Australias Counter Terrorism Strategy

Published Date: 02 Nov 2017

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Australia’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy

The 9/11 terrorist attacks crushed the United States and sent shockwaves to many countries around the world. The magnitude and sophistication of the attacks exposed the cracks within intelligence agencies and heralded the emergence of a brand of terrorism that is internationalized, asymmetrical, and highly sophisticated [1] . In order to effectively respond to the new brand of terrorism, the Australian government has developed an internal intelligence network that stretches from the government to the ordinary citizens [2] . Close cooperation and collaboration between different components of this intelligence network has played a crucial role in providing the information necessary to suppress terrorist attacks within Australia. All terrorism activities in Post-9/11 Australia have been quashed at the planning stage. However, Australian intelligence agencies have been unable to replicate this success in preventing attacks on Australians and Australian interests abroad. Since 2001, there have been more than 10 international terrorist attacks on Australians and Australian interests [3] . The success of these international attacks is as a result of the fact that Australia does not have an international intelligence network that is tasked with the sole responsibility of gathering data on imminent attacks on Australians and Australian interests.

Australia’s counterterrorism strategy is made up of four components: resilience, protection, response, and analysis. According to the Australian Counter-Terrorism White Paper, analysis entails the use of an intelligence-based reaction to terrorism that is informed by an integrated national security community [4] . The white paper states that protection involves the deployment of all practical and necessary measures for the purposes of cushioning Australia’s interests at home and abroad from the threat of terrorism [5] . The white paper also adds that response comprises the provision of an instantaneous and targeted reaction to terrorism attacks and terrorism threats [6] . Resilience, on the other hand, refers to the establishment of a strong Australian community that resists the development of homegrown terrorism and violent extremism within Australia [7] .

Of all the four components of Australia’s counter-terrorism strategy, the element of analysis or intelligence gathering is the most important. The Australian government uses this element to identify possible sources of threats and deploys other components like protection and response to eliminate the threats [8] . The Counter-Terrorism White Paper recognizes the importance of analysis when it states that Australia is in a complicated national security environment that requires an effective national intelligence network [9] . These intelligence agencies that form the network are many and they are not just limited to the agencies tasked with the intelligence gathering mandate. The intelligence agencies that are part of the Australian intelligence community include: Defense Imagery and Geospatial Organization (DIGO), Office of National Assessment (ONA), Defense Intelligence Organization (DIO), Defense Signals Directorate (DSD), Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO), and Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) [10] . The intelligence community has also been extended to: the police, ordinary citizens, business entities, neighborhood associations, and religious bodies [11] . In December 2002, the Australian government introduced National Security Hotline (1-800-123-400) to enhance ordinary citizens’ capacity to communicate directly with intelligence agencies [12] . This hotline enables Australians to share leads on terrorist threats and terrorist attacks as and when they witness or perceive them.

Collaboration and close cooperation have played a crucial role in preventing terrorism attacks in Australia in the post-9/11 era. The Counter-Terrorism White Paper states that collaboration and close cooperation in intelligence gathering is one of the factors that have contributed to the success of these security agencies in preventing attacks within Australia [13] . Intelligence by its very nature is extremely fragmented and it is only through collaboration and close cooperation that intelligence agencies can piece together information and stay ahead of the terrorists. When officers in one intelligence agency receive information on a possible terrorist threat, they share it with their counterparts in the other agencies in a bid to examine whether they have complementary intelligence. It is this close cooperation and collaboration that has contributed to the absence of terrorism attacks within Australia in the post-9/11 era [14] .

The absence of collaboration between intelligence agencies is one of the factors that made it possible for terrorists to hijack planes and attack the United States. Various components of the American intelligence community gathered information, but they were unable to link that data to terrorism attacks because other agencies were withholding vital information [15] . The Congressional Inquiry into the 9/11 attacks stated categorically that the 9/11 terrorist attacks would have been prevented if there was cooperation between the Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Central Intelligence Agency [16] . According to the report on the Congressional Investigation into the 9/11 attacks, the decentralized structure of the Federal Bureau of Investigation made it impossible for its officers to share data on heightened terrorist activity in the lead up to the 9/11 attacks [17] . All these agencies had vital intelligence on the 9/11 attacks, but the absence of collaboration made it impossible for them to piece that data together.

The emphasis on cooperation has made it possible for Australian intelligence agencies to prevent several terrorist attacks within Australia. Prior to 2001, there were several terrorist attacks within Australian soil. These attacks included: the Turkish Consulate Bombing in Melbourne in 1986; the Turkish Consul assassination in Sidney in 1980; the Sydney Hilton bombing in 1978; and the Israeli Consulate bombing in Sydney in 1982 [18] . All these terrorist attacks were successful because of the absence of cooperation between agencies in the Australian intelligence gathering community. The establishment of culture of cooperation and collaboration in the post-9/11 era has resulted in a sharp decline in terrorist attacks within Australia. Since 2001, Australian intelligence agencies have prevented several terrorist attacks on Australian soil. According to the Counter-Terrorism White Paper, 38 people have been prosecuted under the Australian Criminal Code Act on terrorism-related charges in the post-9/11 era [19] . The agencies have also provided intelligence that has led to the revocation and/or cancellation of passports of 40 Australians who are suspected of being directly and indirectly involved in terrorism [20] . These revocations have played a crucial role in preventing homegrown terrorism and the training and indoctrination of Australians into violent extremism. In 2005, Australian law enforcement officers arrested 9 men in Sydney on suspicion of involvement in the planning of a terrorist attack within Australia [21] . In 2006, law enforcement officials arrested Faheem Lodhi, one of the masterminds of the aborted 2003 terrorist attack in Australia [22] .

