The Imagination Of Risk Managers

Published Date: 02 Nov 2017

INTRODUCTION

It was beyond the imagination of risk managers on the significance of the February 1998 �fatwa� (declaration of war) that was issued against America by the 40-year-old Saudi exile Osama bin Laden, and a fugitive Egyptian physician, Ayman al Zawahiri. The fatwa only drew the attention of one Arabic newspaper in London (9/11 Commission, 2004: 47). However, on the morning of September 11 2001, 19 of Al-Qaeda operatives hijacked four U.S. commercial airliners and used them as suicide weapons against selected political, military, and economic targets on the U.S. East Coast (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2007). In the aftermath of 9/11, bin Laden had opened the ruthless ingenuity of terrorism to the world. Since then, bin Laden�s picture and rhetoric has featured in almost every imaginable media. In the next videotaped messaged that was broadcast in October 2001, a few hours after the first American air strikes against Afghanistan began, bin Laden�s declared war on the United States was regarded with a preternatural seriousness that would previously have been unimaginable (Hoffman, 2002: 303).

The essay question calls for a discussion on whether the events of 9/11 and the terrorist attacks that occurred thereafter presage an era of 'new terrorism'. The question further asks whether this poses challenges to risk management. This essay shall argue that 9/11 and the terrorist attacks that happened thereafter foretold new terrorism i.e. they were a sign of the nature terrorist attacks that would happen in future. The essay shall commence by considering the meaning of the terms �terrorism� and �risk management�. Having defined these terminologies, the essay will profile two terrorist attacks as case studies. These case studies shall set the stage for a framework of analysis using key theories and unique characteristics of new terrorism drawn from the case studies. The examinable characteristics in the essay shall be diversification, nature of the attacker, weapons of choice, the timing of the attacks, and counterterrorism response. The essay shall refer to groups such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in order to leverage comparison of new terrorism to its predecessor. The essay shall then raise the pertinent problems that each characteristic presents to risk management, within the analysis of each of the characteristics. The essay shall conclude by returning to the essay question to ask if 9/11 and the terrorist attacks thereafter was a sign of things to come in terms of new terrorism.

Having outlined the framework of analysis, the essay will now build on this framework by considering the terminological issues contained within the question. The broad nature of terrorism as a discipline has led to an array of academic definitions (Schmid, 2012). It is therefore very difficult to find one universally acceptable definition (U.S. Department of State, 2000: 7) that distinguishes terrorism from other violent phenomena (Crenshaw, 2000: 406). In addition, it is not the objective of this essay to digress the definitions of terrorism. In order to assist in the definition of terrorism, the definition contained in Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d) shall be adapted. The statute defines terrorism as:

the term "terrorism" means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents (U.S. Department of State, 2012a: 269)

The essay has adapted this definition because it was the definition that was legally-recognized by the USA on 11 September 2011. This definition informed the response and management of the terrorist attacks. Section 2656f(d) of the US code further provides definitions for the terms �international terrorism� and �terrorist group�.

the term "international terrorism" means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country;

the term "terrorist group" means any group practicing, or which has significant subgroups which practice, international terrorism (Ibid)

Following on from the preceding paragraphs, the essay shall now define risk management, which the Civil Contingencies Act defines as the process involved in identifying, assessing and judging risks, taking actions to mitigate or anticipate them, and monitoring and reviewing progress. Risk in this definition refers to uncertainties of outcome, whether positive opportunity or negative threat of actions and events (Walker & Broderick, 2006: 4). Risk management in the context of terrorism refers to actions, devices, or systems employed to eliminate, reduce, or mitigate terrorism risk and vulnerability (Leson, 2005: 11)

CASE STUDIES

11 September 2001, USA: 19 Al-Qaeda inspired Islamic extremists hijacked four commercial passenger jets, Boeing 767s. Two jets, American Airlines (AAL) Flight 11, and United Airlines (UAL) Flight, 175 were crashed into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Centre (WTC) in New York. Both strikes led to the implosion of the skyscrapers a few hours after the attack. Another jet, American Airlines Flight AAL 77, crashed into the west face of The Pentagon. The last of the hijacked flights, United Airlines Flight UAL 93, crashed near Shanksville, Pennsylvania at 10:03 a.m. (9/11 Commission, 2004). These actions combined to claim over 2,981 lives in the single most destructive coordinated terrorist attack ever recorded (Bunce, 2008: 38).

