by absence of effective accountability mechanisms, (Crook, 2000; Olowu, 2010). In addition, there is a lack of effective intergovernmental relations, (Duncan, 2007; United Cities and Local Governments, 2007; Olowu, 2010). This has resulted according to Olowu, (2010) in local government executives becoming political dinosaurs in their relationship with their legislative assemblies. In some countries, such as Ghana and Zimbabwe, political interference has led to the dissolution of local governments, (Ndengwa, 2002; Olowu, 2010). Consequently, little effective power has been decentralized in the case of Zimbabwe, (Conyers, 1990; Ndengwa, 2002; Olowu, 2010).

In summation, the decentralization reforms in Africa continue to evolve albeit at a slow pace. It is being undermined by institutional and legal gaps which sustain centralization tendencies. The colonial legacy and poor state and local governments’ relationship are also some of the factors adversely affecting decentralization in Africa. The World Bank study on decentralization across thirty (30) African countries including Zimbabwe, noted the disparities and level of decentralization in Africa. The study revealed South Africa as ‘the most decentralized’ with Uganda being the second most decentralized African country, whilst the least decentralized are those that belong to the Francophone group such as the Central African Republic, Niger and Chad. Fiscal decentralization is the least developed component of decentralization in Africa as compared to political and administrative decentralization. The World Bank study concluded that, by and large, the degree of decentralization in Africa across all three dimensions as being partial.