Although the cooperation and collaboration between Australia’s intelligence agencies has resulted in considerable success on the home front, there are various weaknesses in the intelligence agencies that are compromising the security of Australians and Australian interests abroad. The most critical weakness is the security agencies’ inability to appreciate the global nature of the war on terror. Australia’s Counter-Terrorism White Paper, states that partnership between various agencies has played a crucial role in thwarting terrorist attacks within Australia [23] . While such an achievement is commendable considering the fact that Australia’s key allies have been attacked at home, there is a significant disconnect when it comes to the protection of Australia’s interests abroad. The decline in terrorist attacks in Australia is being balanced out by increased attacks against Australians and Australian interests abroad. Since 2001, there has been an escalation in the number of international terrorist attacks on Australians and Australian interests. Some of those attacks include: the Bali bombing of October 2002 that resulted in the death of 88 Australians; the JM Marriot terrorist attack in Jakarta in August 2003 that led to the death of 12 Australians; the March 2003 Riyadh terrorist attack that led to the death of 1 Australian; the Australian Embassy bombing in Jakarta in September 2004 that resulted in the death of 10 people; the July 2005 attack in the London subway that led to the death of 1 Australian; the Bali bombings of October 2005 that led to the death of 4 Australians; the Mumbai attack in November 2008 that led to the death of 3 Australians; the Ritz Carlton and JW Marriott bombings in July 2009 that led to the death of 3 Australians; and the 2013 kidnap and subsequent assassination of Australian expatriate workers at a remote oil drilling in Algeria [24] .

All these attacks are an indication that the excessive focus of the intelligence agencies on Australia’s national security has increased the vulnerability of Australians and Australia’s interests to international terrorist attacks. The issue that is startling about these international terrorist attacks is the fact that more than 60% of the attacks on Australians and Australia’s international interests have been in one country and carried out by members of one terrorist organization. Between 2001 and 2009, Jamaa Islamiyah has orchestrated 5 terrorist attacks on Australians and Australia’s national interests in Indonesia [25] . Although there is no evidence to suggest that Jamaa Islamiyah was specifically targeting Australia and her interests, the quantity of losses that directly affected the country was significant. The success of these attacks raises questions about the degree of preparedness of the Australian intelligence community. The fact that these attacks were in one country would have made it possible for the intelligence agencies to gather and assess information on terrorist threats within the state and device strategies of responding to these threats. For instance, relevant intelligence agencies would gather data on possible attacks and warn Australians against travelling to the country. Such a measure could have resulted in a reduction in the number of Australians and Australian interests that were vulnerable to terrorist attacks.

In other jurisdictions, the presence of intelligence agencies on the ground has played a crucial role in thwarting terrorist attacks. Since 2001, US intelligence agencies have been successful in minimizing attacks on US citizens and its interests abroad. The country has international intelligence agencies that gather information in the countries that are considered hotspots and uses the data to develop strategies of coping with the threat [26] . Even before the attack on the US Consulate in Libya in 2012, the intelligence agencies had gathered data about an imminent attack and delivered it to the relevant departments for onward action. In the case of Australia, the absence of intelligence agencies in terrorism hotspots such as Indonesia has made it difficult for the Australian government to gather information on threats that will result in Australian deaths. According to the Counter-Terrorism White Paper, in the international scene Australia cooperates with intelligence agencies from allied states and trains law enforcement officials in countries where Australians and Australian interests are vulnerable to terror attacks [27] . The statement goes on to state that this cooperation has played a crucial role in reducing the vulnerability of Australians and Australia’s interests. However, when one examines the situation on the ground, it is clear that cooperation between Australia and intelligence agencies from other countries has not resulted in a reduction in terrorist attacks against Australia’s interests abroad.

While gains made in thwarting terrorist attacks within Australia and the cooperation strategy highlighted in the white paper are laudable, one cannot help but marvel at the fact that Australia does not have intelligence agencies abroad. For there to be adequate protection, there must be Australian intelligence agencies that are tasked with the responsibility of gathering data on threats that will directly or indirectly affect Australians and Australian interests. There is need for the formation of an international intelligence agency that is tasked with the responsibility of bridging the existing intelligence gap. The advantage of establishing international intelligence agencies is that it will send the terrorists a clear message that the Australian government is committed to the protection of Australian interests at home and abroad [28] . The creation of international intelligence agencies will also weaken communication links between foreign and domestic terrorists, thereby making it hard for terrorists to attack Australia’s interests at home and abroad. However, the Australian government must tread carefully in the formation and deployment of the international intelligence agency because it raises questions on the sovereignty of foreign states. Placing intelligence agencies in a foreign state requires cooperation and express permission from the government.