Changes In The Intelligence Community

Published Date: 02 Nov 2017

Key Words: intelligence community, national security, intelligence collection, intelligence function, capability, risk, threat, response

Introduction

Robert McNamara (1995) wrote about 11 lessons learned from the Cold War and from the war in Vietnam. One of the biggest mistakes, he said, was failing to empathise with the enemy.

The Intelligence Community (IC) which emerged in the US after 2004 refers to changes brought about as a result of recommendations by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States and the enactment of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act (2004) (IRTPA).

The IRTPA added several new agencies to the IC and established a new director of national intelligence (DNI) replacing the director of central intelligence (DCI) as the most senior intelligence official and advisor.

One of the main objectives of the IRTPA was to improve the IC’s ability to respond to various threats by removing obstacles to the sharing of intelligence between agencies. The IRTPA also redefined intelligence as ‘national intelligence’ by removing the distinction between foreign and domestic intelligence.

The relevance of the IC in carrying out its functions must be considered in context of its ability to deal with a new menu of recognised foreign and domestic threats to national security. Similar changes have also been observed in the UK and Australia.

21st Century Threats

In November 2012, the National Defence Magazine published an article titled "Top Five Threats to National Security in the Coming Decade". These were listed as: biological weapons; nukes; cyber-attacks; climate change, and; transnational crime.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) National Security Threat List (NSTL) lists a number of threat issues divided into eight different categories of activity as well as a list of countries that pose a strategic intelligence threat to US security interests. The issues threat list includes: terrorism; espionage; proliferation of WMDs; economic espionage; targeting of the National Information Infrastructure; targeting the US Government; perception management, and; foreign intelligence activities.

The UK Government’s National Security Strategy identifies three main national security threats: cyber-attacks; espionage, and; terrorism. MI5 notes that since the collapse of the Soviet Union, its priorities have changed and the agency is currently focused on the threat from serious organised crime and subversive organisations.

The United Kingdom Threat Assessment (UKTA) identifies the following threats as posed by organised crime: drugs; money laundering; fraud; human trafficking; people smuggling; identity crime; firearms; cyber-crime; intellectual property crime; counterfeit currency; kidnap and extortion, and; organised acquisitive crime.

Australia also recognises organised crime as a "national security concern". In 2008, the Prime Minister delivered Australia’s first National Security Statement. Echoing the need for increased sharing of intelligence throughout the IC, the Prime Minister said:

The Government will develop two initiatives in the related areas of border management and serious and organised crime. We will strengthen border management by simplifying arrangements and improving coordination across all agencies. Second, we will clearly define the role of the Commonwealth in combating serious and organised crime and enhance coordination among Commonwealth agencies.

Responding to the Threats

Intelligence collection is a significant function of any intelligence agency. Threats identified as being of national security concern to the US, UK and Australia increasingly involves non-traditional threats. This has implications for the IC in terms of collection functions.

THREAT is the function of two operators: "capability" and "intent". THREAT is different from RISK which is the function of "threat" and "impact". It can therefore be said that the purpose of threat assessments, is to allow decision-makers to prioritise resources towards enemies with the greater "capability" and "intent".

Although the IC may have limited input into the collection of criminal intelligence and other non-traditional threats, this largely remains a law enforcement function as stipulated by legislation. Briefings on matters of criminal intelligence and other non-traditional threats are also held by senior law enforcement officials to policy-makers at various departments of justice (not the DoD).

With some notable exception (e.g. the use of coercive powers to obtain telephone intercept or listening device warrants), information collected by various intelligence agencies has usually been held by a variety of sources in the form of historical records.

The IC and private intelligence contractors (e.g. former military- and covert-operatives) do not have lawful access to TI and LD and are increasingly focusing on collection of open source information. The IC and private intelligence contractors are therefore unable to respond to criminal intelligence and other non-traditional threats in a timely manner.

Discussion

The purpose of intelligence is to inform decision-makers (in a timely manner) on an action at either a strategic, operational or tactical level. The reliability of intelligence is therefore paramount. In responding to non-traditional threats to national security, analysis is currently based on incomplete intelligence and the IC is largely involved with the duplication of information already known.

US military history is littered with wars resulting from false information. Recent intelligence failures by the IC, such as the justification for the war in Iraq, also resulted from misleading communications as to the THREAT and RISK of Saddam Hussein’s access to WMD. This is not the same as suggesting that intelligence was falsified or fabricated - it didn’t need to be.

As no evidence could be found to verify Saddam Hussein’s capability to use WMD, the language used in justifying the war switched to the RISK that Hussein might have WMD. However, as the THREAT could no longer be used as justification (an operator of RISK), the entire war-effort was based on the hypothetical impact had Hussein been in possession of WMD. Former National Security Advisor and Secretary of State Colin Powell and Congress were deliberately misled and in an attempt to build public support media began reporting on atrocities against the Kurds in the north of Iraq emphasising the potential impact.

Any intelligence assessment free from political influence would have scored Saddam Hussein’s capability to use WMD as "low". Even if his intent was considered "high", any assessment would have concluded that the threat from Saddam Hussein was at best "medium". Depending on a range of considerations, the impact from the use of WMD is likely to have scored a "high". However, the fact that the threat was "medium"; any risk assessment would be considered "medium". The conclusion is that war was waged against a target that intelligence suggested was of low to medium threat and risk.

Such misrepresentation of the intelligence picture by the IC are no accident, but part of a long tradition which can be traced back to the Cold War.

A combination of factors, including:

inability to collect relevant intelligence, or respond to an increasing menu of threats to national security;

increased requirement for close-to-real-time and actionable intelligence against transnational organised criminals and other non-traditional threats, and;

cultural differences and a lack of credibility in the law enforcement community

have resulted in the IC becoming increasingly obsolete and ill-equipped in terms of dealing with foreign and domestic threats in the 21st century.

We are no closer to understanding the enemy and remain lost in a fog of war.