11 September 2012, Libya: A terrorist attack was carried out by a large group of heavily armed terrorists on the U.S. Special Mission compound (SMC) and the CIA Annex in Benghazi, Libya. In the ensuing 7 hours, the SMC and the CIA Annex were attacked by arson, small-arms and machine-gun fire, and use of rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), grenades and mortars. By the time the attack was over, the Islamist militants had stormed and burned the American Consulate, killing 4 Americans including the United States ambassador to Libya, J. Christopher Stevens, and three others: Sean Smith, a Foreign Service officer, and Tyrone S. Woods and Glen A. Doherty, both former members of the Navy SEALs who helped protect diplomatic personnel. In addition, the attacks severely wounded two U.S. personnel, injured three Libyan contract guards and resulted in the destruction and abandonment of both facilities (U.S. Department of State, 2012b).

The two case studies as profiled set the stage for the analysis if 9/11 and post-9/11 terrorist attacks pre-empted new terrorism and the problems that it poses to risk management. The essay shall begin by an analysis of five characteristics in the two terrorist attacks i.e. diversification, nature of the attacker, weapons of choice, the timing of the attack, and counterterrorism response. Using the analysis of the selected characteristics in the case studies, the essay shall argue that 9/11 and beyond, foretold an era of new terrorism. Within the arguments, there shall also an analysis of the problems that new terrorism poses to risk management. The essay shall use theories from different scholars to strengthen the argument. For ease of reference, USA 9/11 shall represent the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the USA, whereas Libya 9/11 shall refer to the 11 September 2012 terrorist attack in Benghazi, Libya.

i. Diversification

USA 911 and the Libya 9/11 attacks targeted a diverse range of American interests, including a business centre, a security and intelligence facility, and a military liaison mission. Al-Qaeda has also adapted itself to an international business model, which is hierarchical but not pyramidal, loosely run, decentralized but linked, able to assemble and allocate resources and coordinate operations, but hard to depict organizationally or penetrate (Jenkins, 2006: 123). New terrorist groups are also better financed (Howard, 2005) (Tucker, 2001: 7) as they have explored conventional and non-conventional means of financing their operations. Terrorist groups have sought to diversify their means of sustenance, sometimes even collaborating with organized crime in drug trafficking, human trafficking, terrorism, cross-border crimes, and piracy (U.S. Department of State, 2008: 31), especially in Europe and Asia.

By diversifying on organization, geographical location and financing, Al-Qaeda and its leadership presents itself rational actors (Lindauer, 2012: 4) who seek to maximize utility from terrorist and non-terrorist activities (Sandler & Enders, 2004: 10). One of the eloquent and outspoken scholars on the rational choice theory, Professor Martha Crenshaw, further strengthens this argument in the light of the behavior of conspiratorial organizations that practice terrorism. She cites deliberate choice by a political actor, and internal organizational processes, as the two main reasons for the rational behavior of such organizations (Crenshaw, 1987). As rational actors, modern terrorists have managed to maintain a global campaign of terror, which largely has been an elusive problem to the counterterrorism measures employed by the authorities to manage the risk associated with terrorism. The leadership of terrorist groups in the new era has managed to maintain an advantage over the authorities by adjusting and adapting their tactics, modus operandi, and sometimes even their weapons systems as needed (Hoffman, 2002: 313). Drawing from the experience of 9/11, new terrorism has brought a new dimension in managing terrorism risk globally. Authorities that are tasked to manage terrorism risk are therefore bound to prepare for terrorism that is designed to sustain itself and last for a long period in the future. Better financing for terrorism groups also translates into the ability to strike bigger targets and acquire deadlier weapons, including the weapons of mass destruction. The ability of terrorists to maintain a steady flow of funds, whether through conventional or unconventional means, makes terrorism risk more difficult to control and manage.

New terrorism has also catalyzed business in risk management. The insurance industry, which initially struggled in the aftermath of the USA 9/11, has nonetheless found a fertile ground for selling policies to corporate entities and individuals against terrorism. USA 9/11 was, and still remains, the largest single insurance loss in history, resulting in an estimated $33 billion in insured damages (MacDonald, 2011). USA 9/11 prompted the insurance companies to collaborate with the federal government in 2003 on the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program, which now makes terrorism insurance available and affordable (Ibid). Just like terrorists act rationally to elevate their profile in terrorism, risk managers have also been making rational decisions to elevate the profile or risk management.

ii. Nature of the Attacker

The 911 Commission Report attributed the USA 9/11 attacks to Al-Qaeda (9/11 Commission, 2004: 252), whereas the Al-Qaeda-affiliated jihadists are suspected to have been behind the Libya 9/11 attack (U.S. Department of State, 2012b: 2). The organization of modern-day terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda is based on a decentralized model with many points of authority, which operates with different cells that have their own centre of authority, at times with no direct contact with top Al-Qaeda leadership. The leaderless leadership of terrorist groups (Neumann, 2008: 7) such as Al-Qaeda makes it difficult for risk management authorities to trace the attacks and therefore present a challenge to which counterterrorism measure to undertake. The autonomous nature of the terrorist cells means that they have limited or no knowledge of other cells (Hoffman, 2006: 271). When one cell is identified or captured, the chances of interrogative processes revealing the identity and location another cell are limited. Terrorism risk managers are therefore only capable of shutting down the operations of one cell, but in return expose themselves to their tactic of tracing terrorist cells, which in turn triggers counter-capture measures by the remaining cells.

The Libya 9/11 terrorist attack similarly illustrates that leaderless cells can plan and execute attacks independently of one another or of any central command authority (Hoffman, 2006: 39). Managing terrorism risk in the pre-9/11 for a group like the IRA was a less complicated undertaking. The IRA had a more cell-like structure but the authority was much more centralised, and attacks were controlled by the group�s regional commanders. Hence an attack would only occur with the knowledge and approval of the central command (Kometer, 2004: 64). This is not the case with new terrorism as shown in the case of Libya 9/11. The combination of autonomous cells, leaderless leadership, and decentralised decision making makes it difficult for authorities to effectively and efficiently collect, assess, disseminate, and act on intelligence information regarding threats posed by transnational and domestic terrorists (Leson, 2005: 1).

iii. Weapons of Choice

There is also a notable difference in the weapons of choice employed by the attackers. The attacks in New York City, Arlington, and Shanksville were mainly carried out using commercial passenger jets. (U.S. Department of State, 2002). The Benghazi attacks were carried out using �arson, small-arms and machine-gun fire, and use of rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), grenades and mortars� (U.S. Department of State, 2012b: 2). The weapons of choice employed by Al-Qaeda in USA 9/11 and Libya 9/11 reinforce the argument that 9/11 foretold an era where new terrorism would be more violent (Howard, 2005).

Unlike the pre-9/11 terrorist groups such as the PLO and the IRA, whose level of terrorist violence was constrained by psychological, ethical and political considerations, the current breed of terrorist groups employ violent tactics that are more lethal and indiscriminate (Field, 2009: 199). Prior to 9/11, no terrorist group had flown a passenger jet into a soft target such as the WTC. Al-Qaeda�s move to turn commercial jets into large guided missiles with 11,400 gallons of jet fuel (9/11 Commission, 2004), was in itself designed to inflict the maximum possible damage (U.S. Department of State, 2008: 7), hence present terror in a scale that had never been experienced before in the USA. 9/11 and beyond therefore foretold an era in which new terrorism would use destruction as an end in itself, rather than the means to an end (Crenshaw, 2003).

Terrorist groups in the modern era have sought to take advantage of such devastation by using the media, not just as a tool of communication, but also as a weapon to instill fear in the population. The dramatic upsurge in the release of al-Qaeda video- and audiotapes (Hoffman, 2009: 361) is a clear indication that modern terrorists are not only using guns and bombs that they have long been, but the mini-cam, videotape, television, and the Internet (Hoffman, 2002: 307). The use of communication by Al-Qaeda leadership served to propagate its ideology to individual terrorists and groups that operate in isolation � a new paradigm known as �lone wolves� or stochastic terrorism. The new breed of stochastic terrorists have been known to strike in isolation, but belong to virtual terrorist communities on the Internet, according to a study conducted by Prof. Gabriel Weimann (University of Haifa, 2012). Stochastic terrorists present a challenge to risk management due to their nature of being individually unpredictable, hence difficult to determine when, where, and what type of attack may occur (Sheppard, 2011: 3). Even with limited resources, �lone wolves� can mount high-profile, extremely destructive attacks, and their operational planning is often difficult to detect (FBI cited in Hoffman, 2006: 40). The problem to risk management is that stochastic terrorism seems to be on the rise (University of Haifa, 2012). Since 2001, several plots in the U.S. have been linked to individuals from various states including Illinois, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, and Texas (RMS, 2011: 9).

iv. Timing of the Attacks

The timing of the attacks bears some level of significance. Of interest to this analysis is the date, month and year of the attacks. The multiple attacks on 11 September 2001 have been shrouded in various attempts to explain the selection of the date (McKay, 2009), but no credible authority from the US government or Al-Qaeda itself has definitively stated the reason. What the date (11 September 2001) was not able to achieve in USA 9/11 was perhaps amplified and made significant by the Libya 9/11 attack. The Obama administration immediately characterized what had occurred in Benghazi not as an act of terrorism, but as a spontaneous, unplanned uprising that happened, coincidentally, to take place on the anniversary of 9/11 (DiscoverTheNetworks.org, 2012). In theory, terrorist attacks that are based on specific dates to mark anniversaries tend to be associated with groups that use religion as the inspiration to commit acts of terrorism. Scholars have pinpointed terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda and the Japanese cult of Aum Shinrikyo as examples (Crenshaw, 2000: 413). However, the selective interpretation of religion to support terrorism has served to reinforce the argument that religions in themselves do not cause terrorism. Religion is instead used to gain operatives that would assist the terrorist group to achieve their motives which are often more political than religious (Tamara Makarenko cited in Contegiacomo, 2007: 8)

Timing an attack plays to the advantage of the terrorist because it can keep the agencies guessing, and put the public on the edge in fear. Even after an attack happens, and with no information forthcoming, the agencies and the public can sustain the same trend of confusion and fear. Terrorist groups are known to exploit the weakest link (Sandler & Enders, 2004: 16) and therefore time their attacks to take advantage of the vulnerability of their targets. The timing of attacks usually puts responders and security agencies under pressure, which eventually leads to hurried decision-making, and a likelihood for mistakes. Such mistakes are what the terrorists could exploit to increase the lethality of the attack. For instance, the uncertainty surrounding the prospect of further attacks after the two planes hit the WTC prompted the security detail of to put President Bush aboard Air Force One (AF1) and take to the skies (9/11 Commission, 2004: 325). However, in the hours that followed, it was apparent that the security authorities in the USA could not gauge what the actual risk was, and therefore had difficulty identify what avoidance and adaptive behaviors are appropriate (Sheppard, 2011: 12). During this period, AF1 had no escort from Air Force fighter jets. Therefore is was inappropriate to allow AF1 to fly, with the President on board, at a time when America was under an air attack (Cenciotti, 2011). Arguably, the lack of information on the attack prompted the security detail of the President to make hurried decisions that were questionable in terms of terrorism risk management. Similarly, the President, being the Commander in Chief was required to address the nation. This compelled AF1 to land at Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska (9/11 Commission, 2004: 325), which exposed a deficiency in the risk management technology i.e. AF1 did not have the technological capability to be an independent command and control centre. The Commander in Chief could not communicate and address the nation while in the �safety� of the skies. 9/11 and beyond therefore presaged a new frontier in the development and advancement of counterterrorism technologies, including technologies available for risk communication.

The failure of risk communication in a terrorist attack was also evident in the Libya 9/11 attack, where the Mission was not provided with adequate security despite operating in a volatile area such a Benghazi. The Accountability Review Board report noted the lack of transparency, responsiveness, and leadership in communication, cooperation, and coordination between Washington, Tripoli, and Benghazi at the senior level in the U.S. Department of State (U.S. Department of State, 2012b: 6). Libya 9/11 further emphasizes that new terrorism brought a paradigm shift on risk management especially on the need for a risk communication strategy, which when developed, can be instrumental in building resilience to manage and recover from unpredictable and largely unknowable events such as terrorism (Sheppard, 2011: 13). USA 9/11 and Libya 9/11 similarly emphasize the need for risk management to be at the highest level of management (U.S. Department of State, 2012c).

v. Counterterrorism Response

Immediately after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the US Government declared its own �War against Terror�, which was meant to eliminate Al-Qaeda (Neumann, 2008: 5). The response to the Benghazi attacks by the Obama administration was remarkably different from that of the Bush administration following 9/11. On September 12, 2012, the Secretary of State Hillary Clinton denounced the violence in Benghazi (U.S. Department of State, 2012c), and the independent report issued by the Accountability Review Board (ARB) on December 18, 2012 blamed State Department leadership for systemic failures and leadership and management deficiencies at senior levels (DiscoverTheNetworks.org, 2012).

Looking at the counterterrorism response in the USA 9/11, the Bush administration employed terrorism attack as a justification to wage war against Iraq and Afghanistan (Waddington & McSeveny, 2012: 49). The enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act by the Bush administration in 2002, which made it a crime to provide support, was to some extent been interpreted to infringe on the civil liberties (Khalil, 2005), and swayed public sympathy in favour of terrorists, which in turn drew support from philanthropic organizations to terrorist groups (Howard, 2005). The Obama administration is also culpable since the Libya 9/11 attacks took place when the US �mission� in Benghazi was supporting an Al-Qaeda affiliated rebel group to oust Syrian President Bashar al-Assad through the supply or armaments. (DiscoverTheNetworks.org, 2012).

The �stage managed� response to the Benghazi attack and the association of a US mission to a group, which would be defined by the US law as �terrorist� brings forth an argument that reinforces the normalization of deviance theory by sociologist Diane Vaughan (Vaughan, 2004). In the 1980s cold war, the US had supported the Mujahidin to fight against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The end of the Afghan war for liberation and the fall of the Soviet Union led the creation of Al-Qaeda (Contegiacomo, 2007: 8). The normalized military tactics employed by Mujahidin against the Soviet Union would turn against the US by Al-Qaeda, following the military invasion in Afghanistan by the US. Similarly, the normalization process in Libya by the Obama administration (Issa & Chaffetz, 2012) reinforces the argument that the US was deliberately turning unacceptable behaviors of the Al-Qaeda affiliated rebels in Libya and Syria into acceptable behaviors. Normalization of deviance is also portrayed in the active role of the US to support to rebel groups to access arms from the deposed regime, and the failure to authorize military support when the Benghazi mission was under attack. This normalization of the deviant acts of terrorism by the rebels in Libya and Syria once again witnessed the use of the same weapons, in the Libya 9/11 attack, which had been supplied to the rebels by the US mission in Benghazi.

CONCLUSION

The essay has presented a discussion in favour of the statement in the essay question � that 9/11 and beyond presaged an era of new terrorism. Arguably, along the same line of thought, there were a few other terrorist attacks prior to 9/11 that foretold a new era of terrorism. The strength that 9/11 has over its predecessors in favour of the argument presented in this essay is that 9/11 opened a new perspective in the management of terrorism risk. The arguments as presented in this essay affirm that 9/11 revealed terrorism in a manner that had never been experienced before by virtue of violent, technologically, well-financed, and organized terrorist groups, with the capability of waging global campaigns. On a risk management perspective, 9/11 and beyond ushered the adoption of a (Knowledge@Wharton, 2009: 4) with authorities employing new terrorism management techniques, better-trained personnel, information technology, and a huge investment in counterterrorism measures. The new thinking about terrorism risk management changed the risk management subject. With the terrorists� long-term goal of unleashing terror using weapons of mass destruction yet to be achieved (Crenshaw, 2000: 415) (Hoffman, 2006: 272) (9/11 Commission, 2004: 334), new terrorism and risk management are poised to remain important subjects and hot topics in future. It is nonetheless clear that new terrorism is more difficult and presents many problems to risk management than old terrorism, its predecessor (Tucker, 2001: 1).